美国的印度洋战略

冷战期间美国印度洋战略的主要目的是应对苏联,冷战后美国成为印度洋的主导力量,开始在印度洋地区进行军事前沿部署。近年来,随着印度洋战略地位的提高,美国提出了“印度-太平洋”概念,并强化其在印度洋的战略利益：保持主导地位、保护海上交通线安全、控制战略要冲等。美国在意识形态和经济因素的驱使下,通过军事部署和制度安排在印度洋取得霸权地位,但与英国相比,美国的印度洋霸权是“弱势”霸权。     

日美关系的两个周期

作者对日、美学者提出的日美关系存在两个周期的论点作出自己的诠释 ,认为 :以 1 91 1年为界 ,2 0 0余年的日美关系经历了从平等到不平等的两个周期 ,每个周期分为平等、过渡、不平等、准平等四个时期。 2 1世纪初叶的日美关系可定位为准平等关系。随着时间的推移 ,日美关系的平等化趋势将进一步发展。这意味着日本将“普通国家”化。日美关系在 2 1世纪之内将进入第三个平等竞争时期。随着这一时期的到来 ,日美间的利害冲突势将增大。     

国会与美国国家导弹防御系统

在介绍和分析美国国家导弹防御系统 (NMD)和克林顿政府的有关计划之后 ,作者重点研究了国会对此的考虑和反应。     

"九一一"以来日美同盟与美韩同盟的差异性

“九一一”事件以来,日美同盟与美韩同盟出现较大差异性。对美军全球部署调整中两同盟的军事功能进行比较可见:在美国亚太战略中,日美同盟地位中心化、美韩同盟地位边缘化;对两同盟在应对“朝鲜威胁”中的行为进行比较可见:在地区安全难题中,日美同盟手段军事化,美韩同盟手段政治化;对两同盟与中国、印度、俄罗斯的关系态势进行比较可知:在大国政治博弈中,日美同盟紧密化,美韩同盟离心化。     

美国海权的升级版——浅析《海权和美国在西太平洋的利益》

美国的海洋战略逐渐从西太平洋发展到东亚海洋,其主要出于经济利益和安全利益的考量,以扩大贸易区域、推动国内经济增长。美国拥有全球大半的海洋权利,在全球海洋军事实力上占有绝对的主导地位,为了维护它的海上霸权地位,其运用海上军事力量对正在崛起的中国实施遏制战略。本文在评析《海权和美国在西太平洋的利益》的同时,质疑其把中国作为一种牵制利用的对象、一个非常厉害的假想敌的主观设想,并指出中美合作正值机遇期,双方应增强互信,促进合作,构建中美建设性的战略伙伴关系。     

S.H.E说,做“女王”就要“有种”

分别代表着温柔、勇气、自信的Selina、Hebe和Ella,依照她们她时代的跳跃式思考模式和无厘头的爆笑逻辑,不论在声音或在个性的表现上都能以最自然的、最纯粹的个人特质来发挥她们的个人魅力,呈现出最S.H.E的一面。当初高唱《不想长大》的三个女孩已经长大成熟,出道九年的S.H.E,第十二张专辑《SHERO》在3月如期跟歌迷见面了,这次不同     

理想主义与美国对外经济援助

理想主义强调对外援助的人道主义关怀,反对把国家利益作为对外援助的优先考虑因素甚至唯一决定因素.理想主义为美国的外援活动奠定了理论基础,也成为美国政府与个人进行对外援助宣传的思想武器.实际上,美国的经济援助并非如其所说是为改善他国人民的福利,而是另有目的,尤其是美国将对外经济援助与人权挂钩的做法,削弱了经济援助原本应有的人道和慈善的本质,在国际上理应受到诸多的质疑.     

Modeling U.S.-Japan competition in semiconductors

This paper describes an analytical framework used to analyze Japanese-American competition in the market for computer memory devices. The nature of this competition has captured the attention of policy makers in both countries, as evidenced by recent trade disputes alleging Japanese firms have benefited from unfair government subsidies, lax antitrust policies, and restrictive home market practices. In this paper, we present a methodology that may be used to estimate the impact of some of these programs on the competitive structure of the United States market for dynamic random access memory devices (DRAMs). The model incorporates the nature of the DRAM manufacturing process (in which “learning curve” benefits are tremendously important), and portrays the worldwide DRAM market as one in which (1) geographic market segmentation is prevelant, (2) a limited number of suppliers compete, and (3) the products are imperfect substitutes. This situation matches well the situation found in the Semiconductor DRAM Market. The distinctive features of this approach are the detailed modeling of the impact of learning on the cost structure of the firm, and its framework for analyzing firm behavior in an imperfect market. Using this approach, we evaluate how a variety of Japanese government programs have affected the competitive position of their industry, and present our view on the major policy implications which emerge.     

Privatizing Social Services in the U.S.A.

Governmental and private sector social services organizations have traditionally shared important roles for provision and delivery of social services in the United States. Over the past fifty years, however, a predominant position has developed for the public sector, especially through federal funding for social service programmes. Recent challenges to the prevailing role of public sector dominance have been expressed by the proponents for privatization at a time when decreasing federal funds are made available for social service programmes. The analysis presented here examines the potential and problems associated with the privatization strategies offered through load shedding, limited-government arrangements, fee charging and competition. As a macro level approach for a comprehensive system of social service provision and delivery, these privatization strategies raise more questions than immediate solutions. A more optimistic view is taken if privatization leads to a more meaningful balance with increased co-operation between public and private social welfare auspices.     

Office of Economic Opportunity: U.S.A.

The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), was created at the height of Lyndon Johnson's “Great Society” anti-poverty programmes. It represented a degree of radical activism that reached its culmination in the 89th Congress (1965-66) and indeed has never been repeated: that Congress was perhaps the only genuinely left-liberal one this century (outside the New Deal era, at any rate). The OEO's social policies were tied to a particular theory of public and social administration: that a “rival” federal agency to the existing ones (Health, Education and Welfare, now Health and Human Services; Housing, and Urban Development, et al) could escape their conservative norms. Both at the federal level and in the “field” agencies it spanned to implement its programmes, the new approach to social administration was to by-pass traditional channels. This short, illustrative rather than definitive article, examines how such an approach was undermined by both the U.S. political structure and by traditional “politics as usual”. It is but a snapshot of the era. However, it hints at the general problems that such approaches to “by-passing” traditional agencies and attempting to develop a new autonomy in social reform may have in many countries, especially those with decentralized political structures. For, while decentralized politics provides opportunities as well as barriers to reformers seeking to by-pass traditional elites (which themselves tend to be decentralized, mirroring political structures), it is suggested here that the balance sheet will tend to be negative from the viewpoint of reformist social administration.