Changes in wealth in the United States, 1962–1983

A simulation model is developed to account for observed changes in mean household wealth both overall and by age cohort over the 1962–1983 period in the United States. There are three major findings. First, capital gains are the major factor explaining overall wealth changes and account for 77% of the simulated growth in wealth over the entire period. Second, for cohorts under age 40, inheritance and inter vivos transfers dominate observed changes in wealth. Indeed, the oldest age groups appear to have transferred sizable amounts of their wealth to younger generations inter vivos, raising the wealth of these younger groups substantially above what it would be based on saving. Third, while differences in portfolio composition favored the younger cohorts over this period, such differences do not explain a large portion of the great variation in real wealth changes by cohort over the two decade period.The authors wish to thank Kevin Camerlo, Maury Gittleman and Kim Hiskey for research and programming assistance.     

Colourism and African–american wealth: evidence from the nineteenth-century south

Black is not always black. Subtle distinctions in skin tone translate into significant differences in outcomes. Data on more than 15,000 households interviewed during the 1860 US federal census exhibit sharp differences in wealth holdings between white, mulatto, and black households in the urban South. We document these differences, investigate relationships between wealth and recorded household characteristics, and decompose the wealth gaps to examine the returns to racial characteristics. The analysis reveals a distinct racial hierarchy. Black wealth was only 20% of white wealth, but mulattoes held nearly 50% of whites’ wealth. This advantage is consistent with colourism, the favouritism shown to those of lighter complexion.

Malthus to modernity: wealth,status, and fertility in England, 1500–1879

A key challenge to theories of long-run economic growth has been linking the onset of modern growth with the move to modern fertility limitation. A notable puzzle for these theories is that modern growth in England began around 1780, 100 years before there was seemingly any movement to limit fertility. Here we show that the aggregate data on fertility in England before 1880 conceals significant declines in the fertility of the middle and upper classes earlier. These declines coincide with the Industrial Revolution and are of the character predicted by some recent theories of long-run growth.     

Fertility in China 1982–1990: Gender equality as a complement to wealth flows theory

Some scholars claim there is little variation in Chinese fertility because of coercive family planning policies. This research, however, demonstrates that other factors contribute to significant variation in fertility rates among China's 30 provinces/administrative divisions. Although family planning and socioeconomic development are found to explain significant amounts of variation in fertility for both the 1982 and 1990 census cross-sections, it was also found that gender equality in education had become significant by 1990. Path model results that lag the effects of 1982 socioeconomic development and gender equality in education also indicate that they both have sizable direct effects and moderate indirect effects through family planning behavior on 1990 fertility rates. Discussions include the possibility that the recent free market and institutional reforms, e.g., the decollectivization of agriculture, have contributed a social structure whereby many Chinese families have increased awareness of the opportunity costs associated with their reproductive decision making.