UNCERTAINTY AND STICKY-DOWNWARD BUT UPWARD-MOBILE WAGES

The usual search models of unemployment hold that firms do not offer wage cuts to employees in time of slack demand because the employees have alternatives open to them at wages higher than the reduced wage that would be required to maintain full employment. This paper extends these models by considering employees as choosing in conditions of uncertainty and showing that refusal to accept a wage cut is often rational in the absence of a higher alternative wage. Additional implications are derived for union behavior and simultaneous inflation and unemployment.     

EXCESS DEMAND AND MARKET ADJUSTMENT

This paper develops a model of wage and price adjustment that is based on the optimizing behavior of firms. The output of the model is a relationship between price changes and excess demands that looks like a generalized Walrasian adjustment but which is based on firm microfoundations. The model is then applied to stability analysis and the "Phillips curve," using restrictions derived from the underlying optimization to generate results.     

How do Students Respond to Labor Market and Education Incentives? An Analysis of Homework Time

This study examines the extent to which high school students respond to education and labor market incentives when making decisions about homework. Student and state fixed effects estimators are used to control for unobserved individual and geographic heterogeneity and selection. I find that students’ choices about homework respond to unemployment rates and changes in the minimum wage, but not to changes in the price of higher education. These responses are not constant throughout the population: female students, low income students, and low achieving students in particular increase their homework time in response to a higher minimum wage, while male students are more responsive to changes in the unemployment rate.     

GENERAL WAGE ESCALATOR CLAUSES AND THE INFLATION UNEMPLOYMENT TRADE OFF

The purpose of this paper is to determine empirically the effect of general wage escalation, which is practiced in Israel, on the inflation unemployment trade off. Wage escalation is introduced by including a cost of living allowance variable in the wage equation which turns out to be very significant. It makes the long run Phillips Trade off relation much more inflationary, but does not obliterate it. A comparison with a wage price block for the U.S. suggests that the long run trade off is more inflationary in Israel and that wage indexation is one of the reasons for this bias.     

The minimum wage can harm workers by reducing unemployment

Economists may disagree over how much raising the minimum wage increases unemployment, though few argue that the unemployment effect is zero. According to the standard model, the less the unemployment caused by a minimum wage increase, the less the harm (or greater the good) that results. But by recognizing that minimum wage workers receive fringe benefits, I show that increasing the minimum wage may not cause any unemployment and harms workers because it doesn 't. Furthermore, when there is lumpiness in providing fringe benefits, a minimum wage increase may harm workers by     

Career Sidestep,Wage Setback? The Impact of Different Types of Employment Interruptions on Wages

We examined the wage implications of different types of wage employment interruptions in a sample of 44,384 Belgian employees. The employment interruption types included are family leave, unemployment, self‐employment, educational leave and a category other interruptions (for example, travel, voluntary work). We conduct separate analyses for men and women. Results indicate that unemployment spells and family breaks are penalized by lower subsequent wages, while the wage impact of self‐employment spells and educational leave is insignificant. Family breaks and unemployment spells were found to be more harmful for men than for women. Implications of the results and directions for future research are discussed.     

Unemployment,union density,and wages

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, whether long-run industry unemployment rates modify the wage impact of union density on the earnings of members. Our theory suggests that the density effect increases as unemployment increases. Our empirical estimates use wage equations exclusive and inclusive of unemployment and of the interactive effect of unemployment and density in influencing wages. Based on a 1985 sample of manufacturing production workers, our findings indicate that the wage effect of union density for union workers as usually measured is only 41 percent as large as the effect when unemployment is in the model.     

Minimum wages and poverty with income-sharing

Textbook analysis tells us that in a competitive labor market, the introduction of a minimum wage above the competitive equilibrium wage will cause unemployment. This paper makes three contributions to the basic theory of the minimum wage. First, we analyze the effects of a higher minimum wage in terms of poverty rather than in terms of unemployment. Second, we extend the standard textbook model to allow for income-sharing between employed and unemployed persons in society. Third, we extend the basic model to deal with income sharing within families. We find that there are situations in which a higher minimum wage raises poverty, others where it reduces poverty, and yet others in which poverty is unchanged. We characterize precisely how the poverty effect depends on four parameters: the degree of poverty aversion, the elasticity of labor demand, the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line, and the extent of income-sharing. Thus, shifting the perspective from unemployment to poverty leads to a considerable enrichment of the theory of the minimum wage.      

Spatial variations in U.S. unemployment

Interstate unemployment rate differentials are large, tend to persist, and have not converged in recent times. The interstate differential in the natural rate of unemployment seems partially explained by several factors related to labor costs, including wage rates and such institutional factors as unionization, welfare, and probably tax policy. Differential welfare incidence may explain the black-white unemployment differential. Variations in intertemporal fluctuations in unemployment across states seem related to institutionalized wage rigidity caused by such factors as unions and welfare. For still unexplained reasons, unemployment tends to be higher in the West, deep South, and the industrial Midwest.     

A THEORY OF DOWNWARD-RIGID WAGES AND CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT

The theory presented below provides a rationale for downward wage rigidity and consequent cyclical unemployment by modifying the neoclassical assumption of behavioral independence. Such a modification permits an examination of important nonmarket relationships holding between the individual's wage and the wages paid to other people and between perceived equity in wages received and worker productivity—both linkages widely recognized by personnel managers but little explored by economists. The resulting model predicts a pattern of behavior that is consistent with the available evidence on the actual operation of labor markets.     

EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT-ONE VIEW

Persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies. What could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market? Many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models. This paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments. It concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment.     

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT VARIABILITY AND REAL WAGE FLUCTUATIONS: DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The cyclical behavior of the real wage differentiates between the empirical validity of major new Keynesian sticky-wage and sticky-price explanations of business cycles. Across industries of the United States, an increase in price flexibility relative to wage flexibility correlates with a reduction in output fluctuations in the face of demand shocks. Further, industrial real output variability does not vary significantly with nominal wage flexibility. In contrast, an increase in price flexibility moderates industrial real output variability. Consistently, an increase in the real wage response to demand shocks correlates with an increase in industrial output variability. ( JEL E32, E31)     

Job security and unemployment in an efficiency-wage model

Job security and its effects on unemployment are controversial issues. I investigate the effects of job security in an efficiency-wage model of unemployment. Though efficiency-wage ideas have wide appeal and provide strong foundations of involuntary unemployment, not much has been written about the ramifications of job security in these scenarios. I show that job security creates wage and unemployment effects when efficiency-wage aspects are relevant, because employment guarantees shift the burden of workers' effort attraction to the wage mechanism. These effects are further enhanced when workers have some bargaining power. My results, therefore, suggest a trade-off between employment stability and employment: High employment security leads to smaller employment (or larger involuntary unemployment). I thank Ron Oaxaca and participants at the W.E. Upjohn Conference on Unemployment Insurance for useful comments.     

Household job search: A theoretical and empirical model

This article links the literature on family decision making and the economics of job search by examining job search by an unemployed individual within a household context. A theoretical model was developed which demonstrates the interdependence of the utility of household members when one is searching for work. The costs of search are borne by all household members while the benefits are captured in the searcher's expected future wage. A reservation wage was shown to be determined by household financing options, and the perception of relevant labor market parameters. An empirical model of the reservation wage for a sample of unemployment insurance recipients was estimated using two-stage least squares. Results, reported for male and female subgroups, support the hypotheses derived from the household job search model. In particular, the reservation wage was shown to depend on unemployment duration, labor market conditions, increased labor force participation of other household members, use of household assets to finance search, existence of dependents, and unemployment insurance benefits.     

Countercyclical union wage premium? Evidence for the 1980s

Empirical results based on pooled male data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics indicate an overall union wage premium of about 11.92 percent for the 1980s. In response to fluctuations in local labor market conditions, proxied by the local unemployment rate, a much more flexible wage-setting process is found in the nonunion sector relative to the union sector. The long-term effect of unemployment on nonunion real wages suggests an approximate 0.6 percent decline for every one percentage point increase in unemployment, a statistically significant reduction, but the long-term effect of unemployment on real wages of union members is negligible. The union wage premium ranges between 11.6 to 12.3 percent for the sample years. Even though union wages are insensitive to short-run fluctuations in local labor market conditions, and are somewhat countercyclical in nature, widespread union wage concessions which occurred during the 1980s may now be exerting a downward pressure on union wages. We acknowledge financial support of National Science Foundation [OSR-9350540], the Ada Howe Kent Research Fund, and The Fogelman Academic Research Excellence Fund. We thank Barbara Ganley for valuable editorial comments and Noga Peled for her able research assistance. The usual caveat applies.     

SKILLED‐UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

The impact of trade liberalization on the labor market in the North has drawn tremendous attention in the face of the growing skilled‐unskilled wage gap but in the South it has been somewhat neglected. One of the key structural differences between the North and the South is that the South experiences a pronounced rural‐urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. We introduce this feature in the structure of a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of trade liberalization and fragmentation on employment and the skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the South. In particular, we show that while fragmentation necessarily improves the unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment. The effect of fragmentation, ceteris paribus, on the skilled‐unskilled wage gap is sensitive to the degree of substitutability between land and unskilled labor. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled‐unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of trade. It is also shown that a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector increases the skilled‐unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. (JEL F1, O1, F11, F12)     

SELF‐EMPLOYMENT,EFFICIENCY WAGE,AND PUBLIC POLICIES

Empirical evidence suggests that unemployed workers are much more likely to become self‐employed than wage‐employed workers. Also, higher unemployment benefits significantly reduce the rate of self‐employment. This article develops a model of self‐employment which incorporates transitions between unemployment and self‐employment. It integrates two strands of theoretical literature—models of occupational choice and the efficiency wage models. In this model, a higher unemployment benefit reduces the self‐employment rate and the transition rate of unemployed workers to self‐employment, which is consistent with empirical evidence. (JEL J23, J58, J64)     

ELECTORAL CYCLES AND THE EARNINGS OF FEDERAL BUREAUCRATS

This paper analyzes the relationship between the timing of federal elections and the pay raises received by civilian employees of the federal government. The theoretical framework discusses how electoral wage cycles are generated as a result of optimizing behavior on the part of voters, bureaucrats, and the government. The empirical analysis uses a time series of wage rates for the twenty-eight largest federal agencies over the period 1961–1978. The study indicates that pay hikes during the Presidential election year are significantly greater (about 2 to 3 percent higher) than bureaucratic pay raises in other years.     

PROFIT SHARING, WAGE BARGAINING, AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The Paper examines the effects of profit sharing in an economy with decentralized wage bargaining. Profit sharing makes workers' income more sensitive to wage changes, and this leads to wage moderation. But economy-wide profit sharing may also improve worker's outside income opportunities, and this strengthens the union's hand in bargaining and tend to raise wages. It turns out that equilibrium unemployment is reduced by profit sharing as long as the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is less than one, whereas unemployment is increased if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one.     

Did Henry Ford mean to pay efficiency wages?

In the past two decades economists have developed efficiency wage theories, which suggest a link between wage rates and worker productivity, while attempting to explain the existence of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium labor markets. Henry Ford's 1914 announcement of the five-dollar day, an overnight doubling of wage rates, is regularly used as the textbook application of efficiency wage theories put into practice. While previous research demonstrates that the effects of the five-dollar day were largely consistent with those predicted by efficiency wage theories, Ford's wage policy was principally motivated by the fallacious wage-aggregate demand link expressed by the so-called“high-wage doctrine”-a belief that many economists claim significantly contributed to the unemployment problem of the 1930s. In addition to exploring Ford's high-wage motives, I discuss the role Ford's wage statements and policies played in the acceptance and implementation of high-wage public policies during the Great Depression. I appreciate helpful comments from Ranjit Dighe, George Selgin, and participants at the Economic and Business Historical Society meetings.