Schur convexity,quasi-convexity and preference for early resolution of uncertainty

This paper deals with decision makers who choose among information systems. It shows that the properties of Schur convexity and of quasi-convexity are equivalent, even when general preferences are considered. Since Schur convexity is closely related to having a willingness to accept information and since quasi-convexity is closely related to having a preference for early resolution of the uncertainty about which information system prevails, then it follows that the equivalence implies that decision makers prefer more information to less if, and only if, they prefer early resolution of uncertainty to later resolution.     

A note on decisions under uncertainty: the impact of the choice of the welfare measure

The paper addresses the question, how policy decisions under uncertainty depend on the underlying welfare concept. We study three different welfare measures: The first is directly based on the ex ante (expected) utility of a representative consumer whereas the second relies on an ex ante and the third on an ex post valuation of policy changes compared to the status quo. We show that decisions based on these measures coincide if and only if risk-neutral expected utility maximization is applied. Differences between the decisions are analyzed for both, risk-averse expected utility maximization and the MaxiMin criterion. For risk-averse decision makers, differences between the first and the second concept arise if the absolute risk-aversion of the decision maker is not constant in income. For risk-aversion and the MaxiMin criterion, the effort levels to provide a public good based on an optimization of ex post utility changes exceed those based on the first or second concept. Implications for environmental policy decisions based on the concepts of abatement costs and benefits from abatement are discussed.     

A decision support system for the graph model of conflicts

A comprehensive decision support system called GMCA (Graph Model for Conflict Analysis) implementing the multi-player graph model for analyzing conflicts is developed. GMCA contains algorithms for the rapid computation of a wide range of solution concepts, thereby enabling decision makers to take account of the diversity of human behavior. Using an engineering case study, the key features of GMCA are illustrated.     

Theory and implementation of coalitional analysis in cooperative decision making

Stability definitions for describing human behavior under conflict when coalitions may form are generalized within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and algebraic formulations of these definitions are provided to allow computer implementation. The more general definitions of coalitional stabilities relax the assumption of transitive graphs capturing movements under the control of decision makers, either independently or cooperatively, and allow the convenient expansion to the case of coalitions of the four basic individual stabilities consisting of Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric metarationality, and sequential stability. To permit the various coalitional stabilities to be efficiently calculated and conveniently encoded within a decision support system, algebraic expressions for the coalitional stabilities are provided in this research. Furthermore, a range of the theorems establish the mathematical credibility of employing the innovative algebraic approach to conflict resolution when coalitions are present. Finally, a conflict over the proposed exportation of bulk water from Lake Gisborne within the Canadian Province of Newfoundland and Labrador is modelled and analyzed to illustrate the practical application of the different coalitional stabilities and the strategic insights they provide.     

Anxiety and Decision Making with Delayed Resolution of Uncertainty

In many real-world gambles, a non-trivial amount of time passes before the uncertainty is resolved but after a choice is made. An individual may have a preference between gambles with identical probability distributions over final outcomes if they differ in the timing of resolution of uncertainty. In this domain, utility consists not only of the consumption of outcomes, but also the psychological utility induced by an unresolved gamble. We term this utility anxiety. Since a reflective decision maker may want to include anxiety explicitly in analysis of unresolved lotteries, a multiple-outcome model for evaluating lotteries with delayed resolution of uncertainty is developed. The result is a rank-dependent utility representation (e.g., Quiggin, 1982), in which period weighting functions are related iteratively. Substitution rules are proposed for evaluating compound temporal lotteries. The representation is appealing for a number of reasons. First, probability weights can be interpreted as the cognitive attention allocated to certain outcomes. Second, the model disaggregates strength of preference from temporal risk aversion and thus provides some insight into the old debate about the relationship between von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions and strength of preference value functions.     

On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility

Among the most popular models for decision under risk and uncertainty are the rank-dependent models, introduced by Quiggin and Schmeidler. Central concepts in these models are rank-dependence and comonotonicity. It has been suggested that these concepts are technical tools that have no intuitive or empirical content. This paper describes such contents. As a result, rank-dependence and comonotonicity become natural concepts upon which preference conditions, empirical tests, and improvements in utility measurement can be based. Further, a new derivation of the rank-dependent models is obtained. It is not based on observable preference axioms or on empirical data, but naturally follows from the intuitive perspective assumed. We think that the popularity of the rank-dependent theories is mainly due to the natural concepts used in these theories.     

印度战略文化及其变迁机制

自20世纪90年代战略文化成为备受关注的议题以来,从战略文化视角解释印度外交战略的研究不胜枚举.学术界对印度战略文化的研究普遍受到文化“稳定性”、“持久性”等基本特征的限制,主要从静止的视角围绕其起源、属性与形态等方面展开论述.本文试图从动态视角理解印度战略文化,构建战略文化生成与变迁理论框架.通过对战略文化的类型划分发现,印度在冷战时期形成了防御为主、进攻为辅的协调型战略文化,冷战后形成了强进攻性偏好的冲突型战略文化.作为印度战略文化变迁的首要条件,环境认知推动了印度国内政治程序的修正,从而影响了战略文化变迁.具体而言,国际体系环境的变化重塑了印度决策精英对国家安全的判断,并内化成新的观念体系.全新观念体系驱使决策精英行为偏好改变,且通过国内政治程序的修正上升为特定取向的国家战略偏好,最终生成全新的战略文化.     

Competence effects for choices involving gains and losses

We investigate how choices for uncertain gain and loss prospects are affected by the decision maker’s perceived level of knowledge about the underlying domain of uncertainty. Specifically, we test whether Heath and Tversky’s (J Risk Uncertain 4:5–28, 1991) competence hypothesis extends from gains to losses. We predict that the commonly-observed preference for high knowledge over low knowledge prospects for gains reverses for losses. We employ an empirical setup in which participants make hypothetical choices between gain or loss prospects in which the outcome depends on whether a high or low knowledge event occurs. We infer decision weighting functions for high and low knowledge events from choices using a representative agent preference model. For gains, we replicate the results of Kilka and Weber (Manage Sci 47:1712–1726, 2001), finding that decision makers are more attracted to choices that they feel more knowledgeable about. However, for losses, we find limited support for our extension of the competence effect.     

Social organizations and matching theory

We generalize the Gale-Shapley matching theory to the formation of social units consisting of more than two individuals and each individual having more than one role.We show how social preferences and social structure could conflict with freedom. In the absence of such a conflict, we define stability and show that this could conflict with social preferences and social structure. Next, we define Rawlsian justice in case of stability and show how social preferences and social structure can conflict with justice. Thus, it is the social preferences and social-structure which decide whether our concepts of freedom, stability, and justice are achievable or not.     

Action Bias and Environmental Decisions

Individuals have a penchant for action, often for good reasons. But action bias arises if that penchant is carried over to areas where those reasons do not apply, hence is nonrational. Action bias is explored theoretically, and then empirically, using data from surveys of hypothetical environmental decisions. Quite apart from agency considerations, individuals like to affect outcomes when gains are reaped. Given the ability to help one of two sites, we find that decision makers choose to foster improvement rather than prevent deterioration, despite framing that makes it arbitrary which site is improved, which preserved. Strong action bias—individuals choosing to reap gains even though they must impose losses—is also observed. These concepts are related to loss aversion, status quo bias, omission bias for losses, and bright-line behavior.     

Dominance and Efficiency in Multicriteria Decision under Uncertainty

This paper proposes several concepts of efficient solutions for multicriteria decision problems under uncertainty. We show how alternative notions of efficiency may be grounded on different decision contexts, depending on what is known about the Decision Maker's (DM) preference structure and probabilistic anticipations. We define efficient sets arising naturally from polar decision contexts. We investigate these sets from the points of view of their relative inclusions and point out some particular subsets which may be especially relevant to some decision situations.     

试论法律合法冲突的制度成因

法律的冲突可以分为违法冲突与合法冲突两类。法律的合法冲突主要由四个方面的因素而引发 :一是立法权限不明确 ,导致法律规范之间的合理冲突 ;二是立法授权不明确 ,由此引发“政出多门” ;三是不确定法律概念的存在 ,使得相关立法依据条款界限不清 ;四是立法的连续过程 ,即法律的废、改、立引起相关规定难以及时配套。因而 ,如何通过相应的制度配置来消除法律之间的合法冲突 ,成为保障法制统一性的重要内容。     

Religion and World Change: Violence and Terrorism versus Peace

Our article portrays religion as a double-edged sword that can both encourage and discourage world change, and can facilitate both violent and peaceful activism. The article demonstrates how the meaning system approach to religion can shed light on the complicated relationship between religion and world change by illuminating the meaning of world change and the means to achieve it, inherent differences across religious groups, the complexity and malleability of religious meaning systems, and processes that can facilitate either the status quo or violent and peaceful activism. The article discusses context and personality variables that may determine whether religion supports world change and either violent or peaceful activism. It recommends intensive collaboration between researchers, policy–makers, and religious leaders in the contexts of national and international conflicts and religious terrorism.     

Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer to change its policy given the policies of the other DMs. The profile of policies associated to a PSS is called a Policy Equilibrium. Properties of PSSs are developed, and a refinement is suggested that restricts DMs to policies that are credible in that they are in the DM’s immediate interest. Relationships with existing stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution are then explored.     

A new axiomatic foundation of partial comparability

The paper presents some results obtained in searching for a new axiomatic foundation for partial comparability (PC) in the frame of non-conventional preference modeling. The basic idea is to define an extended preference structure able to represent lack of information, uncertainty, ambiguity, multidimensional and conflicting preferences, using formal logic as the basic formalism.A four-valued paraconsistent logic is therefore described in the paper as a more suitable language for the purposes of the research. The concepts of partition, general binary relations properties, fundamental relational system of preferences (f.r.s.p.), maximal f.r.s.p. and well founded f.r.s.p. are then introduced and some theorems are demonstrated in order to provide the axiomatic foundation of PC. The main result obtained is a preference structure that is a maximal well founded f.r.s.p. This preference structure facilitates a more flexible, reliable and robust preference modeling. Moreover it can be viewed as a generalization of the conventional approach, so that all the results obtained until now can be used under it.Two examples are provided at the end of the paper in order to give an account of the operational potentialities of the new theory, mainly in the area of multicriteria decision aid and social choice theory. Further research directions conclude the paper.This research has been done while the first author was in the Université Libre de Bruxelles under the Research in Brussels actions.     

Equivalent decision trees and their associated strategy sets

The purpose of this paper is to examine the structure of individual decisions under uncertainty in extensive (i.e., decision-tree) form at a sufficient level of generality to encompass many traditional as well as novel criteria of general choice under uncertainty. Considerations both of structure and of strategic effect arise. In § 2 we define weak and strong forms of strategic equivalence of decision trees and describe partial-normalization procedures by which all economically defined complete pure strategies may be identified for the decider and for chance. In § 3 we examine characteristics of locally randomized, behavior strategies for the decider as the degree of normalization is varied, and we deduce useful properties of the function which specifies an outcome lottery for each behavior strategy of the decider in conjuction with a deterministic or stochastic selection by Chance. In § 4 we list a wide variety of choice criteria which may be invoked within the framework developed here.     

Reported Peer Conflicts of Children in the United States and Indonesia

U.S. and Indonesian 9‐ to 11‐year‐old children (N=147) reported on multiple occasions conflicts that they experienced with peers. The precursors of conflict, behavior during conflict episodes, and resolutions were coded. Teacher ratings of aggression and social preference were obtained. The conflicts of children in both countries most often occurred between friends, were short, amicably settled, and solved without aggression. Indonesian children reported disengaging from conflict more often than did U.S. children, whereas U.S. children more frequently reported using negotiation. Reports of aggression during conflict were associated with U.S. and Indonesian children's teacher‐rated aggression, whereas reports of disengagement were associated with Indonesian children's teacher‐rated social preference and aggression.     

The Endowment Effect,Status Quo Bias and Loss Aversion: Rational Alternative Explanation

The endowment effect, status quo bias, and loss aversion are robust and well documented results from experimental psychology. They introduce a wedge between the prices at which one is willing to sell or buy a good. The objective of this paper is to address this wedge. We show that the presence of asymmetric information in a rational-agent framework can also account for the endowment effect, status quo bias and loss aversion without invoking psychology-based explanations proposed in the past.