Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism

This paper introduces the “Extended Pareto” axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: “Anonymity” and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: “Weak IIA” it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called “Relative Utilitarianism” that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them. Received: 7 June 1994 / Accepted: 28 April 1997     

Methods for Development Work and Research: A New Guide for Practitioners

From the outset, Britha Mikkelsen is careful to identify thelimitations of this rather detailed and extensive book (345pages). We are appropriately cautioned that it does not tryto do everything: it is a ‘guide’ ‘to a varietyof field study methods from which the reader may combine her/hisown mixture to suit the problem, time and resources available’(p. 23); ‘it is not a cookbook for the study of all developmentissues’ (p. 28) and it can be read selectively; and ‘itdoes not replace more elaborate texts, but will serve as a supplementto the basic methodology texts of sociology, anthropology...’(p. 46). Despite these protestations, it is a     

The cultural apparatus: C. Wright Mitts’ unfinished work

Conclusion Mills wrote to his Oxford publisher in 1955. “One book grows out of another; the trouble is not only is there no end to it, but after the second is pressing upon you before you can finish the first, for planning is more fun than working.” 78 Indeed, this mode of working was common to all of Mills’ projects. He worked fast and furiously and always juggled a number of different ideas in various stages of formation. This certainly was the case with The Cultural Apparatus. In a 1955 letter to his publisher Mills enthusiastically said of the book “I'm into it.” He predicted, optimistically, that unlike his other books, this book would be easy, a natural for him that “writing it will not involve the anguish that White Collar and Elites have provided.” By 1959, however, Mills had to admit that this optimism was premature. In “The Personal Note to the Reader” he confessed that “I've never had so much trouble writing a book as I have with this one, and I’ve never taken so much pain with the writing of it as I’ve taken to heart the criticism of being repetitious, verbose and prone to jargon.” 79 Mills never completed the project. By the late 1950's he became preoccupied with the political issues of “war and peace” and American foreign policy in Cuba, the latter in particular. His health was poor as a result of a heart attack he suffered in December of 1959 on the eve of a televised debate with an American advisor in Latin America, A.A. Berle. He became embroiled in what he understood as necessary public work from within the media and he remained adamant about the personal significance of The Cultural Apparatus in 1959.     

Finessing a point: augmenting the core

The “finesse point” introduced here extends the notion of a core; it is a position that minimizes what a candidate needs to do to counter moves that are made by an opponent. The definition, which is motivated by the “chaos theorem” as well as by the dynamics of positive and negative political campaigning, is also used to define a “malicious point,” which is an optimal location from which a candidate can engage in “negative campaigning.”     

Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces

 In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if (α) its range is a closed Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, (β) the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise veto voting scheme, and (γ) it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity. Received: 18 October 1993/Accepted: 2 February 1996     

The stranger as seer or voyeur: A dilemma of the peep-show theory of knowledge

The belief that ‘the stranger’ (outsider, disinterested third party) sees things more clearly, i.e. is more “objective,” is seen to be a corner-stone of folk wisdom; underlying Western judicial thought and concepts of objectivity in the social sciences. The author raises the dilemma that both positivistic and humanistic sociologists accept this belief—suggesting 1) that it is a residue of positivism and a quest for certain knowledge, or 2) the possibility that ‘the stranger’ does gain deeper insight into group life than members. The paper examines the concept of the stranger, considering the aura of charisma that seems to have been attached to it in ordinary discourse as well as within the sociological dialogue. Two types of strangers are described: outsiders and enemies within. Finally, an attempt is made to examine the testimony of prominant strangers as they describe their marginal status and speculate on the ways that status has made them unusually perceptive observers of social phenomena.     

Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

We introduce the following basic voting method: voters submit both a “consensus” and a “fall-back” ballot. If all “consensus” ballots name the same option, it wins; otherwise, a randomly drawn “fall-back” ballot decides. If there is one potential consensus option that everyone prefers to the benchmark lottery which picks the favorite of a randomly drawn voter, then naming that option on all “consensus” ballots builds a very strong form of correlated equilibrium. Unlike common consensus procedures, ours is not biased toward the status quo and removes incentives to block consensus. Variants of the method allow for large groups, partial consensus, and choosing from several potential consensus options.     

Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

In this paper we show in the context of voting games with plurality rule that the “perfect” equilibrium concept does not appear restrictive enough, since, independently of preferences, it can exclude at most the election of only one candidate. Furthermore, some examples show that there are “perfect” equilibria that are not “proper”. However, also some “proper” outcome is eliminated by sophisticated voting, while Mertens' stable set fully satisfies such criterium, for generic plurality games. Moreover, we highlight a weakness of the simple sophisticated voting principle. Finally, we find that, for some games, sophisticated voting (and strategic stability) does not elect the Condorcet winner, neither it respects Duverger's law, even with a large number of voters. Received: 16 March 1999/Accepted: 25 September 1999     

Rethinking Kink: Sadomasochism as Serious Leisure

Based on extensive ethnographic research in a public SM (sadomasochism) community, this paper frames SM as recreation. Drawing on Robert Stebbins’ work on “serious leisure” (1982), I posit that in order to more adequately understand SM as it occurs in this community, we need to shift from mainstream assumptions of SM as (simply) “kinky sex” to a more nuanced perspective. I explore the unique skills required in order to engage in SM, as well as the benefits and rewards that participants derive from it, in order to illustrate that SM can be more usefully understood as serious leisure.     

Charles Tilly,German Historicism,and the Critical Realist Philosophy of Science

This paper examines Charles Tilly’s relationship to the schools of thought known as historicism and critical realism. Tilly was committed to a social epistemology that was inherently historicist, and he increasingly called himself a “historicist.” The “search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the laws of Newtonian mechanics,” he argued, was a “waste of time” and had “utterly failed.” Tilly’s approach was strongly reminiscent of the arguments developed in the first half of the 20th century by Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and Meinecke for a synthesis of particularization and generalization and for a focus on “historical individuals” rather than abstract universals. Nonetheless, Tilly never openly engaged with this earlier wave of historicist sociology, despite its fruitfulness for and similarity to his own project. The paper explores some of the possible reasons for this missed encounter. The paper argues further that Tilly’s program of “relational realism” resembled critical realism, but with main two differences: Tilly did not fully embrace critical realism’s argument that social mechanisms are always co-constituted by social meaning or its normative program of explanatory critique. In order to continue developing Tilly’s ideas it is crucial to connect them to the epistemological ideas that governed the first wave of historicist sociology in Weimar Germany and to a version of philosophical realism that is interpretivist and critical.     

Old wine in new casks: libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles

Libertarian Paternalism (LP) purports to be a kind of paternalism that is “liberty-preserving” and hence compatible with liberal principles. In this paper, I argue against this compatibility claim. I show that LP violates core liberal principles, first because it limits freedom, and secondly because it fails to justify these limitations in ways acceptable to liberal positions. In particular, Libertarian Paternalists argue that sometimes it is legitimate to limit people’s liberties if it improves their welfare. A closer look at the welfare notions used, however, reveals that they respect neither the subjectivity nor the plurality of people’s values. Thus its justification of the liberty-welfare trade-off is not compatible with liberal principles. I conclude that to justify LP policies, one must appeal to traditional paternalistic principles—and thus, there is no categorical difference between “libertarian” and other forms of paternalism.     

Much ado about Goffman

“The claim that all the world’s a stage is sufficiently commonplace for readers to be familiar with its limitations and tolerant of its presentation.” (Goffman 1959, 72, 254) “Given that the logic of privatization....now odiously shapes archetypes of citizenship, [and] manages our perceptions of what constitute the ‘good society’....it stands to reason that new ethnographic research approaches must take global capitalism not as an end point of analysis, but as a starting point.” (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000, 304) “My abhorrence of neoliberalism helps to explain my legitimate anger when I speak of the injustices to which the ragpickers among humanity are condemned. It also explains my total lack of interest in any pretension of impartiality, I am not impartial, or objective...[this] does not prevent me from holding always a rigorously ethical position.” (Freire 1998, 22)     

A general equilibrium analysis of the Laffer argument

This paper examines the Laffer argument (i.e., the possibility that an increase in a tax rate may reduce tax revenues, and vice versa) in a general equilibrium model and using tax reform techniques. Our methodology allows us to examine the Laffer argument in a very general setting. Despite the high level of generality, we are able to reach some clear conclusions that happen to provide some support for the intuition that the Laffer effect requires: (1) a “ high” labour-income tax rate, and (2) a “ large” labour supply response to wage changes. However, the notions of “high” and “large” in our framework are quite different to the interpretations given them in conventional wisdom about the Laffer argument. The analysis also provides indirect support for the intuition that it is not optimal for a government to operate on the downward-sloping segment of the Laffer curve.     

W. H. Hutt and The economics of the colour bar

Conclusion Long before the international climate of opinion made South Africa’s system of legalized racial discrimination untenable, it was under attack from within. A tiny part of that struggle was waged on moral grounds by decent South Africans both white and nonwhite. The much larger part of the war was waged not on moral grounds but on the economic battlefield where the stakes were profit and losses. As W. H. Hutt so aptly points out, the major disadvantages of apartheid were borne by South Africa’s nonwhite population, but the disadvantage was shared by whites as well. As such it produced widespread tensions leading to resistance, evasion, contravention, and modi-fication of apartheid law. Often evasion and contravention of apartheid law was led by the very people who shared the ideology of white supremacy. The final abolition of apartheid law may indeed reflect a change in heart by South African whites but the coup de grace was, as Hutt put it, the liberating forces “released by what is variously called the ‘free market system,’ the ‘capitalist system,’ or the ‘profit system.’”     

How technology affects the design and administration of pensions and benefits

Conclusion Technology presents opportunities in all areas of employee benefits — design, administration, and communication. Indeed, it holds out the potential to deliver benefits, like almost every other product or service, in a way that is “better, faster, cheaper.” But achieving that goal will involve substantial financial investment and many hours of staff time.     

The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is “majoritarian approving” i.e. it always picks “what's good for a majority” (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better “effective” half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency. Received: 31 January 1995/Accepted: 22 July 1998     

Interaction Ritual Chains and the Mobilization of Conscientious Consumers

Markets for “socially responsible” products are comprised of activists who lead protests, organize boycotts, and promote the consumption of these goods. However, the ultimate success of these movements is dependent upon the support of a large number of consumers whose self-professed values often contradict with their own purchasing patterns. Consumer support of socially responsible products cannot be explained by consumer culture theories, which privilege identity, attitudes, and behavior, or mass consumption theories, which emphasize location and advertising’s influence on consumption patterns. These perspectives are informative but unable to explain why some consumers will only buy socially responsible products while others with similar value systems possess much more contradictory consumption patterns. I extend Collin’s theory of “Interaction Ritual chains” to show that rituals and emotions—more than identity or coercive advertising—explain how ethical consumers are mobilized. I show how face-to-face interactions between consumers and producers produce solidarity and motivate support for the Fair Trade movement. This paper employs a micro-sociological approach to contribute to studies of ethical consumption in three notable ways: 1) it emphasizes the importance of “contexts” and is able to explain contradictions in consumer behavior; 2), it contributes to our understanding of “brand communities” by describing the micro-sociological processes that both help to build these communities and create value within the products that organize these groups; and 3) it offers the potential to develop a predictive model for the purchasing patterns of consumers.     

Calendars and keys: The classification of “home” and “work”

This article presents a discussion of the relationship between classification systems and individuals' everyday activities. The concept of “boundary work” is defined as the practices that concretize and give meaning to mental frameworks by placing, maintaining, and challenging cultural categories. “Home” and “work” provide a case study for examining boundary work across a range of realm relationships, from those that are highly “integrating” to those that are highly “segmenting.” Boundary practices involving calendars and keys, clothes and appearances, eating and drinking, money, people and their representations (like photographs and gifts), talk styles and conversations, reading materials and habits, and work breaks (including lunches and vacations) are discussed. Mary Douglas's work on categorical purity helps illustrate the relationship between cognitive order and visible behavior seen in the boundary work of home and work. This article includes material that was published in a larger study,Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries Through Everyday Life (1996 University of Chicago Press), after it was presented at the 1995 Eastern Sociological Society meetings in Philadelphia.     

Two main problems in the sociology of morality

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed.

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