顾客策略行为下差异产品两阶段定价模型研究

互联网和信息技术的发展,为零售商收集顾客信息带来方便的同时,也使得消费者变得越来越具有策略性和选择性。首先,构建零售商只销售一种高质量产品的情形,研究其两阶段的定价策略,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子对产品的零售价格、销售量和零售商利润的影响。然后,考虑零售商可提供高质量和低质量两种产品的情形,顾客在第一销售期、第二销售期都可以选择两种产品。构建两阶段的定价决策模型,并分析产品的跨期折扣因子、顾客对低质量产品的接受度等参数对产品两阶段的零售价格、销售量的影响。最后,用数值算例分析了第二种模型下顾客对低质量产品的接受度等模型参数对零售商两阶段总利润的影响,然后比较了第一种和第二种模型下高质量产品的零售价格和销售量。研究结论较全面的分析了顾客策略行为对差异产品两阶段销售期的定价决策的影响,为零售商进行定价优化决策提供了十分重要的参考。     

再制造产品保证策略的探讨

本文基于产品保证相关研究和再制造产品的特征,从再制造产品保证成本的角度研究了再制造产品保证策略;最后分析影响再制造产品保证成本的重要因素以及不同再制造产品保证策略的适用情况,从而实现降低再制造保证成本和提高再制造产品可靠性的目标。     

奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型

各国政府为保护环境加强了对废旧电器电子产品的回收再制造的管制。本文研究了两个制造商竞争情况下基于政府奖惩机制的制造商的废旧产品回收决策问题。具体研究时分两种情况:一种情况是两个制造商中只有一个回收再制造废旧产品,另一种情况是两个制造商都回收再制造废旧产品。研究表明:奖惩机制下回收再制造废旧产品的制造商的回收率提高;无论制造商是否回收再制造废旧产品,其新产品销售价均比无奖惩机制时低,奖惩机制对消费者有利;制造商竞争有利于奖惩机制引导制造商提高废旧产品的回收率;回收率随再制造率的提高而提高;无论另一个制造商回收再制造废旧产品与否,实施回收再制造制造商的利润随奖惩力度的提高而增加,随政府规定的目标回收率的提高而降低,且奖惩力度越大,降低幅度越明显。算例分析说明了上述结论的正确性。     

基于产品寿命次数的闭环供应链生产优化问题研究

本文研究了单一厂商制造/再制造集成系统的多期生产优化问题.首先,基于闭环供应链的全生命周期思想,通过引入产品寿命次数的概念构造了不超过产品寿命次数而能够进行再制造的回收产品与新制造产品之间的数量关系;接着,验证了将可再制造产品全部用于再制造时能够实现利润最大化的目标;然后,给出了几个有关解的性质;最后,通过算例对本文模型的性质和规律作进一步分析.     

废旧产品回收再制造计划模式研究述评

在分析再制造基本概念及流程的基础上,从废旧产品回收计划、回收产品拆卸计划、再制造生产计划等三个方面对国内外再制造计划模式的研究现状进行综述。指出目前研究中对再制造过程的不确定性特征认识不足、对产品回收后的状态不能有效预测、对不确定情形的产品拆卸计划研究较少、对于再制造生产计划与控制缺乏系统研究。针对上述不足,提出了进一步研究的方向。     

废旧产品再制造环境下的产品定价和再制造方式分配

原材料价格的不断上涨,使得制造企业开始通过废旧产品的回收和再制造来缓解制造成本的上涨.然而,制造企业可以采用较昂贵的技术生产与新产品无差异的再制造品,也可以采用较廉价的技术生产在低端市场销售的再制造品,不同的再制造方式会给制造商带来不同的利润;另一方面废旧品的边际回收成本随着回收率的上升而上升,使得制造企业必须小心选择废旧品的回收数量.文中构建了高端市场和低端市场之间存在需求的线性替代关系时,再制造品和新产品的定价问题,并在优化计算的基础上得到了成本结构对于最优利润、最优价格、最优回收率和不同再制造方式比重的影响.     

产品再制造、渠道竞争和制造商渠道入侵

针对制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链,通过建立无再制造与再制造两种情形下制造商的渠道入侵决策模型,分析了产品再制造、渠道竞争和制造商渠道入侵决策之间的内在关系。研究发现,1)产品再制造带来的成本节约效应缓解了渠道冲突,从而间接增加了制造商渠道入侵的动力。2)无再制造情形下制造商的渠道入侵会直接损害零售商的利益;而考虑产品再制造的闭环供应链中,再制造会对零售商产生正向的外部性效应使得当直销与传统渠道之间的竞争较小时,制造商的渠道入侵会提高零售商的收益。而如 果渠道间的竞争较强时,再制造对零售商的外部性效应难以抵消渠道冲突对零售商利润降低的影响,从而渠道入侵会损害零售商。3)如果产品回收成本降低或再制造节约增加,则渠道入侵下再制造对于零售商的外部性效应会增强,且制造商和零售商受益于渠道入侵的Pareto共赢区间扩大。最后,对原始模型进行了不同维度的扩展,分析了零售商回收、产量竞争和多零售商竞争情形下以上研究结论的鲁棒性。     

基于异质性消费群体的再制造产品的定价策略研究

消费者对新产品和再制造产品具有不同支付意愿。在此基础上,对再制造产品具有不同接受度的异质性消费群体分别建立了再制造产品差异化定价模型和单一定价策略模型。研究了制造商对新产品和再制造产品进行差异化定价时,新产品和再制造产品的最优定价和与之相对应的产品回收率,并与单一定价策略进行了比较分析。通过数值仿真,讨论了不同参数对单一定价策略和差异化定价策略的利润和产品回收率的影响,并给出了相关结论。     

外包再制造下再制造设计对制造 /再制造影响

为分析外包再制造模式下,再制造设计对制造/再制造供应链竞争的影响,构建制造/再制造博弈模型.基于博弈模型,分析再制造设计费用不同承担方式对再制造设计努力程度、废旧产品回收率、收益和环境等影响.研究结果表明:原始制造商通过外包再制造不仅可以降低再制造商的市场竞争优势,还可以获得再制造带来的收益;再制造设计可以促进再制造商回收废旧产品,提高废旧产品回收率;无论是原始制造商还是再制造商承担再制造设计费用,两者收益分别在再制造设计努力程度的不同点达到最大,而不是再制造设计努力程度越大其收益越大;再制造对环境影响并不总是有利的,当单位再制造产品与新产品对环境造成的影响之比小于某一阀值,同时再制造设计给单位再制造产品带来收益与带给单位新产品收益之比大于某一阀值时,再制造才有利于降低对环境的影响.     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

When to Offer Lower Quality or Remanufactured Versions of a Product

We investigate the profitability of adding a lower quality or remanufactured product to the product portfolio of a monopoly firm, both in single‐period and steady‐state settings. Consumer behavior is characterized by a deterministic utility function for the original product and a nonlinear relative utility function for the lower quality product. We find a threshold for the cost of the low‐quality product below which it is optimal to add it to the firm's portfolio, and show that while a cost advantage is necessary to make the lower quality offering profitable under linear or convex relative utility functions, market segmentation alone can justify the addition of the lower quality product under concave relative utility functions. In particular, we characterize (i) the new product cost under which it is optimal to offer a lower quality version of the product even if it is as costly to produce as the original product; and (ii) the weighted average of new and remanufactured product costs in the steady state under which it becomes cost effective to offer new products under the remanufactured label. Finally, we also identify the maximum possible profits from customer segmentation and the form of the relative utility function that achieves them. We discuss the implications for the common marketing practices of branding and generics.     

Effects of Remanufacturable Product Design on Market Segmentation and the Environment

Despite documented benefits of remanufacturing, many manufacturers have yet to embrace the idea of tapping into remanufactured‐goods markets. In this article, we explore this dichotomy and analyze the effect of remanufacturable product design on market segmentation and product and trade‐in prices by studying a two‐stage profit‐maximization problem in which a price‐setting manufacturer can choose whether or not to open a remanufactured‐goods market for its product. Our results suggest that it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product when the value‐added from remanufacturing is relatively high but product durability is relatively low and innovation is nominal. In addition, we find that entering a remanufactured‐goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate into environmental friendliness. On the one hand, the optimal trade‐in program could result in low return and/or remanufacturing rates. On the other hand, a low price for remanufactured products could attract higher demand and thereby potentially result in more damage to the environment. Meanwhile, external restrictions imposed on total greenhouse gas emissions draw criticism in their own right because they risk stifling growth or reducing overall consumer welfare. Given these trade‐offs, we therefore develop and compare several measures of environmental efficiency and conclude that emissions per revenue can serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall environmental stewardship.     

Joint Life‐Cycle Dynamics of New and Remanufactured Products

Many products considered for remanufacturing are durables that exhibit a well‐pronounced product life cycle—they diffuse gradually through the market. The remanufactured product, which is a cheaper substitute for the new product, is often put on the market during the life cycle of the new product and affects its sales dynamics. In this paper, we study the integrated dynamic management of a portfolio of new and remanufactured products that progressively penetrate a potential market over the product life cycle. To this end, we extend the Bass diffusion model in a way that maintains the two essential features of remanufacturing settings: (a) substitution between new and remanufactured products, and (b) a constraint on the diffusion of remanufactured products due to the limited supply of used products that can be remanufactured. We identify characteristics of the diffusion paths of new and remanufactured products. Finally, we analyze the impact of levers such as remanufacturability level, capacity profile and reverse channel speed on profitability.     

两种激励条件下三级供应链产品质量控制策略研究

本文基于四阶段Stackelberg博弈分析,研究了在三级供应链中如何进行产品质量控制策略问题。构建了由制造商、零售商与最终顾客组成的三级供应链博弈模型,制造商进行产品质量决策,即生产高质量产品或者低质量产品,零售商进行产品采购决策和零售定价决策,最终顾客根据两种产品质量水平和零售价格的差异,决定产品的购买数量;当零售商采购高质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供价格折扣策略;当零售商采购低质量产品时,制造商将会向其提供延迟付款策略。运用最优化原理,求解了制造商的产品质量水平、价格折扣、延迟付款期限和零售商的零售价格、最终顾客的购买数量,及期望收益函数。进行了算例分析,结果表明:高质量产品零售价格关于价格折扣下降幅度更大,而低质量产品零售价格关于延迟付款期限下降幅度更大;制造商提供的价格折扣越大、延迟付款期限越长,其期望收益将会减少,此时零售商的期望收益将会增加,最终顾客产品需求量将会增加;制造商的总期望收益函数将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的产品质量控制策略是可行的。     

基于上游成员的机会成本和消费者偏好的供应链产品策略

基于对上游成员的机会成本和消费者在质量偏好上的异质性的考虑,本文研究中心化和由一零售商与一制造商（供应商）组成的分散化供应链在质量和数量上的最优产品策略。通过构建问题的理论模型及分析,分别获得最优解和博弈均衡解。进而利用灵敏度分析和算例讨论了消费者对质量偏好的异质性和上游成员的机会成本对供应链的产品策略、供应链的利润和消费者剩余的影响。研究发现：当边际质量成本较低时,供应链产品策略应主要考虑满足大众需求;而当边际质量成本和消费者对质量偏好的异质性程度都较高时,供应链只需考虑部分高质量敏感的消费者;当消费者对质量的平均偏好水平较低,边际质量成本较高和顾客需求趋于同质时,产品应考虑退出市场;此外,成员的权利均衡有助于完善供应链利润和社会福利,而零售商的强势帮助消费者培育和提高产品质量。最后,占据先动优势的一方在利润分配时基本上占上风。     

考虑顾客策略行为和产品质量的闭环供应链决策模型

策略型的顾客对于不同质量的产品以及不同时间的产品会有不同的估值和支付意愿,企业在进行决策时应当考虑顾客的策略性行为。建立了由一个制造商(即原始设备制造商)和一个独立的再制造商以及一组策略型顾客组成的闭环供应链模型,利用动态博弈理论分析了当由独立的再制造商负责回收旧产品并进行再制造时顾客策略行为和再制造品的质量水平对闭环供应链的产品价格、利润、消费者剩余的影响。研究结果表明,当顾客的策略程度增加时,制造商的利润减少,再制造商的利润和消费者剩余增加。当再制造品的质量水平增加时,制造商的利润降低,再制造商的利润先增加后降低,消费者剩余增加。     

Design of the Reverse Channel for Remanufacturing: Must Profit‐Maximization Harm the Environment?

A key attribute of a remanufacturing strategy is the division of labor in the reverse channel, especially whether remanufacturing is performed in‐house or outsourced. We investigate this decision for a retailer who accepts returns of a remanufacturable product. Our formulation considers the cost structures of the two strategies, uncertainty in the input quality of the collected/returned used products, consumer willingness‐to‐pay for remanufactured product, the extent to which the remanufactured product cannibalizes demand for a new product, and the power structure in the channel. For the profit‐maximizing retailer, the differentials in variable remanufacturing costs drive strategy choice, and higher fixed costs of in‐house remanufacturing favors outsourcing. The variable remanufacturing costs and the balance of power in the prospective outsourced reverse channel are the key drivers of environmental impact, as measured by the retailer's propensity to remanufacture. While profitability and environmental goals often conflict, they align under certain conditions. These include (a) the third party has less bargaining power; or (b) the fixed cost for in‐house remanufacturing is relatively high. All else equal, when remanufacturing is outsourced, the environment fares better if the third party has leadership power. We generalize to the cases when remanufacturing achieves a quality level less than “good‐as‐new" and when used items have non‐zero salvage value. Analysis of these extensions illuminates how relative power in the reverse channel drives the firms’ preferences, as well as the end customers’ consumption experience.