Supply Management Under High Goal Incongruence: An Empirical Examination of Disintermediation in the Aerospace Supply Chain

Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame supply chain disintermediation (SCD) as a principal–agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multimethod study, combining an Internet‐based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer–supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction‐cost‐based models of buyer–supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets.     

Power and dependence perspectives on outsourcing decisions

Since the 1980s outsourcing has been a major topic in both economic and management literature. Economic literature tends to focus on the transaction cost perspective. In management literature the core competence approach prevails. An emerging alternative view on outsourcing is the power and dependence perspective. Aspects of power and dependence become visible in four case studies involving the maintenance of capital assets. In each instance both the buyer and supplier sides of the dyad are examined. The paper concludes with managerial implications and research opportunities.     

Buyer–Supplier Performance: The Role of Asset Specificity,Reciprocal Investments and Relational Exchange

This paper argues that the extent and balance of transaction specific assets, and the presence of relational norms in a buyer–supplier relationship are important factors affecting partnership performance. Hypotheses were tested using data from 393 manufacturing firms. Results revealed that while specific investments by one participant in the relationship negatively impacted the indicators of performance, offsetting investments by the other party effectively increased performance. Relational-exchange elements were positively related to performance.     

Inter-firm co-ordination: international versus domestic buyer–seller relationships

The use of transaction cost analysis (TCA) to study the choice of governance mode in foreign countries has been a source of considerable research. Empirical tests of the TCA predictions within a single governance mode are, however, limited. Building on transaction costs arguments, and related work in international marketing literature, we examine the association between asset specificity and inter-firm co-ordination in domestic and international buyer–seller relationships. The extant literature is extended by also comparing the impact of environmental uncertainty on inter-firm co-ordination across domestic and international relationships. Empirical findings from a survey of 164 industrial buyers demonstrate that there is a positive association between asset specificity and inter-firm co-ordination, and further that this association is stronger in international relationships than in domestic business-to-business trade. Furthermore, the results indicate that environmental uncertainty is stronger related to inter-firm co-ordination in international buyer–seller relationships compared to domestic buyer–seller relationships.     

Drivers and Outcomes of Long‐term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships

We argue in this paper that a buyer may deliberately develop long‐term orientation as a governance mechanism to deal with risks arising from exchange hazards, and to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of a supplier. While the exchange hazards of asset specificity pose a safeguarding problem, those of market uncertainty pose an adaptation problem. We test our model on a sample of 221 procurement partnerships. Our results show that satisfactory prior history of a supplier, asset specificity of the buyer and market uncertainty are all positively related to a buyer's long‐term orientation towards a supplier. Consistent with the idea that asset specificity and market uncertainty pose different governance problems, we find that satisfactory prior history reduces the positive relationship between asset specificity and a buyer's long‐term orientation, but enhances the positive relationship between market uncertainty and a buyer's long‐term orientation. We also find that a buyer's long‐term orientation fully mediates the relationship between satisfactory prior history and a supplier's opportunistic behaviour. Finally, implications on the theory and the practices of relationship governance are discussed.     

The Many Faces of Asset Specificity: A Critical Review of Key Theoretical Perspectives

This paper presents a review of the concept of asset specificity and of the impact which asset specificity is expected to exert on the performance of buyer–supplier relationships. The paper begins by unpacking the complex definitional features of asset specificity and how its multifaceted nature is reflected in an inconsistent and rather ad hoc operationalization of the construct in the extant empirical literature. Following a comprehensive examination of the many dimensions of asset specificity, the review then focuses on the expected role of asset specificity in inter‐firm relationships according to three different theoretical perspectives: transaction costs economics, the resource‐based view and relational exchange theory. Considerable ambiguities and inconsistencies are highlighted by reviewing hypotheses typically developed within their respective theoretical framework. The paper concludes by identifying key challenges and new directions in order to derive maximum benefit from future research.     

Opportunism in Distribution Networks: The Role of Network Embeddedness and Dependence

Prior research documents the value of network relationships to firm behavior but is relatively silent on how networks influence opportunism in distribution channels. Focusing on a common type of distribution networks in which multiple distributors serve a single, dominant supplier, this study moves beyond a dyadic view to examine how a focal distributor's relational and structural embeddedness in such a distribution network influences its opportunism toward the dominant supplier. In particular, we postulate that a distributor's relational embeddedness in the network curbs its opportunism, whereas its network centrality, as a form of structural embeddedness in the network, promotes its opportunism. Moreover, we propose that relational embeddedness magnifies the role of a focal distributor's dependence on the supplier in suppressing the distributor's opportunism, whereas network centrality buffers such a role. We first empirically test these hypotheses using data collected from car dealers in China; the results provide support for the hypotheses. We then develop an analytical model to validate and further explain the underlying mechanisms of the network effects. Our analytical results not only validate the empirical results but also provide guidance for managers on controlling opportunism in distribution networks.     

Toward a Typology of Buyer–Supplier Relationships: A Study of the Computer Industry*

Buyer–supplier relationship typologies are useful analytical tools for purchasing managers in managing exchange relationships with suppliers and monitoring their purchasing portfolios. Existing buyer–supplier relationship typologies are mainly focused on either relational contents or power‐dependence and have limited empirical support for their performance implications. In this study, we developed an alternative buyer–supplier relationship typology that integrates both relational content and power‐dependence dimensions, resulting in four generic relationship types: market, power, autonomous‐link, and constrained‐link relationships. We then performed a longitudinal exploratory investigation of eight leading firms in the U.S. computer industry to explore the performance implications of the typology, using a combinatorial qualitative approach that leverages the strengths of case study research, content analysis, and quasi‐experimental design. The results suggest three theoretical propositions. First, the association between the type of buyer–supplier relationships and buyer firm performance varies such that constrained‐link relationships are superior in terms of operational efficiency while autonomous‐link relationships are superior in terms of product innovation. Second, the positive association between buyer–supplier relational contents (i.e., relationalism) and buyer firm operational efficiency is strengthened as the suppliers' dependence on the buyer firm increases. And finally, the positive association between buyer–supplier relationalism and buyer firm product innovation is weakened as the suppliers' dependence on the buyer firm increases.     

买方势力、资产专用性与技术创新——基于中国汽车工业的实证检验

在纵向关联市场中,买方势力和资产专用性是影响企业技术创新的重要因素。本文以我国汽车工业2000-2008年统计数据为样本,利用面板数据模型对买方市场势力、资产专用性与技术创新的关系进行了实证检验,研究结果表明:技术创新行为不仅取决于企业自身所处的市场条件,还与作为买方的下游行业市场竞争状况有关,买方市场势力的增强有利于上游企业技术创新活动的开展;下游企业的资产专用性对上游企业技术创新具有显著的负效应,固定资产比例越高,研发投入越少。此外,较快的市场需求增长率和买方技术能力对技术创新具有积极影响,上下游行业之间较为对等的市场势力会阻碍技术创新。     

Ex Post Problems in Buyer–Supplier Transactions: Effects of Transaction Characteristics, Social Embeddedness, and Contractual Governance

This paper focuses on ex post governance of inter-firm transactions. We develop and test hypotheses on the occurrence of ex post problems like delivery delays, inferior quality, and insufficient service in buyer–supplier transactions. Our hypotheses address effects of transaction characteristics, of social embeddedness, and of contractual governance on the occurrence of problems. Other than earlier research on embeddedness effects in this field, we consider not only effects of dyadic embeddedness but also effects of network embeddedness. We test hypotheses using rich survey data on more than 1200 purchases of information technology (IT) products: hardware and software, both standard and complex. We find evidence for effects of transaction characteristics on the occurrence of problems, while our data do not support hypotheses on effects of contractual governance. Our data provide rather consistent support for hypotheses on the effects of embeddedness. Specifically, we find evidence that network embeddedness reduces problems.     

在弹性需求和物品易变质条件下数量折扣定价模型

研究在弹性需求和易变质物品条件下,当供应商和零售商独自决策时,供应商如何确定最优数量折扣问题。基于Stackelberg博奕建立了数学模型,证明了零售商的出售价格随供应商出售价格的降低而降低,从而需求量增大。当供应商给予价格折扣时,零售商的利润是增加的。在此基础上,给出了最优数量折扣的计算方法。对供应商和零售商单独决策时,供应商利用数量折扣对供应链进行协调产生的系统利润与供应商和零售商联合决策时的系统利润做了数值分析和比较。结果表明,供应商采用数量折扣的方法使供应链协调是有效的;价格折扣随价格敏感系数的增大而增大,随变质率的增大而减小。     

E-business services and business performance: a study of the telecommunications manufacturing industry

The development of information and communication technologies has significantly changed the business interactions as well as created new approaches for improving business performances. While the benefits from this development have been well documented in the literature, it also poses a significant challenge for companies in tracking or further improving e-business services. This article contributes to this body of knowledge by investigating the impact of e-business service dimensions on business performance in the telecommunications manufacturing industry. Based on 121 usable responses from a questionnaire survey of the UK telecommunication manufacturers, structural equation modelling is employed to identify the main e-business service dimensions which affect business performance significantly. The data analysis reveals that two e-business service dimensions significantly influence suppliers’ performance from the buyer's perspective. It also indicates the significant relationships between suppliers’ performance, buyer-perceived buyer–supplier relationship maintenance and the buyer's competitive advantage. The findings in this research not only help the supplier to understand which practices significantly improve its overall performance (as perceived by the buyer), but also assist the buyer in its supplier development efforts to improve its own business performance.     

Coopetitive Buyer–Supplier Relationship: An Investigation of Bargaining Power,Relational Context,and Investment Strategies

This study proposes an analytical approach combined with a behavioral experiment for a joint examination of the competitive and cooperative (i.e., coopetitive) relationship between a buyer and a supplier. Specifically, the article considers the scenario in which the buyer and the supplier invest in strategic capabilities to increase their relative bargaining power. The article examines how dynamic investments in strategic assets are influenced by the locus of bargaining power and by the underlying context (synergistic vs. adversarial) of the interfirm relationship. The dynamic evolution of bargaining power is also examined. A dynamic game model is considered to examine the evolution of investment strategies in critical resources and to investigate the issues of bargaining power in a buyer–supplier dyad. Equilibrium expressions for the investment strategies of the buyer and the supplier are presented and their implications for buyer–supplier relationships are examined. The behavioral experiment complements the analytical model and examines the correspondence between optimal behavior suggested by the analytical model and the boundedly rational behavior of decision makers in an experimental context. The results from the model and behavioral experiments suggest that the strategies are a function of the risk‐adjusted returns obtained from investments. The experiment shows that, in a synergistic relational context when the buyer maintains bargaining power, the investment shifts of the buyer and the supplier accord well with theoretical predictions. In an adversarial relational context, the results of the experimental study do not correspond well with that predicted by the theoretical model. The implications of the results are discussed and directions for future research are presented.     

The influence of financial conditions on optimal ordering and payment policies under progressive interest schemes

In many business-to-business transactions, the buyer is not required to pay immediately after the receipt of an order, but is instead allowed to postpone the payment to its suppliers for a certain period. In such a situation, the buyer can either settle the account at the end of the credit period or authorize the payment later, usually at the expense of interest that is charged by the supplier on the outstanding balance. Some payment terms, which are often referred to as trade credit contracts, contain progressive interest charges. In such cases, the supplier offers a sequence of credit periods, where the interest rate that is charged on the outstanding balance usually increases from period to period. If a buyer faces a progressive trade credit scheme, various options for settling the unpaid balance exist, where the financial impact of each option depends on the current credit interest structure and the alternative investment conditions. This paper studies the influence of different financial conditions in terms of alternative investment opportunities and credit interest structure on the optimal ordering and payment policies of a buyer on the condition that the supplier provides a progressive interest scheme. For this purpose, mathematical models are developed and analyzed.     

Supplier Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier New Product Development: A China‐U.S. Study of Antecedents,Consequences, and Cultural/Institutional Contexts

Collaborating with a supplier in a buying firm's new product development (NPD) project is commonly advocated and adopted, but does not always improve project performance. Some pre‐existing collaboration contexts, such as buyer–supplier NPD projects, are especially exposed to supplier opportunism due to the uncertain nature of the collaboration process. Adopting agency theory and transaction cost theory perspectives, we examine: (i) contextual antecedents and project consequences of supplier opportunism and (ii) if these causal influences vary in different cultural and institutional contexts. Using a survey sample of 214 United States (U.S.) and 212 Chinese buying firms’ responses about buyer–supplier NPD projects, we find that supplier opportunism is significantly influenced by the task and relational contexts. We also show that supplier opportunism damages both design quality and efficiency, two aspects of project performance. When comparing U.S. to China, we find that task and relational contexts have a greater impact on supplier opportunism in the U.S., but design efficiency is less hurt by supplier opportunism there. Finally, we show challenges of preventing supplier opportunism in certain NPD collaboration contexts, and offer solutions for overcoming these challenges.     

On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer–Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance

Research on buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and relational capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm's favor may have the opposite effect from that intended. In other words, the firm's counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm opportunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the supplier's perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymmetries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.     

Structuring Supplier Involvement in New Product Development: A China–U.S. Study

Buying and supplying organizations rely on each other for developing better products in an efficient manner, which explains the popularity of involving suppliers in new product development (NPD). However, such involvement is not always successful, partially due to the challenges of structuring a buyer–supplier team to manage joint dependence and dependence asymmetry. This study adopts an organizational dependence view to examine how three types of intergroup structures—administrative (formalization and centralization), task (task interdependence), and physical (colocation)—influence project performance and buyer learning in NPD projects. Furthermore, adopting a contingency theory perspective, we study whether the national context moderates the effects of intergroup structures on project outcomes. We adopt a two‐group structural equation modeling approach to test hypotheses with survey responses from a sample of NPD projects in the United States (US) and China. Results show different ways in which intergroup structures influence project performance and buyer learning in the two culturally, economically, and institutionally distinct countries. We discuss the implications of these new findings and present directions for future research.     

Coordinated Replenishments from a Common Supplier

Coordinated replenishment strategies may be implemented by jointly ordering multiple items from a common supplier. A major benefit of coordinated replenishment is that it increases the size of shipments, permitting the buyer to enjoy transportation economies without a major increase in average inventory levels. The coordinated replenishment problem is complex because side constraints govern the attainment of transportation rate breaks. The problem is further complicated by the presence of purchase quantity discount opportunities. Thus, the buyer must decide which items to order independently, which items to include in a group order, and the order quantities of each item, governed by the frequency of independent or group orders. We present a mathematical model and a heuristic solution procedure that provide analytical support to the buyer seeking to minimize total costs of replenishing multiple items from a common supplier. The relevant costs are purchase prices, ordering costs, holding costs, and transportation costs. Coordinated replenishment provides nearly a 30 percent reduction in controllable costs relative to independent control. Experimentation with the heuristic has yielded optimal solutions over 88 percent of the time. When optimality was not obtained, the mean penalty was much less than one percent. The average heuristic search was more than two orders of magnitude faster than branch and bound, even for small problems, and possessed a much tighter distribution around the mean search time.     

JIT purchasing: attribute classification and literature review

To find critical JIT purchasing attributes for manufacturing industry, 56 refereed articles are reviewed. These articles are categorized as conceptual, case and empirical studies. Thirty-four attributes are thus identified. An input-output model is developed to classify these attributes. The inputs to JIT purchasing environment consists of buyer, supplier and joint buyer-supplier actions with 13, six and six attributes, respectively. The interaction between these attributes leads to the JIT purchasing environment. Output of this environment consists of nine attributes. By using the frequency of citation of an attribute as a measure of its importance, consensus is found among conceptual and case studies regarding those attributes of JIT purchasing considered critical. However, many of these attributes have not been investigated empirically, while others have not been rigorously examined. Common supplier evaluation criteria are identified. Benefits and problems with JIT purchasing implementation are discussed. Analysis suggests the need for comprehensive and statistically rigorous empirical studies.