Are Preference Reversals Errors? An Experimental Investigation

This paper investigates whether some part of the preference reversal phenomenon can be attributed to errors in the responses of subjects in experiments. Such errors have been well documented in other investigations of behaviour in risky decision problems, but their relevance to the preference reversal phenomenon has not been explored. Building on earlier work, we develop an extended error model and apply it to the results of an experiment in which subjects tackle risky choice problems on five separate occasions. In this experiment subjects had to answer choice questions in three occasions and to state selling and buying prices in the remaining two occasions. Our results indicate that scale compatibility can be ruled out as a significant sole explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon. Moreover, we can show that a considerable fraction of observed preference reversals can be classified as pricing errors, whereas choice errors turn out to play a minor role.     

Preference reversals and probabilistic decisions

Preference reversals occur when different (but formally equivalent) elicitation methods reveal conflicting preferences over two alternatives. This paper shows that when people have fuzzy preferences, i.e. when they decide in a probabilistic manner, their observed decisions can generate systematic preference reversals. A simple model of probabilistic choice and valuation can account for a higher incidence of standard (nonstandard) preference reversals for certainty (probability) equivalents and it can also rationalize the existence of strong reversals. An important methodological contribution of the paper is a new definition of a probabilistic certainty/probability equivalent of a risky lottery.     

Preference Reversals and Induced Risk Preferences: Evidence for Noisy Maximization

We combine two research lines: preference reversal research (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971) and research on lottery-based risk preference induction (Roth and Malouf, 1979). Our results are informative for both research lines. We show that inducing risk preferences in preference reversal experiments has dramatic effects. First, while our subjects still display reversals, they do not display the usual pattern of predicted reversals suggested by the compatibility hypothesis. By inducing risk averse and risk loving preferences, we can dramatically reduce reversal rates and even produce the opposite pattern of reversals. Our results are consistent with the assumption that subjects maximize expected utility with error. This provides evidence that Camerer and Hogarth's (1999) framework for incentive effects can be extended to include the risk preference induction reward scheme.     

Testing transitivity in choice under risk

Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the same choice. Results showed that few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that all participants were transitive.     

Preference reversals: Time and again

This paper sheds new light on the preference reversal phenomenon by analyzing decision times in the choice task. In a first experiment, we replicated the standard reversal pattern and found that choices associated with reversals take significantly longer than non-reversals, and non-reversal choices take longer whenever long-shot lotteries are selected. These results can be explained by a combination of noisy lottery evaluations (imprecise preferences) and an overpricing phenomenon associated with the compatibility hypothesis. The first cause explains the existence of reversals, while the second explains the predominance of a particular type thereof. A second experiment showed that the overpricing phenomenon can be shut down, greatly reducing reversals, by using ranking-based, ordinally-framed evaluation tasks. This experiment also disentangled the two determinants of reversals, because imprecise evaluations still deliver testable predictions on decision times even in the absence of the overpricing phenomenon. Strikingly, when unframed ranking tasks were used, decision times in the choice phase were greatly reduced, even though this phase was identical across treatments. This observation is consistent with psychological insights on conflicting decision processes.     

Accommodating stake effects under prospect theory

This paper investigates how letting people predict others’ choices under risk affects subsequent own choices. We find an improvement of strong rationality (risk neutrality) for losses in own choices, but no such improvement for gains. There is no improvement of weak rationality (avoiding preference reversals). Overall, risk aversion in own choices increases. Conversely, for the effects of own choices on predicting for others, the risk aversion predicted in others’ choices is reduced if preceded by own choices, for both gains and losses. Remarkably, we find a new probability matching paradox at the group level. Relative to preceding studies on the effects of predicting others’ choices, we added real incentives, pure framing effects, and simplicity of stimuli. Our stimuli were maximally targeted towards our research questions.     

Preference aggregation and statistical estimation

This paper deals with various connections that are found to exist between statistical estimation methods for decision-making and rules of group choice in the social choice area. Initially the aggregation of individual opinions is formulated as a pattern recognition problem; firstly it is shown that individual preferences lead to a natural representation in terms of binary patterns. Then we proceed to show how the search for a group preference pattern can be conducted by classifying the input preference patterns into various pattern classes and using the resulting classification boundaries to define the area of mutual agreement over some of the available alternatives. This leads to a decision-theoretic problem which consists in defining a decision rule (for classification) that is least likely to lead to misrecognition of arbitrary preference patterns. A maximum likelihood solution is obtained and compared with some well-known rules of group decision-making. Other solutions are also possible, on the basis of different optimality criteria, and their social choice interpretation is suggested. Finally, a method using Coleman's linear model for attributes is applied to yield group decision rules by feature weighting of election issues.     

The arguments of utility: Preference reversals in expected utility of income models

There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas others argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the unified treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference reversals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final wealth alone.     

Developing countries and systemic pension reforms: Reflections on some emerging problems

Since 1981 close to forty countries have introduced systemic pension reforms that have replaced all or part of prior pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) schemes with privately managed funded defined contribution (FDC) pillars or systems. However, over the past decade about half of these countries have subsequently cutback on, or entirely eliminated, these FDC schemes. In this article we explore some of the reasons why this reversal is often taking place in developing countries. As part of our analysis we propose a new pension reform typology that goes beyond the commonly used dichotomy between PAYG and pension privatization. We identify and discuss four factors that are of particular relevance to those seeking to understand the pension policy reversals that have been taking place in many developing countries: low pension coverage and incentive incompatibility, triple burden costs, tradeoffs between pension reforms and social pensions, and difficulties with annuitization.     

The Deep Side of Preference Theory

An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to regular tastes where regularity means that tastes can be derived from a pure qualitative relation between the different commodities. Besides, a preference family based on preference relations corresponding to each particular commodity is said to be rationalizable if there exists a metapreference over commodity bundles which consistently summarizes the preference family and then allows to decide. As a second result, it is shown that if a preference family is rationalizable, then the tastes are organized thanks to a reflexive and transitive qualitative relation between the different commodities.     

Does trust increase willingness to pay higher taxes to help the needy?

The article studies the causal effect of trust on the willingness to pay higher taxes to help the needy in a sample of 29 countries of Eastern and Southern Europe, and the former Soviet Union and Mongolia. It is hypothesized that interpersonal trust leads to a greater willingness to pay taxes to help the needy since (i) trust increases the likelihood of helping strangers; (ii) trust fosters solidarity and cooperation when working to solve common problems in society; and (iii) trust reduces suspicion with respect to the perceived misuse of redistributed money. Three key findings are that the more people trust each other, the more they are ready to support the welfare state; the effect of trust on welfare state support holds even in a contextual environment characterized by rather lower levels of trust and relatively underdeveloped systems of redistribution; and higher individual‐level trust fosters tax morale and helps deter tax evasion.     

“I can’t do it if you’re watching” monitoring and reciprocity in clientelism

This study experimentally examines whether or not a private transfer can induce a voter to change an electoral choice based on reciprocity. It also explores whether or not the reciprocal effects of providing a private transfer vary according to the scope and quality of monitoring technologies. The study finds that reciprocity operates under both turnout monitoring and vote choice monitoring. It also finds that the effects of reciprocity are greater under turnout monitoring than under vote choice monitoring only when a voter’s candidate preference on policy grounds is incongruent with the candidate providing a private transfer. The quality of monitoring, however, has little impact, as the effects of reciprocity do not vary according to monitoring probabilities. I conclude by discussing the implications of the findings.     

Two envelopes

“You have been given either envelopeA orB. B contains either one-half or twice the money inA. Do you want to switch? Now you open your envelope? Are you still happy to stand pat?” Answers depend on whether you think there is an upper bound to the money inA. You should no longer be indifferent if you think there is not an upper bound, but, if you think there is a certain upper boundU, you should want to switch or not depending on whether your envelope holds less thanU. Expected monetary values are extended to acts with infinitely many equally possible monetary values. It is maintained that though strong dominance under infinite partitions does not in the absence of an upper bound for values imply greater expected value, ‘univocal strong dominance’ is even then properly decisive for choice.     

An experimental investigation of violations of transitivity in choice under uncertainty

Several models of decision-making imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. Our experiments explored whether people show patterns of intransitivity predicted by regret theory and majority rule. To distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of true preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of that same choice. Our results showed that very few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that transitivity best describes the data of the vast majority of participants.

A geometric approach to revealed preference via Hamiltonian cycles

It is shown that a fundamental question of revealed preference theory, namely whether the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) implies the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), can be reduced to a Hamiltonian cycle problem: A set of bundles allows a preference cycle of irreducible length if and only if the convex monotonic hull of these bundles admits a Hamiltonian cycle. This leads to a new proof to show that preference cycles can be of arbitrary length for more than two but not for two commodities. For this, it is shown that a set of bundles satisfying the given condition exists if and only if the dimension of the commodity space is at least three. Preference cycles can be constructed by embedding a cyclic $(L-1)$ -polytope into a facet of a convex monotonic hull in $L$ -space, because cyclic polytopes always admit Hamiltonian cycles. An immediate corollary is that WARP only implies SARP for two commodities. The proof is intuitively appealing as this gives a geometric interpretation of preference cycles.     

Assessing the pension reform potential of a notional defined contribution pillar

Abstract As some of the limitations of the traditional pay‐as‐you‐go defined benefit public pension model have become more evident in recent years, pension experts have begun searching for alternative models. The notional defined contribution model, also financed on a pay‐as‐you‐go basis, has emerged as one of the major new approaches. Drawing on evidence from schemes in six countries (Sweden, Italy, Poland, Latvia, Kyrgystan and Mongolia), this article aims to describe the notional defined contribution model and to review its strengths and limitations relative to the major alternatives, the pay‐as‐you‐go defined benefit model and the funded defined contribution model. A four‐pillar pension model is proposed.     

Determinants of stated willingness to pay for public goods: A study in the headline method

Respondents were shown brief statements (“headlines”) referring to various threats to the environment or to public health, and other public issues. An intervention to deal with each problem was also introduced by a single sentence. Some respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to pay for the interventions by voluntary contributions. Others indicated their opinion of the intervention on a conventional rating scale, rated the personal satisfaction of contributing to it, or rated the importance of the problem. Group averages of these response measures were obtained for a large set of issues. Computed over issues, the rank-order correlations between the different measures were very high, suggesting that group averages of WTP and of other opinion statements are measures of the same public attitudes. Observed preference reversals and violations of monotonicity in contributions are better explained by a concept of attitude than by the notion of economic value that underlies the contingent valuation method. Contributions and purchases do not follow the same logic. Possible implications for the contingent valuation method are discussed.     

Market Forces for the Unemployed? Training Vouchers in Germany and the USA

Vouchers are meant to increase competition and consumer choice in public service markets. Using the example of training vouchers for the unemployed in the USA and Germany, we show, however, that deficits, both on the demand and the supply side of the market, create problems with preference alignment and market formation. Information asymmetries undermine choice by the unemployed and reduce government control over the training system. Ironically, restrictions meant to compensate for these information deficits further inhibit competitive market formation. Evaluation data on training vouchers from both countries show that voucher systems do not increase choice, but weaken the partnerships public employment agencies previously had with training providers, and may lead to a shortage of high‐quality and specialized training, as well as creaming in the selection of training participants. Theoretical justification for vouchers is based on the notion of choice and consumer sovereignty. Using this framework to analyse the changed relationship between government, private training providers, and jobseekers, we challenge the efficacy of vouchers as a delivery mechanism in complex public service markets such as job training.     

Risk Perceptions and Value of a Statistical Life for Air Pollution and Traffic Accidents: Evidence from Bangkok,Thailand

This paper presents results of two contingent valuation surveys conducted in Bangkok measuring individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce mortality risk arising from two risk contexts: air pollution traffic accidents Results from the risk perception survey disclose that respondents view the two risks differently. WTP to reduce air pollution risk is influenced by degrees of dread, severity, controllability and personal exposure, while WTP to reduce traffic accident risk is influenced by perceived immediate occurrence. Nevertheless, the value of a statistical life (VSL) for both air pollution and traffic accidents are comparable (US$0.74 to $1.32 million and US$0.87 to $1.48 million, respectively). This indicates that the risk perception factor alone has little impact on the VSL, a finding similar to previous studies using program choice indifferences.JEL Classification: I18, D61, J17, J28     

Actuarial balance sheets as a tool to assess the sustainability of social security pension systems

The choice of the methodology used to produce a social security pension system's balance sheet is mainly determined by the system's financing approach. In this article, it is shown using the example of the Canada Pension Plan that if the assessment of the financial sustainability of a pay‐as‐you‐go or partially funded system is done through the means of an actuarial balance sheet, then the methodology used should take into account future contributions of current and future participants. The balance sheets produced using the open group approach, as well as methodologies used in United States and Sweden, are discussed.