Questioning Contingency in Social Life: Roles,Agreement and Agency

Structure/agency theories presuppose that there is a unity to structure that distinguishes it from the (potential) diversity of agents' responses. In doing so they formally divide the robust social processes shaping the social world (structure) from contingent agential variation (agency). In this article we question this division by critically evaluating its application to the concept of role in critical realism and structural functionalism. We argue that Archer, Elder‐Vass and Parsons all mistakenly understand a role to have a singular structural definition which agents may then diverge from. Drawing on the work of Gross, Mason and McEachern we argue instead that if agents diverge in their conceptions of what role incumbents should do, there is no single role definition, but rather a range of diverse role‐expectations. Acknowledging this can help us to understand variation in role behaviour, with different incumbents potentially being more exposed to some expectations than others. We argue that considering roles in this way can extend the ability of social scientists to identify robust social processes shaping role behaviour and decrease the extent to which they need to call on contingent factors in such explanations.     

Exercising moral agency in the contexts of objective reality: toward an integrated account of ethical consumption

This paper engages with two contrasting approaches to conceptualising and studying consumer behaviour that appear to dominate existing research on consumption. On one hand, agency‐focused perspectives take an individual consumer to be the primary author of practice and a basic unit of analysis. On the other hand, socio‐centric paradigms focus on the social roots of consumption activities and the wider societal contexts in which they take place. The need to provide a more balanced view of consumption phenomena has been acknowledged, yet not adequately acted upon. This paper begins to fill this gap through relevant theoretical and empirical contributions. First, we provide a critical review of the dominant theoretical perspectives on consumption in general and ethical consumption in particular, highlight their key ontological assumptions and explain how they preclude a fuller understanding of the ways in which consumer practices are moulded and shaped. Taking a critical realist approach, we then present the findings from qualitative analysis of consumers' ethical food practices to empirically demonstrate the role of human agency and social structure in creating and shaping ethical consumption. Thus, by means of theoretical analysis and empirical research this paper responds to the call for a more comprehensive understanding of consumption and provides a consolidated account of consumer behaviour which acknowledges and explains the complex ensemble of individual and systemic powers in which consumer practices are contained.     

For Bourdieu, Against Alexander: Reality and Reduction

Jeffrey Alexander argues that despite Bourdieu's considerable achievements ultimately his work is reductionist and determinist. He further argues that though Bourdieu is a middle range theorist he is implicitly realist in his meta-theoretical assumptions. This article accepts these conclusions but argues that Bourdieu's meta-theoretical realism is a virtue rather than a vice and that the manner in which he is a reductionist and determinist necessitate a re-thinking of what is meant by these notions. Alexander uses Bourdieu's concept of habitus to demon-strate a fundamental contradiction in Bourdieu's theorising. According to him habitus presents us with the oxymoron of unconscious strategisation. This article uses a discussion of habitus in order to demonstrate that in its relationship with the concept of field it instead produces a practical resolution of long standing theoretical problems concerning structural determination and human agency. It is also argued that these problems are resolved at the meta-theoretical level in the form of critical realist ontology and that it is Alexander's misunderstandings on this level which cause him to fail to appreciate the significance of Bourdieu's achievements.     

The AART of Ethnography: A Critical Realist Explanatory Research Model

Critical realism is a philosophy of science, which has made significant contributions to epistemic debates within sociology. And yet, its contributions to ethnographic explanation have yet to be fully elaborated. Drawing on ethnographic data on the health‐seeking behavior of HIV‐infected South Africans, the paper compares and contrasts critical realism with grounded theory, extended case method and the pragmatist method of abduction. In so doing, it argues that critical realism makes a significant contribution to causal explanation in ethnographic research in three ways: 1) by linking structure to agency; 2) by accounting for the contingent, conjunctural nature of causality; and 3) by using surprising empirical findings to generate new theory. The paper develops the AART (abduction, abstraction, retroduction, testing) research schema and illustrates its strengths by employing a Bourdieusian field analysis as a model for morphogenetic explanation.     

Role as Resource for Action in Public Service

In this chapter we offer a conceptual framework for the understanding of public service that allows for the incorporation of sociological themes of organizational structure and institutional power. We build on sociological conceptualizations of the self found in role identity theory, using examples from research on health care workers to show how role identities and organizational structures can both limit and enhance the likelihood of principled dissent. Finally, we extend our theoretical framework to better understand how community service is employed to address the structural sources of social problems.     

Critical Realism,Dialectics, and Qualitative Research Methods

Critical realism has been an important advance in social science methodology because it develops a qualitative theory of causality which avoids some of the pitfalls of empiricist theories of causality. But while there has been ample work exploring the relationship between critical realism and qualitative research methods there has been noticeably less work exploring the relationship between dialectical critical realism and qualitative research methods. This seems strange especially since the founder of the philosophy of critical realism, Roy Bhaskar, employs and develops a range of dialectical concepts in his later work in order to extend the main tenets of critical realism. The aim of this paper is to draw on Bhaskar's later work, as well as Marxism, to reorient a critical realist methodology towards a dialectical approach for qualitative research. In particular, the paper demonstrates how dialectical critical realism can begin to provide answers to three common criticisms made against original critical realist methodology: that the qualitative theory of causal powers and structures developed by critical realists is problematic; that critical realist methodology contains values which prove damaging to empirical research; and that critical realists often have difficulties in researching everyday qualitative dilemmas that people face in their daily lives.     

Social Structure and Social Relations

This paper replies to Porpora, King, and Varela's responses to my earlier paper “For Emergence”, focussing on the relationship between the concepts of social structure and social relations. It recognises the importance of identifying the mechanisms responsible whenever we make claims for the emergence of causal powers, and discusses the mechanism underlying one case of social structure: normative institutions. It also shows how critical realism reconciles the claims that both social structures and human individuals have emergent causal powers that combine to produce actual social events.     

Elder-Vass's Move and Giddens's Call

David Elder‐Vass's “For Emergence: refining Archer's account of social structure,” is the latest of a number of papers which together constitute a family quarrel in the cognitive space After Postmodernism among realist social scientists. In the case under examination here in “Elder‐Vass's Move and Giddens's Call”, the concern is the structure and agency problem in the social sciences. The debate continuing in Elder‐Vass's paper represents the proponents of the resurrection of Durkheim's social realism under the auspices of Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism; the debate that continues here as a response to the Elder‐Vass paper, opposes the latter's attempt to advance the argument for social realism under the canopy of Harre's Immanental realism. The theme of this response is this: Elder‐Vass fails to realize the promise of reconciling social structural realism and social relational realism.     

Applying critical social work in direct practice with families

This paper seeks to further discourse concerning the implications of critical social work for direct practice with families and children. It presents and discusses a hypothetical example of how a social worker in a social care agency in Israel can incorporate critical social work notions into an official social work report. The paper begins by presenting key concepts in critical social work, their manifestations in practice and their implications for official social work reports. It then presents a mock report informed by critical social work ideas and discusses its structure and contents. The mock report provides an example of how abstract notions central to critical social work can be actualized. The paper thus offers practitioners the opportunity for a richer discourse on the contribution of critical social work to direct practice with families and children.     

Fully Unconscious and Prone to Habit: The Characteristics of Agency in the Structure and Agency Dialectic

While the human agent must have the capacity for reflexivity, intentionality and consciousness, the same agent must also be affected by the social world in which she lives: herein lies the essence of the structure and agency dialectic. This paper argues that while some realists are in principle committed to a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, there is some dissonance between this commitment and the concepts of agency that they develop. I highlight the exclusion of the unconscious and habit from realist notions of agency and argue that this oversight serves to unbalance the dialectic between structure and agency thereby leading to the over‐empowerment of agency. The concepts of agency developed by Margaret Archer, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu are discussed in this paper. Archer's concept of agency is argued to focus exclusively on reflexivity whilst neglecting to include the unconscious and habit. Giddens is shown to develop a much improved concept of agency, which includes the unconscious, however, his rejection of the independent causal powers of structure and agency problematises his commitment to the dialectic. A much improved approach to theorising agency, developed within a critical realist framework, is offered drawing on Bourdieu's concept of habitus. The paper concludes with a discussion of gender, and considers how the unconscious and habit can help to better understand the myriad ways in which gender functions in society.     

Information and communications technology use in rural child welfare work

This study explores the impact of information and communications technology (ICT) use on rural child welfare practice using a technology-in-practice framework to derive the social structures that are instantiated by rural child welfare workers (CWWs) and to examine their agency as actors. ICT use was tracked, and interviews were conducted with rural CWWs who work with children and families to gain an understanding of and describe their day-to-day ICT use at the practice level. Findings demonstrate that CWWs enact social structures along four frames: bureaucratic structure, family centricity, ICT context and information–documentation culture. In terms of agency, CWWs not only are constrained by but also exert some influence on the social structures they enact through facilities (material resources), norms and interpretive schemes. These findings have implications for how ICT can be used to facilitate the CWW–client relationship and the need in rural areas for increased infrastructure to support CWWs.     

Strategic uncertainty,coordination failure and emergence: A game theory study on agency‐structure interactions

In the social sciences there is a long standing debate over the primacy of structure or agency in shaping human behavior. Structurationists like Giddens think of individuals' agency and collective features as two sides of the same coin while emergentists including Archer and Elder‐Vass claim that structurationists are blurring an important ontological distinction——they argue for effective social analysis, we should think of structures and individuals as different things because emergence happens when the properties of the collective are not reducible to the properties of the parts that constitute them. This paper contributes to the agency‐structure debate by showing how production and reproduction of emergent properties of social groups sharing same normative commitments (norm circles) can be empirically studied using two behavioral game theory experiments, adding a previously neglected insight that strategic uncertainty can lead to coordination failures of individual behaviors within norm circles, manifested as unintended outcomes of interdependent actions that are difficult to predict. Here the synchronic relation between the unpredictable collective outcomes of each game round and agential reactions of the participants to them defines emergence——the previous outcomes are diachronic inputs but they appear in the new outcome only through their effects on the individual decisions.     

Critical Realism and the Process Account of Emergence

For advocates of critical realism emergence is a central theme. Critical realists typically ground their defence of the relative disciplinary autonomy of various sciences by arguing that emergent phenomena exist in a robust non‐ontologically, non‐causally reductionist sense. Despite the importance they attach to it critical realists have only recently begun to elaborate on emergence at length and systematically compare their own account with those developed by others. This paper clarifies what is distinctive about the critical realist account of emergence by comparing it with an alternative. Critical realism and interactivism are shown to independently converge on the same general process (or constraint) view of emergence and develop complementary accounts of particular emergents.     

Critical Realism and Causality: Tracing the Aristotelian Legacy

Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects.     

Animals,Agency and Resistance

In this paper we develop a relational approach to the question of animal agency. We distinguish between agency and action and, using three examples of non‐human animal behaviour, explore how human‐other animal interactions might be understood in terms of action, agency and resistance. In order to do this we draw on the distinction between primary and corporate agency found in the work of Margaret Archer, arguing that, while non‐human animals are able to act and to exercise primary agency, they are unable to exercise corporate agency. Animals are therefore agents; they act and their actions have consequences, they also resist conditions which they do not like and, in some circumstances, are able to change the conditions of their agency. We discuss the place of animals in the social world and the political implications of this way of viewing animal agency.     

The Romantic Realism of Michel Foucault Returning to Kant

Beatrice Han argues that the theories of subjection (determinism: structure) and subjectivation (freedom: agency) are the “the blind spot of Foucault's work:” to the very end of his life, in being transcendental and historical theories, respectively, they were in irresolvable conflict. In part I, I have argued that Foucault encourages us to situate the theories of the subject in an un‐thematized reach for a metaphysics of realism which, in effect, was to ground his uncertain complementary reach for a naturalist conduct of research. In part II I also argue that it is this fundamental feature of Foucault's Foucault that drives his returns to Kant, the purpose of which is to resolve the conflicting theories of the subject, and thus to solve his Giddensian problem of structure and creativity. Locating the returns and their purpose in my context of Science for Humanism and the recovery of human agency, I ultimately argue that Foucault's two special returns to Kant in order to solve his structure/agency problem led to two unfortunate solutions. The resort to Baudelair's aesthetic subject is a failed solution in so far as it regresses to being a pre‐noumenal conception of the subject. The subsequent mere reinstatement of Kant's subject as causally empowered, minus the noumenalism, is nothing more than a reclamation of Kant's conception. Only the reconstruction of Foucault's realism permits us to assert that he could have moved beyond the reclamation of human agency to its recovery.     

“党派实在论”的结构诠释学

如果政治宣传,意识形态以及党派性等概念真的从这些概念本身的内涵来界定自身,那么,在追逐某个政治议程时,这些概念由于存在明显的偏见,从而会导致自相驳斥的结果。因此,毫不奇怪,这些沟通类型的显明特征之一就是宣称它们在精准和公平地再现实在,并且否认存在政治偏见的丑恶内涵。笔者称这种类型为“党派实在论”,即被政治驱动的媒体演出,它们象征性地把自己呈现为是在实在论类型下运作的。本文的问题是,党派性媒体报导是如何在追逐自身的政治议程的同时创造出一种中立且无偏见的实在论表象的。为此,本文借用文化社会学的结构诠释学方法,以“奥莱利实情”这档非常流行的美国电视新闻节目作为党派实在论的分析案例。本文认为,“奥莱利实情”是通过如下几个范畴来生产一种用以诠释新闻的“党派实在论”框架的：主持人形象建构、围绕二元对立符码形成复杂的潜在意义结构,以及一套精致奥妙的修辞技巧。虽然这档节目自诩是一扇投射现实的简单窗户,但事实上,它启用一套精妙的党派文化系统来确证观众通过这扇明显中立的窗户所看到的东西能够支持节目制作人的政治利益。为了让新闻呈现在一定程度上暗合各种党派结论但又看起来依然是实在论,而非充斥着偏见,节目的每个情节和片段都依据一个意义结构来搭建问题。这个意义结构虽然具有强烈的党派结论导向性,但又能给人一种对各方观点都进行过理性思考的外表。本文认为,这种针对意义结构的深度分析对于理解作为政治沟通类型的“党派实在论”具有重要意义。     

Structure and agency between French and Morphogenetic Régulation

This article examines the gradual evolution of the French Régulation school (FR) for the study of capitalism through the lens of structure and agency. The analysis first segments the school into two epochs, the early Régulation, led by authors Aglietta and Lipietz, and the later Régulation, which saw the rise of Boyer. We find that the gradual progression that occurred within the FR school is linked to its authors' implicit ontic engagement with structure and agency, which, in turn, provides natural linkages to Critical Realism. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the comparison between Morphogenetic Régulation and French Régulation (FR) can facilitate a much deeper reading of the structure-agency debate pertaining to the transformation of capitalism. In so doing, it discusses the value addedness of Morphogenetic Régulation through three specific concepts by stressing their relevance for contemporary studies in international political economy. These concepts are: stratified emergence; causality and the problématique of hierarchy.     

The Siren Song of Substantivalism

The defence of a process philosophy as the metaphysics for the foundation of social psychology is part of a general defence of scientific realism. Realists, be they classical or neo critical realists hope to construct a dual level science—a phenomenal level resting on a transcendent level required to account for the order and stability to be found in the unfolding of the phenomena. Also required is a driving force or agency. Discursive psychologists argue for a social ontology in which meanings are created and managed by people engaged in projects, made orderly by shared social representations. Concepts like “social structure” are convenient metaphors to describe clusters of discursive practices but should not be interpreted ontologically. Causal powers are revealed in dispositions, which as a matter of logic, must be ascribed to entities self‐identical over time. Only persons meet this condition. Discursive social psychology is quasi social in that Vygotsky wise it looks for a social origin for social representations, and quasi personal in that persons are the naturally active beings that drive the patterns of life forward. A defence of neo‐critical realism against Professor Ratner's criticisms can only be a more careful statement of the position since his specific criticisms do not address the position I have been advocating.     

Accountability and the design of an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy

This article explores the institutional requirements of accountability for an anticorruption agency in a parliamentary democracy. It suggests that approaching public accountability as ‘the satisfaction of legitimate expectations about the use of discretion’ is useful in understanding or designing an accountability regime for such a powerful agency requiring independence from the executive. The approach facilitates identification of a variety of stakeholders and a range of institutional means by which their legitimate expectations may be satisfied. Despite the recognition, in consequence, of multiple agents and channels of accountability, parliament must remain central to the accountability regime and can achieve this through an appropriately designed oversight committee. Examination of a selected Australian agency, the Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission, provides support for these propositions. Particular controversies involving this agency are used to demonstrate the requirements of a parliamentary oversight committee, and that independent review of determinations of misconduct, as well as appropriately regulated public hearings where there is a strong public interest in matters under investigation, are important elements of public accountability for an anticorruption agency.