The estimated cost of project labor agreements on federal construction

I estimate the cost of President Clinton’s June 1997 executive memorandum encouraging federal departments and agencies to use project labor agreements (PLAs) on “large and significant” construction projects. Based on the higher wage costs associated with PLAs, the cost of federally owned construction will rise by 1.7 to 7.0 percent annually. Over the three years for which the memorandum will apply, federally owned construction costs will increase by $844 million to $3.44 billion. If the memorandum is interpreted to apply to state and local construction projects funded with federal money, the cost could range between $3.2 and $13.0 billion. The author thanks Ken Deavers, Anita Hattiangadi, Edward Potter, and Gary Shiu for their suggestions and help in the preparation of this paper.     

The case against union-only project labor agreements on government construction projects

Imposition of union-only PLAs in the public sector cannot be shown to serve the public interest. The government should not enter into the realm of labor management relations by arbitrarily creating a protected enclave for union work at the expense of taxpayers and to the detriment of fair and open competition. Government agencies that impose union-only PLAs in response to short-term political pressure from labor organizations will suffer long term consequences, in the form of litigation, increased costs of construction, and adverse taxpayer reaction. Mr. Baskin is a partner with the Washington, DC. law firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP. He focuses on all aspects of labor and employment law representing management and serves as General Counsel of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.     

Uncertainty and front-end loading of labor agreements

Uncertainty of future prices is offered as an explanation for front-end loading of real wages in nominal wage contracts. Exploitation of mutually beneficial gains from trade between risk-neutral employers and employees implies an expected future real wage that is lower the greater is the uncertainty of future prices, and the observed extent of front-end loading is consistent with plausible values of uncertainty of future prices. I would like to thank, without implicating, M. L. Burstein, George Fallis, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

“Neutrality” and “card check” agreements: Union assaults on employee rights and the integrity of the national labor relations board

Employer “neutrality” and union recognition by “card check” are tools unions use to bolster their shrinking numbers. Employee freeinformed choice and the sanctity of a democratic, secretballot National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election are the casualties of this fast-track approach to organizing. The NLRB is faced with challenging issues about some of the agreements which may overreach legal boundaries. This paper addresses those issues and highlights pending NLRB cases which may resolve some of them.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

Citizenship, immigration, and the European social project: rights and obligations of individuality

As envisioned by T.H. Marshall, social citizenship was a corrective to the injustices caused by the capitalist market. Entitlements and protections guaranteed by the welfare state would prevent social and economic exclusions that civil and political rights, on their own, simply could not. Such protections consequently would ensure social cohesion and solidarity, as well as a productive economy and market. European welfare states successfully followed this formula for the most part of the post-World War II period, however the last couple of decades witnessed significant changes. For one, the very meaning of 'work' and 'worker' on which the welfare state is based has changed - flexibility, risk, and precariousness have become defining elements of working life. The welfare state itself has gone through a transformation as well, increasingly moving away from a system of 'passive benefits' to 'social investment' in human capital. These developments are coupled with an emphasis on education in 'active citizenship', which envisions participatory individuals who are adaptable in an increasingly globalized society, and ready to contribute at local, national and transnational levels. The emergent European social project draws on a re-alignment between these strands: work, social investment, and active participation. In this article, I consider the implications of this project for immigrant populations in Europe in particular and for the conceptions of citizenship and human rights in general. In contrast to the recent commentary on the neoliberal turn and the return of nation-state centered citizenship projects in Europe, I emphasize the broader trends in the post-World War II period that indicate a significant shift in the very foundations of good citizenship and social justice. The new social project transpires a citizenship model that privileges individuality and its transformative capacity as a collective good. Thus, while expanding the boundaries and forms of participation in society, this project at the same time burdens the individual, rather than the state, with the obligation of ensuring social cohesion and solidarity, disadvantaging not only non-European migrants but also the 'lesser' Europeans. The new social project brings into focus the relationship between universalistic individual rights and their effective exercise. I conclude that rather than treating human rights and citizenship as a dichotomy we should pay attention to their entangled practice in order to understand the contingent accomplishments and possible expansions of citizenship in Europe.     

Whose rights are they anyway?: The supreme court and the rights of Juveniles

This article examines selected United States Supreme Court decisions from 1923 through the 1984 term of the Court. The selection, which includes Wisconsin v. Yoder, In re Gault, In re Winship, and Schall v. Martin, traces and illustrates the triangle of interest among parent, child, and state as parens patriae, when the issue raised is the interest of children. The focal question is: Have children been recognized as having their own individual Constitutional rights, or have their rights been merged with those of their parents and/or the state standing in the place of the parents?     

The Pinochet case: cosmopolitanism and intermestic human rights

This article explores the Pinochet case, widely heralded as a landmark, as a case of 'intermestic' human rights that raises difficult normative and empirical questions concerning cosmopolitan justice. The article is a contribution to the sociology of human rights from the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism, developing conceptual tools and methods to study how cosmopolitanizing state institutions and cultural norms are inter-related. The argument is made that in order to understand issues of cosmopolitan justice, sociologists must give more consideration to political culture.     

The coevolution of trade agreements and investment treaties: Some evidence from network analysis

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are expected to promote trade and investment relationships. One critical feature of such agreements is the network, so the multiplex coevolution of RTAs and BITs should be captured by the dynamics of their two networks. Although many studies have examined the roles of RTAs and BITs, most studies do not account for crucial network properties. This study explores how RTAs and BITs coevolve by applying a stochastic actor-oriented model of multiplex network evolution. In particular, we examine the roles of (i) cross-network dyadic interinfluences and (ii) within- and cross-network preferential attachments to discuss the dynamic relationships between RTAs and BITs. The results are as follows. First, our estimation supports cross-network dyadic interinfluences. Countries that sign a BIT are willing to establish an RTA, while those that sign an RTA are reluctant to establish a BIT. Second, concerning preferential attachments, countries prefer to sign BITs with partners that have more RTA and BIT links. However, countries tend to form RTAs with partners that have more BIT links but are reluctant to form RTAs with those that have more RTA links. We discuss possible justifications for these results, including arguments regarding the benefits and costs associated with the formation of RTAs and BITs.     

A labor of love: The impact of same-sex marriage on labor supply

Review of Economics of the Household - We study how the average labor supply of gay men and lesbian women responds to the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States. We exploit...     

Construction doublebreasted operations and pre-hire agreements: Assessing the issues

Labor relations in the construction industry are conducted under a legal framework that is both different and more favorable to unions than is that in industry generally. Thus, construction employers are more subject to challenge than those in other industries if they operate both union and nonunion subsidiaries; construction unions, but not those in most other industries, may enter into agreements before anyone is hired (“pre-hire agreements”), require employees to join unions after ten days of employment instead of thirty, and require the contractor to notify them of job openings. Despite these advantages, construction unions represented only 22.2 percent of all construction workers in 1987, down from 40.1 percent in 1973, while nonunion, or “open shop,” construction accounted for more than 70 percent of the construction dollar volume as early as 1984. Attempting to overcome these trends, the construction unions have sponsored legislation in the current and last two congresses which would outlaw “doublebreasting,” i.e., one company owning both unionized and open shop subsidiaries, eliminate any restrictions on pre-hire agreements, and have the effect of forcing thousands of construction workers into unions regardless of their wishes. This article examines the reasons for the decline of construction unionism, analyzes the proposed legislation, discusses its probable impact, and concludes that it is lacking in justification for the common good.