America's diversity and growth: signposts for the 21st century

This report provides a summary of the US demographic and population trends in the 21st century. It gives objective information on population growth, the determinants of population change, residential trends, racial and ethnic diversity, age profile, family life, households and families, measures of well-being, and future prospects. It is shown that US population is growing through relatively high fertility, migration and increasing life expectancy. Longer life expectancy has had a significant effect on American family life. Immigration fuels rapid population growth and social change creating increased ethnic diversity. Family life pattern also shifted, early marriage is replaced by cohabitation and divorce rates are increasing resulting in increased number of single-parent families. Many Americans have prospered well beyond their expectations; educational attainment vastly improved; more people moved out of poverty and more working women indicates a change in the workforce trends. Overall, it is noted that the US population will continue to grow. Prospect of such robust growth intensifies concerns about pollution and other environmental threats. At the same time, it seem that population growth is inextricably linked to the nations's prosperity.     

Diverging Demography: Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Contributions to U.S. Population Redistribution and Diversity

The substantial growth and geographic dispersion of Hispanics is among the most important demographic trends in recent U.S. demographic history. Our county-level study examines how widespread Hispanic natural increase and net migration has combined with the demographic change among non-Hispanics to produce an increasingly diverse population. This paper uses U.S. Census Bureau data and special tabulations of race/ethnic specific births and deaths from NCHS to highlight the demographic role of Hispanics as an engine of new county population growth and ethnoracial diversity across the U.S. landscape. It highlights key demographic processes—natural increase and net migration—that accounted for 1990–2010 changes in the absolute and relative sizes of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations. Hispanics accounted for the majority of all U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2010. Yet, Hispanics represented only 16 % of the U.S. population in 2010. Most previous research has focused on Hispanic immigration; here, we examine how natural increase and net migration among both the Hispanic and non-Hispanic population contribute to the nation’s growing diversity. Indeed, the demographic impact of rapid Hispanic growth has been reinforced by minimal white population growth due to low fertility, fewer women of reproductive age and growing mortality among the aging white population America’s burgeoning Hispanic population has left a large demographic footprint that is magnified by low and declining fertility and increasing mortality among America’s aging non-Hispanic population.     

Adolescents’ Sexual Initiation: The Interaction of Race/Ethnicity and Immigrant Status

This paper provides an in-depth examination of the joint effects of race/ethnicity and immigrant status on adolescents’ intercourse risk. We employ a sample of 4,535 females and 3,759 males from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS 88/94) who were followed for 6 years beginning in the eighth grade. We use discrete-time logistic regression models to estimate the associations of race/ethnicity and immigrant generational status with first intercourse hazard, and to evaluate the statistical interactions between race/ethnicity and immigrant status. Overall, Asian and Hispanic girls had lower and non-Hispanic Black girls had higher estimated risks relative to non-Hispanic White girls. Hispanic boys and White non-Hispanic boys had similar intercourse risks, but Black boys had higher and Asian boys lower relative risks. However, these patterns are contingent on immigrant status. Among girls, the protective effects of Asian or Hispanic identity are found only among second generation youth. Risk profiles for boys are more complex: being a third-plus generation Hispanic is associated with a higher risk while an Asian identity is associated with a lower risk only among first- and second-generation youth. These findings confirm the importance of accounting for the overlap between race/ethnicity and immigrant status in models of adolescent behavior. As the demographic diversity of the US population grows, researchers must include both race/ethnicity and immigrant status in their models of adolescent behavior.     

Integration or Fragmentation? Racial Diversity and the American Future

Over the next generation or two, America’s older, largely white population will increasingly be replaced by today’s disproportionately poor minority children. All future growth will come from populations other than non-Hispanic whites as America moves toward a majority-minority society by 2043. This so-called Third Demographic Transition raises important implications about changing racial boundaries in the United States, that is, about the physical, economic, and sociocultural barriers that separate different racial and ethnic groups. America’s racial transformation may place upward demographic pressure on future poverty and inequality as today’s disproportionately poor and minority children grow into adult roles. Racial boundaries will be reshaped by the changing meaning of race and ethnicity, shifting patterns of racial segregation in neighborhoods and the workplace, newly integrating (or not) friendship networks, and changing rates of interracial marriage and childbearing. The empirical literature provides complicated lessons and offers few guarantees that growing racial diversity will lead to a corresponding breakdown in racial boundaries—that whites and minorities will increasingly share the same physical and social spaces or interact as coequals. How America’s older population of elected officials and taxpayers responds today to America’s increasingly diverse population will provide a window to the future, when today’s children successfully transition (or not) into productive adult roles. Racial and ethnic inclusion will be reshaped by changing ethnoracial inequality, which highlights the need to invest in children—now.     

Natural Increase: A New Source of Population Growth in Emerging Hispanic Destinations in the United States

Updated US Census Bureau estimates and race/ethnic‐specific birth and death data for the post‐2000 period are used to highlight the increasing role of natural increase as an engine of population growth in emerging Hispanic destinations. Newly emerging Hispanic growth areas are distinguished from established and high‐growth areas from the 1990s. The findings document that recent Hispanic population gains have been generated increasingly by natural increase—the excess of Hispanic births over deaths. Hispanics accounted for 46 percent of the population gain and 53 percent of the natural increase in nonmetro America in 2000–2005. Yet, Hispanics represented only 5.4 percent of the nonmetro population in 2000. In metro areas, they accounted for 50 percent of the population gain and 47 percent of the natural increase, although they comprised only 14 percent of the metro population. Current trends suggest that the ascendancy of the US Hispanic population is likely to continue unabated, whether restrictive immigration legislation is enacted or not. The growth of the Hispanic population, caused increasingly by natural increase, has taken on a demographic momentum of its own.     

The growing American Indian population, 1960–1990: Beyond demography

Since 1960, the Native American population has exhibited explosive growth, increasing from 552,000 to 1,959,000, or 255 percent. The average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent, extending over a 30-year period, is demographically impossible without immigration – in fact, of the 1.4 million growth only 762,000 comes from natural increase, whereas 645,000 comes from non-demographic factors. This paper expands on previous work to illustrate with demographic techniques how such extraordinary growth was achieved through changing patterns of racial self-identification on the part of people with only partial or distant American Indian ancestry, coupled with relatively high fertility and improving mortality. It also provides some basic demographic background on the size, growth, and geographic structure of the American Indian population, while exploring both demographic and geographic underpinnings of the changing population. Data on race from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses are based on self-identification. A person choosing the American Indian racial response does not have to provide any substantiation or documentation. While this method aids overall census taking by permitting respondents to fill out their own census forms, self-identification adds a temporal component to the data because responses elicited from the same individual (or group of individuals) may change over time in reaction to social, political, or economic conditions or variations in question wording. New identities may emerge or old ones may disappear. This effect has had a noteworthy impact on data for American Indians. Analysts and other data users must be aware of underlying response patterns to interpret changes correctly.     

Restructuring of the US Meat Processing Industry and New Hispanic Migrant Destinations

Findings from the 2000 US Census indicate high rates of Hispanic population increase beyond urban areas and traditional immigrant‐receiving states. The diversity of new destinations raises questions about forces attracting migrants to rural areas and links between economic structural change and Hispanic population growth. Our conceptual framework applies dual labor market theory to the meat processing industry, a sector whose growing Hispanic labor force offers an illustrative case study for analyzing how labor demand influences demographic change. We document the industry's consolidation, concentration, increased demand for low‐skilled labor, and changing labor force composition over three decades. We then position meat processing within a broader analysis that models nonmetropolitan county Hispanic population growth between 1980 and 2000 as a function of changes in industrial sector employment share and nonmetro county economic and demographic indicators. We find that growth in meat processing employment exhibits the largest positive coefficient increase in nonmetro Hispanic population growth over two decades and the largest impact of all sectors by 2000.     

The business of demographics

The emergence of "demographics" in the past 15 years is a vital tool for American business research and planning. Tracing demographic trends became important for businesses when traditional consumer markets splintered with the enormous changes since the 1960s in US population growth, age structure, geographic distribution, income, education, living arrangements, and life-styles. The mass of reliable, small-area demographic data needed for market estimates and projections became available with the electronic census--public release of Census Bureau census and survey data on computer tape, beginning with the 1970 census. Census Bureau tapes as well as printed reports and microfiche are now widely accessible at low cost through summary tape processing centers designated by the bureau and its 12 regional offices and State Data Center Program. Data accessibility, plummeting computer costs, and businessess' unfamiliarity with demographics spawned the private data industry. By 1984, 70 private companies were offering demographic services to business clients--customized information repackaged from public data or drawn from proprietary data bases created from such data. Critics protest the for-profit use of public data by companies able to afford expensive mainframe computer technology. Business people defend their rights to public data as taxpaying ceitzens, but they must ensure that the data are indeed used for the public good. They must also question the quality of demographic data generated by private companies. Business' demographic expertise will improve when business schools offer training in demography, as few now do, though 40 of 88 graduate-level demographic programs now include business-oriented courses. Lower cost, easier access to business demographics is growing as more census data become available on microcomputer diskettes and through on-line linkages with large data bases--from private data companies and the Census Bureau itself. A directory of private and public demographic resources is appended, including forecasting, consulting and research services available.     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

New realities of the American family

The demographic, social, and economic characteristics of American families have changed dramatically over the past few decades. While the male breadwinner/female homemaker model was long traditionally typical,l contemporary families may be openly made up of single-parents, remarried couples, unmarried couples, stepfamilies, foster families, extended or multigenerational families, or 2 families within 1 household. Families are now most likely to have 3 or fewer children, a mother employed outside of the home, and a 50% chance of parental divorce before the children are grown. These trends are common not only in America, but in most industrialized nations around the world. In fact, family trends are so fluid that the US Census Bureau and workplace policy find it difficult to keep pace. This report presents and discusses social and demographic trends behind the ever-changing face of the American family. Households and types of families are further defined, as are the living arrangements of children, young adults, and the elderly. Marriage, divorce, and remarriage trends, age at marriage rates, and interracial marriage are then discussed. Next examined are declining family size, teenage parents, contraception and abortion, unwed mothers, and technological routes to parenthood. The changing roles of family members and family economic well-being are discussed in sections preceding closing comments on the outlook for the American family.     

Housing Tenure and Residential Segregation in Metropolitan America

Homeownership, a symbol of the American dream, is one of the primary ways through which families accumulate wealth, particularly for blacks and Hispanics. Surprisingly, no study has explicitly documented the segregation of minority owners and renters from whites. Using data from Census 2000, this study aims to fill this gap. Analyses here reveal that the segregation of black renters relative to whites is significantly lower than the segregation of black owners from whites, controlling for relevant socioeconomic and demographic factors, contrary to the notion that homeownership represents an endpoint in the residential assimilation process. The patterns for Hispanics and Asians conform more to expectations under the spatial assimilation model. The findings here suggest that race and ethnicity continue to be as important in shaping residential segregation as socioeconomic status, and raise concerns about the benefits of homeownership, particularly for blacks.     

The demography of American Indian families

This paper uses data from the decennial censuses to examine family structure and changes in family structure over time among American Indians. The information about the national Indian population indicates that the trends in family structure among American Indians are parallel in many respects to those in the general US population. That is, the percentage of young American Indian women who have never married has increased over time, the percentage of American Indian women who are divorced has increased over time, and the percentage of American Indian children who reside with a single parent has increased as well. The percentage of American Indian women who have never married and who are divorced and the percentage of American Indian children who live with a single parent are higher than those among the general population. The incidence of children living with single parents is especially high on some reservations which also have high levels of poverty and unemployment. Family patterns, however, vary considerably across reservations in ways that are not easily explained by differences in other demographic characteristics. These variations may be due to cultural and historical differences that are not captured in data collected in the censuses.     

Who are American Indians? Some observations about the perils and pitfalls of data for race and ethnicity

The data for race and ethnicity published from the 1980 Census are based on racial and ethnic self-identification of respondents. Selfidentification of race and ethnicity is problematic mainly because analysts are frequently inclined to treat this information as immutable. However, as this paper suggests, for some groups such as American Indians, racial and ethnic identity is an extremely complex phenomenon which has the potential to be highly variable. American Indians present an ideal case to demonstrate the possible problems facing analysts who do not recognize the potentially variable meanings of race and ethnicity data. This paper shows that, depending on how American Indians are defined, population estimates can range from less than 1.0 million to nearly 7.0 million. Furthermore, it is possible to isolate three types of American Indian identities in 1980 Census data, and each of these groups have different socioeconomic profiles.     

The Council of Economic Advisers on the Changing American Family

The 2000 Annual Report of the US Council of Economic Advisers (a document exceeding 300 pages, formally an Annex to the Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress February 2000, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) devotes considerable space to a discussion of the demographic and economic changes affecting families in the United States. Excerpts reproduced below from the first part of Chapter 5, titled “The Changing American Family,” examine the relevant trends in a broad historical perspective, drawing on data in some cases spanning the entire twentieth century. The second part of this chapter discusses the “money crunch”: financial constraints “that still burden many families despite the remarkable growth in the American standard of living,” and the “time crunch”: shortage of time devoted to family needs “that results from the increased participation of parents, especially mothers, in the paid labor market.” Policies designed to address these problems are also discussed in the second part of the chapter.     

The population structure and development of the national minorities in Guangxi]

The Guangxi Autonomous Region has the largest number of minorities in China. Since 1949, great progress has been achieved in the areas of politics, the economy, culture and education, public health, science and technology, and production businesses. The living standard for the minorities as been raised, and the minority populationshows a trend toward rapid growth. As a matter of fact, the population growth for the minorities exceeds that of te Han people, and an imbalance exists in the population growth of minorities. Population growth does not match the development and production of material resources. The rapid population growth has an adverse impact on the increase in average income and an adequate supply of consumer goods for all the people. In addition, great pressure has been experienced in education, public health, and other developments at the local level. The promotion of population quality for the minorities has also been slowed because of the rapid population growth in quality. At the present time, minorities in the Guangxi area need to develop their economy with greater effort. In addition, they need to practice effective family planning measures with more enthusiasm so that they may gradually reduce the population growth rate and reach a harmony between economic growth and social development.     

Black America in the 1980s

This Bulletin reviews recent demographic and socioeconomic trends in the US black population in order to assess changes in the status of blacks relative to whites since publication of the 1962 edition of Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 classic "An American Dilemma." Blacks numbered 26.5 million in 1980, 11.7% of the total population, with 85% residing in urban areas compared to 71% of whites. Some suburbanization is now occurring among blacks but the majority remain segregated in central cities. In the 1970s, more blacks moved into the South than moved out in a reversal of the historic pattern. Blacks have shared the baby bust since the mid-1960s but teenage and out-of-wedlock fertility remain much higher than for whites as well as overall fertility (2.3 compared to 1.8 births/woman in 1979). Black infant mortality is still double that of whites and life expectancy is 6 years shorter (68.3 vs. 74.4 years in 1979). Single parents (mostly mothers) with children now comprise 31% of black families compared to 10% for the general population. Divorce and separation have risen faster for blacks than whites. Many of these gaps are related to blacks' continuing socioeconomic disadvantages: median family income is 56% that of whites; the poverty rate is 3.5 times higher; unemployment is twice as high. Occupational status has improved for blacks and their educational attainment is now close to that of whites, but these gains may be slowed and income differentials unimproved if the current administration's reversal of socioeconomic policy remains unchanged. Blacks are also affected more than other groups by the recent surge in immigrants who compete directly for the low-level jobs on which many blacks must still rely. (author's).     

Insight into ethnic flux: Marriage patterns among jews of mixed ancestry in Israel

Increases in ethnic and racial intermarriage in immigrant countries have led to growing proportions of persons of mixed ancestry and backgrounds. The marriage patterns of these persons both reflect and affect the salience and meaning of current forms of ethnicity and race in these societies. This article analyzes the marriage behavior of children of ethnically mixed unions in the Jewish population of Israel. Among persons of mixed ancestry, educational attainment plays a large role in whether they marry Ashkenazim or less economically advantaged Mizrahim. Such patterns suggest that intermarriage in Israel does not necessarily reduce ethnic differences in socioeconomic status or the salience of ethnicity among disadvantaged groups.