21世纪中国人口面临的艰难抉择──生育率与人口规模·老龄化的前瞻

总人口、老年人口规模与生育率呈正向变化以及老龄化程度与生育率呈反向变化的矛盾, 决定了低生育率导致人口数量较少但高度老龄化; 高生育率导致人口规模扩大但老龄化程度较低,造成未来生育政策调整的艰难抉择。促进人口与社会经济、资源环境的协调发展和可持续发展是未来中国发展的最主要矛盾,继续坚持低生育率政策,坚持严格控制人口数量是首要任务     

Pronatalist population policies in some Western European countries

This article is restricted to a comparison of four Western European countries: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As the crude birthrates and total period fertility rates of these countries indicate, a stabilization of fertility has set in in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Official government attitudes towards these developments differ greatly, with France having clear pronatalist policy measures, the German Federal Government having only family policy measures, but some member states going further with a policy of family foundation loans. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, no official population policy exists, apart from a certain reluctance to accept more foreign immigrants. It must be concluded that the only common characteristic of population policies in the four countries is that they try to enable women to work and care for a family at the same time. The future effect of pronatalist population policy measures is still highly in doubt.This article was originally presented as a paper to the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Washington DC, March 28, 1981.     

The Apparent Failure of Russia's Pronatalist Family Policies

Russia has a history of pronatalist policies dating back to the 1930s. Two sets of pronatalist measures were implemented during the past 40 years. The one designed in the early 1980s proved to be a clear failure. Instead of raising fertility, completed cohort fertility declined from 1.8 births per woman for the 1960 birth cohort to 1.6 for the 1968 cohort. The government of President Putin became concerned with the dire demographic conditions of high mortality and low fertility in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. A comprehensive set of pronatalist measures came into effect in January 2007. The period total fertility rate increased from 1.3 births per woman in 2006 to 1.6 in 2011, which the authorities view as an unqualified success. An unbiased demographic evaluation as well as analyses of Russian experts reveals that apparently the measures mainly caused a lowering of the age at birth and shortening of birth intervals. It appears that any real fertility increase is questionable, i.e. cohort fertility is not likely to increase appreciably. The recent pronatalist measures are likely to turn out to be a failure.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.     

Population momentum expresses population aging

Population momentum and population aging occur when an initially growing population experiences a reduction in fertility to replacement level. Conceptually and empirically, momentum and aging express the same change, albeit on different scales. Fundamentally, they are two manifestations of the underlying process of demographic transformation. We consider three measures of aging over the transition to stationarity: the increase in mean population age, the decrease in the proportion under age 30, and the increase in the proportion over age 65. The three measures of aging are highly correlated, though the relationship to momentum is weakest for the increase in the proportion over age 65. We find that momentum is linearly related to aging. In both model and actual populations, a one-year increase in mean age translates into about 4.5% more population growth. The population below age 30 does not grow over the transition to stationarity, and the ratio of initial to ultimate proportions under age 30 is virtually identical to momentum.     

Europe's second demographic transition

By 1985, fertility rates in Europe were below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman in all but Albania, Ireland, Malta, Poland, and Turkey, following a steady decline from a 1965 postwar peak well above 2.5 in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe and an erratic trend from a lower level in Eastern Europe. Natural decrease (fewer births than deaths) had begun already in Austria, Denmark, Hungary, and the Federal Republic of Germany and can be expected shortly in many other countries. According to current UN medium projections, Europe's population (minus the USSR) will grow only 6% between 1985 and 2025, from 492 to 524 million and 18.4% of the population in 2025 will be 65 and over. The decline to low fertility in the 1930s during Europe's 1st demographic transition was propelled by a concern for family and offspring. Behind the 2nd transition is a dramatic shift in norms toward progressiveness and individualism, which is moving Europeans away from marriage and parenthood. Cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility are increasingly acceptable; having a child is more and more a deliberate choice made to achieve greater self-fulfillment. Many Europeans view population decline and aging as threats to national influence and the welfare state. However, governments outside Eastern Europe, except for France, have hesitated to try politically risky and costly economic pronatalist incentives. As used in Eastern Europe, coupled with some restrictions on legal abortion, such incentives have not managed to boost fertility back up to replacement level. Immigration as a solution is unfeasible. All countries of immigration have now imposed strict controls, tried to stimulate return migration of guestworkers recruited during labor shortages of the 1960s and early 1970s, and now aim at rapid integration of minorities. Only measures compatible with the shift to individualism might slow or reverse the fertility decline, but a rebound to replacement level seems unlikely and long-term population decline appears inevitable for most of Europe.     

Prospects for fertility reduction and projections for future population growth in Kenya

In 1979 Kenya's annual rate of natural population growth was 3.8%. Data from the1989 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey indicate that significant decreases in fertility levels were experienced during the 1980s. Factors associated with conditions supportive of high fertility in Kenya are discussed, and progress toward attaining significant fertility reduction thresholds during the 1980s is assessed. Findings from recent fertility surveys are presented, and 1969–1989 national level family planning data are evaluated. Four population projections for 1985–2025 are presented and analyzed. One projection is based on official government growth targets; two are based on estimates provided by the United Nations and the Population Reference Bureau, and a fourth projection is based on the assumption that Kenya will attain an annual natural population growth rate of less than 1% by the year 2025. Each projection assumes that fertility declines will be experienced. Kenya's prospects for reducing the annual population growth rate to 1% within the next sixty years and a cost-sharing development policy are addressed briefly in the concluding section. Recent data suggest that Kenya will probably not complete the demographic transition before the year 2050, but Kenya should continue to move through the transition stage.     

Demographic transition and population aging in Korea

"This paper describes the process of population aging in conjunction with the demographic transition in [South Korea]. Korea has recently experienced rapid decreases of both mortality and fertility, which have brought about the rapid process of population aging. The speed of...population aging in Korea is projected as one of the fastest in the world. Population aging brings about changing patterns of family composition, especially new trends of living arrangements of the elderly. Since the process of population aging [began] in Korea, the proportion of [those] living alone and [of those] living with spouse only have significantly increased."     

Aging in the United Kingdom: a review of demographic trends,recent policy developments and care provision

"Although the U.K.'s population is not predicted to grow very much in the future, the population structure is changing and there is a shift towards a much older age distribution. The characteristics of demographic aging in the U.K. include a marked reduction in fertility rates, increasing rates of life expectation at birth..., increasing dependency ratios and variations in mortality and social class in old age. The U.K.'s demographic context has important implications for aged care policy and planning. This paper documents the demographic trends, reviews recent major policy changes and their impact on care provision, and discusses some of the emerging implementation issues that challenge the potential of such policies to meet the needs of an aging population."     

Demography,Culture, and Policy: Understanding Japan's Low Fertility

Insights into the causes of Japan's prolonged and sharp fall in total fertility rate come from comparing Japan with France. The two countries share dirigiste administrative approaches, family policy reform undertaken under the auspices of pragmatic right wing parties and justified on pronatalist grounds, and involvement of demographic experts in crafting and shepherding such policies. But the countries differ with respect to their total fertility rates (France 1.98, Japan 1.29) and the effectiveness of their family policies. Thus comparing them can help identify areas of divergence that might explain these differences and assist in the project of theory building. Several salient explanations are rooted in Japan's labor market: it exacts high opportunity costs from parents who interrupt their careers to raise children, keeps ideal workers from having much time for their families, assumes and reinforces a traditional gender ideology, and hires few young workers into good jobs.     

Analysis of the process and characteristics of China's population aging]

The author projects three stages of population aging in China to the year 2040, based on 1982 census data. It is estimated that by the third stage (2025-2040), 25 percent of the population will be aged 65 and over. Two characteristics of China's population aging are emphasized: the speed of the process relative to other countries and the proportion of aged relative to developed countries.     

A Population Policy Rationale for the Twenty‐First Century

I propose that the primary goal of twenty‐first‐century population policies should be to strengthen the human resource base for national and global sustainable development. I discuss the shortcomings of the three dominant twentieth‐century population policy rationales: acceptance of replacement‐level fertility as a demographic goal; realizing a “demographic dividend” from the changing age structure; and filling the “unmet need” for family planning. I demonstrate that in all three cases the explicit incorporation of education into the model changes the picture and makes female education a key population policy priority. Population policies under this new rationale could be viewed as public human resource management. I argue that 20 years after the Cairo ICPD the international community needs a new rationale for population policies in the context of sustainable development and that a focus on human capital development, in particular education and health, is the most promising approach.     

“未富先老”与“边富边老”：对立还是统一

两大命题各有依归、认识互补。“未富先老”说明的是发展与老龄化关系的先后次序,“边富边老”则说明了两者关系的数量演变。未富是说我们能力不足,先老是说面临的挑战巨大。一先一后,凸显出人口老龄化挑战的严峻性。“边富边老”命题的提出进一步细化和发展了“未富先老”命题,体现了与时俱进的时代精神,可以增强我们解决养老问题的信心。     

After the demographic transition: policy responses to low fertility in four Asian countries

In the low fertility countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, policy-makers are concerned about the consequences of low growth. In South Korea, a family planning (FP) program was instituted in the early 1960s, and fertility declined to 1.6 by 1987. Rural fertility is still higher at 1.96, and abortion rates are high. 32.2% of fertility reduction is accomplished through abortion. South Korean population will not stabilize until 2021, at 50.6 million people. The elderly are expected to increase and strain housing, energy, and land resources. Government support for FP is being reduced, while private sector services are being enhanced. Government sterilization programs have been reduced significantly, and revisions in the Medical Insurance Law will cover part of contraceptive cost. Integrated services are being established. Many argue for an emphasis on birth spacing, child and family development, sex education, and care of the elderly. In Taiwan, replacement level fertility was reached in 1983. Policy in 1992 recommended increasing fertility from 1.6 to 2.1. The aim was to stabilize population without pronatalist interventions. Regardless of policy decisions, population growth will continue over the next 40 years, and the extent of aging will increase. In Singapore since the 1960s, the national government focused on encouraging small families through fertility incentives, mass media campaigns, and easy access to FP services. Fertility declined to 1.4 in 1988. Since 1983, government has established a variety of pronatalist incentives. In 1989, fertility increased to 1.8. The pronatalist shift is viewed as not likely to succeed in dealing with the concern for an adequate work force to support the elderly and economic development. In Thailand, fertility declined the fastest to 2.4 in 1993. The key factors were rapid economic and social development, a supportive cultural setting, strong demand for fertility control, and a successful FP program. The goal is to reduce fertility to 1.2 by 1996. Replacement level may be reached in 2000 or 2005. Future trends are not clear.     

2011:中国人口学研究的回顾与评述

通过检索与回顾2011年刊发在国内主要人口学刊物上较有代表性的文章以及人口学相关著作或科研文集,从中国人口国情、人口与社会、流动人口、人口老龄化、生育、人口与经济、其他领域等学界关注的领域系统性地评述2011年中国人口学研究的现状与进展。总体来看,2011年学界加强了对中国人口发展总体形势的判断,更多地关注人口与社会管理、人口与公共政策、人口与教育等与社会现实息息相关的领域。此外,对流动人口、人口老龄化、生育、人口与经济等以往人口学传统主题也进行了更为深刻和细致的研究。     

Re-linking fertility behaviour and old age economic security: A delayed note on demeny

Recently Paul Demeny proposed a policy to solve the problem of below-replacement fertility. His proposal is to link the old age economic security of parents to their fertility behaviour, strengthening the material position of those aged persons who have carried the financial burden of childraising by assigning some proportion of the social security contributions of children directly to their parents. I argue that in the course of constructing his proposal, Demeny undermines the fertility-facilitating effect of conventional welfare policies and ignores the class-specific effects of existing pronatalist policies. I suggest that the adoption of additional welfare policies, apart from strengthening and correcting existing measures, would not only foster the achievement and maintenance of a socially adequate fertility level but also foster social justice for the individuals more directly involved in generational reproduction.     

China's demographic dilemmas

The year 2000 marks the end of a tumultuous century in China's population history, which weathered the demographic effects of devastating famines, wars, and epidemics and population growth and change. This paper examines the effect of population policies on the demographic dilemmas of China. In the 1950s, China had seen the fastest demographic transition in history, with a dramatic decline in mortality rates, followed by a decrease in fertility rates. However, in the 1970s, revisions in population control measures, changes in age structure, and fluctuations in age at marriage resulted in lower fertility rates. The struggles encountered by China in regulating fertility are described; these include the different methods of birth control, gender preference, marriage, population aging, and minority populations. Population and development issues within the context of urbanization, employment, education, health care, economy, and environment are also discussed. Future implications of these findings indicate the need for a systematic, effective, and complete environmental clean-up, as well as fertility and population policies.     

China’s Demographic Future Under the New Two-Child Policy

China implemented the two-child policy in 2016, however, potential impacts of this new policy on its population reality have not been adequately understood. Using population census data and 1% population sampling data during the period of 1982–2015, this study develops a fertility simulation model to explore the effects of the two-child policy on women’s total fertility rate, and employs Cohort Component Method in population projections to examine China’s demographic future with different fertility regimes. The fertility simulation results reveal that the two-child policy will make significantly positive effects on China’s total fertility rate through increasing second births, leading to a sharp but temporary increase in the first 5 years after the implementation of the new policy. In addition, population projections using simulated total fertility rates show that the Chinese population would reach its peak value around the middle 2020s and be faced with the reduction of labor force supply and rapid aging process, featured with remarkable increases in both size and share of the elderly population. The findings suggest that the two-child policy would undoubtedly affect China’s fertility rates and demographic future; however, the effects are mild and temporary.

     

Population change in the former Soviet Republics

Demographic trends in the former Soviet Republics and Russia are summarized and discussed in this publication. The former Soviet Republics in Europe as well as Georgia and Armenia had completed or almost completed their demographic transition before October 1991. Other Central Asian republics experienced reduced mortality, but, despite rapid declines, fertility is still above replacement level (at 3-4 children per woman). The economic and social dislocation of the breakup of the republics has hastened fertility decline. The annual population growth rate of the USSR in the mid-1980s was 0.9%; this rate declined to 0.4% in 1991, and the decline has continued. The 1991 population of the USSR was 289.1 million. Between 1989 and 1991, the crude birth rate was 18/1000 population, and the crude death rate was 10/1000. The net migration rate of -4/1000 helped to reduce growth. Total fertility in the USSR was 2.3 children in 1990. In Russia, fertility declined from 1.9 in 1990 to 1.4 in 1993. The preferred family size in Russia was 1.9 in 1990 and 1.5 in 1993. This decline occurred due to lack of confidence in the economy and insufficient income. Only 19% of women used contraception in 1990. Marriages declined after 1990. Age pyramids were similar in the republics in that there was a narrowing in the proportion aged 45-49 years, and the male population aged over 65 years was diminished, due to the effect of World War II. The cohort of those aged 20-24 years in 1992 was very small due to the small parental birth cohort. The differences in the republics was characterized as broad-based in the younger ages because of high fertility. The number of childbearing women will remain large. Life expectancy has been 70 years since the 1950s and has declined in some republics due to substandard health care, lack of job safety measures, and alcoholism. Some republics experienced increased life expectancy, but, after 1991, mortality increased. Tajikistan had the highest infant mortality of 47/1000 live births in 1993. A demographic profile provided for each republic offers several population projection scenarios.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.