论公民道德建设与社会控制机制

公民道德建设不但是贯彻以德治国的具体举措,而且是社会转型期维护社会稳定的重要手段。道德控制是与制度化控制相辅相成的有利的社会控制手段,它在社会控制中的作用是由其不同于制度化控制的特点决定的:它是“人类精神的自律”、重在引导激励人们的行为、直接关注行为者的精神世界,可起到消除违规观念、防止越轨行为发生的作用。运用道德建设方式加强社会控制,必须从基础道德建设入手、消除妨碍公民道德建设的不利因素、创造良好的社会和社区氛围。     

Kuhn's impossibility proof and the moral element in scientific explanations

Thomas S. Kuhn and others have arrived at the conclusion that at certain stages of investigation scientists cannot have recourse to criteria by which to justify their choices and actions. From this they have inferred that the choices made at these stages cannot be justified, leaving the impression that scientists may not be responsible for acting in some (sound, right, correct) as opposed to other (wrong, unsound, incorrect) ways in those circumstances. Kuhn's judgment is that in the last analysis it is so called subjective aesthetic considerations that will determine the actions taken.In this paper I argue that Kuhn fails to consider criteria of justification not provided by some field of science itself. He appears even to reject the possibility of invoking such field-invariant (S. Toulmin's term) criteria. He also seems to reject recourse to metaphysical first principles, without even giving these a polite perusal. Finally he does not allow for any possible moral element within these types of human activities - i.e., people faced with dilemmas in or out of science.I end by indicating how we might approach the Kuhnean type of choices and actions from within a moral perspective. The notion of acting as guided by moral rules is rejected since in stress cases the same problems occur here as do with paradigm selections namely we are left without rules. I suggest that the moral element consists, broadly, in exerting the effort needed to find solutions, in moral integrity, conscientiousness or the like. Mainly, however, I argue that how this moral element is to be characterized (identified) will in such cases have to await the occurrence of the dilemma and its solution. That is its uniqueness. But it does not exclude the possibility that once these cases have emerged, they should be discovered to require a given approach, not another. This, in turn, allows that the actions to be taken be justifiable and even that those who face the situation are responsible to discover how to act under the circumstances.     

Social ontology,practical reasonableness,and collective reasons for action

I argue that the ontology of human social institutions and collective intentionality could be anchored in the normative notion of ‘practical reasonableness’ as collective reason for action. This involves the deontic idea of mutuality, accepted rules, and shared attitudes of other‐regardedness. I examine John Searle's three primitive notions of social ontology: collective intentionality, assignment of social functions, and constitutive rules and procedures. I use these notions to provide a plausible basis for understanding how people reason, in order to arrive at practically reasonable decisions and collective agency. Searle argues that social reality, institutions, processes, and facts are grounded in collective intentionality and the acceptance of social rules, procedures, and functions. I argue that collective intentionality and socially accepted rules are anchored in the need for human interdependence that engenders the social rules and norms or attitudes of ‘practical reasonableness’. I analyze the concept of ‘practical reasonableness’ as a representation of human mode of reasoning that involves collective intentionality.     

Having Our Dogs and Eating Them Too: Why Animals Are a Social Issue

Until recently, the study of people's relationships and interactions with other (nonhuman) animals has received scant attention from the social sciences. The preceding articles in this issue illustrate some of the important insights such studies can bring to the field. Animals, by their nature, occupy an intermediate boundary zone between the world of human subjects and the world of insensate objects or "things." This ambiguity allows us to exploit most of them with relative impunity, while simultaneously endowing some of them with the status of quasi-human social partners or even kin. It also confronts us with fundamental questions about what it means to be "human" and how far, if at all, our moral responsibilities should extend beyond the taxonomic limits of our species. Our efforts to reconcile these competing and opposing perspectives have generated extraordinary inconsistencies in attitudes and behavior toward animals: inconsistencies that pose significant challenges to current understandings of human psychology, sociology, and morality.     

Some criteria for making decisions concerning the distribution of scarce medical resources

In this paper I proceed on the assumption that moral philosophers can and should contribute to the resolution of perplexing moral problems. The ones considered here relate to decisions concerning the distribution of scarce medical resources as between those in need of treatment. I draw on considerations of egalitarianism and concern for the maximization of the use of scarce resources in the task of satisfying basic human needs (such as for good health). I propose certain principles and offer some supporting suggestions as guidelines or rules for medical decisions with a view to providing a helpful decision procedure for the various persons (doctors, community panels and so on) whose task it is to make the life-or-death decisions involved in allocating certain scarce medical resources.     

Autism, Empathy and Questions of Moral Agency

In moral psychology, it has long been argued that empathy is a necessary capacity of both properly developing moral agents and developed moral agency ( Blair, 2008 ; Hume et al., 1978 ). This view stands in tension with the belief that some individuals diagnosed with autism—which is typically characterized as a deficiency in social reciprocity (including empathy)—are moral agents. In this paper we propose to explore this tension and perhaps trouble how we commonly see those with autism. To make this task manageable, we will consider whether high functioning individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder are capable of empathetic responses. If they are, then they possess a capacity that, on the view above, is required for moral agency. If they are not so capable, and yet sometimes engage in moral behaviour, this casts some doubt on the claim that empathy is required for moral agency. This second possibility will necessitate an exploration of the capacity of some individuals with autism to engage in moral behaviour, giving us further grounds to re-see these individuals as moral agents.     

吕大临佚文《西铭解》辑释

吕大临佚文《西铭解》因在史籍中的著录方式与他的其他著述不同,故长期以来很少被人注意。因此需要对其内容进行了辑佚和校勘,对其注释风格和思维转向进行分析,吕大临在注释时广泛用典、据己意解经改经,相对于张载《西铭》"推天道以明人事"的易学旨趣,他在思维方式上转向了"人道具则天道具"。     

中国古代德治传统及其借鉴

中国古代德治传统 ,一是要求统治者集团以身作则 ,注意修身和勤政 ,充分发挥道德感化作用。二是重视对民众的道德教化 ,“为政以德” ,德主刑辅。前者忽视常人本性 ,仅靠道德觉悟解决廉政勤政过于理想化 ,因此德治必须和法制相结合。后者洋溢的“民本”思想和利用家族伦理关系进行道德教育的做法值得借鉴 ,但要区分民本和民主的界限 ,警惕过分推崇道德 ,导致道德化法律的危险。法治包含工具性价值和目的性价值两层含义。法治和德治只是在工具性价值层面上相辅相成、相互促进     

论人权的两面性

人权的两面指的是作为道德权利的一面和作为道德义务的一面。人们在理解人权之概念时,往往只看到其道德权利一面,而极少看到其道德义务一面。其实,作为道德权利的人权表达的是人之为人应该具备的资格和人之尊严的价值,它强调了人权之目的与理想;而作为道德义务的人权则表达了人权实现的手段与工具价值,注重了人权之现实。作为道德权利的人权与作为道德义务的人权,应当是我们在完整理解人权时皆须认真对待的,二者不可偏废。     

Emotions and Moral Motivation

One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as embedded in agentic processes, and regulated by conscious concerns. So understood, emotions acquire an important role in the person's moral life. These conclusions are reached through an extensive review of psychological and philosophical conceptions.     

The effect of intent and character information on children's evaluations of third-party transgressions

Research in adults suggests that their perception of moral transgressions is affected by the moral character of the agent performing the transgression, such that undesirable actions enacted by ‘good’ agents are seen as less serious than those performed by ‘bad’ agents. This may be partly driven our tendency to view undesirable acts as less intentional when the agent has a perceived good moral character. It is currently unclear whether or not children make similar judgements. Therefore, we investigated if children's use of moral character information is consistent with their judgements of transgressions when the intent behind the act was ambiguous or blatant. Children aged 6–8-years (N = 60) viewed a series of six moral transgressions in which the protagonist's intent was ambiguous or blatantly harmful, and their moral character was described as being good, mixed or bad. The children were then asked how much they felt the behaviour was intentional, how severe it was and the degree of punishment it deserved. Transgressions performed by ‘good’ characters were viewed as less intentional than those by ‘bad’ characters, but only when the intent behind it was ambiguous. Similarly, transgressions performed by good characters were viewed as less severe and deserving of less punishment than those performed by bad characters, although this effect was not moderated by intent information. These pattern of findings suggest that the view of transgressions performed by good individuals as less serious than the same act performed by bad individuals is established early in development.     

On Harrod's first refining principle

Harrod introduced a refinement to crude Utilitarianism with the aim of reconciling it with common sense ethics. It is shown (a) that this refinement (later known as Rule Utilitarianism) does not maximise utility (b) the principle which truly maximizes utility, marginal private benefit equals marginal social cost, requires that a number of forbidden acts like lying be performed. Hence Harrod's claim that his refined Utilitarianism is the foundation of moral institutions cannot be sustained. Some more modern forms of Utilitarianism are reinterpreted in this paper as utility maximizing decision rules. While they produce more utility than Harrod's rule, they require breaking the moral rules some of the time, just like the marginal rule mentioned above. However, Harrod's rule is useful in warning the members of a group, considered as a single moral agent, of the externalities that lie beyond the immediate consequences of the collective action.     

Comparison of the Polar Decision Rules for Various Types of Distributions

We focus on the dichotomous choice model, which goes back as far as Condorcet (1785; Essai sur l'application de l'analyse a la probabilité des décisions rendues a la pluralité des voix, Paris). A group of experts is required to select one of two alternatives, of which exactly one is regarded as correct. The alternatives may be related to a wide variety of areas. A decision rule translates the individual opinions of the members into a group decision. A decision rule is optimal if it maximizes the probability of the group to make a correct choice. In this paper we assume the correctness probabilities of the experts to be independent random variables, selected from some given distribution. Moreover, the ranking of the members in the team is (at least partly) known. Thus, one can follow rules based on this ranking. The polar different rules are the expert and the majority rules. The probabilities of the two polar rules being optimal were compared in a series of papers. The main purpose of this paper is to outline the results, providing exact formulas or estimates for these probabilities. We consider a variety of distributions and show that for all of these distributions the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilities of the two polar rules follows the same patterns.     

What is Behaviour? And (when) is Language Behaviour? A Metatheoretical Definition

Behaviour is central to many fields, but metatheoretical definitions specifying the most basic assumptions about what is considered behaviour and what is not are largely lacking. This transdisciplinary research explores the challenges in defining behaviour, highlighting anthropocentric biases and a frequent lack of differentiation from physiological and psychical phenomena. To meet these challenges, the article elaborates a metatheoretical definition of behaviour that is applicable across disciplines and that allows behaviours to be differentiated from other kinds of phenomena. This definition is used to explore the phenomena of language and to scrutinise whether and under what conditions language can be considered behaviour and why. The metatheoretical concept of two different levels of meaning conveyed in human language is introduced, highlighting that language inherently relies on behaviours and that the content of what‐is‐being‐said, in and of itself, can constitute (interpersonal) behaviour under particular conditions. The analyses reveal the ways in which language meaningfully extends human's behavioural possibilities, pushing them far beyond anything enabled by non‐language behaviours. These novel metatheoretical concepts can complement and expand on existing theories about behaviour and language and contribute a novel piece of theoretical explanation regarding the crucial role that language has played in human evolution.     

The 'Unbearable Lightness' of the Economic Approach to Economic Behavior in the Social Setting: Rational Action and the Sociology of the Economy

This article entails endeavours to properly conceive the theoretical-methodoÍlogical relations between sociology of the economy or economic sociology and the economic approach to human behaviour or rational action theory. These endeavors are induced by recent proposals for an economic approach to economic sociology and other conflations between the two disciplines. Such proposals exemplify the tendency of rational action theorists to dissolve economic (and all) sociology into their universalist 'theory of everything'. Many economic sociologists display a bona fide attitude toward such extensions of the economic approach albeit these can be essentially incongruous with a sociological perspective on the economy as advanced by their discipline. The article allows for the possibility that the economic approach to economic sociology is unsustainable in epistemological terms. This would imply epistemologically non-rational grounds for the attraction of economic sociologists to the economic approach to human behaviour.     

What difference do different settings in residential care make for young people? A comparison of family‐style homes and institutions in Sweden

Residential care in Sweden has undergone great change in recent decades. With new small family-style institutions, the boundaries between residential care and foster care have been blurred. Almost all residential care used to be run by the public sector. Today about 80 per cent is privately run. This study compares three different settings in residential care: institutions run by the public sector, privately run institutions and family-style homes. Among other things, it is found that the institutions run by the public sector have better educated staff and a higher staff–resident ratio than privately run institutions. Despite this, they are more restrictive in their intake and they have youths with fewer problems, especially delinquency and other antisocial behaviour. The results are discussed in relation to developments in the residential care sector in Sweden and in relation to the balance between care and treatment.     

Characteristic properties of FPTP systems

In this article, we model FPTP systems as social preference rules and give two characterizations. We show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms of subset consistency, district consistency, subset cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization consists of the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto optimality, district consistency and district cancellation. The characterizations give us an opportunity to compare the characteristic properties of FPTP systems to the characteristic properties that we found for list systems of proportional representation (list PR systems) in Hout et al. (Social Choice and Welfare, 27:459–475, 2006), where we modelled those systems also as social preference rules. We find that consistency and anonymity distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems. On the other hand, it is district cancellation that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems.     

Morality and welfare

The economic theory of utility does not take into account moral behaviour, that is behaviour in which an individual faced with two courses of action may choose the one which is less profitable to him. It is shown in this paper that the economic approach can be broadened to take such behaviour into account. The individual is considered to maximize a higher welfare function whose arguments are (a) his utility and (b) higher goods or moral value. The latter are goals which he ought to achieve. The amount of higher goods achieved depends upon his moral preference. The ranking of different acts is complete - an assumption commonly made in economics with regard to bundles of goods. In an extension of the economic model of optimization over time, the individual is considered to maximize his higher welfare over his lifetime. This may require raising his moral preference.     

Institutional Violations,Costs and Attitudes

The paper proposes an alternative approach to the ontology of social institutions by systematizing various normative institutional influences and identifying processes that distinguish between conforming and violating behaviour. The prevailing – cost-based model – suggests that an agent's conformity to a specific institutional rule can be represented by a single measure – cost. The model is limited in its explanatory potential since it accounts for varieties of institutional behaviour in terms of single parametrical changes in the agents' utilities. The central argument shows that normative attitudes represent a distinctive normative structure capable of explaining crucial aspects of institutional behaviour. These attitudinal aspects provide the structure necessary for understanding institutional normativity and its violations.     

论当代大学生的网络责任感

网络的迅速发展与普及,一方面有利于大学生开阔视野,学习新知识,思考新问题,更为全面地认识世界;另一方面,由于大学生正处于人生观、价值观、世界观形成时期,缺乏足够的辨别力与抵御力,很容易沉溺其中,对自身良好网络道德意识、网络责任感的养成构成了极大的挑战。为此有必要加强网络德育工作,健全各种规章制度,做到自律与他律相结合,增强大学生的网络责任感,使其更好地适应网络社会的发展需要。