控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值

本文在“控制性家族—双重三层委托代理问题—企业价值”假说基础上,将2004年212家上市家族企业分为创业型家族企业(FFB)和非创业型家族企业(N-FFB)两类,发现虽然两者都属于家族企业,但面临着不同的代理冲突:FFB主要面临着第一重代理问题——业主和经理人之间的代理问题,尽管业主权威能降低代理成本,但家族内部的利他主义加剧了业主和家族经理人之间的代理问题,没有证据表明控制性家族存在系统性侵占社会股东利益的情况。相反,N-FFB主要面临着第二重代理问题——控制性家族和分散的社会股东之间的代理冲突,控制性家族通过隧道行为侵占外部股东利益的情况已经比较严重,这类代理冲突随着控制权和现金流权偏离程度的扩大而恶化。     

家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为——基于资产减值的研究

以2004~2013年沪深两市上市家族企业为样本,本文研究家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为。基于CEO更换附近的大清洗行为,本文研究发现家族企业CEO更换过程中存在利他主义,体现为离任CEO在离任前通过多计提减值准备的方式为继任CEO制造"秘密储备"。进一步研究表明不同类型的CEO更换体现出了不同程度的利他主义,家族成员内部权力交接时,离任CEO的利他主义行为最为明显,其次是职业经理人传家族成员。而家族成员传职业经理人和职业经理人传职业经理人时,主要体现为继任CEO在更换当年的大清洗行为。本文的结论对家族企业CEO更换的相关研究具有借鉴意义,也有助于资本市场投资者理解和认识家族企业CEO更换附近的大清洗行为。     

外戚“干政”?姻亲涉入与家族企业代理成本

由血缘与姻缘关系所缔结的家族企业一直受到诸多学者的关注，但长期以来姻亲与血亲成员被完全等同，假定他们在目标、决策行为等方面具有同质性.本研究以公司实际控制人的姻亲家族成员作为分析对象，基于社会嵌入理论提出了姻亲代理人假说.基于中国家族上市公司的数据，研究发现：公司实际控制人的姻亲方成员涉入企业将显著提高家族企业的代理成本，姻亲代理人假说得到验证；公司实际控制人的中立的父辈对家族冲突起到显著的缓解作用，有助于弱化姻亲成员涉入企业所产生的代理成本.另外，实际控制人的配偶涉入和血亲涉入会产生不同于姻亲涉入的代理成本，不同亲缘关系远近的血亲与姻亲参与治理也会带来不同程度的代理成本；女性家庭地位与公司非家族大股东的制衡将对姻亲涉入所带来的代理成本起到不同的作用.本研究进一步丰富了家族企业代理问题的研究成果，对家族企业建立完善的治理机制具有重要的借鉴意义.     

家族控制、职业化经营与公司治理效率——来自CEO变更的经验证据

本文以2002-2008年上市公司为研究样本,从CEO变更的视角,考察了家族控制和职业化经营特征对不同类型家族企业公司治理效率的影响.研究发现,由于家族所有权与管理层的分离以及家族控制对管理层的有效监督,相对于非家族企业和家族CEO企业,在职业经理人担任CEO的家族企业中,代理问题较低,CEO变更与公司业绩之间具有较强的敏感性,公司治理效率较高.家族职业化治理效率的实现机制主要是所有权监督和董事席位控制.进一步研究发现,在公司较差的经营业绩期间,CEO变更决策所导致的代理问题会影响公司价值.上述研究结论说明,在CEO变更的情境中,家族控制特征降低职业化经营的家族企业中的代理问题,加重家族成员担任CEO的企业中的代理问题.     

创业型家族企业中的亲缘关系与代理成本

运用2004~2011年的非平衡面板数据,对创业型家族企业中的亲缘关系如何影响代理成本进行实证研究。结论如下:1家族成员卷入企业经营管理的可能性和程度可以有效地降低代理成本;2家族成员担任董事或者CEO可以有效地降低与在职消费关联的代理成本,但在降低与管理效率关联的代理成本方面作用并不显著。此外,研究表明董事会规模和独立性不能有效地降低代理成本。     

关于中国家族企业治理模式的相关研究

中国的民营经济经过改革开放至今30多年的发展,无论是在促进经济发展、促进就业还是在刺激消费方面都做出了突出的贡献。但是,民营企业普遍采取的家族管理模式却被主流经济学视为日渐衰弱的组织形式,并且最终要被职业经理人控制,以委托-代理机制为核心的现代企业制度所取代。但是基于中国现有家族企业的现状、中国职业经理人市场不发达的现实,中国的民营企业陷入了一种管理上的困难局面。本文就将结合现阶段中国民营企业发展的特点,对于家族企业制度存在的可能性、必要性做出分析,试图证明家族企业制度对于中国民营中小企业的发展是有益的。     

我国家族企业家长制管理模式存在的问题研究

家族企业是当前我国普遍存在的企业组织形式,对我国的经济有着重要的影响。在我国家族企业的管理中,家长制的管理模式是70%-80%的民营企业的普遍管理模式。在创业初期,家长制的管理确实促进了企业的发展。但随着企业的发展壮大,家长制管理的弊端就日益显露出来。本文通过对家族企业家长制管理模式进行分析,提出了家族企业在管理上的一些改革意见。     

我国家族企业家长制管理模式存在的问题研究

家族企业是当前我国普遍存在的企业组织形式,对我国的经济有着重要的影响。在我国家族企业的管理中,家长制的管理模式是70%-80%的民营企业的普遍管理模式。在创业初期,家长制的管理确实促进了企业的发展。但随着企业的发展壮大,家长制管理的弊端就日益显露出来。本文通过对家族企业家长制管理模式进行分析,提出了家族企业在管理上的一些改革意见。     

家族成员组合与公司治理效率:基于家族上市公司的实证研究

家族成员内部的组合是家族治理安排的重要内容之一,不同的家族成员组合模式将对家族企业治理效率产生不同程度的影响.本文假定家族成员具有利他主义动机、趋同性与行动一致性,但也具有自利动机、目标与偏好差异性.基于此,本文将家族成员的组合模式分为核心家庭成员主导型、远亲家族成员主导型、复合家族成员主导型,并基于中国家族上市公司的数据,以家族持股成员作为分析对象,对这些家族成员组合模式的功效进行了实证检验.本文的研究结论表明:(1)不同家族成员组合内部,其冲突与代理问题是存在差异的,核心家庭成员内部的冲突与代理问题最低,这种组合能够创造最优的治理效率;远亲家族成员内部与复合家族成员内部存在显著的矛盾与代理问题,这种组合明显不利于提高公司治理效率.(2)家族成员为了其自身的家族财富最大化能够凝聚在一起,采取一致性的监督管理者或侵占其他非家族股东利益的行为.但家族成员的一致性行为主要体现在核心家族成员内部以及以核心家庭成员为主的复合家族成员组合中,而远亲家族成员很难采取一致性的决策行为.本文的研究为进一步探索家族公司治理机制的本质提供了一个新的方向.     

家族企业研究综述

家族企业是一种企业组织形态,由于家族企业治理过程中掺杂许多非正式制度因素,例如信任、社会交往、关系网络等,使得家族企业治理研究不同于传统意义的委托代理理论。本文通过阐述家族企业定义的基础上,总结了家族企业治理理论、传承机理、管理模式,最后提出中国家族企业发展中遇到的问题及解决建议。     

互联网的经济效果与对营销学的冲击

本文通过回顾新的信息基础即互联网的发展进程及其对电子商务的意义,从经济学方面探讨互联网的经济效果,包括代理成本、交易成本、网络外部性三部分的分析阐述了互联网对于市场、营销体制和营销实践的冲击.提出,电子商务仍是一种不确定的商务模式,需要着眼于消费者及营销体制,对市场变化的结果进行营销学领域的系统性研究.     

家族企业接班人的胜任—绩效建模——基于越商代际传承的实证分析

接班人的选择与培养对于家族企业的生存发展至关重要。本文通过文献回顾、深度访谈和问卷调查方式,采用探索性和验证性因子分析方法构建了家族企业接班人的胜任—绩效模型。结果显示,模型具有较好的拟合度,家族企业接班人胜任能力包括社会网络、政府关系、发现机会、承担风险、资源整合、战略决策、学习创新和科学管理八个因子,其中,前四个因子和后四个因子可以分别归属于管理素质和管理技能两个一级因子;家族企业的继承绩效包括客观绩效和主观绩效两个因子,其中,客观绩效包括人才结构、产品技术、品牌形象、市场份额、利润增长和企业规模六个二级因子,而主观绩效主要包括家族满意和员工满意两个二级因子;社会网络、学习创新、政府关系、资源整合等因子对于家族企业的继承绩效具有更显著的相关性关系,而社会网络和政府关系对于企业继承的影响颇具中国特色。     

A Review of Theory in Family Business Research: The Implications for Corporate Governance

In recent years, increasing scholarly attention has been directed toward the field of family business research. Based on an exhaustive sample of 235 publications, this article provides a comprehensive review and a critical assessment of the theoretical underpinnings and corporate governance issues in family business research. Three predominant theoretical perspectives, namely principal–agent theory, stewardship theory and the resource‐based view of the firm, have emerged and provide empirical evidence that family businesses significantly differ from non‐family firms in important dimensions such as agency costs, competitive advantages or corporate governance structure. On their own, none of the aforementioned perspectives succeeds in addressing all complexities associated with family businesses and their corporate governance. Accordingly, joint approaches combining different theoretical frameworks can help to improve understanding of the family business. The article concludes by discussing possible directions for future research that might further contribute to building a comprehensive theory of the family business and its corporate governance.     

Public planners and business investors—Why can't they collaborate?

Effective long-range investment plans covering international asset management will take into account not only the business environment but external factors, especially political and regulatory uncertainties, which can dampen profits and cash flows anticipated over the economic life of the projected investment. Although financial concession packages promoted by development agencies tend to compensate for some of these costs arising from uncertainties, this approach to industrial development is fraught with obstacles. A closer examination of one such program reveals why concessioned firms are leaving or failing, despite numerous advantages, and why the developement agency may be unable to offset future adverse trends.     

Ownership Strategy and Foreign Affiliate Performance in Multinational Family Business Groups: A Double-edged Sword

We argue that ownership strategies can be a double edged sword for multinational family business groups from emerging economies and the performance of their affiliates located abroad. We test an integrated framework based on internalization and agency theory on a longitudinal dataset of multinational family business groups from Taiwan. We find evidence for the contingent impact of cultural differences and family management on the association between ownership strategy and affiliate performance. While direct ownership is seen as offering more control over the affiliate, we show that this comes at a performance cost for affiliates in culturally different host countries and affiliates under family management. Indirect ownership seems to be one way to positively influence affiliate performance in culturally distant countries, but seems not to be contingent on family management utilization.     

Entrenchment in publicly traded family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500

Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels of family ownership.     

股权集中,投资决策与代理成本

通过建立实物期权模型,我们分析了集中股权结构下,股东异质性所导致的控股股东代理冲突对企业投资决策和负债融资代理成本的影响。研究发现,集中股权结构下的控股股东价值最大化动机会导致过度投资的产生,并显著提高负债融资的代理成本,即控股股东的价值侵占行为不仅影响到大小股东间的代理冲突,而且会加重股东与债权人之间的代理冲突。控股股东的持股比例会产生公司治理的正向激励效应,持股比例的增加会降低过度投资程度、增加企业价值和降低负债融资代理成本。而控制权和现金流权的分离则会产生公司治理的负向侵占效应,分离程度的增加会导致更严重的过度投资、更低的企业价值和更高的负债融资代理成本。     

机构投资者、代理成本与公司价值——基于随机前沿模型及门槛回归的实证分析

本文运用随机前沿模型,从代理成本的视角出发,实证检验了以证券投资基金为代表的机构投资者对公司价值的影响。研究结果表明,机构投资者持股对公司价值具有显著正面影响,但同时也表现出明显的“倒L”型特征。基于这一发现,进一步采用Hansen（1999）提出的面板门槛模型,测算了机构投资者对公司价值的影响发生显著结构性变化时的门槛水平,结果表明,当机构持股比例超过大约12%时,机构投资者对公司价值的提升作用会大幅减弱。同时,本文还发现,开放式基金相较于封闭式基金对公司价值的提升具有更加积极的作用。     

Promotional pricing and online business model choice in the presence of retail competition

Online promotional channels provided by competitive conventional reselling or novel agency selling e-tailers are widely used by firms to stimulate significant sales in retail. Compared with reselling, agency selling gives firms the power to directly control prices, but it involves costly platform fees. Given the unique features of the reselling and agency selling business models, we develop game theoretic models to explore how the firm and e-tailers, under consideration of retail competition, should strategically use these two business models in promotion. Our analysis generates several insights. We demonstrate that the agency selling model might lead to a higher price than the reselling model, a result contrary to the double marginalization. We also present that without retail competition, there exists a “win-win” promotional strategy, which is also a Pareto-optimal situation for the firm and e-tailer. Specifically, this situation occurs when the e-tailer is in the reselling model under a moderate inventory level or in the agency selling model with a moderate platform fee under a high inventory level. However, under conditions of competitive e-tailers, both e-tailers being in the reselling model is no longer a “win-win” promotional strategy, while the hybrid selling model, i.e., one in the reselling model and the other in the agency selling model, can generate a Pareto improvement. In addition, low platform fees, customers’ high price sensitivities, increased selling costs or decreased competitive intensities will drive supply chain participants to seek direct pricing power in the agency selling model.     

Transformational Leadership Education and Agency Perspectives in Business School Pedagogy: A Marriage of Inconvenience?

We critique transformational leadership education in university business schools based on a literature review, a study of the websites of 21 leading business schools, and an analysis of two presentations to business school students at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University by the former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch. Our critique draws attention to the unresolved tension between two motivating ideas that underpin much teaching in business schools: collective interest ideas that permeate transformational leadership education; and self-interest ideas derived from agency theory. Transformational leadership tends to be depicted as a process by which leaders exert a 'top-down' influence over the activities of others, while simultaneously asserting that their organizations have a common purpose and pursue a collective interest. We highlight the risk that business schools are producing graduates who will attempt to appeal to common needs (guided by precepts of transformational leadership) but who will simultaneously enact contradictory performance management systems (guided by agency theory). We encourage business school educators in leadership to adopt approaches which are more critical, relational and reflexive. We suggest some general directions for an alternative leadership prospectus, based on followership, the promotion of critical upward communication within organizations, and the recognition of leadership as a contested, discursive and co-constructed phenomenon.