German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy

The mathematical theory of democracy is applied to analyze the German Bundestag elections 2009 and to evaluate five German leading parties and their coalitions from the viewpoint of direct democracy. For this purpose, the positions of the parties on over 30 topical issues are compared with results of public opinion polls. The outcomes are summarized in the party indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency of representing a majority). It is shown that the election winner 2009, the conservative party CDU/CSU, has a quite low representativeness (ranked fourth), whereas the most representative is the left party die Linke which received only 11.9% votes. It is concluded that voters are not very consistent with their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven by political traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. To bridge approaches of representative and direct democracy, some modifications to the election procedure are proposed, which, among other things, complicate vote manipulations.     

Soziale Einflüsse auf die Klassenwahl im Generationen- und Periodenvergleich:

Social influences on the class vote result in a higher SPD-vote of workers who live in class homogeneous environments. These environments can be operationalized as ego-centric networks. In West Germany, these social influences are restricted to older cohorts and earlier Bundestag elections. This result gets corroborated by applying a more sophisticated dynamic version of an influence model, which analyses the relationship between party identification and the vote intention. It is shown that workers who do not identify with a party get mobilized as SPD-voters during election campaigns if they have contacts with other workers. This effect cannot be observed with ALLBUS-data from 1980, 1990 and 2000 for which interviewing did not take place during election campaigns. What has not changed in the last decades is the recruitment of friends and acquaintances from the same social class and subjective class identification under the impact of class homogeneous networks. What has changed is the politisation of these class homogeneous networks.     

How important are political interest and internal political efficacy in the prediction of political participation? Longitudinal evidence from Germany / La importancia del interés en la polític y dae la eficacia política interna en la predicción de la participación política. Datos longitudinales originados en Alemania

This study aims to disentangle the effects of interest in politics and internal political efficacy in the prediction of different political activities. The analysis examines the hypothesis that political interest is a more important precursor of electoral and unconventional political participation, and that both political interest and efficacy are required to promote participation in political parties. Using the German Longitudinal Election Study, multiple regression analyses yield that political efficacy is a strong and positive predictor of intentions to participate in party politics and unconventional political behaviour. Political interest has differential effects on voting conditional on whether respondents are surveyed before or after elections, and differential moderated effects appear for conventional and unconventional political action. The findings are discussed with respect to the importance of political interest and efficacy for citizen participation.     

Pre-election polling and third party candidates

I analyze voters’ incentives in responding to pre-election polls with a third party candidate. Third party supporters normally have an incentive to vote strategically in the election by voting for one of the major candidates. But these voters would vote third party if the third party candidate is doing surprisingly well in the polls. Because voters are more likely to vote third party if the third party candidate is doing well in polls, voters who like the third party candidate best have an incentive to claim they will vote third party in the polls so that more voters will ultimately vote third party in the election. The differing incentives faced during polls and elections accounts for why third party candidates do better in polls than in elections.     

More than ideology: perceived unfairness differentiates supporters of a new anti-austerity party from supporters of traditional left-wing parties / Más que ideología: la injusticia percibida diferencia a los simpatizantes de un nuevo partido antiausteridad de los simpatizantes de los partidos tradicionales de izquierda

After the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008, anti-austerity parties in South Europe have gained prominence and dramatically transformed the political landscape. In Spain, the emergence of PODEMOS, a left-wing, anti-austerity party, has jeopardized the traditional two-party system. However, little is known about the psychological reasons that prompted more than one million Spaniards to vote for a newly created party in its first elections. To fill this gap the present study examines why people intend to vote for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. We found that in addition to conventional predictors of voting behaviour (ideological orientation and party identification), perceived unfairness — a key variable within the collective action theory — critically influenced the preference for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. A qualitative analysis of the reasons that participants reported in an open question yielded similar results. These findings suggest that supporting an anti-austerity party might be considered a collective action aimed at promoting social change.     

Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey

Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are differentiated by differing valences??the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a ??convergence coefficient??, defined in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. We estimate pure spatial models and models with sociodemographic valences, and use simulations to compare the equilibrium predictions with the estimated party positions.     

Campaign Activities and Electoral Outcomes in Britain 1979 and 1983

Political broadcasting through the electronic media has largelydisplaced two older methods of influencing voters—canvassingand advertising in the press—as the dominant party campaignactivity during elections. This article utilizes survey datacollected during the 1979 and 1983 British general electionsto estimate the reported effects of these three types of campaignactivity on electoral outcomes. The results show that few votersreport being influenced by canvassing and advertising, and thenet effect on the vote is either small or nonexistent. By contrast,around 1 in 6 report being influenced by a party political broadcast,and those most influenced are eventual Liberal-Alliance voters.The net electoral effect of political broadcasting can rangeas high as 3.4 percent, but gains for the Conservatives andLabour are offset by the political broadcasting of competitors.The main exceptions are the Liberals in 1979 and the Alliancein 1983, who made a net gain of 1.5 percent and 3.3 percentof the vote, respectively.     

Gleich und gleich gesellt sich gern — auch im Wahlkampf?

Does the well-known effect of social position on party preference depend on the distance to election day? Based on findings on campaign effects, it is argued that the effect of social position on party preference could vary over time, especially it may react on changes in political communication in campaign phases: parties appeal to their social bases, and therefore the effect of social position on party preference may rise in election campaigns; furthermore, this means that throughout a parliamentary term the partisan effect of social position should first weaken and later rise again. These hypotheses are tested empirically against trend data (Politbarometer) and panel data covering the German federal elections 1972 to 1998. Empirically, however, the core hypotheses are rejected: the structuring effect of social position is almost constant throughout parliamentary terms. Hence, federal election campaigns in Germany do not strengthen the partisan effect of social position substantially.     

A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

We construct an equilibrium model of party competition, in which parties are especially concerned with their core and swing voters, concerns which political scientists have focused upon in their attempts to understand party behavior in general elections. Parties compete on an inifinite-dimensional space of possible income-tax policies. A policy is a function that maps pre-fisc income into post-fisc income. Only a fraction of each voter type will vote for each party, perhaps because of issues not modeled here or voter misperceptions of policies. Each party??s policy makers comprise two factions, one concerned with maximizing the welfare of its constituency, or its core, and the other with winning over swing voters. An equilibrium is a pair of parties (endogenously determined), and a pair of policies, one for each party, in which no deviation to another policy will be assented to both its core and swing factions. We characterize the equilibria: they have the property that both parties propose identical treatment of a possibly large interval of middle-income voters, while the ??left?? party gives more to the poor and the ??right?? party more to the rich. An empirical section uses the data of Piketty and Saez on taxation in the US to assess the model??s predictions. We argue that the model is roughly confirmed.     

Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty

After an election, when party positions and strengths are known, there may be a centrally located large party at the core position. Theory suggests that such a core party is able to form a minority government and control policy. In the absence of a core party, theory suggests that the outcome be a lottery associated with coalition risk. Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. This paper first presents an existence theorem for local Nash equilibrium (LNE) under vote maximization, and then constructs a more general model using the notion of coalition risk. The model allows for the balancing of office and policy motivations. Empirical analyses of elections in the Netherlands and Israel are used as illustrations of the model and of the concept of a structurally stable LNE. The figures and tables are reproduced from Schofield and Sened (2006) with permission from Cambridge University Press.     

Union campaign activities and voter preferences

The impact of campaign activity on voting preferences in union representation elections is investigated using a panel study approach. The context of this study is a four-year, multicampus, university system, in which two faculty unions competed vigorously for representation rights for several years. We propose a multivariate model of individual voting intentions which, we argue, depend on the precampaign expected consequences of collective bargaining, recent changes in institutional conditions, various normative and value constraints, and union campaign activity. Both self-reports of exposure to campaign activity and exogenous measures of campus-specific organizing efforts are used in the analysis. The use of exogenous indicators of campaign activity, which we argue is more appropriate, suggests that campaign activity exerts no appreciable effect on the manner in which individuals vote in such elections. Policy implications of these findings are discussed. The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version.     

Why Is Turnout Down?

The monotonic decline in turnout in presidential elections since1960 is the subject of this analysis of survey data. After somecommon explanations for this decline were rejected, it was discoveredthat the decline occurred mainly among low-income and low-educationwhites. Two explanatory hypotheses were examined, but appropriatedata for testing themwere unavailable; however, in the 1970snonvoters were more likely than voters at all income levelsto express dissatisfaction with the political system. Nonvotingwhites are not always a Democratic group, and their voting behavioris unpredictable over time. Their failure to vote may have anespecially significant impact on Democratic party policies,and implies that palliatives like reform of voter registrationlaws may not have the desired effect.     

The impact of legislator and constituency ideology on voting on the assault weapons ban

Using variables that represent a legislator's entire legal constituency, previous research by social scientists has concluded that views of the legislator's constituency have little effect on how legislators vote. This question is reexamined by defining constituency as those voters most likely to vote for the legislator (i.e., members of the legislator's own political party and independents). Furthermore, instead of measuring constituency by either a demographic or vote-based measure, a survey measure of the ideological identification of voters (i.e., the voter's self-identification as liberal, moderate, or conservative) is introduced. It is found that the ideology of a senator's electoral constituency was an important factor on the recent U.S. Senate vote to ban 19 semi-automatic assault weapons. The findings have important implications for how social scientists conceptualize and measure constituency.     

The election campaign as a liminal stage – negotiations over meanings

The paper deals with the role and significance of election campaigns through a consideration of the relevant literature in political science, communication and anthropology. The current interpretation of elections as ritual and drama is altered by focusing on V. Turner's concept of liminality. As liminal periods, it is claimed, election campaigns are an active arena for social construction of political worlds. They take an active part in moulding political cognition and thus produce long-term effects. Perceiving elections in this conceptual frame focuses the empirical concern on the different actors participating in moulding old or new social meanings, the way challenging alternatives are presented, negotiated, included or excluded, the way events as well as symbols became meaningful. It reveals the contested as well as the taken-for-granted, unquestioned and thus reinforced political symbolic world.     

Election Predictions: An Empirical Assessment

Examination of 155 poll forecasts in 68 national elections since1949 shows that errors average nearly twice what statisticaltheory would indicate. Polls predict the division of vote betweenmajor parties better than individual party percentages, leadingto 85 percent success in picking the winner. The worst failuresoccurred in a few elections where most polls went wrong. Liberalparty votes are correctly forecast, conservatives slightly underestimated.Improved polling methods have not led to better forecasts.     

The impact of legislator and constituency ideology on voting on the assault weapons ban

Using variables that represent a legislator's entire legal constituency, previous research by social scientists has concluded that views of the legislator's constituency have little effect on how legislators vote. This question is reexamined by defining constituency as those voters most likely to vote for the legislator (i.e., members of the legislator's own political party and independents). Furthermore, instead of measuring constituency by either a demographic or vote-based measure, a survey measure of the ideological identification of voters (i.e., the voter's self-identification as liberal, moderate, or conservative) is introduced. It is found that the ideology of a senator's electoral constituency was an important factor on the recent U.S. Senate vote to ban 19 semi-automatic assault weapons. The findings have important implications for how social scientists conceptualize and measure constituency.     

ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF "WINNING" TELEVISED CAMPAIGN DEBATES

This study explores the long-neglected impact of a candidatebeing perceived as the "winner" of political debates on individualvoting behaviour in West Germany. While there has been muchresearch on the effects of debates on perceptions of candidatepolicy stands and personality atttributes, there has been littlework that attempts to guage how much "winning" the debate helpsa candidate at the polls. I investigate this process with straightforwardprobit models of the vote choice, including party identificationand candiate evaluation as well as whether the individual judgeda particular candidate as the "winner", or "fared best" in thedebate. These models are run for the 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1983elections in West Germany. The results show that there is aconsistent impact of "winning" the debate on individual votingchoices in West Germany; controlling for party and other factors,there is a significantly higher probability of voting for theparty of the politician the respondent feels won the contest.Debates, then, do ultimately make a substabtial electoral difference.     

Labor and the democratic party: A report on the 1998 elections

The nature of the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic party — still much debated among scholars —can be usefully examined through an analysis of the role of unions in the 1998 congressional elections. Evidence drawn from a wide range of sources shows that the AFL- CIO and its affiliated unions devoted considerable financial and organizational resources to mobilizing union members and allied con-stituencies to vote for Democratic candidates. Combined with the unions' direct finan-cial contributions to campaigns, this activity made unions important players in the elections and helped project an image of potency and effectiveness in the news media and among politicians. As a result, the labor/Democrat alliance remained stronger than one would expect on the basis of union density figures alone.     

Character Counts?: Honesty and Fairness in Election 2000

This article examines the impact that voters’ evaluationsof the candidates’ character had on their vote choicein the 2000 presidential election. We find that while the magnitudeof the impact of character on the vote was roughly equal forboth major party candidates, contrary to common perception,the substantive significance of character evaluations disproportionatelyaffected George W. Bush. Our results indicate the need to accountfor the influence of character in other elections, given thatcharacter issues are a recurring theme in American presidentialcampaigns.     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)