Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments

A voting rule maps voter preferences into outcomes, and is called sophisticated if there exists a voting tree whose sophisticated outcomes coincide with the voting rule for every voter preference. As yet, no complete characterization of such rules is available. In this paper, we provide an important step toward this characterization by completely solving the problem when there are two possible sets of voter preferences.The second author was supported by the Office of Naval Research, Grant N00014-92-J-1387.     

Rationing,bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets

This paper analyzes the temporary equilibrium of 2-sided markets from the point of view of bargaining theory. The minimum rule, quantity traded equal the minimum of demand and supply, is shown to hold under both the Nash bargain and the -transfer value. Moreover, both concepts imply that rationing is uniform on the long side of the market. The paper then considers disequilibrium price dynamics. Under majoritarian price dynamics, nex period's price is the majority rule price of this period's active traders. The sequence of temporary equilibria according to the majoritarian price dynamics is shown to converge to Walrasian equilibrium.The author wishes to thank Y. Balaska, V. Böhm, F. Breyer, J. M. Grandmont, R. Guesnerie, R. Myerson, W. Hildenbrand, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Research support from the National Center for Scientific Research (France) and the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged     

Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria

In a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called “exclusive matchability (EM)”: the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria. Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001 I would like to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.     

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof,efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, tops-onlyness, and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem. We are grateful to an associate editor of this journal for comments that helped to improve the presentation of the paper and to Matt Jackson for suggesting us the interest of identifying a maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules. We are also grateful to Dolors Berga, Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, and a referee for helpful comments. The work of Alejandro Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB unde r a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF RESEARCH TOURNAMENTS

Research tournaments are predicted to encourage R&D. Recent theoretical developments in research tournaments are grounded in search theory. Although the economic intuition behind tournaments is straightforward, computing equilibrium strategies is complex. The participants compute a stopping rule based on the number of participants, the prize and the cost of research. It is an empirical question whether agents will behave as predicted or will employ simple "rule of thumb" strategies such as taking a predetermined number of draws. This paper reports the results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to test the predictions of the search model of tournaments. ( JEL C9, D8)     

The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

We show how computational complexity might protect the integrity of social choice. We exhibit a voting rule that efficiently computes winners but is computationally resistant to strategic manipulation. It is NP-complete for a manipulative voter to determine how to exploit knowledge of the preferences of others. In contrast, many standard voting schemes can be manipulated with only polynomial computational effort.Presented at Purdue University, March 1987; at the University of Arizona, April 1987; at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 1987; at Yale University, November 1987; at Centre International de Rencontres Mathematiques, Marseille-Luminy, April 1988. This research was supported in part by Presidential Young Investigator Awards from the National Science Foundation to the first two authors (ECS-8351313 and ECS-8451032), and by grant N00014-86-K-0173 from the Office of Naval Research.The authors appreciate many helpful comments and suggestions by the editor and three anonymous referees. We also thank Michel Balinski, Salvador Barbera, Jean-Pierre Barthelemy, and Peyton Young for stimulating discussions.     

The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny’s method and Slater’s rule

In this paper we provide a binary extension of Dodgsons non-binary preference aggregation rule. This new aggregation rule is then compared to two other rules which, as Dodgsons rule, are also explicitly based on distance functions, namely Kemenys and Slaters rule. It is shown that the alternative which is top ranked by any of those rules can occur at any position in the Dodgson ranking.I am very grateful to Nick Baigent, Daniel Eckert and the participants of the CEPET 2002 Workshop in Udine and the Graz University Research Seminar for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. It goes without saying that any remaining errors are exclusively the authors responsibility.     

Redistribution of wealth when knowledge is dispersed

The second theorem of welfare economics is generalized so that ethical redistribution of wealth can be carried out by the centre by means of an adjustment rule that depends only on prices and an exogenously given feasible allocation x. When equilibrium is achieved each household i will have at least as much utility as it would derive from its component of x.Mike Peters and a referee of this journal provided useful expositional comments. I am grateful for their help and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada) for financial support. Any defects in the paper can be attributed to the author.     

Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods

We consider the allotment problem of homogeneous indivisible goods among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that a rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, this statement does not hold even with the additional requirements of no-envy, anonymity, at most binary, peaks-onlyness and continuity. We would like to thank the associate editor and two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions significantly improve this paper. We are also grateful to Masaki Aoyagi, Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Hervé Moulin, Hiroo Sasaki, Koji Takamiya, William Thomson, Takuma Wakayama as well as other participants at the Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Istanbul, the 2006 Autumn Annual Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in Osaka, and Yokohama National University Seminar of Economic Theory for their helpful comments. We acknowledge financial supports from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science via the Research Fellowship for Young Scientist (Hatsumi) and the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Serizawa).     

Get High and Get Stupid: The Effect of Alcohol and Marijuana Use on Teen Sexual Behavior

Numerous studies have documented a strong correlation between substance use and teen sexual behavior, and this empirical relationship has given rise to a widespread belief that substance use causes teens to engage in risky sex. This causal link is often used by advocates to justify policies targeted at reducing substance use. Here, we argue that previous research has not produced sufficient evidence to substantiate a causal relationship between substance use and teen sexual behavior. Accordingly, we attempt to estimate causal effects using two complementary research approaches. Our findings suggest that substance use is not causally related to teen sexual behavior, although we cannot definitively rule out that possibility.Research for this paper was supported by grant number 5 R01 DA12692 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse to the National Bureau of Economic Research. We are indebted to Inas Rashad and Nasreen Khan for research assistance. We wish to thank Donald Kenkel, Jody Sindelar, David Salkever, David Bishai, Eric Slade, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Our research is based in part on the Add Health project, a program project designed by J. Richard Udry (PI) and Peter Bearman, and funded by grant PO1-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development to the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with cooperative funding participation by the National Cancer Institute; the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders; the National Institute on Drug Abuse; the National Institute of General Medical Sciences; the National Institute of Mental Health; the National Institute of Nursing Research; the Office of AIDS Research, NIH; The Office of Behavior and Social Science Research, NIH; the Office of the Director, NIH; the Office of Research on Womens Health, NIH; the Office of Population Affairs, DHHS; the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, DHHS; the Office of Minority Health, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, DHHS; the Office of Minority Health, Office of Public Health and Science, DHHS; the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, DHHS; and the National Science Foundation. Persons interested in obtaining data files from The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health should contact Add Health Project, Carolina Population Center, 123 West Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-3997 (email: addhealth@unc.edu). This paper has not undergone the review accorded to official NBER publications; in particular, it has not been submitted for approval by the Board of Directors. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of NIDA or NBER.JEL Classification: I10, I11     

Consumers' surpluses and consistent cost-benefit tests

In this paper we show that even if consumers' surpluses are known precisely, there are severe difficulties in using them to make consistent social-welfare judgements. In order for the Hicksian surpluses to be used, consumers must face the same prices and preferences must have affine parallel Engel curves. The cost-benefit rule must be the (possibly weighted) sum of the surpluses. We also analyze the Marshallian measure.We are indebted to Alan Abouchar, David Maloney, Robert Pollak, John Weymark, Robert Willig and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and criticisms. We also wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research support     

‘Democracy always comes first’: adolescents’ views on decision-making in everyday life and political democracy

Research shows adolescents to be positively oriented towards democracy, but little is known about what it actually means to them and what their views are on decision-making in both everyday situations and political democracy. To gain insight into these aspects of adolescents’ democratic views, we have interviewed 40 Dutch adolescents from second grade of different types of high school. Potential conflict between various democratic principles prevalent in everyday life situations was discussed and compared to how they view decision-making in political democracy. The results of our qualitative study showed that adolescents’ views on issues concerning collective decision-making in everyday situations are quite rich and reflect different models of democracy (majoritarian, consensual, and deliberative). Moreover, how adolescents deal with tensions between democratic principles in everyday life situations varies. While some adolescents combine several principles (for instance, majority rule as a last resort after trying to find broader consensus), other adolescents tend to strictly focus on only one of these principles. Adolescents’ views on political democracy, however, are rather limited and one-dimensional. Those adolescents who seemed to have a more explicit picture of political democracy often preferred a strict focus on majority rule, neglecting minority interests.     

Exclusive representation and american industrial democracy: An historical reappraisal

Exclusive representation in the public sector has been defended on the basis of private sector experience, which purportedly demonstrates that stable, orderly, peaceful collective bargaining is otherwise impossible or impracticable. Nevertheless, nonexclusive collective bargaining was the norm in most industrial nations when the Wagner Act was passed in the 1930s, and it still is the rule outside the U.S. Historical evidence is presented for the thesis that exclusivity was adopted in the private sector primarily in order to pave the way for a corporative state. Peaceful, orderly collective bargaining by “responsible” unions in a competitive economy was a minor, secondary consideration. Editor’s Note: This Symposium was jointly sponsored by theJournal of Labor Research and the National Institute for Labor Relations Research and was held February 10, 1984 at the Westpark Hotel, Rosslyn, Virginia.     

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of candidates: by comparison of worst candidates, best candidates, or by comparison based on stochastic dominance. We perform a similar exercise for k-approval rules, where voters approve of a fixed number k of candidates. These results can be used to compare (k-)approval rules with respect to their manipulability. Analytical results are obtained for the case of two voters, specifically, the values of k for which the k-approval rule is minimally manipulable—has the smallest number of manipulable preference profiles—under the various preference extensions are determined. For the number of voters going to infinity, an asymptotic result is that the k-approval rule with k around half the number of candidates is minimally manipulable among all scoring rules. Further results are obtained by simulation and indicate that k-approval rules may improve on the approval rule as far as manipulability is concerned.     

A NONEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF UNANIMITY RULE, MAJORITY RULE, AND PARETO

It is widely held that in the absence of transaction costs unanimity rule is more effective at producing Pareto improvements and Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. We compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their ability to adhere to the Pareto criterion and to select Pareto-optimal alternatives using a single-dimensional spatial voting model without rational proposals. This produces two interesting results. First, if proposals are random, then majority rule is almost always more adept at selecting Pareto-optimal alternatives than unanimity rule. Second, if individuals propose their ideal points, then majority rule selects Pareto-optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule. These results contrast with equilibrium analyses, which typically show that unanimity rule is the best voting procedure for maintaining Pareto optimality. (JEL D7 , C61 )     

Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules

This article introduces and analyzes random conjugates of bankruptcy rules. A random conjugate is a rule which is derived from the definition of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems. For example, the random conjugate of the Aumann–Maschler rule yields an extension of concede-and-divide: the basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants. Using the concept of random conjugates an alternative characterization of the proportional rule is provided. It turns out that the procedural definition of a random conjugate extends several of the properties of the underlying rule for two-claimant problems to the general domain of problems with an arbitrary number of claimants.     

Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims

For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we propose the following method to extend a lower bound rule: (i) for each problem, assign the amounts recommended by the lower bound rule and revise the problem accordingly; (ii) assign the amounts recommended by the lower bound rule to the revised problem. The “recursive-extension” of a lower bound rule is obtained by recursive application of this procedure. We show that if a lower bound rule satisfies positivity then it’s recursive extension singles out a unique awards rule.We then study the relation between desirable properties satisfied by a lower bound rule and properties satisfied by its recursive extension.     

Understanding Nonprofit Advocacy in Non-Western Settings: A Framework and Empirical Evidence from Singapore

Research on nonprofit advocacy in non-Western settings is still rather limited. In this article, we address this limitation by examining the advocacy practices of nonprofit charitable organizations in Singapore, a non-liberal democratic city-state in Southeast Asia with a history of colonial rule. We ask the following questions: What are the key environmental and organizational factors that influence the scope and intensity of advocacy activities of nonprofit organizations? In particular, what is the effect of the political context on the advocacy strategies and tactics among these organizations? To answer these questions, we present a three-factor explanatory model of nonprofit advocacy incorporating cause, capacity, and context. The research methodology entails a survey of nonprofit executives from a random sample of Singapore human and social service organizations. Our findings shed light on how the various aspects of the political context—perceived opportunities and threats from government intervention and dependence on government funding—shape nonprofit advocacy in a non-Western setting.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN RELATED MARKETS

The Pigou-Robinson pricing rule for third degree monopolistic price discrimination states that price ratios vary inversely with ratios of direct price elasticities of demand. The rule holds when markets are sealed, and cross price elasticities of demand are zero. We show how the rule can fail when imperfect sealing permits leakage. We also develop a general discriminatory pricing rule that holds when leakage causes market demands to be related. The general pricing rule is based on all direct price elasticities of demand, all cross price elasticities of demand, and the size distribution of the markets     

People are conditional rule followers

Experimental participants are more likely to follow an arbitrary rule the more others in their reference group do so as well. The effect is most pronounced for individuals who follow few rules when not knowing others’ behavior. Unlike what is observed for conditional cooperation, learning that only few others follow a rule does not reduce rule following.