6月新职业速递

工资谈判员 随着劳资双方集体协商制度的发展,工资谈判员应运而生.所谓工资谈判员,就是以第三者的身份,在谈判中为劳资双方提供专业帮助.他们有较高的政策理论水平和劳资协调经验.大连的20名工资谈判员成为国内首批获得这一资格的专业人士.     

浅析工会如何在非公企业中发挥工资集体协商作用

随着改革开放的不断深入,如何在非公有制企业推行工资集体协商制度,对完善以按劳分配为主、以多种分配方式并存的分配体制、构建和谐劳动关系具有重要的意义,也给工会组织的工作带来了新的思考,在此,就工会如何在非公企业中发挥工资集体协商作用进行探讨。     

金矿可以“谈”出来

工资集体协商制度无疑是入春以来中国劳资领域最火爆的话题.中华全国总工会副主席张鸣起此前曾表示,全总将全面推行工资集体协商制度,并培养一批专业的工资集体协商谈判员.无疑,工资谈判员这一新职业今后将备受瞩目和期待.     

从利益诉求的视角看社会管理创新

社会管理不是要追求一个无差别、无矛盾的社会,而是要在不同利益群体之间建立一个有序的关系。当今中国社会矛盾的凸显和日显激烈的趋势与普遍存在的"个体化诉求"和利益博弈力量不对称相关,与利益诉求的转型和群体博弈制度的缺失相关。社会管理创新需要搭建与社会主义市场经济相符的利益博弈平台,探索利益诉求的群体表达机制;需要搭建能累积以网络、信任和规则为要素的社会资本的平台。由此,国家与个人之间的"中间地带"才能重新形成,政府才能真正回归到法律的执行者、秩序的维护者角色。     

如何通过集体协商达成社区公共品的合作治理——以蛇口翠竹园小区加装电梯为例

城市既有多层住宅楼建造时多未装电梯,随着住户年龄增长,上下楼梯极不方便,加装电梯成了这部分住户的"刚需"。面对政府各部门的政策限制和各楼层住户之间协商的重重困难,在主流经济学理论框架下选择"搭便车(free-ride)"而非合作是纳什均衡。但是现实中观察到蛇口翠竹园5栋住户历经集体协商数十次、前后奔走三年多,成为深圳老旧住宅加装电梯的首个成功案例。以理论与现实的反差为切入口,在实地调研和访谈的基础上,尝试解释这些住户们如何通过自愿的集体协商、通过各种利益补偿,形成一致契约,达成合作治理,使得原本理论上无解的问题出现了新的转机,为此类城市社区公共品的业主自发协商、自愿供给提供一种可行路径。     

完善我国劳资集体协商制度立法的几点建议

集体协商制度是市场经济环境中劳动力市场主体双方依据国家有关法律规定自主调整劳动关系的一项基本制度,是市场经济国家的通行做法。     

关于群众失范行为的分析与控制

<正>集体行为是一种社会现象,凡有人群的地方,都有发生集体行为的可能,群众是最常见的、也是人们最能意识到的一种集体行为主体。"失范"是由法国社会学家涂尔     

地方政府博弈行为与长三角一体化的制度设计研究

一、长三角一体化发展过程中地方政府博弈行为分析 在长三角一体化发展过程中．各城市政府为了实现自身利益的最大化目标．彼此间进行了激烈竞争．其中不乏非合作博弈的竞争行为．甚至是恶性竞争行为。各地方政府的寻租、搭便车和诚信缺失等现象．已经危及长三角区域共同市场的建设和长三角一体化的进程。     

公民参与视野下的地方政府治理能力建设——基于中国语境的分析

作为国家治理的重要组成部分,地方治理能力高低直接影响国家治理能力的提升。参与时代,地方政府与公众互动的能力是地方治理能力的重要表现。我国地方政府面对公民参与时能力不足的表现有:左躲右闪、打退堂鼓、束手无策。公民参与中地方政府能力建设应以最大化公民参与积极功能和最小化消极功能、保障政府的帮助者和伙伴者及服务者角色、维护和增进公民与政府的关系为依据。公民参与中地方政府能力建设围绕制度能力、参与网络管理能力、政府人员胜任力三个层面,包括信息公开制度、参与制度、政府回应制度、识别和整合利益能力、协调合作能力、维护参与网络能力、尊重公民权利能力、选择参与策略能力等八项建设内容。     

工资集体协商：说容易做难

2007年5月14日，国家劳动和社会保障部劳动工资司司长邱小平在天津表示，中国将力争在未来5年内使各类企业都建立工资集体协商制度，形成正常的工资增长机制。一年过去了，河南省洛阳市自2008年初开始强力推行工资集体协商制度，难度之大令市总工会法律部部长陈守仁直言有崩溃之感。工资集体协商制度，难道真的只是看起来很美？     

A theory of union collective action

The relationship between government behaviors and union collective action has been a neglected research area. Where unions are not heavily involved in policymaking, as long as governments respect the status quo and do not undermine unions’ vested interests in organizational and job security, unions are not likely to break with their past institutionalized behaviors. But what happens when a government promulgates policies that threaten the unions’ vested interests and simultaneously excludes them from the political decisionmaking system? The politically excluded unions’ arsenal of responses ranges from a passive, waitandsee behavior to collective protests. Understanding the process of the latter response is my focus herein.     

Formalization,collectivization, and the demand for union services

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman. Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees. I wish to thank John Pencavel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. For further analysis of these points, see Flanders (1968). See Epstein and Monat (1973) for a discussion of the services provided by labor contractors.     

Is collective bargaining a collective good?

This study argues that legislation imposes on collective bargaining an artificial collective goods characteristic as a legal property, which should be distinguished from collective goods in the economic sense. The law creates an artificial freerider problem. Congressional intent was to require compulsory unionism to the extent that all workers would be required to share in the expenses incurred by the union in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements. Recent court decisions have attempted to define the obligation of employees, employers, and labor unions in terms of this legislative intent.     

Unions,politics, and protectionism

Conventional models of labor relations emphasize “business unionism,” that is, collective bargaining activities and outcomes. We argue that a more realistic model of behavior incorporates the union’s role as an agent of redistribution that seeks to benefit some members and union leaders primarily at the expense of other members, nonunion employees, and consumers. Union power to redistribute wealth is obtained from the special privileges that labor organizations obtain from government. This paper demonstrates how, as political entities, unions and their employers attempt to secure government-sanctioned wealth transfers through protectionism. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Earhart Foundation.     

Quality upgrading and restrictive hiring practices in unionized jobs

Most previous work has suggested that unionized employers upgrade labor quality of new hires, but has been silent on the behavior of unions when they control hiring. In this paper, it is argued that unions also have the incentive to upgrade quality, but to an extent less than or equal to upgrading by employers. Empirical support for this argument is provided using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of young men and young women, in conjunction with an industry measure of union control over hiring. Years of schooling and worker IQ measure labor quality. The author may be contacted at 9271-B Jamison Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19115. She thanks her dissertation committee members Masanori Hashimoto, Patricia Reagan, and especially Donald Parsons, for their detailed comments, and seminar participants at the Ohio State University for helpful suggestions on previous drafts.     

Industrial injuries in British manufacturing industry

This paper begitis by cotisidering the effects of the business cycle upon the incidence of industrial accidents in British manufacturing industries, arguing that a generalized discussion of such cycles obscures important aspects of the political economy within individual cycles. In particular, the strength of the labour movement is related to the incidence of accidents at work. Since the trade unions are only one part of the tripartite system of the legal regulation of safety in British manufacturing industries, the paper goes on to consider the effects of recent material and ideological initiatives on the part of both the government and employers upon the ability of the Health and Safety Executive in general and the Factory Inspectorate in particular, to fulfil their role in this tripartite system of self-regulation. As a result of weakened trade unions and emasculated regulatory agencies, it is argued that there has been a virtual demise of this system of self-regulation. While the analysis outlined does not suggest that this demise is causal of the decline in safety performance across much of British manufacturing industry in the present decade, the paper does argue that the role of the law and its (non) implementation is not an insignificant factor in explaining this decline.     

Sociotechnical Systems and Unions: Nicety or Necessity

Sociotechnical systems (STS) theorists havelargely ignored the role of unions both in theirtheoretical framework and in STS implementation. Thisoversight weakens the potential application anddissemination of STS theory and practice. STS democracy isfrequently seen by its proponents as preferable to uniondemocracy except when they come to the same conclusion.Unions have historically played a role in the development and success of seminal STSinitiatives but are not seen as a critical specificationfor success. Many practitioners have noted theinstrumental importance of unions in unionized settings without acknowledging class, conflict, or unionvalues. As such, many unions have dismissed or resistedSTS innovations. Despite these serious shortcomings, thelabor process argument has failed to produce a credible alternative to STS principles. Insome cases, the union role has been central to STSreforms and examples like these have prompted somenational union movements to promote work reform with an STS base. Recently, the American labor movementhas endorsed work reform approaches akin to STSapproaches. STS changes are seen not just as ways tochange managerial practices but also to alter unionstructures and functioning. As such, a union-rooted STSapproach provides greater societal and workplace impactbenefitting employees, employers, trade unions, and thesociety.     

Equality Bargaining: Where,Who, Why?

It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women’s voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers.     

The long-run and short-run impacts of global competition on U.S. union wages

Union opposition to trade liberalizing agreements suggests that international trade harms organized labor. Using union contract data, we assess both long- and short-run impacts of international trade on U.S. collective bargaining outcomes. Results indicate that, in the short run, increases in either imports or exports reduce union wages. This is attributed to risk aversion on the part of both unions and management. In the long run, however, trade has little net impact on average union wage settlements. In forming their opposition to more open U.S. trade policies, unions appear more concerned with short-run impacts of trade and are willing to trade-off immediate wage gains in lieu of future employment possibilities. We thank Dan Rickman, Bill Levernier, and the anonymous referee for their useful comments.     

Collective versus mass behavior: a conceptual framework for temporary and permanent migration in Western Europe and the United States

"Present theories treat migration as one basic movement. [In the present paper,] conceptualization of economic migration as collective rather than mass behavior has been proposed to overcome present theoretical inadequacies and facilitate empirical analyses. Permanent migration has been correctly regarded as statistically aggregated, institutionalized behavior. Temporary international labor migration is, however, a different phenomenon--one that is more accurately portrayed as a collective product. It is the culmination of nontraditional interactions between three major groups: the migrants, their employers and host nation-states. The development of collective behavior, including a noninstitutionalized role of the state, may be illustrated by Western European guestworkers and United States illegal aliens. Advantages of the conceptualization include easier cross-cultural comparisons, guidelines for predictability and recognition of the dual role of the state as both major actor in the migration process and social control agent."