Sourcing Decisions with Competitive Suppliers and Imperfect Information

Manufacturers often must choose between outsourcing and producing internally. This choice is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the costs and capabilities of the potential suppliers. In addition, if the manufacturer outsources, he must design the sourcing process. We study the manufacturer's outsourcing decision, with a focus on the impact of the sourcing process on that decision. We consider a setting in which the manufacturer has imperfect information regarding the suppliers' costs and capabilities, and we assume that the manufacturer uses a two‐stage sourcing process. The first stage is the qualification stage, in which the manufacturer seeks to reduce the uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The second stage is the supplier selection stage, in which the manufacturer selects among the qualified suppliers on the basis of price. We first characterize the optimal design of the two‐stage process, and then consider the outsourcing decision. We demonstrate several trade‐offs. Vertical integration enables the manufacturer to reduce uncertainty and extract all of the profits of production. However, outsourcing enables the manufacturer to take advantage of the (potentially) lower costs and higher capabilities of the suppliers, particularly if competition between suppliers can be encouraged. We find that the manufacturer is more likely to vertically integrate when the warranty cost and the cost of exerting effort during qualification are large, and when there is significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The manufacturer is more likely to outsource when the suppliers' costs (capabilities) are low (high), and when the number of suppliers is large.     

Global Multisourcing Strategy: The Emergence of a Supplier Portfolio in Services Offshoring

In today's global services outsourcing arena, increasing numbers of companies adopt “multisourcing,” that is, they select and combine information technology (IT) and business services from multiple providers. The literature on IT outsourcing and supply chain management has identified critical tradeoffs involved in increasing the number of suppliers and has strongly recommended focusing on a handful of strategic partners to balance these tradeoffs. Committing to a few strategic partners, however, may prevent a firm from discovering new suppliers, or even supply regions. Such missed opportunities may be particularly limiting in the context of offshoring professional services, which has exhibited rapid changes in supplier markets in the last decade. Thus, firms may want to engage in a more intensive multisourcing in services. If they do so, their success will depend on a global sourcing process that effectively addresses the critical tradeoffs involved. To explore how a global sourcing process can support multisourcing, we conducted a qualitative longitudinal case study of a large financial services institution that developed a varied global supply base to obtain offshore professional services. Our analysis results in a theory that emphasizes (i) advantages of a multiple provider strategy in rapidly changing global supply markets; (ii) the critical role of middle managers in enabling continuous innovation in the supplier structure; and (iii) the importance of the global sourcing process combining top–down and bottom–up decision making in multisourcing.     

A Multi‐Supplier Sourcing Problem with a Preference Ordering of Suppliers

We study a sourcing problem faced by a firm that seeks to procure a product or a component from a pool of alternative suppliers. The firm has a preference ordering of the suppliers based on factors such as their past performance, quality, service, geographical location, and financial strength, which are commonly included in a supplier scorecard system. Thus, the firm first uses available inventory from supplier 1, if any, then supplier 2, if any, and so on. The suppliers differ in costs and prices. The buyer firm seeks to determine which suppliers to purchase from and in what quantities to maximize its total expected profit subject to the preference ordering constraint. We present the optimal solution to this problem, and show that it has a portfolio structure. It consists of a sub‐set of suppliers that are ordered by their underage and overage costs. This portfolio achieves a substantial profit gain compared to sourcing from a unique supplier. We present an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal solution. Our model applies to component sourcing problems in manufacturing, merchandizing problems in retailing, and capacity reservation problems in services.     

Managing dependency in China outsourcing relationships

Abstract

This paper examines manufacturing firms’ use of guanxi and formal control to address dependence on suppliers and achieve desired outsourcing performance in China. Using survey data collected from manufacturing firms operating in China, a structural equation model is used to test the research model. The results suggest that manufacturing firms with high dependence on suppliers build Chinese guanxi with those suppliers to overcome the dependence and enhance outsourcing performance. In addition, Chinese guanxi also appears to facilitate the use of formal control, which was also found to have a positive relationship with outsourcing performance. This paper contributes to the literature by illustrating the importance of guanxi in achieving desired outsourcing performance in the China context, particularly in the case where a manufacturer perceives high dependency on its major supplier.     

Reverse Auctions to Innovate Procurement Processes: Effects of Bid Information Presentation Design on a Supplier's Bidding Outcome

Information technologies (ITs) are being used to innovate various procurement processes. This research study focuses on the supplier‐side effects of IT design choices to conduct reverse auctions, which are increasingly used to procure a wide range of products and services. IT–enabled reverse auctions enhance supplier participation across geographical boundaries, leading to more efficient pricing. However, there are growing concerns about the adverse effects of IT–enabled reverse auctions on a supplier's performance. Supplier‐side issues are gaining prominence in the reverse auction literature and are critical for the long‐term success of reverse auctions. Therefore, we focus on suppliers’ bidding outcomes and assess how the design of an IT–enabled reverse auction facilitates the auction bidding outcomes of participating suppliers. Specifically, we examine the effects of two types of bid information presentation design—full price visibility and partial price visibility—on supplier's auction bidding outcomes, across auctions with different cost certainty and suppliers bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the buyer. The results of this study contribute new knowledge about the ways to use IT for creating effective auction designs and innovating procurement through auctions to enhance both the buyer's and suppliers’ performance. We present the detailed theoretical contributions of our study and discuss the managerial implications for designers of reverse auctions.      

The effect of supplier development on outsourcing performance: the mediating roles of opportunism and flexibility

Abstract

In this increasingly competitive business environment, firms utilise outsourcing as a strategic tool to leverage globally dispersed resources so that they may focus on their core competencies and improve efficiency. The more firms rely on outsourcing, the more they depend on their suppliers, and the more important it is to manage and develop suppliers in order to achieve and maximise the benefits of outsourcing. This paper explores the impact of supplier development on outsourcing performance. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse data collected from 213 manufacturing firms in China. The results indicate that supplier development has a strong direct positive impact on outsourcing performance, and that supplier development also leads to enhanced outsourcing performance through reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility. In addition to making a contribution to current theories of outsourcing, our findings also provide outsourcing managers with practical understanding and insights about the role of supplier development in enhancing outsourcing performance.     

Production systems and supplier selection: a multi-phase process model

Abstract

Purpose: This paper presents a combined multi-phase supplier selection model. The process repeatedly revisits the criteria and sourcing decision as the development process continues. This enables a structured adoption of product and production system innovation from strategic suppliers, where previously the literature purely focuses on product innovation or cost reduction. Design/methodology/approach: The authors adopted an embedded researcher style, inductive, qualitative case study of an industrial supply cluster comprising a focal automotive company and its interaction with three different strategic stamping suppliers. Findings: Our contribution is the multi-phased production and product innovation process. This is an advance from traditional supplier selection and also an extension of ideas of supplier-located product development as it includes production system development, and complements the literature on working with strategic suppliers. Specifically, we explicitly articulate the previously unreported issue of whether a supplier chosen for its innovation capabilities at the start of the new product development process will also be the most appropriate supplier during the production system development phase, when an ability to work collaboratively may be the most important attribute, or in the large-scale production phase when an ability to manufacture at low unit cost may be most important. Originality/value: The paper identifies a multi-phase approach to tendering within a fixed body of strategic suppliers which seeks to identify the optimum technological and process decisions as well as the traditional supplier sourcing choice. These areas have not been combined before and generate a valuable approach for firms to adopt as well as for researchers to extend our understanding of a highly complex process.     

Supplier competition and its impact on firm׳s sourcing strategy

Most research on firms׳ sourcing strategies assumes that wholesale prices and reliability of suppliers are exogenous. It is of our interest to study suppliers׳ competition on both wholesale price and reliability and firms׳ corresponding optimal sourcing strategy under complete information. In particular, we study a problem in which a firm procures a single product from two suppliers, taking into account suppliers׳ price and reliability differences. This motivates the suppliers to compete on these two factors. We investigate the equilibria of this supplier game and the firm׳s corresponding sourcing decisions. Our study shows that suppliers׳ reliability often plays a more important role than wholesale price in supplier competition and that maintaining high reliability and a high wholesale price is the ideal strategy for suppliers if multiple options exist. The conventional wisdom implies that low supply reliability and high demand uncertainty motivate dual-sourcing. We notice that when the suppliers׳ shared market/transportation network is often disrupted and demand uncertainty is high, suppliers׳ competition on both price and reliability may render the sole-sourcing strategy to be optimal in some cases that depend on the format of suppliers׳ cost functions. Moreover, numerical study shows that when the cost or vulnerability (to market disruptions) of one supplier increases, its profit and that of the firm may not necessarily decrease under supplier competition.     

A contingency view on the impact of supplier development on design and conformance quality performance

This study extends contingency theory’s account of organisational size and culture by exploring the relationship between supplier development and internal quality performance. Drawing on supplier development research, the study aims to examine the moderating impact of organisational size and culture on the relationship between supplier development and design and conformance quality dimensions. Using survey data of 518 UK manufacturing organisations, we found that larger organisations with greater access to resources and a strong supply chain orientation culture tend to place the most weight on supplier development programmes which in turn yield higher internal quality performance. These findings contribute to ‘Operations Management Practice Contingency Research (OM PCR)’ and will raise awareness among operations managers of their future sourcing decisions.     

Supply Chain Sourcing Under Asymmetric Information

We study a supply chain with two suppliers competing over a contract to supply components to a manufacturer. One of the suppliers is a big company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a small part of his business. The other supplier is a small company for whom the manufacturer's business constitutes a large portion of his business. We analyze the problem from the perspective of the big supplier and address the following questions: What is the optimal contracting strategy that the big supplier should follow? How does the information about the small supplier's production cost affect the profits and contracting decision? How does the existence of the small supplier affect profits? By studying various information scenarios regarding the small supplier's and the manufacturer's production cost, we show, for example, that the big supplier benefits when the small supplier keeps its production cost private. We quantify the value of information for the big supplier and the manufacturer. We also quantify the cost (value) of the alternative‐sourcing option for the big supplier (the manufacturer). We determine when an alternative‐sourcing option has more impact on profits than information. We conclude with extensions and numerical examples to shed light on how system parameters affect this supply chain.     

Managing Supplier Competition and Sourcing Sequence for Component Manufacturing

We consider a setting in which a manufacturer sequentially sources two components and uses reverse auction to select a supplier with the lowest bidding price for each component. The manufacturer chooses a quantity to order from each supplier and a price for selling the final product. We show that the interplay between the direct competition faced by suppliers in providing their respective components and the sequence whereby the manufacturer sources components influence system performance in a subtle, and sometimes dramatic, way. As the direct competition for the early sourced component intensifies, the profit of its supplier will deteriorate while the profits of the other firms will improve. As the direct competition for the late sourced component intensifies, however, the profit of its supplier may improve, and the profits of the other supplier, the manufacturer, and the system can all decrease. Compared with when the manufacturer simultaneously sources the components, sequentially sourcing the components can benefit the manufacturer and every supplier. Furthermore, all the channel parties can unanimously agree on a specific sourcing sequence. All of these signify the importance for manufacturers to take appropriate measures to manage their sourcing procedures and the competition environments faced by their suppliers.     

Supplier Selection via Tournaments

In this paper, we study the performance of a sourcing mechanism gaining popularity in industrial procurement environments; a tournament. Under a tournament, a buyer initially procures her parts from two suppliers with possibly different quality levels, for T time periods, i.e., she parallel sources. During this time, the buyer is able to observe noisy signals about the suppliers' quality. At time T, she selects the supplier with the highest observed performance and awards it the remainder of her business. We characterize the optimal duration of the tournament as a function of various market parameters, including information and investment costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a tournament can be more profitable for the buyer than selecting the highest quality supplier at time T = 0 and sole sourcing entirely.     

Search for Alternatives and Collaboration with Incumbents: Two-Sided Sourcing Behavior in Business Markets*

Sourcing strategies in business markets have been considered separately and the practice of two-sided sourcing behavior—engaging in search for alternative suppliers and collaboration with an incumbent supplier—has not been examined. To fill that gap, we first identify boundary conditions under which the poor performance of an incumbent supplier intensifies an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) search and collaboration. Then, we examine how an OEM's two-sided sourcing behavior influences one of the critical elements of sourcing performance: the responsiveness of the incumbent supplier. Our proposed hypotheses were tested with data from a national survey of 539 OEM purchasing managers in the Japanese electronics industry. The analysis results indicate three main findings. First, two environmental conditions—pace of technological change and volume uncertainty—have contrasting influences on the link between incumbent supplier performance and an OEM's search and collaboration. While uncertainty from the upstream channel (pace of technological change) enhances an OEM's search and collaboration, uncertainty from the downstream channel (volume uncertainty) lowers an OEM's search and collaboration. Second, an OEM's dependence on its incumbent supplier has differential effects: an OEM reduces search as its dependence on incumbent supplier increases, while it enhances collaboration as its dependence on incumbent supplier increases. Third, while search alone has a negative effect on responsiveness of an incumbent supplier, engaging in two-sided sourcing behavior (i.e., combining search with collaboration) has a positive effect on responsiveness of the incumbent supplier.     

The Role of Contract Negotiation and Industry Structure in Production Outsourcing

Despite the spread of cost‐driven outsourcing practices, academic research cautions that suppliers' cost advantage may weaken manufacturers' bargaining positions in negotiating outsourcing agreements, thereby hurting their profitability. In this study, we attempt to further understand the strategic impact of low‐cost outsourcing on manufacturers' profitability by investigating the contractual form of outsourcing agreements and the industry structure of the upstream supply market. We consider a two‐tier supply chain system, consisting of two competing manufacturers, who have the option to produce in‐house or to outsource to an upstream supplier with lower cost. To reach an outsourcing agreement, each manufacturer engages in bilateral negotiation with her supplier, who may be an exclusive supplier or a common supplier serving both manufacturers. Our analysis shows that wholesale‐price contracts always mitigate the competition between manufacturers regardless of whether they compete with price or quantity. In contrast, two‐part tariffs intensify the competition when the manufacturers compete with quantity, but soften it when they compete with price. As a result, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn lower profits than they would from in‐house production, although the suppliers are more cost efficient. This suggests that managers have to be wary about the downside of using coordinating contracts such as two‐part tariffs when pursuing low‐cost outsourcing strategies. Our analysis also sheds some light on the profitability of using an exclusive supplier for outsourcing. When outsourcing with wholesale‐price contracts, the competing manufacturers are better off outsourcing to an exclusive supplier. However, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn higher profits by outsourcing to a common supplier than to an exclusive one when the manufacturers' bargaining power is sufficiently strong (weak) under quantity (price) competition.     

Sourcing Decisions with Stochastic Supplier Reliability and Stochastic Demand

Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier.     

Joint supplier selection and scheduling of customer orders under disruption risks: Single vs. dual sourcing

This paper presents a stochastic mixed integer programming approach to integrated supplier selection and customer order scheduling in the presence of supply chain disruption risks, for a single or dual sourcing strategy. The suppliers are assumed to be located in two different geographical regions: in the producer's region (domestic suppliers) and outside the producer's region (foreign suppliers). The supplies are subject to independent random local disruptions that are uniquely associated with a particular supplier and to random semi-global (regional) disruptions that may result in disruption of all suppliers in the same geographical region simultaneously. The domestic suppliers are relatively reliable but more expensive, while the foreign suppliers offer competitive prices, however material flows from these suppliers are more exposed to unexpected disruptions. Given a set of customer orders for products, the decision maker needs to decide which single supplier or which two different suppliers, one from each region, to select for purchasing parts required to complete the customer orders and how to schedule the orders over the planning horizon, to mitigate the impact of disruption risks. The problem objective is either to minimize total cost or to maximize customer service level. The obtained combinatorial stochastic optimization problem will be formulated as a mixed integer program with conditional value-at-risk as a risk measure. The risk-neutral and risk-averse solutions that optimize, respectively average and worst-case performance of a supply chain are compared for a single and dual sourcing strategy and for the two different objective functions. Numerical examples and computational results are presented and some managerial insights on the choice between the two sourcing strategies are reported.     

Managing Engineering Design for Competitive Sourcing in Closed‐Loop Supply Chains

We examine the strategic interplay between a buyer's design decision and the ensuing competition between suppliers in a three‐tier closed‐loop supply chain setting with significant recycling considerations. The nature of the engineering design decision in our research entails choice of integral versus modular design that has direct implications for the input raw material waste and ensuing competition between suppliers (i.e., incumbent and new). Whereas the integral design requires a large blank and generates excessive material scrap, the modular design reduces the generated scrap, and enhances cut‐to‐fit modularity, but incurs joining cost and yield loss. The incumbent supplier who supports the status quo choice of integral design can effectively recycle excessive material waste, as it is strategically located close to the source of material. The engineering design team at our study firm is currently exploring the option to source from alternative suppliers that can support either integral or modular designs, but have significantly lower effectiveness in recycling scrap material. We characterize the buyer's price sensitivity levels, component characteristics, supply chain configurations, and virgin and scrap specialty material prices that yield various design and sourcing policy alternatives. The buyer's optimal policy choice, the ensuing price–demand dynamics, and the resulting recycling implications demonstrate that the buyer can benefit from strategically tailoring his design decisions to affect the suppliers' material requirements and costs. We show that utilizing an alternative supply option is particularly valuable for components made from a material with a low price differential in virgin and scrap forms in supply chains wherein the new supplier base can recycle effectively. In such cases, the buyer induces severe price competition by dual sourcing the integral design, and competition may negate the seemingly obvious benefits of operational improvements (e.g., higher scrap material return rate).      

Optimal Inventory Control with Dual‐Sourcing,Heterogeneous Ordering Costs and Order Size Constraints

We consider a dual‐sourcing inventory system, where procuring from one supplier involves a high variable cost but negligible fixed cost whereas procuring from the other supplier involves a low variable cost but high fixed cost, as well as an order size constraint. We show that the problem can be reduced to an equivalent single‐sourcing problem. However, the corresponding ordering cost is neither concave nor convex. Using the notion of quasi‐convexity, we partially characterize the structure of the optimal policy and show that it can be specified by multiple thresholds which determine when to order from each supplier and how much. In contrast to previous research, which does not consider order size constraints, we show that it is optimal to simultaneously source from both suppliers when the beginning inventory level is sufficiently low. We also show that the decision to source from the low‐cost supplier is not monotonic in the inventory level. Our results require that the variable costs satisfy a certain condition which guarantees quasi‐convexity. However, extensive numerical results suggest that our policy is almost always optimal when the condition is not satisfied. We also show how the results can be extended to systems with multiple capacitated suppliers.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

A Structural Analysis of the Effectiveness of Buying Firms' Strategies to Improve Supplier Performance

Many manufacturing firms have increased the amount of component parts and services they outsource, while refocusing on their core capabilities. Outsourcing parts and services to independent, external suppliers means that suppliers' performance is increasingly critical to the long‐term success of these buying firms. Buying firms are increasingly using disparate supplier development strategies to improve supplier performance including supplier assessment, providing incentives for improved performance, instigating competition among suppliers, and direct involvement of the buying firm's personnel with suppliers through activities such as training of suppliers' personnel. Using resource‐based theory, internalization theory, and structural equation modeling, we examine the impact of these supplier development strategies on performance. We conclude that direct involvement activities, where the buying firm internalizes a significant amount of the supplier development effort, play a critical role in performance improvement.