Ethnic Stratification and Inter-Generational Differences in Japan: A Comparative Study of Korean and Japanese Status Attainment

Abstract: There are plenty of stereotypical discourses concerning the Korean minority in Japan that are widely accepted, not because of their plausibility, but because of the lack of basic empirical data. In order to fill this intellectual vacuum, I conducted a social stratification and mobility survey focusing on resident Korean men in 1995, comparable with the Japanese sample. The purpose of this article is exploratory rather than aimed at hypothesis testing, given the extreme paucity of the earlier empirical data for the ana‐lysis of Korean minority status attainment. The results show that:  

• 1 For the Korean minority in Japan, class resources translate into educational attainment to a much lower extent than for the Japanese.
• 2 Korean status attainment patterns deviate from those of their Japanese counterparts. For the Japanese, the crucial status attainment path is secured through educational attainment, which is not the case among Koreans.
• 3 Despite being denied access to such mainstream status attainment paths, major status indicators for Koreans are not significantly different than those of Japanese, and regarding this equality of outcomes, one of the possible explanations is that Korean ethnic disadvantages in the status attainment process may have been overcome by mobilizing informal bilateral ethnic networks.

     

Middle classes,democratization, and class formation

Conclusions This analysis of the South Korean case demonstrates the importance of the historical context for understanding the political role of the middle classes. In late industrialization, as occurred in South Korea and other East Asian countries, the new middle class has emerged as a significant social class, before the capitalist class established its ideological hegemony and before industrial workers developed into an organized class. Neither of these two major classes was able to offer an ideological or organizational leadership to the middle classes. In this context, the middle class can act as more than merely a dependent variable. In South Korea, the minjung movement led by an intellectual segment of the middle class played a critical role in the formation of the working class, by providing an opposition ideology, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and other resources.The Korean experience also highlights the significant role of the state in class formation. The predominant role of the state in economic and social development puts it at the center of major social conflicts. Social tensions and conflicts that emerge in rapid industrialization are directly and indirectly related to the character of the state and the economic policies it implements. A high level of politicization among Korean middle-class members, not only among intellectuals but also among a large number of white-collar workers, is the product of the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun and their repressive control of civil society. Both the nature of Korean middle-class politics and its relationship with the working-class formation have been shaped by the nature of state politics.The role of the middle class in the South Korean democratization process has been complex and variable, in part because of its internal heterogeneity and in part because of shifting political conjunctures in the transition to democracy. It would not make much sense, therefore, to characterize the Korean middle class as progressive or conservative, because different segments of it were inserted into the shifting conjunctures of political transition differently. At the same time, it would be also unsatisfactory to characterize middle-class politics as simply inconsistent or incoherent, because there exists some definite pattern in their behaviors.This analysis suggests that political behaviors of different segments of the middle class can be explained in terms of their locations within the broad spectrum of middle-class positions between capital and labor and by the changing balance of power between the two major classes. This is to acknowledge the fact that capital-labor relations constitute the primary axis of conflict and that middle-class politics must be understood ultimately in terms of this principal mechanism of class struggle. This is, however, not to assume that middle-class politics is simply a terrain of struggle between the capitalist and the working classes, as many Marxist theorists do. To repeat, in certain historical contexts middle-class politics can have an independent effect on the formation of the two major classes and the outcomes of struggles between the two.     

White Racism,Social Class,and the Backlash Against Affirmative Action

Among scholars in sociology and history, the backlash against affirmative action has been blamed on White working‐class Americans. What has received far less attention is the individual and collective institutional role(s) played by the White middle and upper middle‐class in backlash politics. Given that individuals in these social classes have far greater institutional power than White working‐class Americans, their beliefs and practices deserve sustained critical attention, and, as the few existing research studies demonstrate, White middle‐class and upper middle‐class Americans have played an influential role in backlash politics. Part of the reason for this gap in the literature is that these groups are more difficult to access as research subjects. Gaining access to this population may require working through many levels of a bureaucratic organization designed to protect their time and privacy. Moreover, when interviewed, these Americans are more likely than their working‐class counterparts to mask racist sentiments through the polite language of “color blindness.” Research methods that complement surveys and in‐depth interviews are recommended as strategies for probing White middle and upper middle‐class Americans' deeply hidden beliefs.     

“Indian Arrivistes and Cyber Coolies: Reflections on Global Outsourcing and the Middle Class”

Globalization, we used to think, meant the movement of manufacturing jobs to the developing world. It brought work to regions that needed it, while dislocating the lives of the working classes in the richer countries. That was until it moved into the information technology and service sectors at the turn of the century. This article examines the globalization of white‐collar service work, with a view to its impact on emerging economies like India. The bulk of evidence suggests that while offshore outsourcing benefits the middle class in receiving countries, it does not appreciably expand it. Nor does it reliably produce upward mobility or recognizable career paths or even significant upskilling – most of the work being outsourced is rote and standardized. It produces decent jobs in holding patterns. And there are more and more of them as corporations look to continue cutting costs. Rather than authors of their own destinies, corporations have made of countries in the global south their willing and faithful scribes. I first provide a bird's eye view of what is happening and then look more closely at discoveries on the ground.     

Stratification and Prestige Hierarchies in Graduate and Professional Education*

Earlier research indicates that the “academic hierarchy” encourages and reflects both meritocratic standards and long-standing status distinctions. Using a nationwide survey of graduate and professional students, this study considers the relative and independent influence of students' social class, sex, race, undergraduate achievement, and rank of undergraduate institution attended on rank of graduate or professional school they attend. Students in the total group, universities and colleges, as well as public and private institutions are examined. Analysis of covariance results suggest that undergraduate rank is the strongest predictor of rank of institution attended. Attendance at highly ranked undergraduate institutions predicts appropriate location at prestigious graduate and professional schools. Level of undergraduate achievement also has independent effects. Higher achievement predicts attendance at both highly ranked and slightly lower ranked institutions. Social class influences location in the academic hierarchy, but in an unexpected direction. Working class students often attend higher ranked schools than their upper middle and middle class counterparts. Findings show that men and women attend similarly ranked institutions, and female students attend higher ranked schools than males. The independent effects of race also indicate that racial groups attend different as well as similarly ranked institutions. Finally, limited interactions of three independent variables show that expected merit, social class, and sex advantages do not persist for all students.     

The Effect of Age and Childhood Social Class on Preference for New Healthcare Practices

Bourdieu theorized that habitus structures and is structured by experiences in the social world, with childhood experiences having the strongest influence. Habitus can yield rewards in specific fields through dispositions to enact certain practices. Healthcare provides an opportunity to assess how age and childhood social class interact to produce preferences in a changing field. Are people who developed their habitus in higher social classes as children more likely to report preferences that reflect new practices? Is there greater inequality at older ages? We find that parents’ educational attainment and occupational prestige does not have a direct effect on respondents’ preferences to be involved in their healthcare decisions. However, there is a significant interaction with age, with larger gaps by childhood social class among older respondents. Results suggest that when valued practices change, socially advantaged groups can most quickly adapt. The findings have implications for the replication of class inequality.     

From philosophy of history to political philosophy: an ideological investigation of globalization

Many have argued that one of the reasons for the irresistible trend of liberal democracy is the irreversible process of globalization. The logic assumes that globalization is not only an inseparable prerequisite for promoting economic development but also the dynamic to transform political structures into liberalism in less democratic countries, because economic development within countries creates new middle classes around the world, with their natural demands for more participation in decision and political pluralism. In other words, all societies will evolve to a point where they will adopt liberal democratic institutions. In turn, the resulting new world order will be characterized by international cooperation through market economies and liberal democracy. This paper investigates the ideological origin of globalization by inspecting Fukuyama's theory of the ‘end of history’. It argues that this belief is a continuance of modernization theory and reminiscent of functionalist concepts by Western scholars concerning the development of less developed countries. The difference is that globalizers cleverly cover their ethnocentrism with Hegel's philosophy, as it implies that the Western system is some perfect theory that all people will eventually accept as their cultures and societies evolve into a Western superior state.     

Interpretative Freedom and New Combination: The Way in Which the “Middle Class” Has Been Narrated

The English words “middle class” have experienced much more connotations and denotations—typically “bourgeoisie,” “white‐collar,” and professional—than any other class‐referring word since the latter half of the 18th century. On the one hand, in response to such diverse narrations during about two and a half centuries, I partially agree with some of the nominalistic theories of class, in that the middle classes were not created until they were named by contemporaries. On the other hand, my view diverges from those theories, in my asserting that the contemporaries have had an interpretative freedom to recognize “middle classes” only within the bounds of plausibility on the side of the realistic social world. The typical middle class in each period has emerged in such a way that Schumpeter's new combination is performed in a stage of recession by new entrepreneurs, who will move into the “middle” strata and hold some cultural leadership but still obtain inconsistent statuses, to be recognized as “middle class”ex post facto in a boom time. Two Kondratieff's cycles have had one recognition of the typical “middle class.” The new combination is one of the pressures bringing middle classes into a modern society, contrary to the so‐called class decomposition into the two poles.     

Intergenerational Mobility in East Asian Countries: A Comparative Study of Japan, Korea and China

Abstract:  There have been fewer cross-national comparative works on social mobility in East Asian countries than in Western countries. The present study aims to explore the similarities and differences of intergenerational social mobility in three East Asian countries and to examine whether the Featherman–Jones–Hauser (FJH) hypothesis would fit well into the mobility tables for Japan, Korea, and China. Log-linear and log-multiplicative models are applied to the mobility tables of respondents' occupations according to the father's occupation in the three countries. The analysis of relative rates of mobility did not completely support the FJH hypothesis in a strict sense, even though it reasonably accounts for the total association of origin and destination in the three countries. My analysis demonstrates that a level of social fluidity has been higher in Korea and China than in Japan. Focusing on how relative mobility patterns differ between the three countries, intergenerational mobility in Korea is characterized by lower rates of class inheritance compared to Japan, while there seems to be a similarity between the patterns of social fluidity in Japan and Korea, even though they are to a certain extent deviant from Erikson and Goldthorpe's core model. In contrast to Korea, class inheritance rates in China are almost as large as in Japan. However, the mobility pattern between classes appears to differ substantially between the post-socialist and two capitalist countries. In particular, both downward and upward mobility between the white collar bloc and the unskilled manual position are more pervasive in China than in Japan and Korea. These results imply that sociologists interested in cross-national comparison of the social mobility between the East Asian countries should pay attention to both political institutions and the local labor market situatuion which can substantially affect social mobility.     

Updating the Critical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper argues that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a key element of the new neo‐liberalism as it searches for both legitimacy and new sources of innovation. Rather than simply being a fraud or a drain on resources as CSR is often portrayed, we argue that it is one of a suite of practices that corporations are deploying as they seek to shift the nature of social regulation away from collective to more individual solutions. While the criticism that CSR is corporate propaganda has purchase, we explore a deeper development. This development is one wherein as the old ways of capitalist regulation were surpassed in the 1970s and 1980s new social practices such as CSR, Human Resource Management, ethical marketing etc. were deployed as a way of engineering new forms of identity, new expectations of individuals and institutions and new sources of legitimacy and social value. Social criticism needs to take this development more seriously (than the propaganda view) since it frames CSR as a predatory facet of this new neo‐liberalist tendency.     

The Global Middle Class: How Is It Made,What Does It Represent?

One important phenomenon to be observed in the world today is the rapid growth of the middle classes in emerging economies, especially in Asia. This development called for a new concept, the global middle class. The purpose of this paper is twofold: one is to examine the ways this term is currently used and clarify its meaning, and the other is to examine one empirical case of South Korea and highlight important processes involved in the making of a global middle class. The term global middle class has 2 meanings: (1) all the middle classes that exist in the world or (2) the affluent and globally oriented segments of the middle classes in developing countries. These 2 different conceptions serve different purposes and address different aspects of globalization's effect on the affected economy and society. While the expansion of the middle classes around the world is an unquestionably welcome phenomenon, the rise of the affluent global middle classes in developing countries represents a more complex and problematic phenomenon. The Korean case demonstrates that the emergence of the global middle class is associated with growing internal division within the middle class and intense processes of class distinction and educational pursuits in the global education market.     

The persistence of national differences in a globalizing world: the Japanese struggle for competitiveness in advanced information technologies

This paper represents a critique of that aspect of globalization theory that predicts the convergence of national economic institutions and practices toward some single optimal model. This is done through the examination of the innovative practices of Japanese firms and government within the context of US–Japanese competition in high-technology industries. A profile of Japanese innovative competencies is developed through an overview of competition in consumer electronics and personal computing and the emerging wireless Internet industry. The paper argues that different national systems of innovation result in levels of competitiveness that vary according to the technological profile in a given industry, thus undermining one of the basic premises of convergence theory.     

Migrants and Changing Urban Periphery: Social Relations, Cultural Diversity and the Public Space in Istanbul's New Neighbourhoods

This study examines the dynamics of socio-cultural change in a peripheral neighbourhood in Istanbul, an "edge city" that is ethnically mixed, culturally heterogeneous, socially differentiated and spatially multi-functional. One major focus in the study is the changing nature of social relations in traditional groups. Though kinship, hemşeri (place of origin) and neighbourhood solidarity is still crucial in the lives of the migrants, participation in these groups becomes more voluntary and the ties among members less obligatory. Secondly, the ethnic and religious groupings in the neighbourhood are not always exclusive, authoritarian and patriarchal communities. What generally appears as rigid communitarian fragmentation is often one of cultural diversity for the residents of the locality. The associational pluralism that exists in the neighbourhood enables people to claim multiple ethnic, religious, political and cultural identities. Thirdly, though they compare unfavourably with their middle class counterparts in the city, the new neighbourhoods provide greater opportunities and more public space for interaction among the members of the locality than for instance, the rural communities. The study also questions the often taken-for-granted image of a rigidly polarized city in view of empirical evidence that indicates the multiple and complex economic and political links between the new neighbourhoods and the broader urban society. Finally, isolation from middle class areas in the city does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of the whole peripheral urban population from urban life, urban institutions and urban culture. These become increasingly present in the new neighbourhoods and available for the majority of the residents. The main conclusion is that Istanbul contains a number of such edge cities, which have powerful integrating and urbanizing influences on individuals.     

The middle classes in rural England 1971–1991

This paper examines the issue of whether the English countryside has been ‘captured’ by the service classes. It examines this issue with regard to three questions: the role of the service classes in deciding dominant rural images; their role in controlling change processes in the countryside; and their share of the rural population. For the first two, doubts are raised about the importance that is being attached to middle class ‘capture’ ideas. The demographic takeover of the countryside is examined empirically, using census data on individuals from the Longitudinal Study. This shows that notions of a demographic dominance by the service classes are exaggerated and largely apply to SE England. Extending class membership to include those who have ever been in a class indicates that there is a comparatively slight tendency for migration into rural areas to be associated with downward social mobility amongst service class members. Inward movement was more closely allied to longer term service class membership. In gender terms rural areas were not distinguished from other zones in the same region in terms of the likelihood that female in-migrants would stay in full-time employment or leave the paid workforce.     

Transnational Corporate Elites in Japan: International Career Mobility in East and South Asia

Although mainstream globalization literature has attempted to provide an empirical proof of the rise of transnational business elites using several indicators, it is still not clear how to pinpoint transnationality and to establish whether globalization has led to the erosion of nation‐state boundaries through worldwide mobility and networks, as globalization theorists argue. Using empirical data on career paths and mobility over three decades in Japan – compared with other East Asia economies and India – we examine the shift in career mobility. First, we maintain that a comprehensive understanding of social, political and cultural dimensions need to be considered in a discussion of transnationality. Second, we suggest that the globalizing economy does not necessarily lead to the weakening of the nation‐state territory and its institutions in all sociocultural and political dimensions. In particular, transnationality in career mobility in Asian economies is not greatly evident. We propose instead that a new career pattern, which we call brain circulation, highlighting the importance of international experience, has emerged.     

HOW IMPORTANT IS SOCIAL CLASS IDENTIFICATION IN TAIWAN?

Data from a 1992 survey (N = 2,377) of the population of Taiwan show that class identification is rooted in the objective stratification system: the higher one's education, occupational status, power, and income, the more likely one is to identify with the middle or upper classes rather than the working or lower classes. Class interest theory predicts that the higher a person's objective position and subjective class identification, the more likely s/he is to hold a conservative ideology concerning class issues (e.g., do large firms have too much power? Should employees protest against their employer's personnel practices, and go on strike?). Multiple regression analysis provides only partial confirmation for class interest theory. The finding that the most educated and those in professional and technical occupations are the least conservative on class issues is interpreted as supporting a “new class” form of class interest theory. While the Taiwan respondents are not generally conservative on these class issues, their class identification appears to have little to do with whether they are conservative or nonconservative, either before or after objective position in the stratification system is held constant.     

The sources of political orientations in post-industrial society: social class and education revisited

This paper studies the impact of social class and education on political orientation. We distinguish the 'old' middle class from a new class of social/cultural specialists. However, the difference in their political orientation may especially be related to the level and field of education; the new middle class is more highly educated and often in fields of study that extensively address social competencies, characteristics independently affecting political outcomes. Analyses on Dutch data showed that education is more important in the prediction of 'cultural' liberal issues than social class. Economically-oriented issues are more strongly affected by social class. This means that interests of the new middle class are served by liberal standpoints relating to a strong government and income redistribution policies, but not relating to cultural issues.     

Impoverished Clientele and Influential Institutions: Perspectives on Neighborhood Poverty near Harvard Yard

The role of institutions in the social reproduction of the economic status quo is not a new discovery in sociological literature. However, this literature rarely highlights how the catalysts of poverty are transparent in public institutions like schools, social services, police, or renowned universities such as Harvard. Drawing upon historical archival research, decennial census information, and ethnographic studies from the 1990s and early 2000s in Cambridge, Massachusetts we contribute to the discussions about urban poverty. We argue that there are structural factors other than the widely discussed spread of socio-geopolitical isolation or racial dynamics that prevent poor residents from bridging social distances and experiencing upward mobility. Those dynamics are specifically visible in cases such as Cambridge where the consequences of economic shifts and racial dynamics were not as dire as in other cities, but the exclusionary practices are still present. We implicate systematic ‘exclusionary closure,’ as defined by Max Weber and employed by Loïc Wacquant, operating in influential institutions. Following Wacquant’s lead, we argue that institutional practices and policies have played a large role in creating and maintaining urban marginality and pockets of poverty in Cambridge. Institutions like these, considered foundational to social and intellectual advancement, may be key players in the perpetuation of urban poverty.     

Scalar politics,language ideologies,and the sociolinguistics of globalization among transnational Korean professionals in Hong Kong

This paper argues that the sociolinguistics of globalization is accompanied by a constitutive scalar politics. Based on ten interviews with Korean professionals in Hong Kong, we report that Korean migrants’ use and experience of English is characterized by competing language ideologies we identify as: Pragmatic English/Perfect English, Multilingualism/English Only, and Global Language/Local Language. Tensions within these ideologies were revealed as respondents referenced the contexts of their daily lives as intersecting sets of geographic, temporal, and social scales. We discuss how sociolinguistic relations associated with the transnational lifecourse, hybridizing identity, and racialization were imagined in ways that re‐negotiated these scales to serve the interests of the participants and provide coherence to their communicative practices. Sociolinguistic relations both reference scales and constitute them. We conclude that attending to scales and scalar politics provides a better explanatory framework for the ways the uneven linguistics markets of globalization are negotiated by transnational subjects.     

Mobility closure in the upper class: assessing time and forms of capital

Most understandings of the ways classes become social groupings centre on processes of mobility closure whereby mutual appreciation and recognition within classes arise from homogenous experiences over time. The mapping of such structured biographies, however, remains understudied. This paper explores intra‐ and intergenerational mobility patterns in the upper strata of the Norwegian class structure and aims to include temporal processes and multiple forms of capital in the quantification of class trajectories. By combining multiple correspondence analysis and social sequence analysis, two important but often neglected aspects of recruitment to the upper class are emphasized: first, by introducing multiple forms of capital, different ways of maintaining mobility closure are demonstrated; second, different pathways to power are highlighted by distinguishing between divergent class careers. A key aim of the analysis is to explore internal divisions within the upper class in forms of parental capital (an ‘origin space’) and link these divisions to a typology of ‘destination careers’ in adulthood. The analysis suggests that individuals from modest origins are more likely to have careers that feature a biographically late arrival and/or short‐term affiliations to upper‐class positions whereas individuals from families rich in capital are more likely to have stable careers in the upper‐class fractions from which they originate. The analysis thus reveals important divisions in the trajectories of Norwegians who reach the upper class; not only are there differences in their upbringing in terms of the availability of different amounts and types of capital but such divisions also seem linked to their own class careers later in adulthood.