Essential alternatives and freedom rankings

We study the problem of ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice. The analysis is based on the notion of essential alternatives introduced in Puppe (J Econ Theory 68:174–199, 1996). An alternative in an opportunity set is called essential if by deleting it, the reduced opportunity set offers less freedom than the original set. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the ranking according to which an opportunity set offers more freedom than another opportunity set if its share of essential elements in their union is larger.     

Freedom of choice and rational decisions

The paper formalizes a notion of preference-based freedom and examines to which extent such a notion is consistent with otherwise standard conditions of rational decision making. The central result is as follows. Suppose that a preference-based ranking of opportunity sets satisfies a very mild condition of preference for freedom of choice. Then, either the ranking is degenerate in being discontinuous, or the underlying preference relation among the basic alternatives is incomplete. Hence, in any case preference-based rankings of freedom will violate at least some of the basic assumptions of traditional choice modelling. This conclusion is enhanced if the conditions on preference-based freedom are slightly strengthened.I would like to thank the participants of seminars held at the Universities of Karlsruhe and Vienna for valuable comments and stimulating discussions. I am especially indebted to Thomas Christ, Egbert Dierker, Georg Kirchsteiger, Dieter Puppe and anonymous referees for helpful comments. The research has been made possible by a fellowship of the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) which is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Bayesian utilitarianism and probability homogeneity

This paper investigates, within the axiomatic framework of Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory, two kinds of conditions and the relation between them: (1) The Utilitarian condition that social rankings of prospects be representable by an expected utility function that is a weighted sum of the expected utility functions representing individual rankings; and (2) Homogeneity conditions on the probabilities and preferences of individuals. In particular, we show that identity of individuals’ probabilities is necessary and sufficient for the Utilitarian condition to hold and that the homogeneity of individuals’ probabilities can be derived from a Pareto condition on the relation between individual and social rankings, provided that these rankings are separable in a particular sense.This paper has considerably benefited from comments by John Broome, Isaac Levi and an anonymous referee. Special thanks to Philippe Mongin who provided encouragement, help and careful criticism throughout the development of this paper.     

On the multi-preference approach to evaluating opportunities

The purpose of the paper is to provide a general framework for analyzing “preference for opportunities.” Based on two simple axioms a fundamental result due to Kreps is used in order to represent rankings of opportunity sets in terms of multiple preferences. The paper provides several refinements of the basic representation theorem. In particular, a condition of “closedness under compromise” is suggested in order to distinguish the flexibility interpretation of the model from normative interpretations which play a crucial role in justifying the intrinsic value of opportunities. Moreover, the paper clarifies the link between the multiple preference approach and the “choice function” approach to evaluating opportunities. In particular, it is shown how the well-known Aizerman/Malishevski result on rationalizability of choice functions can be obtained as a corollary from the more general multiple preference representation of a ranking of opportunity sets. Received: 3 September 1996 / Accepted: 18 August 1997     

Freedom of choice and diversity of options: Some difficulties

This paper explores the possibility for a (non-preference-based) freedom ranking of opportunity sets that is sensitive to the diversity of the options. It turns out that how distances between sets and alternatives are measured is crucial to the derivation of such a ranking. Several proposals are examined, each of which is shown to lead to impossibility results. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences in Kortrijk, Osnabrück, Oisterwijk, Caen and Pavia. I thank the participants at these conferences for their comments. I would also like to thank Steven Hartkamp, Theo Kuipers, Clemens Puppe and especially Kotaro Suzumura for their helpful comments. Furthermore, I am very grateful to Somdeb Lahiri for pointing out a mistake in a previous version of this paper.     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Capabilities and disability: the capabilities framework and the social model of disability

This article seeks to illuminate the complementarity between the capabilities framework, developed by Amartya Sen and others, and the social model of disability. Common themes include the relationship between social barriers and individual limitations, the importance of autonomy and the value of freedom, and dissatisfaction with income as a measure of well-being. Bringing the two approaches together has implications for analysis (for example in identifying poverty or disadvantage), and for policy, which are briefly illustrated. The article concludes that the capabilities framework provides a more general theoretical framework in which to locate the social model of disability, without compromising any of its central tenets; and the social model provides a thorough-going application of the capabilities framework. Each can benefit from exposure to the other.     

A rights-based conceptual framework for the social inclusion of children and young persons with an intellectual disability

There is a basic principle that all children and young persons with intellectual disabilities should be able to enjoy citizenship on an equal basis with others. This includes enjoying personal dignity and exercising choice, control and freedom in social, community and cultural life, in keeping with their individual lifestyle preferences and aspirations. There is a need for a stronger human rights narrative to achieve this. This article identifies a conceptual framework for a rights-based approach to the integration of children and young persons with disabilities. Seven components of such a framework are identified: citizenship and social inclusion; recognition; agency; voice; capabilities; equality; and self-realisation. This framework was developed as part of an Irish case study involving consultation with young persons with intellectual disabilities, their parents or guardians and professional staff delivering support services. The rights of children/young persons with intellectual disabilities are essentially those of children generally. While this principle may be obvious in many respects, its implementation presents significant challenges. The need for a transformative narrative and its components are outlined.     

On Preference, Freedom and Diversity

We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that reflect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two different criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of the rankings proposed so far in the literature.     

Values on Paper,in the Head,and in Action: On Max Weber and Value Freedom Today

This article starts out with a summary of Weber's views on value freedom, by emphasizing: (1) that value freedom constitutes a special constellation of values; and (2) that value freedom makes it possible for the social scientist to theorize on the basis of new and more extensive knowledge than if she had simply stated her own values and focused the analysis around these. The latter point emerges most clearly in Weber's instructions for how a social scientist should proceed when carrying out an analysis of her own preferred social policy. After the section on Weber's views on value freedom, an attempt is made to update his views. This is done by arguing that the impact of values (and value freedom) differs, depending on where these can be found: on paper, in the head of the social scientist, or in her actions. “Actions,” in the context of value freedom, refer to the research process and especially to the element of theorizing. Value freedom helps to guide the research into new and fruitful directions and to steer it clear of propaganda.     

Welfare brokers and European Union migrants' access to social protection

In spite of the existence of an extensive national and supranational legal framework, European Union (EU) citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement to work in another Member State face numerous hurdles in accessing social protection. While recent scholarship on street-level bureaucracy and on migration and welfare has shed light on the role of discretion and stereotypes in access to rights, little is known about the processes through which such hurdles are overcome. In this article, we focus on a specific strategy which is the recourse to what we call “welfare brokers”. These actors offer assistance to EU migrants to overcome specific cross-border administrative challenges in the area of social protection that derive from their use of the right to freedom of movement. Relying on qualitative data collected with brokers and Romanian migrants working in Germany, the article also demonstrates that welfare brokers attempt to transform the norms, bureaucratic practices and representations that condition access to these entitlements. The article concludes by underlining how the existence of a brokerage industry is a sign of existing inequalities in the exercise of freedom of movement within the EU.     

Freedom of choice

Inspired by the discussion of different functions of freedom of choice (instrumental versus intrinsic value) by Sen and others and an axiomatic characterization of an intrinsic aspect by Pattanaik and Xu, we compare unique axiomatic characterizations of three classes of rankings of opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice: First, we investigate the simple cardinality-based ranking proposed by Pattanaik and Xu and a generalization of this. Secondly, we propose a new criterion that is based on the comparison of the ranges of sets of options. Thirdly, we solve possibly occuring conflicts between these two criteria.I am indebted to Wulf Gaertner, Yongsheng Xu, Walter Bossert, the participants of the Economic Theory Workshop of the University of Rochester, and anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments. Financial support by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.     

Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty

This paper examines a possibility of enlarging the domain of definition of individual preferences suggested by the recent literature on freedom of choice. More specifically, the possibility for an individual to have preferences that depend upon both the opportunity set that she faces and the particular alternative that she chooses from that set is considered. Even more specifically, the possibility for these preferences to value freedom of choice, as defined by the set theoretic relation of inclusion, while being consistent, in a certain sense, with the existence of a preference ordering over the options contained in opportunity sets is investigated. It is shown in the paper that a necessary condition for the existence of any transitive extended preferences of this type is for freedom of choice to be given no intrinsic importance. Received: 22 November 1995 / Accepted: 11 January 1997     

Is India better off today than 15 years ago? A robust multidimensional answer

This paper provides a robust multidimensional normative evaluation of the growth episode that India has experienced in the last 15 years. Specifically, the paper compares the evolution, between 1987, 1995 and 2002, of the distribution of several individual attributes on the basis of ethically robust dominance criteria. The individual attributes considered are real consumption (measured at the individual level), literacy rate, under 5 mortality and violent crime rates (all measured at the district levels). District level variables are interpreted as (local) public goods which, along with consumption, contribute to individual well-being. The robust criteria used are generalizations, to more than two attributes, of the first and second order dominance criteria of Atkinson and Bourguignon (Rev Econ Stud 49:183–201, 1982) and coincide with the unanimity of utilitarian value judgements taken over a specific class of individual utility functions. The main result of the empirical analysis is that all utilitarian rankings of distributions of the four attributes that assume that individual utility functions satisfy the assumptions of second order dominance agree that India is better off in 2002 than in 1987 or 1995 but that these rankings disagree as to how to rank 1987 and 1995. Furthermore, if one removes crime from the list of attributes, the dominance is shown to apply steadily over the whole period.     

Two main problems in the sociology of morality

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed.

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The nature and measurement of freedom

This article develops an ergodic theory of freedom and its measurement. The key idea is that freedom and uncertainty are inextricably entwined. Measuretheoretic isomorphism of stationary processes is a natural way of identifying at an abstract level identity of the structure of uncertainty, which can be measured by the entropy rate of a stationary process. Various empirical examples of markets and elections are considered, as well as the Kantian, as opposed to utilitarian, philosophical framework of the general ideas.     

Objective and Reputational Rankings of Ph.D.-Granting Departments of Sociology, 1965–1982

Abstract

From its inception in 1965 until 1975 when it stopped publishing such studies, The American Sociologist (TAS) published numerous quality rankings of Ph.D.-granting sociology departments and several articles that compared different rankings. During these years TAS published far more rankings of sociology departments than did any other journal This article reviews these studies as well as the rankings of sociology departments found in three major multi-disciplinary rankings (Cartter, 1966; Roose and Andersen, 1970; Jones, Lindzey, and Coggeshall, 1982). It discusses the major methodological approaches used in these studies and reviews the debate among scholars regarding the most appropriate ways to rank departments. An analysis of the various objective and subjective rankings reveals that there is an elite group of seven departments that consistently rank at the top regardless of the ranking method employed.     

Science or propaganda?an examination of rind, tromovitch and bauserman (1998)

An article, “A Meta-analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples,” published in the July 1998 edition of the Psychological Bulletin resulted in an unprecedented amount of media attention and became the first scientific article to be formally denounced by the United States House of Representatives. The study's authors analyzed the findings of 59 earlier studies on child sexual abuse (CSA) and concluded that mental health researchers have greatly overstated CSA's harmful potential. They recommended that a willing encounter with positive reactions would no longer be considered to be sexual abuse; instead, it would simply be labeled adult-child sex. The study's conclusions and recommendations spawned a debate in both the popular and scholarly press. A number of commentators suggested that the study is pedophile propaganda masquerading as science. Others claimed that the authors are victims of a moralistic witch-hunt and that scientific freedom is being threatened. After a careful examination of the evidence, it is concluded that Rind et al. can best be described as an advocacy article that inappropriately uses science in an attempt to legitimize its findings.     

‘Globalizing’ academics? Ranking and appropriation in the transformations of the world-system

ABSTRACT

In an historical materialist analysis, the article challenges the dominant understanding of global academic rankings as ‘inevitable’ and ‘here to stay’. Instead, rankings are treated as historically transformative ‘tracings’ over the accumulation of capital in the world-system, and thus offer a contingent strategic response to three historical shifts in global political economy: ‘financialization’, displacement of the Core, and an shift to surplus ‘appropriation’ in the core. By understanding these transformative shifts as elements of an historic ‘inversion’ of the global frontier of capitalization, the argument: (1) connects global rankings to neoliberal capitalism; (2) challenges the utopian view of rankings as instruments of marketization; and most specifically (3) opens up a space between frontiers of appropriation and commodification proper, indicating how rankings exist in a historically transient and politically dialectical space of hybrid outcomes, imperfect commodifications, and indirect subjections, that are bound to the contradictions of accumulation in contemporary world history.