The more attacks,the more retweets: Trump’s and Clinton’s agenda setting on Twitter

The present study aims to contribute to the agenda setting theory and political campaign literature by examining candidates’ tweets and their effects on voter reactions in the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Content analysis of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s 3-month tweets (N = 1575) revealed that half of their tweets were attacks, and those attacks were effective in attracting favorites and retweets for both candidates. Their tweets reflected their issue agendas highlighted on campaign websites, and they mainly emphasized issues owned by their parties in both venues. Some of the issues Trump stressed in his tweets (i.e., media bias and Clinton’s alleged dishonesty) drew significantly more favorites and retweets, suggesting public agenda setting possibilities through Twitter. None of the issues Clinton emphasized were significant predictors of favorites and retweets. However, visual elements such as pictures and videos were effective in bringing voter reactions for Clinton. While Clinton sent twice as many tweets as Trump did during the three months, Trump’s tweet received in average three times as many favorites and retweets as Clinton’s. Overall, the results show that Trump was more successful than Clinton in drawing public attention to preferred issues through Twitter.     

A group majority voting model of public good provision

A model of public good provision by majority rule selection incorporating the behavior of rational group voting is formulated. Two probability maximizing candidates are assumed. If voters are risk averse in public sector preferences, then a unique symmetric (both candidates offering identical platforms) equilibrium exists. If certain additional conditions hold on the group cost functions of political support, this equilibrium will lie at the public good levels which maximizes the sum of voter utility. It is further demonstrated that it is unlikely for those conditions to be satisfied and therefore more realistic asymmetric equilibria with positive voter turnout is predicted.This paper is based on an essay of a dissertation submitted to Tulane University under the supervision and invaluable assistance of Steven Slutsky, Jonathan Hamilton, and William Oakland. The advice of Gerald Whitney, Michaels Johnson, and an anonymous referee is also gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain the authors.     

Masculinity, consumerism, and appearance: a look at men's hair

Historically, being concerned about appearance was stereotypically associated with women. Now masculinities too have become embedded in appearance norms. Consequently men too are increasingly concerned about their appearance. Via interviews with 14 Canadian men, the role of hair in self-identification and both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with appearance is examined. Emergent themes suggest that masculinity and appearance are increasingly intertwined, and consumer culture cultivates a climate that encourages men to view their appearance as something worthy of investment. Findings suggest that men are concerned about their appearance-specifically their hair-and that there is a relationship between masculinity, appearance, and self-identification. Findings are discussed within theories of masculinity and consumerism.     

Do Truly Comparable Public and Private Sector Workers Show Any Compensation Differential?

Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we apply propensity score matching methods to examine evidence on the rent paid to public sector workers in the United States. Traditionally, wage differentials are computed assuming that workers from both public and private sectors are comparable, without actually controlling for the comparability of the units. Using this method, we are able to control for selection bias and, at the same time, select a subsample of comparable workers in terms of their conditional probability of choosing to work in the public sector on which to estimate separate wage equations.     

An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories

Do polls simply measure intended voter behavior or can they affect it and, thus, change election outcomes? Do candidate ballot positions or the results of previous elections affect voter behavior? We conduct several series of experimental, three-candidate elections and use the data to provide answers to these questions. In these elections, we pay subjects conditionally on election outcomes to create electorates with publicly known preferences. A majority (but less than two-thirds) of the voters are split in their preferences between two similar candidates, while a minority (but plurality) favor a third, dissimilar candidate. If all voters voted sincerely, the third candidate — a Condorcet loser — would win the elections. We find that pre-election polls significantly reduce the frequency with which the Condorcet loser wins. Further, the winning candidate is usually the majority candidate who is listed first on the poll and election ballots. The evidence also shows that a shared history enables majority voters to coordinate on one of their favored candidates in sequences of identical elections. With polls, majority-preferred candidates often alternate as election winners.     

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

We propose a generalization of the probabilistic voting model in two-candidate elections. We allow the candidates have general von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions defined over the voting outcomes. We show that the candidates will choose identical policy positions only if the electoral competition game is constant-sum, such as when both candidates are probability-of-win maximizers or vote share maximizers, or for a small set of functions that for each voter define the probability of voting for each candidate, given candidate policy positions. At the same time, a pure-strategy local Nash equilibrium (in which the candidates do not necessarily choose identical positions) exists for a large set of such functions. Hence, if the candidate payoffs are unrestricted, the “mean voter theorem” for probabilistic voting models is shown to hold only for a small set of probability of vote functions.     

To What Extent Did Ethnicity and Economic Issues Matter in the 2007 Disputed Kenyan Elections?

This article assesses the key factors that influenced the intention to vote in the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, using data from a survey and other external datasets. Ethnicity was found to be one of the main factors. However, access to private and public goods, poverty and differences in wealth across ethnic groups also mattered, depending on how the voter claimed to be self‐identified. Those who self‐identified in terms of their ethnicity were influenced the most by access to services such as schools, health clinics and police stations, evidence suggesting that voters use ethnicity as a proxy to gauge which candidates will give them greater access to services provided by the state.     

Party Elites and Women Candidates

ABSTRACT

Using a four state survey of party county chairs and locally elected women, this study finds support for the notion that potential women candidates are subject to bias in recruitment that hinders the cause of electing more women to state legislatures and Congress. It is hypothesized that bias is most likely due to one of two processes: one, the outgroup effect where negative evaluations of women as candidates are predicated on their lack of surface similarity to the predominantly male party elite, or two, the distribution effect where negative evaluations of women as candidates are predicated on the relative paucity of women in high status positions generally and politics specifically. Strong support was found for the outgroup effect, as party chairs consistently preferred candidates more like themselves. Given the ubiquity of men in the party elite, such outgroup biased attitudes represent a significant hurdle for prospective women candidates.     

Through the Brick Wall,and the Glass Ceiling: Women in the Civil Service in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh the disparity between male and female representation in public administration is wide. Fewer women are employed in the civil service and they figure prominently in jobs set aside for them, while executive positions are generally occupied by men. Both systemic and subjective discrimination have created obstacles for women's access to public employment. They have to surmount enormous difficulties, first to gain entry into the civil service by thwarting social and cultural barriers and competing against well‐prepared and favoured male contestants, and then fight against a variety of odds to climb up the career ladder. Public personnel management is dominated by men whose perceptions and attitudes influence the development of personnel policies with a clear male bias. This has led to women's persistent discrimination in recruitment, placement, advancement, mobility and training. Women quotas are capriciously administered and subjective discrimination serves as a barrier in their career path. The promotion system is heavily inclined towards subjectivity and generally works against them. Most women come with high expectations and are committed to and always enthusiastic about their work and keen to advance their career, but circumstances work against them.     

The Effect of Residential Concentration on Voter Turnout among Ethnic Minorities

Utilizing a large and unique dataset composed of government records, we study the widely contested effect of co‐ethnic residential concentrations on voter turnout. Non‐Western immigrants are moderately affected by the concentration of co‐ethnic voters in their neighborhoods. As the local concentration of same‐ethnicity voters increases, so does the individual's propensity to turn out for the election. In general, the concentration of non‐Western immigrants in the neighborhood has only a very limited impact on an immigrant's propensity to vote. Finally, we investigate the possible mobilizing effect of local candidates and, in particular, local co‐ethnic candidates on voter turnout. We find that the presence of candidates in general and co‐ethnic candidates running for office in a neighborhood has a moderate positive mobilization effect. However, taking this factor into account, the effect of residential concentrations was not eliminated.     

From the Trenches: Attacking First-Time Women Candidates for Congress

SUMMARY

Women candidates in the United States no longer enjoy a “compassion advantage” when running against male candidates. First-time women congressional candidates in open seats are especially vulnerable to excessively aggressive negative attacks from their male opponents because (1) high-tech message delivery systems make attack campaigning easy; (2) attack messages attract more attention than positive messages and get the voters to pay attention; (3) large sums of money can be raised for these attacks from national interest groups by emphasizing the national importance of Congressional races; (4) first-time women candidates who are not elected officials do not have the public record and visibility that could insulate them from the abusive distortions of their views and even of their physical appearance; (5) the press does a poor job of covering suburban-rural races and independent fact checking is virtually nonexistent; and (6) since 9/11, terrorism has become a major issue and women are apt to be portrayed as too inexperienced to be trusted with protecting the national defense.     

The two-party system under alternative voting procedures

Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a two-party system. This observation can be explained by the strategic behavior of voters. This article derives two broad classes of voting procedures under which strategic voting behavior induces a two-party system under standard assumptions on voter preferences. One class consists of the voting procedures with unique top-score, i.e., under which a voter can cast a top-score vote for only one candidate (e.g., Plurality Voting, Borda Count). The other class consists of the voting procedures that permit truncated ballots, i.e., under which voters do not have to cast all their votes (e.g., Approval Voting). This analysis suggests that the key for strategic voting behavior to induce a two-party system is that voters can always cast a different score for the two candidates they rank first and second on their ballots.     

PRESSURE GROUPS AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE FLYPAPER EFFECT RECONSIDERED

A model of government budgeting is developed in which lobbying by interest groups can divert the allocation of funds away from the one preferred by the median voter. The model is applied to state and local governments to show that the "flypaper effect"–the tendency for lump-sum grants to increase public expenditures by more than an equivalent increase in the community's pretax income–can be explained without the customary assumption of voter fiscal illusion. Furthermore, the model predicts variation in the extent of the flypaper effect among expenditure categories, as found in previous empirical studies.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING: THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT JACKPOT

To raise money for their campaigns, political candidates auction a part of government wealth (the jackpot) to contributors. The larger the jackpot, the more candidates spend. Data on the gubernatorial races of 1978 and 1986 indicate that (1) for every dollar increase in the per capita jackpot, campaign spending rises by 0.0004 cents per voter, (2) balanced budget laws hinder the candidate's ability to raise money, (3) in states that give the governor more power over the budget (measured by a "Schlesinger" index) candidates raise more. The paper emphasizes that candidates willingly limit their spending to avoid indebtedness to contributors.     

Two’s a Crowd: Women Candidates in Concurrent Elections

ABSTRACT

Most research on evaluations of women candidates considers single elections in isolation. Using two Dynamic Process Tracing experiments, this article examines whether voters alter their evaluations of women candidates, as well as their willingness to learn about and vote for them, based on the presence of other women running simultaneously in concurrent contests. We find a consistent pattern in which female candidates are not adversely affected when they are the only woman on a voter’s ballot, but they are disadvantaged when other women appear on the same party’s ballot in other races. This effect is more prominent for women in lower offices: women running for the House of Representatives are more disadvantaged than women running for higher offices are.     

WILLINGNESS TOUPEE

In this paper we tackle the hairy problem of male pattern baldness. We survey balding men and elicit their willingness to pay to move from their current situation to a more plentiful one. Then we comb‐over the results. What's the average willingness to pay to move from a glistening cue ball to a luscious mane? About $30,000. (JEL B12)     

Contest with attack and defense: does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?

There are two ways of winning a competition, by increasing one’s own chances of winning or by decreasing those of one’s opponents. I consider a model of contest with attack and defense and propose an application to negative political campaigns, where two candidates choose between disparaging their opponent or valorizing their own image. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contest game. Through this model, I then contribute to the controversy concerning the effect of negative campaigning on voter turnout.     

Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections

This article focuses on voting systems that (i) aim to select the Condorcet candidate in the common case where one exists and (ii) impede manipulation by exploiting voter knowledge of electorate preferences. The systems are relatively simple, both mathematically and for voter understanding, and are fully workable for large-scale elections. Their designated equilibrium strategies, under which voters vote sincerely, involve discerning the top one or two candidates in the preference ordering of the electorate. One set of systems uses its ballot to obtain voters’ preference rankings plus approval votes, and tallies the latter if no Condorcet winner exists. It offers solid advantages vis-à-vis instant-runoff voting, which uses a kindred ballot and has attracted recent reformers. Another set of systems uses only approval voting, which is examined from a new angle.     

Out of Step? Voters and Social Issues in U.S. Presidential Elections

Recent political commentary has argued that the Republican Party is “out of step” with voters on social issues, costing Republicans the 2012 presidential election. This dramatic claim is deserving of scrutiny in its own right and also for the way it offers new perspective on long‐standing controversies concerning the role of social issues in U.S. national elections. We present results that seek to advance established scholarship on electoral politics as well as journalistic claims concerning the rising importance of social issues for elections. Using data from the American National Election Study, we find that social issues mattered to voters in presidential elections from 1992 through 2012. The influence of social issues on voter choice rivals those of attitudes toward defense spending and government provision. We find further evidence that liberalizing trends in social issue opinion consistently benefited Democratic candidates in presidential elections. We consider the relevance of these results for scholarship on voter choice and elections, noting further implications for commentary on the 2012 presidential election.     

Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections

The literature on stochastic voting to date has focused almost exclusively on models with only two candidates (or parties). This paper studies multiparty competition with stochastic voting. We look at two different models in which candidates aim to maximize their expected vote, as well as a model where the objective of candidates is rank minimization. The equilibria of these models are derived and characterized. We show that the properties of the equilibria are quite different from those derived in deterministic models. Furthermore, the analysis shows that deterministic voting models are not robust since the introduction of even a minute level of uncertainty leads to a drastic change in predictions. Consequently, we argue that the deterministic model provides a misleading benchmark. Stochastic models provide a much richer framework, and the nature of the uncertainty in voter choice is a key determinant of the qualtitative properties of the equilibria.The authors thank Martin Osborne and Maurice Salles for useful comments and suggestions. The first author would also like to thank the Bankard Fund for financial support.