Public support for Hispanic deportation in the United States: the effects of ethnic prejudice and perceptions of economic competition in a period of economic distress

This paper investigates the effect of ethnic prejudice and perceived economic competition on support for deportation and alternative policy options concerning the handling of undocumented immigrants. Using a national survey conducted in early 2009, data are analysed using bivariate and multinomial regression techniques. Ethnic prejudice and perceived economic competition were found to be significantly related to support for deportation in the face of alternative options, controlling for the effects of age, sex, employment status, nativity, race, party identification, and education. Furthermore, majority support for deportation was found among conservatives, moderates, Republicans, and Independents. Even among liberals and Democrats, substantial numbers supported deportation. During the recent economic recession, perceived economic competition and ethnic prejudice were dominant influences on deportation preferences, and deportation appears to have become a mainstream policy option. However, we speculate that deportation preferences are relatively shallow and unstable owing partly to the dependence of immigration public opinion on economic cycles, and, ultimately, the unfeasibility of deportation as a policy option.     

Israel's population: the challenge of pluralism

This Bulletin describes the interplay of demographic and sociopolitical processes in Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948 and projects what it might be until the year 2015. Heavy Jewish immigration, especially during the mass immigration of 1948-51, has balanced the high natural increase of Moslems, who comprise the majority of Israeli Arabs, so that the proportion of Jews in Israel's population at the end of 1982 (83% of 4.1 million) was little changed from June 1948 (81% of 806,000). Even with Jewish immigration now low, this proportion is likely to be no lower than 76% in 2015, the Jewish proportion could be only 50% in a Greater Israel as Israel annexes the Occupied Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 1.2 million Arabs now live. Oriental Jews from less developed North African and Asian countries, 15% of Israel's Jewish population in 1984, with their largescale immigration to the mid-1960s and initially higher fertility, have managed to outnumber European-American Jews by 1970. This was an important factor in the 1977 shift of political dominance from the leftwing Labor parties, supported by the better educated, socialist leaning European-American Jews, to the rightwing Likud bloc, espousing economic policies based on more private initiative and Israel's historic rights to Judea and Samaria (West Bank). Western oriented Jews of European or American origin, although still the country's establishment, comprised only 40% of Israel's population by 1981. By 2015, their share is likely to be down to 30% within Israel's present boundaries and would be only 22% of the population of a Greater Israel. First raised by 19th century Zionists in Europe who set off the drive for the reestablishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the quesions of whether or not Israel will be a Jewish state and remain a Western society will continue salient into the 21st century.     

Has immigration affected Spanish presidential elections results?

Between 1998 and 2008, the immigrant share in Spain jumped from less than 3 % to more than 13 %. We provide bounds on the effect of immigration inflows on natives’ election outcomes by considering alternative assumptions about nationalized immigrants’ participation rates and voting behavior. We find that Latin-American immigration increased natives’ participation rate and their support for the major leftist party (Socialist Workers’ Party) over the major conservative party (People’s Party (PP)). Conversely, African immigration only increased natives’ support for anti-immigration formations relative to the PP while leaving unaffected their participation rate. The estimated effects are of modest size in all cases. We provide suggestive evidence that economic factors cannot account for such a heterogeneity in the effects of interest by immigrants’ ethnic groups. We argue that Spanish natives’ attitudes towards immigrants are mainly driven by noneconomic factors like dissimilarities between natives and immigrants in language, religion, and race.     

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular, we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. To do that, we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the levels of border enforcement and the way it has to be financed. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

Canada's population: growth and dualism

In Canada the current 1.3% population growth rate is causing some concern. Those concerned argue that such a rate of growth in combination with high levels of consumption could jeopardize the country's resource base and its comfortable style of living. Many Canadians are questioning high levels of immigration, for now that the fertility level is below replacement level, net immigration contributes substantially to population growth (over 1/3 in 1976). The growing proportion of non-Europeans among recent immigrants is causing resentment, and, in a tight job market, immigrants are regarded as threats to the World War 2 baby boom cohort who are now at working ages. The baby boom generation also puts stress on housing and health services, and it will increase the need for pension checks as it ages. Although French fertility is no longer high and immigration is no longer dominated by the British, the French group's 200-year struggle to preserve its identity continues on in the current effort of the Quebec government to enforce the use of French language by law within that province. Geography and climate dictate another demographic fact that divides the country and pervades its history. In addition to intense regionalism, uneven population distribution is responsible for 2 other concerns: the rapid growth of several already large cities and depopulation of many small communities. Focus in this discussion is on Canada's population growth in the past and as projected for the future, historical and current fertility, mortality and immigration trends, the search for a new immigration policy, the impact of the baby boom generation on the population's age structure and the problems this creates, and recent shifts in population distribution and in the country's ethnic and linguistic makeup. The population policy proposals evolved thus far involve to a great extent the use of immigration as a lever for achieving given population objectives.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.     

Recent net alien immigration to the United States: Its impact on population growth and native fertility

Estimates of the size and structure of recent alien immigration to the United States are made. Substituting these revised estimates in the Series II projections of the U.S. Bureau of the Census implies a future U.S. population smaller than that implied by the Census Bureau’s estimates of immigration. The analysis of Coale (1972)—which calculates the decline in native-born fertility required to accommodate immigration and, at the same time, maintain a stationary population—is replicated, using both the Census Bureau’s estimates and the revised estimates reported here. The revised estimates indicate a smaller reduction in native fertility and a smaller ultimate size of the stationary population than are implied by the Census Bureau’s immigration estimates. The importance of age structure in all of these calculations is demonstrated.     

Immigration restrictions and the American worker: An examination of competing interpretations

This paper examines three competing interpretations of support for tougher immigration restrictions. One interpretation posits that tighter restrictions are favored by those in direct competition with immigrants for jobs, namely low or unskilled workers who toil in labor markets that are low-paying and often unstable. A second line of thought is that greater restrictions are favored by workers who perceive immigrants as potential competitors in labor markets, even though there may be no real basis for such perceptions. The third interpretation explaining support for tougher restrictions is rooted in a broad based cultural nativism or nationalism, and relies heavily on traditional theories of prejudice and discrimination. Data for the study are derived from the 1992 National Election Survey, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Contrary to theoretical expectations, neither actual nor perceived economic insecurity explain variations in current levels of support for tougher immigration restrictions among American workers. The theoretical significance of the findings are discussed and elaborated. Suggestions are made for future research in this important area of inquiry.     

Immigrants’ ages and the structure of stationary populations with below-replacement fertility

A sustained regime of low fertility plus immigration yields an unusual kind of stationary population. The author demonstrates that all stationary populations have a common structure, and that the familiar replacement-level fertility population is the youngest among the many stationary populations corresponding to a particular life table. This finding has important consequences for policy because although fertility increase and immigration are equally effective at halting population decline, immigration is inferior as a means of rejuvenating low-fertility populations. In fact, an immigration-based policy could make a low-fertility population older rather than younger. The paper includes examples using U.S. and West German vital rates.     

Immigration and the American century

The full impact of immigration on American society is obscured in policy and academic analyses that focus on the short-term problems of immigrant adjustment. With a longer-term perspective, which includes the socioeconomic roles of the children of immigrants, immigration appears as one of the defining characteristics of twentieth-century America. Major waves of immigration create population diversity with new languages and cultures, but over time, while immigrants and their descendants become more "American," the character of American society and culture is transformed. In the early decades of the twentieth century, immigrants and their children were the majority of the workforce in many of the largest industrial cities; in recent decades, the arrival of immigrants and their families has slowed the demographic and economic decline of some American cities. The presence of immigrants probably creates as many jobs for native-born workers as are lost through displacement. Immigrants and their children played an important role in twentieth-century American politics and were influential in the development of American popular culture during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Intermarriage between the descendants of immigrants and old-stock Americans fosters a national identity based on civic participation rather than ancestry.     

Immigration and the stable population model

This paper reports on work aimed at extending stable population theory to include immigration. Its central finding is that, as long as fertility is below replacement, a constant number and age distribution of immigrants (with fixed fertility and mortality schedules) lead to a stationary population. Neither the level of the net reproduction rate nor the size of the annual immigration affects this conclusion; a stationary population eventually emerges. How this stationary population is created is studied, as is the generational distribution of the constant annual stream of births and of the total population. It is also shown that immigrants and their early descendants may have fertility well above replacement (as long as later generations adopt and maintain fertility below replacement), and the outcome will still be a long-run stationary population.     

How responsive is U.S. population growth to immigration? A situational sensitivity analysis

There has been public concern about the effect of immigration on population growth in the U.S. But how responsive is population growth to immigration? This paper examines the sensitivity of intrinsic population growth to immigration and situates such sensitivity in fertility and survival changes. The application of second derivatives on a modified Leslie matrix facilitates the analysis of situational sensitivity of U.S. population growth to immigration. The results show that the sensitivity to immigration is not as influential as the sensitivity to fertility, and that the sensitivity to immigration further depends on changes in fertility and survival.     

Immigration to the U.S.: the unfinished story

Annual totals of new immigrants and refugees in the US may now be up to the record highs of over a million immigrants counted in 6 years between 1905 and 1914. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year (570,009 in 1985), newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000, and the "settled" illegal immigrant population is growing by up to 1/2 million a year, according to some estimates. 1/2 of illegal immigrants are persons who entered the US legally but then overstayed the terms of temporary visas. Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehensions of illegal aliens, projected at a record 1.8 million for fiscal year 1986, indicate a sharp increase in illegal border crossers, driven by Mexico's and Central America's mounting population and economic pressures and lured by the prospect of jobs with employers who through a loophole in US immigration law can hire illegal aliens without penalty. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28% of US population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030's if fertility stays at the current low 1.8 births per woman. Public opinion strongly favors crubs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the US, and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration to the US. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80% of legal immigrants and Latin Americans comprised 77% of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income and might be expected to assimilate in the same manner as earlier immigrant group did. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, maintaining their own culture and the Spanish language. Research in California indicates that recent Hispanic immigrants (legal and illegal) have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the US are only likely to increase.     

U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

Demographic Change and Immigration in Age-structured Epidemic Models

Immigration might be a remedy against the stress that low fertility causes to demographic and welfare systems. Sustained immigration, however, can alter both the demographic and epidemiological profiles of the receiving population. An age-structured SIR (susceptible-infective-recovered) model with realistic immigration under conditions of below replacement fertility is studied. Equilibria and threshold phenomena are characterized. The immigration profile and the epidemiological features of immigrants affect the reproduction number and the force of infection in the receiving population. Finally, an illustration is given, showing the potential effects of immigration for rubella control in Italy, by considering how the age profile of immigration influences the reproduction number of the disease.     

On Stable Population Theory With Immigration

The paper extends stable population theory to include a constant stream of immigration. Previous attempts at tackling the problem have either restricted themselves to a below-replacement native population or else used an approach that does not produce the values of all of the parameters explicitly. It is shown that under a constant stream of immigration, the population will asymptotically tend toward a constant, linear, or exponential behavior, depending on whether the fertility behavior is below, equal to, or above replacement level. All of the parameters are determined in terms of the characteristics of the population at the origin.     

Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty‐First Century

The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.     

Race,Remarital Status,and Infertility in 1910: More Evidence of Multiple Causes

The dominant approach to studying historical race-related fertility differences has been to limit samples to first-married and younger women. We argue that studying historical race-related fertility differences in the context of remarriage is also important: remarriage and fertility patterns are both rooted in the biosocial conditions that produce racial disparities in health. We employ a multiple causes framework that attributes variation in fertility patterns to voluntary limitation and involuntary factors (infecundity/subfecundity). We use data from the 1910 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series and estimate zero-inflated negative binomial models that simultaneously distinguish those who are infecund (vs. fecund) and estimate the number of remarital births among the fecund. Our approach allows us to evaluate historical remarital (in)fertility differences, accounting for marital, socioeconomic, and geographic influences on fecundity and fertility, while empirically accounting for the influence of children “missing” from the household due to mortality and fostering/aging out. Consistent with past studies that emphasized poorer African American health as a major influence on involuntary infertility, we find that African American women were more likely than white women to be in the always-zero (infecund) group and to have fewer remarital births. Supplemental analyses nuance these findings but indicate that these results are robust. Overall, we find support for a multiple-causes perspective: while the findings are consistent with the adoption of deliberate fertility control among urban and higher-status women at higher parities, remarital fertility differences in 1910 also reflected greater infecundity/subfecundity among subgroups of women, especially African American women.