Four forms of youth civic engagement for diverse democracy

Which form or forms of civic engagement have the most potential to involve young people in a socially-just diverse democracy? At a time when civic engagement will benefit from conceptual clarification, this paper addresses this question and some of the issues it raises. It analyzes four forms of youth civic engagement for a socially-just diverse democracy. It examines each one according to analytic categories, compares their similarities and differences, and raises questions for future work. It draws upon research in psychology, sociology, and other academic disciplines; and on intergroup relations, multicultural education, social work, and other professional fields. The expectation is that systematic analysis of these phenomena as a subject of study will contribute to the quality of their practice, and move discussion of civic engagement to the next level.     

Stages of change among ethnically diverse college students

The authors applied the stage-of-change construct in the transtheoretical model to examine the distribution of Asian (n = 869), African American (n = 373), White (n = 1322), and Hispanic (n = 535) American undergraduate students across the 5 stages of change for exercise. Stage of change varied as a function of ethnicity. Higher percentages of minorities were in the precontemplation and contemplation stages. The likelihood of being in these stages was from 43% to 82% greater for minorities than for White students. Also examined were the congruency between stage of change and self-reported levels of physical activity. Half of the sedentary students and 15.6% of the active students were misclassified by the stage-of-change procedure. Misclassification rates were higher for minority women (27.8%) than for White women (17.8%) and for Asian students (24.6%) compared with all others (20.6%). The results of this study have implications for the design of physical activity interventions based on stage of change.     

Popular incorporation and prospects for democracy

Conclusion It has become commonplace to observe that Brazilian politics has undergone little change in recent years. Political society remains conservative, elitist, and dominated by amorphous and fluid political coalitions maneuvering for access to power. At first sight, it appears that dramatic transformations in the economic and social fabric of Brazilian society have had little or no effect on the way the political processes are conducted. One reason for this is the apparent willingness of the popular classes to participate in political arrangements that secure the hegemony of traditional elites. As I have shown, however, the various forms of collective organization that surfaced in protest of the military in the late 1970s are capable of breaking this spell. In providing vehicles of interest representation that militate against the logic of incorporative, patronage-based politics, these organizations make an important contribution toward the reconstitution of civil society along class lines. The accomplishment of this task is essential if the Left is to resolve the tension between ideological purity and electoral success.This tension is not specific to the Brazilian case. The legacies of dependent capitalist development common to most of Latin America have created conditions upon which both clientelist and populist politics thrive. And if there was a sudden spate of authoritarian reactions to economic and political crises in the region in the 1960s and 1970s, this interlude has been followed, predictably, by the reemergence en masse of populist-based political movements. Many of these movements - Aprismo in Peru, Peronismo in Argentina, and Brizolismo in Brazil - are the direct descendants of their pre-authoritarian counterparts. They are all trapped because of the inconsistency of their political bases by the contradiction between distributive politics and economic solvency.Most recent transitions from authoritarian rule were also, however, accompanied by the emergence and eventual demise of a popular movement. The thesis presented here suggests that if these movements played only a limited role in the actual process of transition, they may well determine the form that post-authoritarian politics takes in such countries.     

The early institutionalists on industrial democracy and union democracy

Conclusion  Today the term “industrial democracy” has a rather quaint sound, at least in the U.S., and is seldom encountered in either academic or practitioner industrial relations. Likewise, the work of the early institutional economists is infrequently cited by modern IR scholars and even less often read. So, one may ask, why re-plow this intellectual ground when it has so long lain fallow?     

Philanthrophy and democracy

Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism, by Joan Roelofs. Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 2003. 269 pp., $29.95 paper.     

Community identity and language change in North American Anabaptist communities

Patterns of language maintenance and shift among historical German-speaking North American Amish and Mennonite communities reveal ways in which these groups have utilized language to encode and mediate group identity. The Old Order Amish and the Old Order Mennonites have maintained German to resist secular authority, to remain separate from the dominant society, to preserve the traditions of their forefathers and, above all, to mark themselves as Old Order. More liberal groups have shifted to English to demonstrate a commitment to evangelism and a rejection of Old Order practice. This paper supports the view that individual communities may actively direct language change. Guided by an ideology that invests particular patterns of language use with religious significance, each Amish and Mennonite community determines its own linguistic fate.     

Sciences,politics, and associative democracy: democratizing science and expertizing democracy

Relations between science and politics are under pressure because urgent problems create an increasing external demand on sciences while inside sciences the old idea that “science speaks truth to politics” is increasingly seen as unfeasible and undesirable. We are not forced to choose between such an objectivist and a skepticist model. Associative democracy provides more fruitful interactions between sciences and politics in order to “democratize science/expertise” and to “expertize democracy” compared with the outworn institutional alternative of parliamentary democracy – incapable of solving risk-decisions because of limited and misguided information, lack of qualification and practical knowledge – and neo-corporatist “shifts from government to governance” – suffering from rigidity, exclusion of legitimate stakeholders, intransparency and lack of democratic legitimacy. It introduces contest where it matters most and where it is most productive: in the framing of issues, in the deliberation/negotiation on alternatives, and in the implementation and control of the chosen problem solving strategy.     

Social complexity and strong democracy

The pluralistic liberal paradigm of democracy has shown its inability to guarantee economic prosperity and political stability and, as a consequence, has become increasingly vulnerable. Within political theory, democratic criticism of liberalism has mainly proceeded along two paths. On the one hand, communitarians have challenged liberal atomism and sought to rehabilitate the community as the focus for social life and human personality. On the other hand, ‘strong’ democrats have rejected the political division of labour characteristic of liberalism and sought to revive the ideal of participatory democracy. There are many points of contact between these two strands of thought—indeed some influential writers have explicitly subscribed to both—and radical communitarianism has had an important influence in practical politics over the past 15 years. However their fundamental theoretical assumptions clash, in particular because strong democracy has an implicit bias towards social uniformity that contradicts the essential premise of communitarianism. The most straightforward way out of this problem is multiculturalism, i.e. the conception of society as a liberal federation of strong communities. How much scope this leaves for true democracy is however unclear.     

The limits of epistemic democracy

The so-called doctrinal paradox reveals that a jury that decides by majority on the truth of a set of propositions, may come to a conclusion that is at odds with a legal doctrine to which they all subscribe. The doctrinal paradox, and its subsequent generalization by List and Pettit (Econ Philos 18:89–110, 2002), reveal the logical difficulties of epistemic democracy. This paper presents several generalizations of the paradox that are formulated with the use of many-valued logic. The results show that allowing the individual or the collective judgements to be formulated in terms of degrees of beliefs does not ensure the possibility of collective epistemic decision making.