Knowledge and Risk Perception Among Nuclear Power Plant Employees

This is a study of knowledge, risk perception, and attitudes among nuclear power plant employees. A total of 236 persons participated, belonging to 10 different professional groups and working at two Swedish power plants. Job-related radiation risks were judged about average as compared to a number of other risks. On the whole, the participants in the study were satisfied with the measures of safety at work, but there were some exceptions to this rule, especially among those hired for temporary jobs through external contractors. The experience of job-related radiation risks was related to the level of knowledge about radiation and its risks: those who knew less experienced larger risks. General level of anxiety did not correlate with risk perception. The latter was accounted for mainly by perceived radiation risks. Job satisfaction was more strongly related to perceived conventional job risks than to nuclear risks. Risk ratings were related to how subjects defined the concept of risk. Those who stressed consequences as part of their risk definition gave higher risk ratings.     

Perceived Nuclear Risk, Organizational Commitment, and Appraisals of Management: A Study of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel

This study examined to what extent nuclear risk perceptions, organizational commitment (OC), and appraisals of management are associated with each other among nuclear power plant personnel. The sample consisted of 428 nuclear power plant workers who completed a questionnaire at their workplace. Perceived nuclear risk and OC were most closely related to the appraisals of the top management of the organization. As the trust in and satisfaction with the top management increased, perceived nuclear safety and acceptance of the organizational goals and values heightened. This result is discussed in the context of industrial safety management.     

Fuzzy‐Logic‐Based Safety Verification Framework for Nuclear Power Plants

This article presents a practical implementation of a safety verification framework for nuclear power plants (NPPs) based on fuzzy logic where hazard scenarios are identified in view of safety and control limits in different plant process values. Risk is estimated quantitatively and compared with safety limits in real time so that safety verification can be achieved. Fuzzy logic is used to define safety rules that map hazard condition with required safety protection in view of risk estimate. Case studies are analyzed from NPP to realize the proposed real‐time safety verification framework. An automated system is developed to demonstrate the safety limit for different hazard scenarios.     

Risk Perception Among Nuclear Power Plant Personnel: A Survey

This study investigated risk perception, well-being, and organizational commitment among nuclear power plant personnel. The study group, 428 employees from a nuclear power plant, completed a questionnaire which included the same questions as those in previous surveys on risk perception of lay persons and industrial workers. Hazards at work were not seen as a sizable problem by nuclear power plant personnel. The study group estimated the safety of nuclear power plants better and the possibility of a serious nuclear accident as more unlikely than the general public. Compared to employees in other industrial companies, the overall perceived risks at work among plant personnel did not exceed the respective perceptions of the reference groups. Risk-related attitudes did not explain well-being among plant personnel, but the relationship between the perceived probability of a serious nuclear accident at work and organizational commitment yielded to a significant correlation: Those plant workers who estimated the likelihood of an accident higher were less committed to the organization.     

“What—Me Worry?”1“Why So Serious?”:2 A Personal View on the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Infrequently, it seems that a significant accident precursor or, worse, an actual accident, involving a commercial nuclear power reactor occurs to remind us of the need to reexamine the safety of this important electrical power technology from a risk perspective. Twenty‐five years since the major core damage accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, the Fukushima reactor complex in Japan experienced multiple core damages as a result of an earthquake‐induced tsunami beyond either the earthquake or tsunami design basis for the site. Although the tsunami itself killed tens of thousands of people and left the area devastated and virtually uninhabitable, much concern still arose from the potential radioactive releases from the damaged reactors, even though there was little population left in the area to be affected. As a lifelong probabilistic safety analyst in nuclear engineering, even I must admit to a recurrence of the doubt regarding nuclear power safety after Fukushima that I had experienced after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. This article is my attempt to “recover” my personal perspective on acceptable risk by examining both the domestic and worldwide history of commercial nuclear power plant accidents and attempting to quantify the risk in terms of the frequency of core damage that one might glean from a review of operational history.     

Energy Choices and Risk Beliefs: Is It Just Global Warming and Fear of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident?

A survey of 3,200 U.S. residents focused on two issues associated with the use of nuclear and coal fuels to produce electrical energy. The first was the association between risk beliefs and preferences for coal and nuclear energy. As expected, concern about nuclear power plant accidents led to decreased support for nuclear power, and those who believed that coal causes global warming preferred less coal use. Yet other risk beliefs about the coal and nuclear energy fuel cycles were stronger or equal correlates of public preferences. The second issue is the existence of what we call acknowledged risk takers, respondents who favored increased reliance on nuclear energy, although also noting that there could be a serious nuclear plant accident, and those who favored greater coal use, despite acknowledging a link to global warming. The pro‐nuclear group disproportionately was affluent educated white males, and the pro‐coal group was relatively poor less educated African‐American and Latino females. Yet both shared four similarities: older age, trust in management, belief that the energy facilities help the local economy, and individualistic personal values. These findings show that there is no single public with regard to energy preferences and risk beliefs. Rather, there are multiple populations with different viewpoints that surely would benefit by hearing a clear and comprehensive national energy life cycle policy from the national government.     

Insights into the Societal Risk of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

The elements of societal risk from a nuclear power plant accident are clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident: land contamination, long‐term relocation of large numbers of people, loss of productive farm area, loss of industrial production, and significant loss of electric capacity. NUREG‐1150 and other studies have provided compelling evidence that the individual health risk of nuclear power plant accidents is effectively negligible relative to other comparable risks, even for people living in close proximity to a plant. The objective of this study is to compare the societal risk of nuclear power plant accidents to that of other events to which the public is exposed. We have characterized the monetized societal risk in the United States from major societally disruptive events, such as hurricanes, in the form of a complementary cumulative distribution function. These risks are compared with nuclear power plant risks, based on NUREG‐1150 analyses and new MACCS code calculations to account for differences in source terms determined in the more recent SOARCA study. A candidate quantitative societal objective is discussed for potential adoption by the NRC. The results are also interpreted with regard to the acceptability of nuclear power as a major source of future energy supply.     

Fire Risk Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants: Methodological Developments and Applications

A methodology to quantify the risk from fires in nuclear power plants is described. This methodology combines engineering judgment, statistical evidence, fire phenomenology, and plant system analysis. It can be divided into two major parts: (1) fire scenario identification and quantification, and (2) analysis of the impact on plant safety. This article primarily concentrates on the first part. Statistical analysis of fire occurrence data is used to establish the likelihood of ignition. The temporal behaviors of the two competing phenomena, fire propagation and fire detection and suppression, are studied and their characteristic times are compared. Severity measures are used to further specialize the frequency of the fire scenario. The methodology is applied to a switchgear room of a nuclear power plant.     

Evaluating the Cost,Safety, and Proliferation Risks of Small Floating Nuclear Reactors

It is hard to see how our energy system can be decarbonized if the world abandons nuclear power, but equally hard to introduce the technology in nonnuclear energy states. This is especially true in countries with limited technical, institutional, and regulatory capabilities, where safety and proliferation concerns are acute. Given the need to achieve serious emissions mitigation by mid‐century, and the multidecadal effort required to develop robust nuclear governance institutions, we must look to other models that might facilitate nuclear plant deployment while mitigating the technology's risks. One such deployment paradigm is the build‐own‐operate‐return model. Because returning small land‐based reactors containing spent fuel is infeasible, we evaluate the cost, safety, and proliferation risks of a system in which small modular reactors are manufactured in a factory, and then deployed to a customer nation on a floating platform. This floating small modular reactor would be owned and operated by a single entity and returned unopened to the developed state for refueling. We developed a decision model that allows for a comparison of floating and land‐based alternatives considering key International Atomic Energy Agency plant‐siting criteria. Abandoning onsite refueling is beneficial, and floating reactors built in a central facility can potentially reduce the risk of cost overruns and the consequences of accidents. However, if the floating platform must be built to military‐grade specifications, then the cost would be much higher than a land‐based system. The analysis tool presented is flexible, and can assist planners in determining the scope of risks and uncertainty associated with different deployment options.     

Nuclear Safety in Ontario: A Critical Review of Quantitative Analyses

In this article quantitative analyses of CANDU nuclear generating stations are evaluated using an explicit set of criteria derived from a decision-analytic framework. A systematic search was made for relevant analyses, including both risk assessments and economic analyses. Only a small number of scientifically sound quantitative analyses that are being used to make decisions about specific safety measures or projects were located. The availability of scientifically sound quantitative data for making major energy policy decisions is even more limited, and what is available has major shortcomings. The province of Ontario is now heavily dependent on nuclear energy. Given the uncertainties surrounding the health, environmental, economic, and social consequences of nuclear energy, there is a need to assemble the information that is available within a comprehensive decision-making framework, and to decide future energy policies for the province in a public forum from a societal perspective.     

Determinants and Mapping of Collective Perceptions of Technological Risk: The Case of the Second Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan

Nuclear power is a highly controversial and salient example of environmental risk. The siting or operating of a nuclear power plant often faces widespread public opposition. Although studies of public perceptions of nuclear power date back to 1970s, little research attempts to explain the spatial heterogeneity of risk attitude toward nuclear power among individuals or communities. This article intends to improve the knowledge about the major factors contributing to nuclear power plant risk perceptions by mapping the geographical patterns of local risk perception and examining the determinants in forming the nature and distribution of the perceived risk among potentially affected population. The analysis was conducted by a case study of the Second Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) in Taiwan by using a novel methodology that incorporates a comprehensive risk perception (CRP) model into an ethnographic approach called risk perception mapping (RPM). First, we examined the determinants of local nuclear power risk perceptions through the CRP model and multivariate regression analysis. Second, the results were integrated with the RPM approach to map and explain the spatial pattern of risk perceptions. The findings demonstrate that the respondents regard the nuclear power plant as an extremely high‐risk facility, causing them to oppose the SNPP and reject the compensation payment to accept its continuing operation. Results also indicate that perceptions of nuclear power risk were mainly influenced by social trust, psychological and socioeconomic attributes, proximity, and the perceived effects of the SNPP on the quality of everyday life.     

Risk Perceptions of Offshore Workers on UK Oil and Gas Platforms

Knowledge of the workforce's risk perceptions and attitudes to safety is necessary for the development of a safety culture, where each person accepts responsibility for working safely. The ACSNI Human Factors report stresses the importance of assessing workforce perceptions of risk to achieve a proper safety culture. Risk perception research has been criticized for insufficient analysis of the causal relationships between risk factors and perceived risk. The present study reports some of the factors which predicted risk perception in a sample of 622 employees from six UKCS offshore oil installations who completed a 15-section questionnaire. This paper focuses on the accuracy of workers' risk perceptions and what underlying factors predict the perception of personal risk from both major and minor hazards.     

Risk Assessment Can Be a Game‐Changing Information Technology—But Too Often It Isn't

The printing press was a game‐changing information technology. Risk assessment could be also. At present, risk assessments are commonly used as one‐time decision aids: they provide justification for a particular decision, and afterwards usually sit on a shelf. However, when viewed as information technologies, their potential uses are much broader. Risk assessments: (1) are repositories of structured information and a medium for communication; (2) embody evaluative structures for setting priorities; (3) can preserve information over time and permit asynchronous communication, thus encouraging learning and adaptation; and (4) explicitly address uncertain futures. Moreover, because of their “what‐if” capabilities, risk assessments can serve as a platform for constructive discussion among parties that hold different values. The evolution of risk assessment in the nuclear industry shows how such attributes have been used to lower core‐melt risks substantially through improved templates for maintenance and more effective coordination with regulators (although risk assessment has been less commonly used in improving emergency‐response capabilities). The end result of this evolution in the nuclear industry has been the development of “living” risk assessments that are updated more or less in real time to answer even routine operational questions. Similar but untapped opportunities abound for the use of living risk assessments to reduce risks in small operational decisions as well as large policy decisions in other areas of hazard management. They can also help improve understanding of and communication about risks, and future risk assessment and management. Realization of these opportunities will require significant changes in incentives and active promotion by the risk analytic community.     

Scheduling Updates of Probabilistic Risk Assessments: The Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Experience

This paper presents the results of a study that identified how often a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)should be updated to accommodate the changes that take place at nuclear power plants. Based on a 7-year analysis of design and procedural changes at one plant, we consider 5 years to be the maximum interval for updating PRAs. This conclusion is preliminary because it is based on the review of changes that occurred at a single plant, and it addresses only PRAs that involve a Level 1 analysis (i.e., a PRA including calculation of core damage frequency only). Nevertheless, this conclusion indicates that maintaining a useful PRA requires periodic updating efforts. However, the need for this periodic update stems only partly from the number of changes that can be expected to take place at nuclear power plants–changes that individually have only a moderate to minor impact on the PRA, but whose combined impact is substantial and necessitates a PRA update. Additionally, a comparison of two generations of PRAs performed about 5 years apart indicates that PRAs must be periodically updated to reflect the evolution of PRA methods. The most desirable updating interval depends on these two technical considerations as well as the cost of updating the PRA. (Cost considerations, however, were beyond the scope of this study.)     

Risk-Informed Requirements for Design and Assessment of Structures Under Temporary Use

The relatively high failure rates, with important consequences in many cases, suggest that the implicitly acceptable risk levels corresponding to temporary civil engineering structures and activities might exceed the bounds of normally acceptable levels associated with different societal activities. Among other reasons, this may be attributed to the lack of a rational approach for the assessment of risks associated with the different technologies supporting these activities in general, and for structures in particular. There is a need for establishing appropriate target reliability levels for structures under temporary use taking into account specific circumstances such as reduced risk exposure times. This issue is being addressed in this article. Acceptance criteria for building-structure-related risks to persons obtained in prior studies are adapted to the special circumstances of nonpermanent risk exposure. Thereby, the general principle followed is to maintain the same risk levels per time unit as for permanently occupied buildings. The adaptation is based on the statistical annual fatality rate, a life safety risk metric that allows for a consistent comparison of risks across different societal activities and technologies. It is shown that the target reliability indices taking account of the temporary use of buildings might be significantly higher than the values suggested for permanently used structures.     

An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

Risk—Its Priority and Probability: The Analytic Hierarchy Process

Risk estimation involves priorities and probabilities which are themselves a form of priority of natural alternatives. This paper provides illustrations of how one can deal with risk and uncertainty using the Analytic Hierarchy Process, a new approach to measurement by ratio scales. The paper also includes a discussion of how to deal with risk strategies involving interdependence. Particular emphasis is made on the siting of nuclear power plants.     

An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

Effects of the Chernobyl Accident on Public Perceptions of Nuclear Plant Accident Risks

Assessments of public perceptions of the characteristics of a nuclear power plant accident and affective responses to its likelihood were conducted 5 months before and 1 month after the Chernobyl accident. Analyses of data from 69 residents of southwestern Washington showed significant test-retest correlations for only 10 of 18 variables--accident likelihood, three measures of impact characteristics, three measures of affective reactions, and hazard knowledge by governmental sources. Of these variables, only two had significant changes in mean ratings; frequency of thought and frequency of discussion about a nearby nuclear power plant both increased. While there were significant changes only for two personal consequences (expectations of cancer and genetic effects), both of these decreased. The results of this study indicate that more attention should be given to assessing the stability of risk perceptions over time. Moreover, the data demonstrate that experience with a major accident can actually decrease rather than increase perceptions of threat.     

Introduction to Special Section on Sensitivity Analysis and Summary of NCSU/USDA Workshop on Sensitivity Analysis

This guest editorial is a summary of the NCSU/USDA Workshop on Sensitivity Analysis held June 11–12, 2001 at North Carolina State University and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Office of Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis. The objective of the workshop was to learn across disciplines in identifying, evaluating, and recommending sensitivity analysis methods and practices for application to food‐safety process risk models. The workshop included presentations regarding the Hazard Assessment and Critical Control Points (HACCP) framework used in food‐safety risk assessment, a survey of sensitivity analysis methods, invited white papers on sensitivity analysis, and invited case studies regarding risk assessment of microbial pathogens in food. Based on the sharing of interdisciplinary information represented by the presentations, the workshop participants, divided into breakout sessions, responded to three trigger questions: What are the key criteria for sensitivity analysis methods applied to food‐safety risk assessment? What sensitivity analysis methods are most promising for application to food safety and risk assessment? and What are the key needs for implementation and demonstration of such methods? The workshop produced agreement regarding key criteria for sensitivity analysis methods and the need to use two or more methods to try to obtain robust insights. Recommendations were made regarding a guideline document to assist practitioners in selecting, applying, interpreting, and reporting the results of sensitivity analysis.