The family planning law should be issued as soon as possible]

China is facing a baby boom in the next ten years. Now is a perfect time to formulate legislature on family planning (FP) to strengthen the current policy and regulations in order to slow the momentum of excessive population growth. As a result of current economic reform and implementation of the rural household responsibility system, the migrant population has increased tremendously. The fact that millions of rural farmers are shifting to non-agricultural areas created new challenges to the effectiveness of traditional measures of the FP program. Promulgating laws and legislature will facilitate the job of FP. The law should stress the restriction of population growth and encouraging one child per couple. In the rural area it is not feasible to implement the one child policy indiscriminately. Under the policy of one child for a majority of the couples, no third birth is permitted. Local governments should be given the authorization to grant permission for second births for special cases within the birth planning quota. Allowing people living in poor and less developed areas to have more children and granting mothers of handicapped children permission to have an additional child were in fact facilitating the deterioration of the quality of the population. Some current policy in rural income distribution and social welfare was beneficial to large-sized family. Such policies should be changed to give incentives to small-sized families.     

We must pay attention to the difference between the original intention and the current status of family planning]

Due to imperfections in the current family planning (FP) policy, and the differences un program implementation in urban and rural areas, the fertility of the urban population with higher IQ scores is under control but this is not the case for the rural population. Among rural couples, one child is rare and two or three are commonplace, while in cities over 70% of couples are having one child. In the metropolitan cities, this figure is about 90%. In the rural areas, provision of education is a serious problem because of insufficient resources, a lack of qualified teachers and inadequate facilities. At the present, at least 3 million school age children in rural areas can not go to primary school. Besides there is a big contrast in FP practice between Han nationality and minorities. Population growth is basically under control among the more advanced Han nationally but not among the less advances minority nationalities. This growth rate among the minority population was about 50.27/1000 in the past five years, which is alarming. Furthermore, the couples given opportunity to have a second child are often those whose first child had birth defects or is mentally retarded, whereas couples with a normal child can have only one child. This has become a vicious circle, since subsequent children are more likely to have the same birth defects. It was discovered from a 1983-85 survey that the prevalence of birth defects was 12.8/1000. The current situation is that the fertility of urban, educated, and healthy people is restricted while the less educated, those living in less developed areas, and those with health defects are having more children. The outcome of this situation is the decline of national population quality, which greatly deviates from the original intention of the FP.     

A discussion of the effect of development of commodity economy on rural fertility trend in the countryside]

A long-term commodity economy in China, according to this report, will help to improve family planning and to decrease the population. The new economic reforms have brought a commodity economy to rural areas of China and the result is an improved level of productivity and a higher standard of living. At this stage in China's economic development, many couples want to have more than 1 child which they could not afford before. This poses a new problem for family planning objectives. As the economy has shifted from a partially self-contained economy to a commodities-based one, more rural inhabitants want more children for the following reasons: 1) the economic system in China is based on the production of individual households (since agriculture in China today is still carried out by manual laborers, the household productivity rate is determined by the number of laborers it can provide); 2) as rural inhabitants have a higher income than before, they are no longer worried about fines; 3) decentralization reduces the governments financial resources and it is unable to follow through with, e.g., promises of 1-child family incentives and bonuses, and welfare. As a result, families do not uphold the family planning objectives. Family planning will eventually overcome these problems, however, through promotion of family planning campaigns and as the commodity economy advances and becomes more thoroughly developed. The author states that China is currently in the midst of an economic transition period which, once over, will see a decrease in the overall population.     

Preliminary inquiry into the difference in sex ratio at birth in China]

Based on population statistics from China's 2nd and 3rd national censuses, China's unusually high male/female birth rates are examined. It appears that the lower male/female birth rates are generally found in China's minority-populated autonomous regions. Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet) has the nation's lowest male/female birth ratio of 101.3; the highest ratio, 112.5, is in Anhui province; the national average for 1981 was 108.47. Although geographic, socioeconomic, and other factors may be attributed to regional differences, it is maintained that the high male/female birth rate is universal throughout China. The significant difference between the relatively high male/female birth rate in China's urban areas in 1981 (109.9), and the lower rate in the rural areas (107.6) is challenged by the author, who suggests that China's urban statistics are unquestionably more reliable than the rural statistics. The author suggests that factors such as the importance of raising male offspring, China's traditionally male-dominated family system, and the desire for male farm workers is strongest in China's rural sector. The current male/female birth rate is not a recent trend; prior to 1949, the male/female birth rate ranged from 110 to 115.     

Additional Work,Family Agriculture,and the Birth of a First or a Second Child in Russia at the Beginning of the 1990s

At the beginning of the transition period, many Russian households faced substantial economic hardships and uncertainties. An economic downturn had become one of the major factors responsible for the significant and rapid decline of Russian fertility. However, many households tried to cope with this situation by engaging in multiple income generating activities and the cultivation of food on private plots of land. The question therefore arises whether these activities had a positive impact on fertility decisions. This paper explores the association between additional employment or subsistence measures (second jobs, part-time self-employment, and part-time family agriculture) and the probability to have a first or a second child in Russia during 1990 and the spring of 1993. Data from 966 respondents from the Russian component of the survey Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: General Population Survey show that activities that generate an additional income were positively associated with the birth of a second child. This is especially the case if these activities produce half of a respondent's or her household's income. The birth of a second child was also positively associated with the fact that a household consumed food that was cultivated by the household itself. However, none of these activities was significantly connected with the birth of a first child.     

农村妇女生育意愿影响因素分析

低生育水平不代表我国农村社会生育意愿已经完成了从传统型向现代型的转变,因为生育意愿的变化受到社会和家庭多种因素的影响。借助莱宾斯坦孩子"成本-效用"理论,通过农村妇女边际孩子的选择对农村妇女生育意愿的影响因素进行分析。结果发现,性别偏好、孩子的经济成本以及抵御家庭风险、扩大家庭规模的效用在影响妇女生育意愿中起着较为明显的作用。了解农村妇女生育意愿影响因素,对建设先进生育文化有重要意义。     

农村纯女户再生育意愿的经济学思考

当前,农村纯女户的再生育意愿强烈已经成为制约低生育水平稳定的一个突出因素。通过实地调查分析,笔者认为,发展农村经济,增加农民收入,完善农村社会制度,变革农村婚嫁模式,建立农村社会养老保障机制是切实转变农村纯女户生育意愿、稳定低生育水平的有效措施。     

生育一孩弱化二孩生育意愿吗？——基于北京市“单独”家庭的考察

本文使用北京市西城区2013年生育意愿调查数据,基于不同的生育意愿测度指标,采用描述分析和回归分析方法检验城市＂单独＂家庭中生育一孩对二孩生育意愿的作用,并借助倾向值分析方法控制生育状况的自选择问题,从而使得研究结论更具稳健性和可靠性。结果表明,城市＂单独＂家庭的二孩生育意愿并不低迷,生育一孩能够强化育龄妇女的二孩生育意愿,而且生育状况的作用在生育意愿的众多影响因素中较为突出。上述结果需要在生育意愿的评估和生育政策的制定中有所关注。     

农村独女户男孩偏好转化研究——基于湖北部分县市的抽样调查

在性别比居高不下的大环境下,湖北农村的独女户群体依然保持一定规模但其男性偏好呈现弱化走势,本文通过比较独女户群体和有几户群体在基本生存状况、生育意愿、性别平等观念等方面的差异和不同,来分析“独女户”这种家庭结构的选择对男孩偏好的影响的制约,以期为性别比控制政策的制定做出有益探索。     

Fertility effects of child benefits

We exploit the 1996 reform of the German child benefit program to identify the causal effect of heterogeneous child benefits on fertility. While generally the reform increased child benefits, the exact amount of the increase varied by household income and the number of children. We use these heterogeneities to identify their causal effects on fertility in a difference-in-difference setting. We apply the large samples of the German Mikrozensus and the rich data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The reform effects on low-income couples are not statistically significant. We find some support for positive fertility effects for higher as opposed to lower income couples deciding on a second birth.     

“小二胎”：内涵、特征、成因及启示——基于江西省T村的实证分析

本文利用一个村庄的个案访谈与统计资料探讨了农村新近出现的“小二胎”现象的内涵、特征与成因。结果表明,一、二胎生育间隔大于等于7年的“小二胎”大量涌现,其中计划外生育占据多数,且随着间隔的拉长其所占比重更大。与此相对应的是生育妇女以30岁以上的大龄妇女为主。作为农民的理性选择．“小二胎”是农民在内在动机与外在条件共同交织下的合力结果．其中农民的生育意愿是核心,基层计生环境的放松为诱因,家庭经济条件的改善为此提供了经济基础。希望本研究能从微观视角为思考我国计生政策的下一步走向提供一些启发。     

用孩次递进比模拟“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为--以湖北省为例

以2014年湖北省卫生和计划生育委员会提供的包括“单独”、“双独”方面的数据为基础,描述了生育政策调整下被压抑的生育潜能释放的规律性和用孩次递进比的方法预测“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为,与意愿分析方法相互比照,丰富了当下生育政策下生育行为预测研究。从分析结果可以看出,假定2016年“全面二孩”生育政策调整,湖北省第一年内会新增二孩出生量52621人,占湖北省2014年总出生量的7?41％;三年内最低会新增139262人的二孩生育量。城乡对比发现,农村新增二孩生育占到将近六成,且由抢生而导致的堆积主要集中在农村,40岁后的高龄抢生情况不严重。     

Continue to encourage one couple to have one child]

The Chinese State Council exhorted the masses in 1984 and 1986 to improve upon its adherence to the birth policy. The policy of 1 child per couple is the proper policy reflecting specific historical conditions. China's goal to modernize cannot be realized if the population grows unchecked. With the exception of minorities and certain rural families, all couples are affected by this policy. The 1 child rate jumped from 20.73% in 1970 to 58.3% in 1984, while the 3 child rate dropped to 19.8% from 60.21% during those years. In order to solve one of China's major future population problems, it is necessary to continue advocating 1 child per couple. With the 1986 population at 1,060,080,000, China's average per capita income is among the lowest in the world. It is not enough simply to improve the economy. Population growth must be contained at 1,200,000,000 by 2000. If every couple were permitted 2 children, and allowing for unplanned births, the population would be 1,300,000,000 in 2000. Therefore, it is essential to encourage more couples to limit families to 1 child through example by officials, propaganda, material incentives and priorities in jobs and housing.     

甘肃省农村最低生活保障的实证分析

按照农民年人均纯收入的高低,我们将甘肃各市（州）相对地划分为较发达、欠发达和贫困地区。然后依据农村住户调查的详细资料和三类经济区农民年人均纯收入的分布分析计算出三类经济区农民最低生活保障的标准、人数及金额,结果符合甘肃实际。鉴于甘肃现行的农村最低生活保障标准低、范围小的问题,提出了调整、完善农村最低生活保障制度的思路和减缓贫困、改善民生的政策措施。     

Speech at the UN International Conference on Population,Mexico City,August, 1984

In seeking a solution to its population problem, China, as a developing socialist country, has been making unremitting efforts to develop economy while controlling the rapid growth. The objective is to control rapid population growth so that population growth may be in keeping with socioeconomic development and commensurate with utilization of natural resources and environmental protection. In the past decade, and particularly since 1979, China has made much progress in developing economy and gained remarkable successes in controlling population growth. The natural population growth rate dropped to 1.15% in 1983, from 2.089% in 1973. Living standards have improved with a gradual annual increase of per capita income. All this proves that the policy of promoting family planning to control population growth along with planned economic development is correct. In China family planning is a basic state policy. The government has advocated the practice of "1 couple, 1 child" since 1979. This does not mean that 1 couple could have 1 child only in every case. The government provides guidance for the implementation of family planning programs in the light of specific conditions such as economic developments, cultural background, population structure, and the wishes of the people in different localities. The requirements are more flexible in rural than in urban areas and more so among the people of national minorities than among the people of the Han Nationality. In rural areas, couples who have actual difficulties and want to have 2 children may have a 2nd birth with planned spacing. In carrying out its family planning program, China has consistently adhered to the principle of integrating state guidance with the masses' voluntariness. The government has always emphasized the importance of encouraging the people's own initiatives, through publicity and education, which is the key link in implementing the family planning program.     

收入、相对地位与女性的生育意愿

文章基于中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）2006年成人调查数据,对中国52岁以下在婚、离婚和丧偶女性的收入、相对地位对生育意愿的影响进行实证分析。与以往研究不同的是,在分析影响女性生育意愿的因素时,除了通常的收入、价格、职业和年龄等因素外,本文还特别引入了反映女性相对地位的变量。根据家庭谈判模型以及中国的现实情况,本文用相对收入、相对教育以及相对家务劳动时间来反映女性在家庭中的相对地位。结果显示,对于是否生育孩子的决策,生理因素的影响占据主导地位;对于生育多少个孩子的决策,社会经济因素占据主导地位,尤其是女性在家庭中的相对地位无论城乡均产生显著的影响,而女性的收入对生育意愿并没有产生显著影响。     

Shift the focus of family-planning work to one couple giving birth to one child--an investigative report on family-planning conditions in Shifang County]

Sheng-Fang county of Sichuan province, China, is famous for its successful birth control program. The rate of natural increase declined from 32% in 1970 to 2.6% in 1979 with a 99.3% rate of planned birth. Each couple averaged only 2 children in 1978 but, with population increasing faster than the food supply, there was still room for improvement. In order to reach the goal of a 5% rate of natural increase in 1985 and a 0% rate in the year 2000, it was necessary to advocate "one couple one child". With 90% of the families complying with this rule, the goal could nearly be met. Instilling this norm in a rural area where childbearing has traditionally been valued, especially for old age security, required careful educating of the population. A campaign was conducted to inform the people of the benefits to the country, the community, and themselves of smaller families. Incentive programs reinforced the lessons. The Party leaders considered instillation of the 1-child/family norm a top priority and worked to put it into effect. The educational work must continue, to reach newly married couples and to maintain the resolve of couples reached earlier. Child health programs were improved as well as old age security programs to obviate the need for extra children.     

Economic Insecurity and the Fertility Intentions of Italian Women with One Child

The present study addresses the issue of economic insecurity and its relationship with the reproductive plans of 5,358 Italian women in couples who have recently had their first child. Data were sourced from the ISTAT Sample Survey on Births, 2005 edition. This article’s originality lies in the conceptualization of economic insecurity and the investigation of its effects on fertility intentions. We propose to capture economic insecurity by considering both the insecurity associated to the two partners’ employment status and a variety of aspects that contribute to the household’s ability to cope with possible unpredictable future events. Then, we investigate whether and how economic insecurity shapes the fertility intentions of women over their entire reproductive life span. With specific respect to women who intend to have one additional child only, we also observe the effect of economic insecurity on their intention to give birth sooner (i.e., within the next 3 years) or later. Our data show the existence of a critical factor in the passage from the generic fertility intentions to the contingent plan to have a child in the next 3 years: only half of women with one child who intend to follow the two-child family model feel ready to plan to have a second child in the next 3 years. The study also reinforces an argument that is frequently made: fertility intentions over the entire lifetime are less conditioned upon contingent constraints, and are often more closely related to individual traits and/or preferences.     

Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium

Many scholars have argued that deliberate birth spacing may have played a role before and during the modern fertility transition. There are good historical and theoretical reasons for this view, but it has proved to be hard to demonstrate convincingly that birth intervals were in fact partly determined by attempts at deliberate fertility control. This paper suggests a method of securing evidence on the issue for married couples. The method is applied to three cohorts living in a Belgian town in the nineteenth century. The findings indicate that, even before the fertility transition, couples in the working class were controlling their fertility by deliberate spacing.     

Stepfamily childbearing in Sweden: quantum and tempo effects, 1950-99

Several studies have demonstrated that stepfamily couples have a higher risk of childbearing than couples in a stable union with the same total number of children. Analysing retrospective data from a nationally representative sample of Swedish adults, we find that the risk of a second or third birth is higher when it is the first or second child in a new union. We also find a faster pace of childbearing after stepfamily formation than after a shared birth. The risk of a second birth (in total) is only a little higher in the first two years after stepfamily formation than in the first two years after a shared birth, and thereafter the risk is lower for stepfamilies. The risk of a third birth (in total) is particularly high early in the stepfamily union and remains higher than that of couples with two shared children for at least five years. The stepfamily difference was lower after than before 1980, when the Swedish government introduced parental leave incentives for short birth intervals.