Does Communicating (Flood) Risk Affect (Flood) Risk Perceptions? Results of a Quasi‐Experimental Study

People's risk perceptions are generally regarded as an important determinant of their decisions to adjust to natural hazards. However, few studies have evaluated how risk communication programs affect these risk perceptions. This study evaluates the effects of a small-scale flood risk communication program in the Netherlands, consisting of workshops and focus group discussions. The effects on the workshop participants' ( n  = 24) and focus group participants' ( n  = 16) flood risk perceptions were evaluated in a pretest-posttest control group ( n  = 40) design that focused on two mechanisms of attitude change—direct personal experience and attitude polarization. We expected that (H1) workshop participants would show greater shifts in their flood risk perceptions compared with control group participants and that (H2) focus groups would rather produce the conditions for attitude polarization (shifts toward more extreme attitudinal positions after group discussion). However, the results provide only modest support for these hypotheses, perhaps because of a mismatch between the sessions' contents and the risk perception measures. An important contribution of this study is that it examined risk perception data by both conventional tests of the mean differences and tests for attitude polarization. Moreover, the possibility that attitude polarization could cause people to confirm their preexisting (hazard) beliefs could have important implications for risk communication.     

“Know What to Do If You Encounter a Flash Flood”: Mental Models Analysis for Improving Flash Flood Risk Communication and Public Decision Making

Understanding how people view flash flood risks can help improve risk communication, ultimately improving outcomes. This article analyzes data from 26 mental models interviews about flash floods with members of the public in Boulder, Colorado, to understand their perspectives on flash flood risks and mitigation. The analysis includes a comparison between public and professional perspectives by referencing a companion mental models study of Boulder‐area professionals. A mental models approach can help to diagnose what people already know about flash flood risks and responses, as well as any critical gaps in their knowledge that might be addressed through improved risk communication. A few public interviewees mentioned most of the key concepts discussed by professionals as important for flash flood warning decision making. However, most interviewees exhibited some incomplete understandings and misconceptions about aspects of flash flood development and exposure, effects, or mitigation that may lead to ineffective warning decisions when a flash flood threatens. These include important misunderstandings about the rapid evolution of flash floods, the speed of water in flash floods, the locations and times that pose the greatest flash flood risk in Boulder, the value of situational awareness and environmental cues, and the most appropriate responses when a flash flood threatens. The findings point to recommendations for ways to improve risk communication, over the long term and when an event threatens, to help people quickly recognize and understand threats, obtain needed information, and make informed decisions in complex, rapidly evolving extreme weather events such as flash floods.     

Using Risk Communication to Disclose the Outcome of a Participatory Decision-Making Process: Effects on the Perceived Acceptability of Risk-Policy Decisions

It has been suggested that public participation during decision making about risks can lead to more widely accepted risk policies. This article discusses an experiment to determine if this is true when people are made aware of the fact that a participatory decision-making process has taken place only through information disclosed during a subsequent risk communication effort. The results from this experiment showed that, after receiving information during risk communication that cast risk policies about space exploration as the product of a participatory decision process, participants in the study felt more supportive of the resulting decisions than did participants in a control group. This result coincided with the participants in the study group perceiving the risks associated with the decision to be lower and the benefits higher. Responses from these participants also showed that they were more satisfied with the decision-making process than they were with the outcome of the decision itself Therefore, it may be premature to view the objective of participatory decision-making approaches-and the risk communication efforts that discuss them-as a means of making risk policies more widely acceptable to the public at large. Rather, it may be better to view the benefits of these approaches in terms of their ability to help lead to higher quality decisions that are the product of more widely accepted decision processes.     

Flash Flood Risks and Warning Decisions: A Mental Models Study of Forecasters,Public Officials,and Media Broadcasters in Boulder,Colorado

Timely warning communication and decision making are critical for reducing harm from flash flooding. To help understand and improve extreme weather risk communication and management, this study uses a mental models research approach to investigate the flash flood warning system and its risk decision context. Data were collected in the Boulder, Colorado area from mental models interviews with forecasters, public officials, and media broadcasters, who each make important interacting decisions in the warning system, and from a group modeling session with forecasters. Analysis of the data informed development of a decision‐focused model of the flash flood warning system that integrates the professionals’ perspectives. Comparative analysis of individual and group data with this model characterizes how these professionals conceptualize flash flood risks and associated uncertainty; create and disseminate flash flood warning information; and perceive how warning information is (and should be) used in their own and others’ decisions. The analysis indicates that warning system functioning would benefit from professionals developing a clearer, shared understanding of flash flood risks and the warning system, across their areas of expertise and job roles. Given the challenges in risk communication and decision making for complex, rapidly evolving hazards such as flash floods, another priority is development of improved warning content to help members of the public protect themselves when needed. Also important is professional communication with members of the public about allocation of responsibilities for managing flash flood risks, as well as improved system‐wide management of uncertainty in decisions.     

Understanding Organizational Safety Using Value-Focused Thinking

Decision analysis is recognized as the right way to make risk management decisions, using probabilistic techniques to assess the accident risk. It is also accepted that the decisions that individuals in the organization make affect the likelihood of an accident and thus managerial and organizational factors should be included in the risk modeling process. However, decision analytic techniques have not been used to understand the decisions that are made by these individuals. The initial domain for this research is marine transportation. We use the framework of value-focused thinking in order to understand safety decisions made within our research partner organization, a major domestic oil tanker operator. We describe the results of interviews held with managers and employees from this organization. Through these interviews, we sought to understand the values these experts apply in their roles within the organization and the objectives they seek to achieve to contribute to its overall safety performance. The end result is a framework that not only portrays the fundamental objectives of safe operations for various roles in the organization, but also interconnects these different decision contexts. We believe that this approach is fundamentally different from those used in previous work and that this is an interesting application of value-focused thinking.     

Risk Assessment Can Be a Game‐Changing Information Technology—But Too Often It Isn't

The printing press was a game‐changing information technology. Risk assessment could be also. At present, risk assessments are commonly used as one‐time decision aids: they provide justification for a particular decision, and afterwards usually sit on a shelf. However, when viewed as information technologies, their potential uses are much broader. Risk assessments: (1) are repositories of structured information and a medium for communication; (2) embody evaluative structures for setting priorities; (3) can preserve information over time and permit asynchronous communication, thus encouraging learning and adaptation; and (4) explicitly address uncertain futures. Moreover, because of their “what‐if” capabilities, risk assessments can serve as a platform for constructive discussion among parties that hold different values. The evolution of risk assessment in the nuclear industry shows how such attributes have been used to lower core‐melt risks substantially through improved templates for maintenance and more effective coordination with regulators (although risk assessment has been less commonly used in improving emergency‐response capabilities). The end result of this evolution in the nuclear industry has been the development of “living” risk assessments that are updated more or less in real time to answer even routine operational questions. Similar but untapped opportunities abound for the use of living risk assessments to reduce risks in small operational decisions as well as large policy decisions in other areas of hazard management. They can also help improve understanding of and communication about risks, and future risk assessment and management. Realization of these opportunities will require significant changes in incentives and active promotion by the risk analytic community.     

Specifying Risk Goals: Inherent Problems with Democratic Institutions

Many risks have the property that large numbers of people are exposed and have little or no individual control over the risks they face. Dams, nuclear power plants, and recombinant DNA research have proven controversial not simply because there is vast uncertainty about the true level of risk associated with each, but because a fundamental issue is that in each case social risks can be lessened by spending more on safety: dams can be designed to withstand larger earthquakes, nuclear plants can have additional safety equipment, and DNA research could be done in yet more carefully isolated laboratories. Since each person will have preferences regarding the proper trade-off between increased cost and increased safety, there is little possibility of consensus. More importantly, we show that a voting process for expressing individual preferences can be manipulated and is seriously flawed in the sense that it does not lead to an "efficient" outcome. In addition, we show that virtually all people are unhappy with the safety decision, in the sense that each would prefer either a safer or a cheaper outcome. Thus, making safety decisions that affect a large group of people who will not be able to control the outcome is even more difficult than has been appreciated. We suggest some ways of handling some of the difficulties.     

Public Perception of the Risks of Floods: Implications for Communication

Floods in the U.S. kill an average of 162 people each year and cause $3.4 billion in property damage. Flood control programs have been successful in lowering, but not eliminating, the risks to lives and property. Since the late 1960s, the federal government has emphasized flood insurance as a primary tool for improving location and flood-proofing decisions, as well as for reimbursing flood losses. Since only 12.7% of houses in flood plain areas are covered by flood insurance, the program has been ineffective. We interviewed people living in three communities that had recently been flooded. Most people had little knowledge of the cause of floods or what could be done to prevent damage. People who work and who are better educated know more and are more likely to have flood insurance. Current government publications about flood risks are not likely to be understood by those at risk. There is little effective communication about the nature and magnitude of the risks and what individuals can do to protect their lives and property and lower their financial risks. The risk management program should both emphasize communication and enforcement of the current law requiring people at risk who hold federally funded loans to be insured.     

Some Limitations of Qualitative Risk Rating Systems

Qualitative systems for rating animal antimicrobial risks using ordered categorical labels such as “high,”“medium,” and “low” can potentially simplify risk assessment input requirements used to inform risk management decisions. But do they improve decisions? This article compares the results of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment systems and establishes some theoretical limitations on the extent to which they are compatible. In general, qualitative risk rating systems satisfying conditions found in real‐world rating systems and guidance documents and proposed as reasonable make two types of errors: (1) Reversed rankings, i.e., assigning higher qualitative risk ratings to situations that have lower quantitative risks; and (2) Uninformative ratings, e.g., frequently assigning the most severe qualitative risk label (such as “high”) to situations with arbitrarily small quantitative risks and assigning the same ratings to risks that differ by many orders of magnitude. Therefore, despite their appealing consensus‐building properties, flexibility, and appearance of thoughtful process in input requirements, qualitative rating systems as currently proposed often do not provide sufficient information to discriminate accurately between quantitatively small and quantitatively large risks. The value of information (VOI) that they provide for improving risk management decisions can be zero if most risks are small but a few are large, since qualitative ratings may then be unable to confidently distinguish the large risks from the small. These limitations suggest that it is important to continue to develop and apply practical quantitative risk assessment methods, since qualitative ones are often unreliable.     

Communicating Worst-Case Scenarios: Neighbors'' Views of Industrial Accident Management

The prospect of industrial accidents motivated the U.S. Congress to require in the Clean Air Act of 1990 that manufacturing facilities develop Risk Management Plans (RMP) to submit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) by July 1999. Industry worried that the requirement to communicate to the public a "worst-case scenario" would arouse unnecessary and counterproductive fears among industry neighbors. We report here the results of focus groups and surveys with such neighbors, focusing particularly upon their reactions to messages about a hypothetical worst-case scenario and management of these risks by industry, government, and other parties. Our findings confirmed our hypotheses that citizens would be skeptical of the competence and trustworthiness of these managers and that this stance would color their views of industrial-facility accident risks. People with job ties to industry or who saw industrial benefits to the community as exceeding its risks had more positive views of industrial risks, but still expressed great concern about the risk and doubt about accident management. Notwithstanding these reactions, overall respondents welcomed this and other related information, which they wanted their local industries to supply. Respondents were not more reassured by additional text describing management of accidents by government and industry. However, respondents did react very positively to the concept of community oversight to review plant safety. Claims about the firm's moral obligation or financial self-interest in preventing accidents were also received positively. Further research on innovative communication and management of accident risks is warranted by these results, even before recent terrorist attacks made this topic more salient.     

Risk Communication,Public Engagement,and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions

This article discusses the potential role that emotions might play in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes climate change. Climate change is an important challenge for society. There is a growing consensus that climate change is due to our behavior, but few people are willing to significantly adapt their lifestyle. Empirical studies show that people lack a sense of urgency: they experience climate change as a problem that affects people in distant places and in a far future. Several scholars have claimed that emotions might be a necessary tool in communication about climate change. This article sketches a theoretical framework that supports this hypothesis, drawing on insights from the ethics of risk and the philosophy of emotions. It has been shown by various scholars that emotions are important determinants in risk perception. However, emotions are generally considered to be irrational states and are hence excluded from communication and political decision making about risky technologies and climate change, or they are used instrumentally to create support for a position. However, the literature on the ethics of risk shows that the dominant, technocratic approach to risk misses the normative‐ethical dimension that is inherent to decisions about acceptable risk. Emotion research shows that emotions are necessary for practical and moral decision making. These insights can be applied to communication about climate change. Emotions are necessary for understanding the moral impact of the risks of climate change, and they also paradigmatically provide for motivation. Emotions might be the missing link in effective communication about climate change.     

Do Users Ignore Spatial Data Quality? A Decision‐Theoretic Perspective

Risk analysis (RA) has been proposed as a means of assessing fitness for use of spatial data but is only rarely adopted. The proposal is that better decisions can be made by accounting for risks due to errors in spatial data. Why is RA so rarely adopted? Most geographical information science (GISc) literature stresses educational and technical constraints. In this article we propose, based on decision theory, a number of hypotheses for why the user would be more or less willing to spend resources on RA. The hypotheses were tested with a questionnaire, which showed that the willingness to spend resources on RA depends on the presence of feedback mechanisms in the decision‐making process, on how much is at stake, and to a minor extent on how well the decision‐making process can be modeled.     

One Agency's Use of Risk Assessment and Risk Communication1

Few organizations have the courage to evaluate their own use of risk assessment (identifying hazards and estimating their probability and magnitude) and risk communication (interacting with internal and external stakeholder groups about risks). The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) wants to enhance its overall risk analysis process for managing a wide range of risks to animals, plants, and human health. We gathered survey data for a baseline of APHIS professionals’ understanding and use of risk assessment and risk communication. APHIS professionals spend a surprisingly large share of their time communicating about risks. They perceive that risk estimates influence decisions, but that risk estimates should have more influence. Respondents reported little opposition to APHIS risk management decisions, and little use of channels such as USDA Extension Service for disseminating risk messages. Substantial variance across responses is explained mostly by differences in the roles of the 11 work units (now 10) within the agency. Location also contributes to the variance. Demographic variables seem less important.     

Knowledge-Based Representations of Risk Beliefs

Beliefs about risks associated with two risk agents, AIDS and toxic waste, are modeled using knowledge-based methods and elicited from subjects via interactive computer technology. A concept net is developed to organize subject responses concerning the consequences of the risk agents. It is found that death and adverse personal emotional and sociological consequences are most associated with AIDS. Toxic waste is most associated with environmental problems. These consequence profiles are quite dissimilar, although past work in risk perception would have judged the risk agents as being quite similar. Subjects frequently used causal semantics to represent their beliefs and "% of time" instead of "probability" to represent likelihoods. The news media is the most prevalent source of risk information although experiences of acquaintances appear more credible. The results suggest that "broadly based risk" communication may be ineffective because people differ in their conceptual representation of risk beliefs. In general, the knowledge-based approach to risk perception representation has great potential to increase our understanding of important risk topics.     

Farmers’ Risk‐Based Decision Making Under Pervasive Uncertainty: Cognitive Thresholds and Hazy Hedging

Researchers in judgment and decision making have long debunked the idea that we are economically rational optimizers. However, problematic assumptions of rationality remain common in studies of agricultural economics and climate change adaptation, especially those that involve quantitative models. Recent movement toward more complex agent‐based modeling provides an opportunity to reconsider the empirical basis for farmer decision making. Here, we reconceptualize farmer decision making from the ground up, using an in situ mental models approach to analyze weather and climate risk management. We assess how large‐scale commercial grain farmers in South Africa (n = 90) coordinate decisions about weather, climate variability, and climate change with those around other environmental, agronomic, economic, political, and personal risks that they manage every day. Contrary to common simplifying assumptions, we show that these farmers tend to satisfice rather than optimize as they face intractable and multifaceted uncertainty; they make imperfect use of limited information; they are differently averse to different risks; they make decisions on multiple time horizons; they are cautious in responding to changing conditions; and their diverse risk perceptions contribute to important differences in individual behaviors. We find that they use two important nonoptimizing strategies, which we call cognitive thresholds and hazy hedging, to make practical decisions under pervasive uncertainty. These strategies, evident in farmers' simultaneous use of conservation agriculture and livestock to manage weather risks, are the messy in situ performance of naturalistic decision‐making techniques. These results may inform continued research on such behavioral tendencies in narrower lab‐ and modeling‐based studies.     

Does a Reactor Need a Safety Backfit? Case Study on Communicating Decision and Risk Analysis Information to Managers

An approach to communicating decision and risk analysis findings to managers is illustrated in a real case context. This article consists essentially of a report prepared for senior managers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to help them make a reactor safety decision. It illustrates the communication of decision analysis findings relating to technical risks, costs, and benefits in support of a major risk management decision: whether or not to require a safety backfit. Its focus is on the needs of decision makers, and it introduces some novel communication devices.     

Improving Flood Risk Communication by Focusing on Prevention‐Focused Motivation

This article proposes an approach to flood risk communication that gives particular emphasis to the distinction between prevention and promotion motivation. According to E. Tory Higgins, the promotion system and the prevention system are assumed to coexist in every person, but one or the other may be temporarily or chronically more accessible. These insights have far‐reaching implications for our understanding of people's reasoning about risks. Flood risk communication framed in terms of prevention involves the notions of chance and harm, woven into a story about particular events that necessitate decisions to be more careful about safety issues and protect one's family and oneself from danger. The article describes how the insights worked out in practice, using a flood risk communication experiment among a sample from the general population in a highly populated river delta of the Netherlands. It had a posttest‐only control group design (n = 2,302). The results showed that risk communication had a large effect on the participants’ responses and that this effect was higher among chronic prevention‐focused people than among others. Any information that increased the fit between a prevention‐framed message and a person's chronic prevention motivation produced stronger situationally induced, prevention‐focused responses. This may significantly improve communication about risks. In contrast, the notion of water city projects, featuring waterside living, had more appeal to promotion‐focused people.     

Mental Models in Risk Assessment: Informing People About Drugs

One way to communicate about the risks of drugs is through the use of package inserts. The problems associated with this medium of informing patients have been investigated by several researchers who found that people require information about drugs they are using, including extensive risk information, and that they are willing to take this information into account in their usage of drugs. But empirical results also show that people easily misinterpret the information given. A conceptual framework is proposed that might be used for better understanding the cognitive processes involved in such a type of risk assessment and communication. It is based on the idea that people develop, through experience, a mental model of how a drug works, which effects it might produce, that contraindications have to be considered, etc. This mental model is "run" when a specific package insert has been read and a specific question arises such as, for example, whether certain symptoms can be explained as normal or whether they require special attention and action. We argue that the mental model approach offers a useful perspective for examining how people understand package inserts, and consequently for improving their content and design. The approach promises to be equally useful for other aspects of risk analysis that are dependent upon human judgment and decision making, e.g., threat diagnosis and human reliability analysis.     

Variability and Uncertainty Meet Risk Management and Risk Communication

In the past decade, the use of probabilistic risk analysis techniques to quantitatively address variability and uncertainty in risks increased in popularity as recommended by the 1994 National Research Council that wrote Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment. Under the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act, for example, the U.S. EPA supported the development of tools that produce distributions of risk demonstrating the variability and/or uncertainty in the results. This paradigm shift away from the use of point estimates creates new challenges for risk managers, who now struggle with decisions about how to use distributions in decision making. The challenges for risk communication, however, have only been minimally explored. This presentation uses the case studies of variability in the risks of dying on the ground from a crashing airplane and from the deployment of motor vehicle airbags to demonstrate how better characterization of variability and uncertainty in the risk assessment lead to better risk communication. Analogies to food safety and environmental risks are also discussed. This presentation demonstrates that probabilistic risk assessment has an impact on both risk management and risk communication, and highlights remaining research issues associated with using improved sensitivity and uncertainty analyses in risk assessment.