Are Some Risk Comparisons More Effective Under Conflict?: A Replication and Extension of Roth et al.

Despite many claims for and against the use of risk comparisons in risk communication, few empirical studies have explored their effect. Only one study, published by Roth et al. in this journal in 1990, has tested the 1988 predictions by Covello et al. as to the public's relative preferences for 14 kinds of risk comparisons as they might be used by a factory manager to explain risks of his ethylene oxide plant. That study found no correlations between the Covello predictions and seven different measures of "acceptability" of Covello's examples of each type of comparison. However, two critics of the Roth study, as well as its own authors, suggested that a scenario involving local risks, a conflict-ridden situation, and a plant manager unknown to the townspeople might better evoke Covello-like preferences than the distant, calm, friends-involving scenario used by Roth. The research reported here replicated the Roth study using the same scenario, risk comparison examples, and evaluation measures, and added a second scenario intended to replicate the conditions suggested by critics. Over 200 New Jersey residents answered the study questionnaire. The replication scenario reproduced Roth's results, and the conflict scenario also evoked no rankings correlated with Covello's predictions. Furthermore, neither agreement nor disagreement with five statements representing "conflict"--respondents' reports that the industrial-plant scenario made them angry, they lived near industry, they were concerned about industrial risks, people in their home town were angry about industrial pollution, and they worried "frequently" about long-term effects of pollution--correlated with Covello's predictions. Over half of all ratings ascribed to the comparisons in aggregate were positive, and most detailed comments offered by respondents also were positive, despite many criticisms and suggestions for their improvement. The wide variability in individuals' rankings also undermines the notion of any single ranking of preferred comparisons. These findings have implications for use of risk comparisons, but also reveal the inaccuracy of the field's assumptions about public reaction to industrial risk information, including risk comparison.     

Value of Statistical Life and Cause of Accident: A Choice Experiment

The purpose of this study is to compare the value of statistical life (VSL) estimates for traffic, drowning, and fire accidents. Using a choice experiment in a mail survey of 5,000 Swedish respondents we estimated the willingness to pay for risk reductions in the three accidents. In the experiment respondents were asked a series of questions, whether they would choose risk reducing investments where type of accident, cost of the investment, the risk reduction acquired, and the baseline risk varied between questions. The VSLs for fire and drowning accidents were found to be about 1/3 lower than that for traffic accidents. Although respondents worry more about traffic accidents, this alone cannot explain the difference in VSL estimates. The difference between fire and drowning accidents was not found to be statistically significant.     

The Impact of Accident Attention,Ideology, and Environmentalism on American Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy

This study involves the analysis of three waves of survey data about nuclear energy using a probability‐based online panel of respondents in the United States. Survey waves included an initial baseline survey conducted in early 2010, a follow‐up survey conducted in 2010 following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and an additional follow‐up conducted just after the 2011 Fukushima, Japan, nuclear accident. The central goal is to assess the degree to which changes in public views following an accident are contingent on individual attention and respondent predispositions. Such results would provide real‐world evidence of motivated reasoning. The primary analysis focuses on the impact of Fukushima and how the impact of individual attention to energy issues is moderated by both environmental views and political ideology over time. The analysis uses both mean comparisons and multivariate statistics to test key relationships. Additional variables common in the study of emerging technologies are included in the analysis, including demographics, risk and benefit perceptions, and views about the fairness of decisionmakers in both government and the private sector.     

Energy Choices and Risk Beliefs: Is It Just Global Warming and Fear of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident?

A survey of 3,200 U.S. residents focused on two issues associated with the use of nuclear and coal fuels to produce electrical energy. The first was the association between risk beliefs and preferences for coal and nuclear energy. As expected, concern about nuclear power plant accidents led to decreased support for nuclear power, and those who believed that coal causes global warming preferred less coal use. Yet other risk beliefs about the coal and nuclear energy fuel cycles were stronger or equal correlates of public preferences. The second issue is the existence of what we call acknowledged risk takers, respondents who favored increased reliance on nuclear energy, although also noting that there could be a serious nuclear plant accident, and those who favored greater coal use, despite acknowledging a link to global warming. The pro‐nuclear group disproportionately was affluent educated white males, and the pro‐coal group was relatively poor less educated African‐American and Latino females. Yet both shared four similarities: older age, trust in management, belief that the energy facilities help the local economy, and individualistic personal values. These findings show that there is no single public with regard to energy preferences and risk beliefs. Rather, there are multiple populations with different viewpoints that surely would benefit by hearing a clear and comprehensive national energy life cycle policy from the national government.     

Lessons learned from Toulouse and Buncefield disasters: from risk analysis failures to the identification of atypical scenarios through a better knowledge management

The recent occurrence of severe major accidents has brought to light flaws and limitations of hazard identification (HAZID) processes performed for safety reports, as in the accidents at Toulouse (France) and Buncefield (UK), where the accident scenarios that occurred were not captured by HAZID techniques. This study focuses on this type of atypical accident scenario deviating from normal expectations. The main purpose is to analyze the examples of atypical accidents mentioned and to attempt to identify them through the application of a well-known methodology such as the bow-tie analysis. To these aims, the concept of atypical event is accurately defined. Early warnings, causes, consequences, and occurrence mechanisms of the specific events are widely studied and general failures of risk assessment, management, and governance isolated. These activities contribute to outline a set of targeted recommendations, addressing transversal common deficiencies and also demonstrating how a better management of knowledge from the study of past events can support future risk assessment processes in the identification of atypical accident scenarios. Thus, a new methodology is not suggested; rather, a specific approach coordinating a more effective use of experience and available information is described, to suggest that lessons to be learned from past accidents can be effectively translated into actions of prevention.     

Accident Epidemiology and the U.S. Chemical Industry: Accident History and Worst-Case Data from RMP*Info

This article reports on the data collected on one of the most ambitious government-sponsored environmental data acquisition projects of all time, the Risk Management Plan (RMP) data collected under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This RMP Rule 112(r) was triggered by the Bhopal accident in 1984 and led to the requirement that each qualifying facility develop and file with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency a Risk Management Plan (RMP) as well as accident history data for the five-year period preceding the filing of the RMP. These data were collected in 1999-2001 on more than 15,000 facilities in the United States that store or use listed toxic or flammable chemicals believed to be a hazard to the environment or to human health of facility employees or off-site residents of host communities. The resulting database, RMP*Info, has become a key resource for regulators and researchers concerned with the frequency and severity of accidents, and the underlying facility-specific factors that are statistically associated with accident and injury rates. This article analyzes which facilities actually filed under the Rule and presents results on accident frequencies and severities available from the RMP*Info database. This article also presents summaries of related results from RMP*Info on Offsite Consequence Analysis (OCA), an analytical estimate of the potential consequences of hypothetical worst-case and alternative accidental releases on the public and environment around the facility. The OCA data have become a key input in the evaluation of site security assessment and mitigation policies for both government planners as well as facility managers and their insurers. Following the survey of the RMP*Info data, we discuss the rich set of policy decisions that may be informed by research based on these data.     

Judgments of Chemical Risks: Comparisons Among Senior Managers, Toxicologists, and the Public

Nineteen Senior Managers of a major chemical company in the United Kingdom participated in a survey to determine their attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions regarding risks from chemicals. Similar surveys had previously been conducted with toxicologists and members of the general public in the United States and Canada. In general, the Senior Managers tended to judge risks to be quite small for most chemicals. Moreover, they had lower risk perceptions than did members of the British Toxicological Society and even far lower perceptions of risk than a comparison group of members of the Canadian public. The managers held views that were similar to British toxicologists working in industry and government and dissimilar to the views of toxicologists working in academia. The observed differences between views of managers, toxicologists, and the public must be recognized and understood in order to facilitate communication and constructive efforts to manage chemical risks.     

Perception of Mobile Phone and Base Station Risks

Perceptions of risks associated with mobile phones, base stations, and other sources of electromagnetic fields (EMF) were examined. Data from a telephone survey conducted in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland are presented (N = 1,015). Participants assessed both risks and benefits associated with nine different sources of EMF. Trust in the authorities regulating these hazards was assessed as well. In addition, participants answered a set of questions related to attitudes toward EMF and toward mobile phone base stations. According to respondents' assessments, high-voltage transmission lines are the most risky source of EMF. Mobile phones and mobile phone base stations received lower risk ratings. Results showed that trust in authorities was positively associated with perceived benefits and negatively associated with perceived risks. People who use their mobile phones frequently perceived lower risks and higher benefits than people who use their mobile phones infrequently. People who believed they lived close to a base station did not significantly differ in their level of risks associated with mobile phone base stations from people who did not believe they lived close to a base station. Regarding risk regulation, a majority of participants were in favor of fixing limiting values based on the worst-case scenario. Correlations suggest that belief in paranormal phenomena is related to level of perceived risks associated with EMF. Furthermore, people who believed that most chemical substances cause cancer also worried more about EMF than people who did not believe that chemical substances are that harmful. Practical implications of the results are discussed.     

Managing the Fukushima Challenge

The Fukushima Daiichi accident raises a fundamental question: Can science and technology prevent the inevitability of serious accidents, especially those with low probabilities and high consequences? This question reminds us of a longstanding challenge with the trans‐sciences, originally addressed by Alvin Weinberg well before the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. This article, revisiting Weinberg's issue, aims at gaining insights from the accident with a special emphasis on the sociotechnical or human behavioral aspects lying behind the accident's causes. In particular, an innovative method for managing the challenge is explored referring to behavioral science approaches to a decision‐making process on risk management; such as managing human behavioral risks with information asymmetry, seeking a rational consensus with communicative action, and pursuing procedural rationality through interactions with the outer environment. In short, this article describes the emerging need for Japan to transform its national safety management institutions so that these might be based on interactive communication with parties inside and outside Japan.     

Insights into the Societal Risk of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

The elements of societal risk from a nuclear power plant accident are clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident: land contamination, long‐term relocation of large numbers of people, loss of productive farm area, loss of industrial production, and significant loss of electric capacity. NUREG‐1150 and other studies have provided compelling evidence that the individual health risk of nuclear power plant accidents is effectively negligible relative to other comparable risks, even for people living in close proximity to a plant. The objective of this study is to compare the societal risk of nuclear power plant accidents to that of other events to which the public is exposed. We have characterized the monetized societal risk in the United States from major societally disruptive events, such as hurricanes, in the form of a complementary cumulative distribution function. These risks are compared with nuclear power plant risks, based on NUREG‐1150 analyses and new MACCS code calculations to account for differences in source terms determined in the more recent SOARCA study. A candidate quantitative societal objective is discussed for potential adoption by the NRC. The results are also interpreted with regard to the acceptability of nuclear power as a major source of future energy supply.     

Probabilistic Analysis of Domino Effects by Using a Matrix-Based Simulation Approach

Major industrial accidents occurring at so-called major hazard installations may cause domino accidents which are among the most destructive industrial accidents existing at present. As there may be many hazard installations in an area, a primary accident scenario may potentially propagate from one installation to another, and correlations exist in probability calculations of domino effects. In addition, during the propagation of a domino effect, accidents of diverse types may occur, some of them having a synergistic effect, while others do not. These characteristics make the analytical formulation of domino accidents very complex. In this work, a simple matrix-based modeling approach for domino effect analysis is proposed. Matrices can be used to represent the mutual influences of different escalation vectors between installations. On this basis, an analysis approach for accident propagation as well as a simulation-based algorithm for probability calculation of accidents and accident levels is provided. The applicability and flexibility of this approach is discussed while applying it to estimate domino probabilities in a case study.     

Public Response to a Near‐Miss Nuclear Accident Scenario Varying in Causal Attributions and Outcome Uncertainty

Many studies have investigated public reactions to nuclear accidents. However, few studies focused on more common events when a serious accident could have happened but did not. This study evaluated public response (emotional, cognitive, and behavioral) over three phases of a near‐miss nuclear accident. Simulating a loss‐of‐coolant accident (LOCA) scenario, we manipulated (1) attribution for the initial cause of the incident (software failure vs. cyber terrorist attack vs. earthquake), (2) attribution for halting the incident (fail‐safe system design vs. an intervention by an individual expert vs. a chance coincidence), and (3) level of uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain) about risk of a future radiation leak after the LOCA is halted. A total of 773 respondents were sampled using a 3 × 3 × 2 between‐subjects design. Results from both MANCOVA and structural equation modeling (SEM) indicate that respondents experienced more negative affect, perceived more risk, and expressed more avoidance behavioral intention when the near‐miss event was initiated by an external attributed source (e.g., earthquake) compared to an internally attributed source (e.g., software failure). Similarly, respondents also indicated greater negative affect, perceived risk, and avoidance behavioral intentions when the future impact of the near‐miss incident on people and the environment remained uncertain. Results from SEM analyses also suggested that negative affect predicted risk perception, and both predicted avoidance behavior. Affect, risk perception, and avoidance behavior demonstrated high stability (i.e., reliability) from one phase to the next.     

Risk-Based Approaches to Deal with Uncertainty in a Data-Poor System: Stakeholder Involvement in Hazard Identification for Marine National Parks and Marine Sanctuaries in Victoria, Australia

Management responsibilities for the system of marine national parks and sanctuaries declared in Victoria, Australia in 2002 have created imperatives for robust, scientifically defendable approaches to identifying threats to valued ecological attributes of the parks, setting management priorities, and developing monitoring systems. We are developing a protocol for ecological risk assessment in the parks that has due regard for the perception of risks by individuals, and ensures that stakeholder values are an intrinsic part of decision making. The inclusive and transparent protocol provides an opportunity for stakeholder involvement in the identification of valued attributes, as well as in the assessment of associated risks. Our approach brings together ideas about how science enters the community engagement domain in ways that promote collaboration and transparency in decision making. A series of stakeholder workshops across the state drew on the expertise of agency staff, community groups, fishers, industry representatives, academics, and knowledgeable park neighbors to identify hazards of major concern in the parks. Many hazards involved predictable, tangible threats like pollution and exotic species, but the approach also identified a number of less obvious threats related to governance issues and the knowledge-base for the parks. Importantly, the workshops with their broad range of stakeholders identified threats not previously considered by the management agency in its internal assessments, and several of these "new" threats are already the subject of action by the agency. The deliberate incorporation of local knowledge and local networks in the risk assessment process also provided opportunities for greater engagement of stakeholders with the management agency.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.     

Public Perception of the Risks of Floods: Implications for Communication

Floods in the U.S. kill an average of 162 people each year and cause $3.4 billion in property damage. Flood control programs have been successful in lowering, but not eliminating, the risks to lives and property. Since the late 1960s, the federal government has emphasized flood insurance as a primary tool for improving location and flood-proofing decisions, as well as for reimbursing flood losses. Since only 12.7% of houses in flood plain areas are covered by flood insurance, the program has been ineffective. We interviewed people living in three communities that had recently been flooded. Most people had little knowledge of the cause of floods or what could be done to prevent damage. People who work and who are better educated know more and are more likely to have flood insurance. Current government publications about flood risks are not likely to be understood by those at risk. There is little effective communication about the nature and magnitude of the risks and what individuals can do to protect their lives and property and lower their financial risks. The risk management program should both emphasize communication and enforcement of the current law requiring people at risk who hold federally funded loans to be insured.     

Major Hazard Information Policy in the European Community: Implications for Risk Analysis

The main impetus to the development of information about major industrial hazards in the European Community comes from the so-called Seveso Directive, which defines an information network and requires the generation and transmission of information as the basis for accident prevention and risk management. This important policy development, which calls for the formal identification and analysis of major hazards and the communication of risk information to members of the public, presents new opportunities and challenges to risk analysis and research in Europe. This paper briefly reviews the accidents that gave rise to the Directive and shaped its content, and then summarizes its requirements. The status of its implementation in the EC Member States is discussed, with special emphasis given to the comparison of safety analysis practices, the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), and risk communication. Some new research directions stimulated by the Directive are identified.     

Values,Perceived Risks and Benefits,and Acceptability of Nuclear Energy

We examined how personal values and perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with the acceptability of nuclear energy (NE). A theoretical model is tested in which beliefs about the risks and benefits of NE mediate the relationship between values and acceptability. The results showed that egoistic values are positively related to the perceived benefits and acceptability of NE. In contrast, altruistic and biospheric values were positively related to the perceived risks of NE. Although it has been argued that NE may help to combat climate change through lower CO₂ emissions, these environmental benefits were not acknowledged by people with strong biospheric values. Furthermore, results confirmed that the more risks respondents perceived, the less they were inclined to accept NE. In contrast, the more a person believed that NE has beneficial consequences, the more acceptable NE was. Finally, as expected, perceived risks and benefits were found to partly mediate the relationship between personal values and acceptability. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

基于行业相关性的银行业信用风险宏观压力测试研究

遵循宏观审慎管理的原则和理念, 提出了基于行业相关性的银行业信用风险宏观压力测试方法。通过考虑行业相关性和风险因子t分布特性, 对多元风险因子模型进行了拓展;将宏观压力测试情景与多元风险因子模型对接起来, 将压力情景下得到的行业景气指数取值转换为相应压力情景下行业风险因子的条件分布;在考察宏观经济周期的基础上, 采用指数平滑法、回归模型方法和历史情景分析方法处理宏观经济整个周期的历史数据, 从而确定宏观压力测试的情景设置, 这种情景设置能消除信用风险计量的顺周期性。这一过程将银行业经济资本管理与系统性风险防范有机地联系起来。这一信用风险宏观压力测试方法能反映不同行业信贷资产间的违约相关性, 能识别某一行业衰退对其他行业信贷资产产生的负面影响, 从而反映系统性风险的来源及其作用机理。     

Perceptions of Risk and Vulnerability Following Exposure to a Major Natural Disaster: The Calgary Flood of 2013

Many studies have examined the general public's flood risk perceptions in the aftermath of local and regional flooding. However, relatively few studies have focused on large‐scale events that affect tens of thousands of people within an urban center. Similarly, in spite of previous research on flood risks, unresolved questions persist regarding the variables that might influence perceptions of risk and vulnerability, along with management preferences. In light of the opportunities presented by these knowledge gaps, the research reported here examined public perceptions of flood risk and vulnerability, and management preferences, within the city of Calgary in the aftermath of extensive flooding in 2013. Our findings, which come from an online survey of residents, reveal that direct experience with flooding is not a differentiating factor for risk perceptions when comparing evacuees with nonevacuees who might all experience future risks. However, we do find that judgments about vulnerability—as a function of how people perceive physical distance—do differ according to one's evacuation experience. Our results also indicate that concern about climate change is an important predictor of flood risk perceptions, as is trust in government risk managers. In terms of mitigation preferences, our results reveal differences in support for large infrastructure projects based on whether respondents feel they might actually benefit from them.     

The Theory of Risk Homeostasis: Implications for Safety and Health

No strategy for countermeasure design or future directions of research in the areas of human behavior which leads to traffic accidents or lifestyle-related diseases can be rationally developed without an acceptable working theory of human behavior in these domains. For this purpose, an attempt has been made to conceptually integrate the available evidence with respect to the role of human behavior in the causation of road accidents. From this integrative effort it would seem that the accident rate is ultimately dependent on one factor only, the target level of risk in the population concerned which acts as the reference variable in a homeostatic process relating accident rate to human motivation. Various policy tactics for the purpose of modifying this target level of risk have been pointed out and the theory of risk homeostasis has been speculatively extended to the areas of lifestyle-dependent morbidity and mortality.