Effects of public education and social security on fertility

Introducing a fertility decision and child care cost into an overlapping generations model with public education and social security, we examine the effects of these public policies on fertility. We show that an increase in income tax, which finances social security benefits and public investment in education, increases fertility. On the other hand, with a constant tax rate, a change in the allocation from social security benefits to public investment in education decreases fertility and, with a constant social security tax, the effect of education tax on fertility is neutral.      

The Apparent Failure of Russia's Pronatalist Family Policies

Russia has a history of pronatalist policies dating back to the 1930s. Two sets of pronatalist measures were implemented during the past 40 years. The one designed in the early 1980s proved to be a clear failure. Instead of raising fertility, completed cohort fertility declined from 1.8 births per woman for the 1960 birth cohort to 1.6 for the 1968 cohort. The government of President Putin became concerned with the dire demographic conditions of high mortality and low fertility in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. A comprehensive set of pronatalist measures came into effect in January 2007. The period total fertility rate increased from 1.3 births per woman in 2006 to 1.6 in 2011, which the authorities view as an unqualified success. An unbiased demographic evaluation as well as analyses of Russian experts reveals that apparently the measures mainly caused a lowering of the age at birth and shortening of birth intervals. It appears that any real fertility increase is questionable, i.e. cohort fertility is not likely to increase appreciably. The recent pronatalist measures are likely to turn out to be a failure.     

Federal financing of child care: Alternative approaches and economic implications

This paper surveys alternative approaches to financing child care at the federal level and discusses their economic implications with respect to female labor force participation, fertility, child care demand and supply, and poverty. The current system of federal support for child care is seen to consist of a series of overlapping programs that tend to create inefficiencies and inequities in the distribution of child care benefits. Four basic principles of an ideal child care system are outlined, and a general two-tiered system of support is proposed that would satisfy these four principles. The two-tiered system is centered on a refundable tax credit considerably more progressive than the current child care tax credit. A simulation analysis indicates that the proposed refundable tax credit would not cost much more than many of the more popular child care bills currently being debated in Congress.     

After the demographic transition: policy responses to low fertility in four Asian countries

In the low fertility countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand, policy-makers are concerned about the consequences of low growth. In South Korea, a family planning (FP) program was instituted in the early 1960s, and fertility declined to 1.6 by 1987. Rural fertility is still higher at 1.96, and abortion rates are high. 32.2% of fertility reduction is accomplished through abortion. South Korean population will not stabilize until 2021, at 50.6 million people. The elderly are expected to increase and strain housing, energy, and land resources. Government support for FP is being reduced, while private sector services are being enhanced. Government sterilization programs have been reduced significantly, and revisions in the Medical Insurance Law will cover part of contraceptive cost. Integrated services are being established. Many argue for an emphasis on birth spacing, child and family development, sex education, and care of the elderly. In Taiwan, replacement level fertility was reached in 1983. Policy in 1992 recommended increasing fertility from 1.6 to 2.1. The aim was to stabilize population without pronatalist interventions. Regardless of policy decisions, population growth will continue over the next 40 years, and the extent of aging will increase. In Singapore since the 1960s, the national government focused on encouraging small families through fertility incentives, mass media campaigns, and easy access to FP services. Fertility declined to 1.4 in 1988. Since 1983, government has established a variety of pronatalist incentives. In 1989, fertility increased to 1.8. The pronatalist shift is viewed as not likely to succeed in dealing with the concern for an adequate work force to support the elderly and economic development. In Thailand, fertility declined the fastest to 2.4 in 1993. The key factors were rapid economic and social development, a supportive cultural setting, strong demand for fertility control, and a successful FP program. The goal is to reduce fertility to 1.2 by 1996. Replacement level may be reached in 2000 or 2005. Future trends are not clear.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

The earned income tax credit and fertility

Government programs designed to provide income safety nets often restrict eligibility to families with children, creating an unintended fertility incentive. This paper considers whether dramatically changing incentives in the earned income tax credit affect fertility rates in the USA. We use birth certificate data spanning the period 1990 to 1999 to test whether expansions in the credit influenced birthrate among targeted families. While economic theory would predict a positive fertility effect of the program for many eligible women, our results indicate that expanding the credit produced only extremely small reductions in higher order fertility among white women.

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

The dependent tax exemption,abortion availability,and US fertility rates

The impact of the personal income tax dependent exemption, abortion availability, and other factors on fertility rates is analyzed. US time series data for 1915–88 are used in the empirical model. The results indicate that greater abortion availability in the USA is associated with lower fertility. A higher value of the dependent exemption generally is associated with higher fertility, but the magnitude and significance of the effect is sensitive to specification choice. The results suggest that restricting abortion availability in the USA will increase the fertility rate, but a change in the tax value of the dependent exemption will have a less predictable impact on fertility.     

Evidence bearing on the construct validity of "ideal family size"

George Gallup polled "ideal family size" in 1936 and introduced a concept which subsequently appeared in many polls and fertility surveys. Previous research shows that ideal is a poor measure of respondent's personal fertility plans or behavior and that among researchers there is little agreement about what ideal family size does measure, if anything. Construct validity analysis based on historical, trend, and cross-sectional data suggests that the late 1960s saw ideal politicized as preoccupation with the "population problem" grew. Ideal family size is now appropriately regarded as a measure of a societal pronatalist norm and not merely a projected fertility preference.A version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Merida, Mexico, 5 April 1978. Data on ideal family size from Blake (1974) are used with permission of the editors ofDemography. Other data come from the 1965 and 1970 National Fertility Studies co-directed by N.B. Ryder and C.F. Westoff (under contract No. PH-43-65-1048 with the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development).     

生育激励与个人所得税 ——理论逻辑与经验论据

中共十九大报告提出要进一步“促进生育政策和相关经济社会政策配套衔接”。在厘清税收激励生育的理论逻辑基础上,运用工资税模型,获取OECD国家对此的经验论据。结果显示,许多国家运用税收政策向有子女家庭提供正向激励,且更注重中低收入家庭。进一步分析发现,通常为符合资格条件的儿童设计相同的或递增的定额税收优惠,甚至为大规模家庭赋予额外优惠;将儿童税收宽免转化为抵免,引进收入限制和可退抵免制;单亲家庭可享受额外优惠,而已婚家庭还通过个人申报纳税、婚姻优惠、家庭申报纳税等多种举措受益。应汲取和借鉴OECD国家的成功经验,逐步构建我国“生育友好型”的税收制度。     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.     

Reducing the excess burden of subsidizing the stork: joint taxation, individual taxation, and family tax splitting

Analyzing a homogenous household setting with endogenous fertility and endogenous labor supply, we demonstrate that moving from joint taxation to individual taxation and adapting child benefits so as to keep fertility constant entails a Pareto improvement. The change is associated with an increase in labor supply and consumption and a reduction of the marginal income tax, while the child benefit may move in either direction. Similarly, a move from joint taxation to some scheme of family tax splitting increases labor supply and welfare.     

The potential of child care tax credits to reduce poverty and welfare recipiency

As more and more mothers of young children enter the work force, interest in government financing of child care grows. The chief government subsidy for child care is the child care credit in the federal Internal Revenue Code. This is a nonrefundable credit and therefore provides benefits only to those with incomes high enough to require them to pay income tax. Yet of the $ 5.5 billion spent by the federal government on child care in 1986, this program accounted for $ 3.5 billion.This paper simulates the effects of expanding the child care tax credit by (1) doubling the reimbursement rates of the current credit; (2) making the credit refundable; and (3) both making the credit refundable and increasing its value for all families with income below $ 32,000.Results suggest that these changes will have modest effects on the income and earnings of mothers, and on the poverty gap and welfare recipiency. Costs, however, differ substantially. Doubling the value of the credit is far more expensive than either making the credit refundable or making it both refundable and more generous at the bottom of the income distribution. Making the credit refundable may cost taxpayers very little by leading to increases in hours worked and concomitant reductions in welfare payments.     

Population Policy in a Prosperous City‐State: Dilemmas for Singapore

Singapore has achieved one of the highest levels of per capita income in the world, through sound economic planning and a stress on building its human capital. Yet its enviable living conditions are at risk of being enjoyed by fewer citizens, and indeed themselves placed in jeopardy, by the continued very low fertility levels. Ultra‐low fertility and growing reluctance by citizens to accept an increasing share of foreign‐born pose difficult dilemmas for population policy, given the planning scenario of reaching a resident population of 6.5 million. A range of pro‐marriage and pronatalist policies has failed to raise fertility substantially, while past success in modifying population trends and structure through migration has now encountered the twin problems of political constraints on the volume of immigration that is acceptable and a possible increase in emigration of Singapore citizens.     

Religious Differentials in Reproduction: the Effects of Sectarian Education

College-educated Catholic women in the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth had higher actual and expected fertility than did college educated Protestants. Moreover, Catholic colleges or universities had a pronatalist effect on alumnae. Thus, a significant part of the higher Catholic than Protestant cumulative fertility among college-educated women arose from the greater propensity of such Catholics to attend sectarian schools and colleges. The implications are explored.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Eastern Europe: pronatalist policies and private behavior

Fertility trends in the 9 Eastern European socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia) are reviewed. Official policy in all these countries but Yugoslavia is explicitly pronatalist to varying degrees. Attention is directed to the following areas: similarities and differences; fertility trends (historical trends, post World War 2 trends, and family size); abortion trends (abortion legislation history, current legislation, abortion data, impact on birth rates, abortion seekers, health risks, and psychological aftereffects); contraceptive availability and practice; pronatal economic incentives (impact on fertility); women's position; and marriage, divorce, and sexual attitudes. The fact that fertility was generally higher in the Eastern European socialist countries than in Western Europe in the mid-1970s is credited to pronatalist measures undertaken when fertility fell or threatened to fall below replacement level (2.1 births/woman) after abortion was liberalized in all countries but Albania, following the lead of the USSR in 1955. Fertility increased where access to abortion was again restricted (mildly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary at various times, and severely in Romania in 1966) and/or economic incentives such as birth grants, paid maternity leave, family and child care allowances, and low interest loans to newlyweds were substantially increased (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to some extent, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the German Democratic Republic in 1976). Subsequent declines in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania suggest that policy induced increases in fertility are short-lived. Couples respond to abortion restrictions by practicing more efficient contraception or resorting to illegal abortion. It is evident that the region's low birth rate is realized mainly with abortion, for withdrawal remains the primary contraceptive method in all countries but Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It seems that cash incentives have advanced the timing of 1st and 2nd births without substantially increasing the 3rd births required to keep national fertility above replacement level. Demographic factors alone will most likely keep birth rates low in several Eastern European countries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Due to the low birth rates in the 1960s, there will be fewer women in the prime childbearing ages of 20-29 in at least Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. It becomes clear that policy efforts to influence private reproductive behavior can only be moderately successful if the living conditions are such that women are determined not to have more than 1 or 2 children.     

The effects of child-related benefits and pensions on fertility by birth order: A test on Hungarian data

Using aggregate time-series data from post-war Hungary, we investigated the effect of child-related benefits and pensions on overall fertility and fertility by birth order. The results indicate moderate effects that are robust across a wide range of specifications. According to our estimates, a 1-per-cent increase in child-related benefits would increase total fertility by 0.2 per cent, while the same increase in pensions would decrease fertility by 0.2 per cent. The magnitude of both effects increases by birth order; this is more robust for child-related benefits.     

Population and Resources: An Exploration of Reproductive and Environmental Externalities

This article identifies four types of social externalities associated with fertility behavior. Three are shown to be pronatalist in their effects. These three are exemplified by the way theories of economic growth treat fertility and natural resources, the way population growth and economic stress in poor countries are seen by environmental and resource economists, and the way development economists accommodate environmental stress in their analysis of poverty. It is shown that the fourth type of externality, in which children are regarded as an end in themselves, can even provide an invidious link between fertility decisions and the use of the local natural‐resource base among poor rural households in poor countries. The fourth type is used to develop a theory of fertility transitions in the contemporary world; the theory views such transitions as disequilibrium phenomena.     

Africa's expanding population: old problems,new policies

Sub-Saharan Africa faces an historic challenge: to achieve economic and social progress while experiencing extraordinary population growth. With an estimated 1989 population of 512 million, the 42 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have the highest birth and death rates of any major world region. While death rates have fallen since the 1960s, persistently high birth rates yield annual growth rates above 3% in many countries. The United Nations projects that the region's population will increase 2.7 times by 2025--to 1.4 billion. Throughout the region, population has outstripped economic growth since the mid-1970s. In addition, many African countries are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The extent and demographic impact of the epidemic still are unknown, but disturbing social and political effects are already being felt. The region's population growth will slow only when African couples begin to have fewer children. The average number of children per woman ranges from 6 to 8 for most countries. The Africans' preference for large families is deeply rooted in the culture and fed by the perceived economic benefits they receive from their children. Economic stagnation during the 1980s prompted many national governments to recognize that rapid population growth was hindering their socioeconomic development. The political climate has shifted away from pronatalist or laissez-faire attitudes toward official policies to slow population growth. The policy formation process--detailed here for 4 countries (Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Liberia)--is ponderous and beset with political and bureaucratic pitfalls, However, policy shifts in more and more countries combined with evidence of increased contraceptive use and fertility downturns in a few countries give some hope that the region's extraordinary population growth may have peaked and will start a descent. Whatever the case, the decade of the 1990s will be crucial for the future of sub-Saharan Africa.