Modeling Uncertainties in Workforce Disruptions from Influenza Pandemics Using Dynamic Input‐Output Analysis

Influenza pandemic is a serious disaster that can pose significant disruptions to the workforce and associated economic sectors. This article examines the impact of influenza pandemic on workforce availability within an interdependent set of economic sectors. We introduce a simulation model based on the dynamic input‐output model to capture the propagation of pandemic consequences through the National Capital Region (NCR). The analysis conducted in this article is based on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic data. Two metrics were used to assess the impacts of the influenza pandemic on the economic sectors: (i) inoperability, which measures the percentage gap between the as‐planned output and the actual output of a sector, and (ii) economic loss, which quantifies the associated monetary value of the degraded output. The inoperability and economic loss metrics generate two different rankings of the critical economic sectors. Results show that most of the critical sectors in terms of inoperability are sectors that are related to hospitals and health‐care providers. On the other hand, most of the sectors that are critically ranked in terms of economic loss are sectors with significant total production outputs in the NCR such as federal government agencies. Therefore, policy recommendations relating to potential mitigation and recovery strategies should take into account the balance between the inoperability and economic loss metrics.     

Multiobjective Prioritization Methodology and Decision Support System for Evaluating Inventory Enhancement Strategies for Disrupted Interdependent Sectors

Disruptions in the production of commodities and services resulting from disasters influence the vital functions of infrastructure and economic sectors within a region. The interdependencies inherent among these sectors trigger the faster propagation of disaster consequences that are often associated with a wider range of inoperability and amplified losses. This article evaluates the impact of inventory‐enhanced policies for disrupted interdependent sectors to improve the disaster preparedness capability of dynamic inoperability input‐output models (DIIM). In this article, we develop the dynamic cross‐prioritization plot (DCPP)—a prioritization methodology capable of identifying and dynamically updating the critical sectors based on preference assignments to different objectives. The DCPP integrates the risk assessment metrics (e.g., economic loss and inoperability), which are independently analyzed in the DIIM. We develop a computer‐based DCPP tool to determine the priority for inventory enhancement with user preference and resource availability as new dimensions. A baseline inventory case for the state of Virginia revealed a high concentration of (i) manufacturing sectors under the inoperability objective and (ii) service sectors under the economic loss objective. Simulation of enhanced inventory policies for selected critical manufacturing sectors has reduced the recovery period by approximately four days and the expected total economic loss by $33 million. Although the article focuses on enhancing inventory levels in manufacturing sectors, complementary analysis is recommended to manage the resilience of the service sectors. The flexibility of the proposed DCPP as a decision support tool can also be extended to accommodate analysis in other regions and disaster scenarios.     

A Framework for Linking Cybersecurity Metrics to the Modeling of Macroeconomic Interdependencies

Hierarchical decision making is a multidimensional process involving management of multiple objectives (with associated metrics and tradeoffs in terms of costs, benefits, and risks), which span various levels of a large-scale system. The nation is a hierarchical system as it consists multiple classes of decisionmakers and stakeholders ranging from national policymakers to operators of specific critical infrastructure subsystems. Critical infrastructures (e.g., transportation, telecommunications, power, banking, etc.) are highly complex and interconnected. These interconnections take the form of flows of information, shared security, and physical flows of commodities, among others. In recent years, economic and infrastructure sectors have become increasingly dependent on networked information systems for efficient operations and timely delivery of products and services. In order to ensure the stability, sustainability, and operability of our critical economic and infrastructure sectors, it is imperative to understand their inherent physical and economic linkages, in addition to their cyber interdependencies. An interdependency model based on a transformation of the Leontief input-output (I-O) model can be used for modeling: (1) the steady-state economic effects triggered by a consumption shift in a given sector (or set of sectors); and (2) the resulting ripple effects to other sectors. The inoperability metric is calculated for each sector; this is achieved by converting the economic impact (typically in monetary units) into a percentage value relative to the size of the sector. Disruptive events such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and large-scale accidents have historically shown cascading effects on both consumption and production. Hence, a dynamic model extension is necessary to demonstrate the interplay between combined demand and supply effects. The result is a foundational framework for modeling cybersecurity scenarios for the oil and gas sector. A hypothetical case study examines a cyber attack that causes a 5-week shortfall in the crude oil supply in the Gulf Coast area.     

Risk‐Based Input‐Output Analysis of Influenza Epidemic Consequences on Interdependent Workforce Sectors

Outbreaks of contagious diseases underscore the ever‐looming threat of new epidemics. Compared to other disasters that inflict physical damage to infrastructure systems, epidemics can have more devastating and prolonged impacts on the population. This article investigates the interdependent economic and productivity risks resulting from epidemic‐induced workforce absenteeism. In particular, we develop a dynamic input‐output model capable of generating sector‐disaggregated economic losses based on different magnitudes of workforce disruptions. An ex post analysis of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in the national capital region (NCR) reveals the distribution of consequences across different economic sectors. Consequences are categorized into two metrics: (i) economic loss, which measures the magnitude of monetary losses incurred in each sector, and (ii) inoperability, which measures the normalized monetary losses incurred in each sector relative to the total economic output of that sector. For a simulated mild pandemic scenario in NCR, two distinct rankings are generated using the economic loss and inoperability metrics. Results indicate that the majority of the critical sectors ranked according to the economic loss metric comprise of sectors that contribute the most to the NCR's gross domestic product (e.g., federal government enterprises). In contrast, the majority of the critical sectors generated by the inoperability metric include sectors that are involved with epidemic management (e.g., hospitals). Hence, prioritizing sectors for recovery necessitates consideration of the balance between economic loss, inoperability, and other objectives. Although applied specifically to the NCR, the proposed methodology can be customized for other regions.     

International Trade Inoperability Input-Output Model (IT-IIM): Theory and Application

The inoperability input-output model (IIM) has been used for analyzing disruptions due to man-made or natural disasters that can adversely affect the operation of economic systems or critical infrastructures. Taking economic perturbation for each sector as inputs, the IIM provides the degree of economic production impacts on all industry sectors as the outputs for the model. The current version of the IIM does not provide a separate analysis for the international trade component of the inoperability. If an important port of entry (e.g., Port of Los Angeles) is disrupted, then international trade inoperability becomes a highly relevant subject for analysis. To complement the current IIM, this article develops the International Trade-IIM (IT-IIM). The IT-IIM investigates the resulting international trade inoperability for all industry sectors resulting from disruptions to a major port of entry. Similar to traditional IIM analysis, the inoperability metrics that the IT-IIM provides can be used to prioritize economic sectors based on the losses they could potentially incur. The IT-IIM is used to analyze two types of direct perturbations: (1) the reduced capacity of ports of entry, including harbors and airports (e.g., a shutdown of any port of entry); and (2) restrictions on commercial goods that foreign countries trade with the base nation (e.g., embargo).     

基于ITIM模型的政治争端事件对产业经济系统的影响评估

本文在考虑事件恢复期的情景下,扩展了Jung^[7]的针对进出口国际贸易的非正常投入产出模型。将2012年中日"钓鱼岛事件"视为一类政治争端事件,在几个假设前提下,评估该事件给中国的产业经济系统带来的间接经济损失,并筛选出对该事件较为敏感的产业。结果表明:"钓鱼岛事件"严重影响了中日贸易,2012年中日进出口贸易总额同比减少134.3716亿美元,考虑到产业经济系统内部的技术经济关联性,估算出"钓鱼岛事件"带来的静态间接经济损失区间为;然后假设"钓鱼岛事件"在1年、2年、3年、5年、10年和15年内得以解决,分别计算了该事件带来的间接经济损失区间;筛选出了"钓鱼岛事件"的高敏感行业:通用、专用设备制造业、电气机械及器材制造业、化学工业、金属冶炼及压延加工业和金属制品业等。最后提出了相应的政策建议。本文的研究方法可为类似事件的损失评估提供借鉴,研究结果可为政府、行业管理部门和相关企业提供参考。     

Pandemic Recovery Analysis Using the Dynamic Inoperability Input-Output Model

Economists have long conceptualized and modeled the inherent interdependent relationships among different sectors of the economy. This concept paved the way for input-output modeling, a methodology that accounts for sector interdependencies governing the magnitude and extent of ripple effects due to changes in the economic structure of a region or nation. Recent extensions to input-output modeling have enhanced the model's capabilities to account for the impact of an economic perturbation; two such examples are the inoperability input-output model^{( 1 , 2 )} and the dynamic inoperability input-output model (DIIM).^{( 3 )} These models introduced sector inoperability, or the inability to satisfy as-planned production levels, into input-output modeling. While these models provide insights for understanding the impacts of inoperability, there are several aspects of the current formulation that do not account for complexities associated with certain disasters, such as a pandemic. This article proposes further enhancements to the DIIM to account for economic productivity losses resulting primarily from workforce disruptions. A pandemic is a unique disaster because the majority of its direct impacts are workforce related. The article develops a modeling framework to account for workforce inoperability and recovery factors. The proposed workforce-explicit enhancements to the DIIM are demonstrated in a case study to simulate a pandemic scenario in the Commonwealth of Virginia.     

Testing Branching Process Estimators of Cascading Failure with Data from a Simulation of Transmission Line Outages

We suggest a statistical estimator to quantify the propagation of cascading transmission line failures in large blackouts of electric power systems. We use a Galton‐Watson branching process model of cascading failure and the standard Harris estimator of the mean propagation modified to work when the process saturates at a maximum number of components. If the mean number of initial failures and the mean propagation are estimated, then the branching process model predicts the distribution of the total number of failures. We initially test this prediction on failure data generated by a simulation of cascading transmission line outages on two standard test systems. We discuss the effectiveness of the estimator in terms of how many cascades need to be simulated to predict the distribution of the total number of line outages accurately.     

Stochastic Counterfactual Risk Analysis for the Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber‐Physical Attacks on Electricity Distribution Infrastructure Networks

In December 2015, a cyber‐physical attack took place on the Ukrainian electricity distribution network. This is regarded as one of the first cyber‐physical attacks on electricity infrastructure to have led to a substantial power outage and is illustrative of the increasing vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure to this type of malicious activity. Few data points, coupled with the rapid emergence of cyber phenomena, has held back the development of resilience analytics of cyber‐physical attacks, relative to many other threats. We propose to overcome data limitations by applying stochastic counterfactual risk analysis as part of a new vulnerability assessment framework. The method is developed in the context of the direct and indirect socioeconomic impacts of a Ukrainian‐style cyber‐physical attack taking place on the electricity distribution network serving London and its surrounding regions. A key finding is that if decision‐makers wish to mitigate major population disruptions, then they must invest resources more‐or‐less equally across all substations, to prevent the scaling of a cyber‐physical attack. However, there are some substations associated with higher economic value due to their support of other Critical National Infrastructures assets, which justifies the allocation of additional cyber security investment to reduce the chance of cascading failure. Further cyber‐physical vulnerability research must address the tradeoffs inherent in a system made up of multiple institutions with different strategic risk mitigation objectives and metrics of value, such as governments, infrastructure operators, and commercial consumers of infrastructure services.     

Systemic Valuation of Strategic Preparedness Through Application of the Inoperability Input-Output Model with Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has mandated all regions to "carefully weigh the benefit of each homeland security endeavor and only allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risk is worth the amount of additional cost" (DHS, 2006, p. 64). This mandate illuminates the need to develop methods for systemic valuation of preparedness measures that support strategic decision making. This article proposes an analysis method that naturally emerges from the structure of the inoperability input-output model (IIM) through which various regional- and sector-specific impact analyses can be cost-effectively integrated for natural and man-made disasters. The IIM is described extensively in a companion paper (Lian et al., 2007). Its reliance on data classifications structured by the U.S. Census Bureau and its extensive accounting of economic interdependencies enables us to decompose a risk analysis activity, perform independent assessments, and properly integrate the assessment for a systemic valuation of risk and risk management activity. In this article, we account for and assess some of the major impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to demonstrate this use of the IIM and illustrate hypothetical, reduced impacts resulting from various strategic preparedness decisions. Our results indicate the capability of the IIM to guide the decision-making processes involved in developing a preparedness strategy.     

A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

This article analyzes possible terrorist attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach using a radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a "dirty bomb") to shut down port operations and cause substantial economic and psychological impacts. The analysis is an exploratory investigation of a combination of several risk analysis tools, including scenario generation and pruning, project risk analysis, direct consequence modeling, and indirect economic impact assessment. We examined 36 attack scenarios and reduced them to two plausible or likely scenarios using qualitative judgments. For these two scenarios, we conducted a project risk analysis to understand the tasks terrorists need to perform to carry out the attacks and to determine the likelihood of the project's success. The consequences of a successful attack are described in terms of a radiological plume model and resulting human health and economic impacts. Initial findings suggest that the chances of a successful dirty bomb attack are about 10-40% and that high radiological doses are confined to a relatively small area, limiting health effects to tens or at most hundreds of latent cancers, even with a major release. However, the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbors due to the contamination could result in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including the decontamination costs and the indirect economic impacts due to the port shutdown. The implications for countering a dirty bomb attack, including the protection of the radiological sources and intercepting an ongoing dirty bomb attack are discussed.     

Development of Economic Consequence Methodology for Process Risk Analysis

A comprehensive methodology for economic consequence analysis with appropriate models for risk analysis of process systems is proposed. This methodology uses loss functions to relate process deviations in a given scenario to economic losses. It consists of four steps: definition of a scenario, identification of losses, quantification of losses, and integration of losses. In this methodology, the process deviations that contribute to a given accident scenario are identified and mapped to assess potential consequences. Losses are assessed with an appropriate loss function (revised Taguchi, modified inverted normal) for each type of loss. The total loss is quantified by integrating different loss functions. The proposed methodology has been examined on two industrial case studies. Implementation of this new economic consequence methodology in quantitative risk assessment will provide better understanding and quantification of risk. This will improve design, decision making, and risk management strategies.     

Measurement and Pricing of Risk in Insurance Markets

The theory and practice of risk measurement provides a point of intersection between risk management, economic theories of choice under risk, financial economics, and actuarial pricing theory. This article provides a review of these interrelationships, from the perspective of an insurance company seeking to price the risks that it underwrites. We examine three distinct approaches to insurance risk pricing, all being contingent on the concept of risk measures. Risk measures can be interpreted as representations of risk orderings, as well as absolute (monetary) quantifiers of risk. The first approach can be called an "axiomatic" one, whereby the price for risks is calculated according to a functional determined by a set of desirable properties. The price of a risk is directly interpreted as a risk measure and may be induced by an economic theory of price under risk. The second approach consists in contextualizing the considerations of the risk bearer by embedding them in the market where risks are traded. Prices are calculated by equilibrium arguments, where each economic agent's optimization problem follows from the minimization of a risk measure. Finally, in the third approach, weaknesses of the equilibrium approach are addressed by invoking alternative valuation techniques, the leading paradigm among which is arbitrage pricing. Such models move the focus from individual decision takers to abstract market price systems and are thus more parsimonious in the amount of information that they require. In this context, risk measures, instead of characterizing individual agents, are used for determining the set of price systems that would be viable in a market.     

Integrating Risk and Resilience Approaches to Catastrophe Management in Engineering Systems

Recent natural and man‐made catastrophes, such as the Fukushima nuclear power plant, flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Haiti earthquake, and the mortgage derivatives crisis, have renewed interest in the concept of resilience, especially as it relates to complex systems vulnerable to multiple or cascading failures. Although the meaning of resilience is contested in different contexts, in general resilience is understood to mean the capacity to adapt to changing conditions without catastrophic loss of form or function. In the context of engineering systems, this has sometimes been interpreted as the probability that system conditions might exceed an irrevocable tipping point. However, we argue that this approach improperly conflates resilience and risk perspectives by expressing resilience exclusively in risk terms. In contrast, we describe resilience as an emergent property of what an engineering system does, rather than a static property the system has. Therefore, resilience cannot be measured at the systems scale solely from examination of component parts. Instead, resilience is better understood as the outcome of a recursive process that includes: sensing, anticipation, learning, and adaptation. In this approach, resilience analysis can be understood as differentiable from, but complementary to, risk analysis, with important implications for the adaptive management of complex, coupled engineering systems. Management of the 2011 flooding in the Mississippi River Basin is discussed as an example of the successes and challenges of resilience‐based management of complex natural systems that have been extensively altered by engineered structures.     

Strategic Preparedness for Recovery from Catastrophic Risks to Communities and Infrastructure Systems of Systems

Natural and human‐induced disasters affect organizations in myriad ways because of the inherent interconnectedness and interdependencies among human, cyber, and physical infrastructures, but more importantly, because organizations depend on the effectiveness of people and on the leadership they provide to the organizations they serve and represent. These human–organizational–cyber–physical infrastructure entities are termed systems of systems. Given the multiple perspectives that characterize them, they cannot be modeled effectively with a single model. The focus of this article is: (i) the centrality of the states of a system in modeling; (ii) the efficacious role of shared states in modeling systems of systems, in identification, and in the meta‐modeling of systems of systems; and (iii) the contributions of the above to strategic preparedness, response to, and recovery from catastrophic risk to such systems. Strategic preparedness connotes a decision‐making process and its associated actions. These must be: implemented in advance of a natural or human‐induced disaster, aimed at reducing consequences (e.g., recovery time, community suffering, and cost), and/or controlling their likelihood to a level considered acceptable (through the decisionmakers’ implicit and explicit acceptance of various risks and tradeoffs). The inoperability input‐output model (IIM), which is grounded on Leontief's input/output model, has enabled the modeling of interdependent subsystems. Two separate modeling structures are introduced. These are: phantom system models (PSM), where shared states constitute the essence of modeling coupled systems; and the IIM, where interdependencies among sectors of the economy are manifested by the Leontief matrix of technological coefficients. This article demonstrates the potential contributions of these two models to each other, and thus to more informative modeling of systems of systems schema. The contributions of shared states to this modeling and to systems identification are presented with case studies.     

Assessment of the Regional Economic Impacts of Catastrophic Events: CGE Analysis of Resource Loss and Behavioral Effects of an RDD Attack Scenario

We investigate the regional economic consequences of a hypothetical catastrophic event—attack via radiological dispersal device (RDD)—centered on the downtown Los Angeles area. We distinguish two routes via which such an event might affect regional economic activity: (i) reduction in effective resource supply (the resource loss effect) and (ii) shifts in the perceptions of economic agents (the behavioral effect). The resource loss effect relates to the physical destructiveness of the event, while the behavioral effect relates to changes in fear and risk perception. Both affect the size of the regional economy. RDD detonation causes little capital damage and few casualties, but generates substantial short‐run resource loss via business interruption. Changes in fear and risk perception increase the supply cost of resources to the affected region, while simultaneously reducing demand for goods produced in the region. We use results from a nationwide survey, tailored to our RDD scenario, to inform our model values for behavioral effects. Survey results, supplemented by findings from previous research on stigmatized asset values, suggest that in the region affected by the RDD, households may require higher wages, investors may require higher returns, and customers may require price discounts. We show that because behavioral effects may have lingering long‐term deleterious impacts on both the supply‐cost of resources to a region and willingness to pay for regional output, they can generate changes in regional gross domestic product (GDP) much greater than those generated by resource loss effects. Implications for policies that have the potential to mitigate these effects are discussed.     

Dynamic Pricing and Demand Estimation for a Single Unique Asset*

We address the situation of a firm that needs to dispose of a large, expensive asset (e.g., car, machine tool, earth mover, turbine, house, airplane), with or without a given deadline (and either known or unknown to the buyer). If a deadline exists, the asset is salvaged at a known value which may be zero, or even negative if there is a disposal cost. The asset has a known holding cost and may also have an initial nominal (undiscounted) price. The question is how, if at all, the price should be discounted as time progresses to maximize the expected proceeds. We use a dynamic recursion where each decision stage can be optimized based on classic economic monopoly pricing theory with a demand intensity function estimated from sales data, and show that the model is well‐behaved in the sense that the optimal price and optimal expected revenue monotonically decline as the deadline approaches. We test the model by comparing its optimal price pattern to the official pricing policy practiced at a used‐car dealer. We then extend the model to situations where the buyer knows the seller's deadline and thus may alter his behavior as the deadline approaches.     

A Note on the Inoperability Input-Output Model

In this note, we propose some comments and some extensions of the inoperability input-output model (IIOM), as recently proposed by Santos and Haimes (2004). In particular, we propose the use of some analytic tools capable of providing information on the reaction of sectors subsequent to a terrorist attack on infrastructure service sectors. These tools, namely, the field of influence and the multiplier product matrix, provide information on the way sectors react to a shock on the aggregate demand and/or to a (temporary or permanent) change of production function coefficients. Finally, using the 2003 65 sectors input-output matrix for the U.S. economy, a simple empirical example is presented.     

Modeling Imbalanced Economic Recovery Following a Natural Disaster Using Input‐Output Analysis

Input‐output analysis is frequently used in studies of large‐scale weather‐related (e.g., Hurricanes and flooding) disruption of a regional economy. The economy after a sudden catastrophe shows a multitude of imbalances with respect to demand and production and may take months or years to recover. However, there is no consensus about how the economy recovers. This article presents a theoretical route map for imbalanced economic recovery called dynamic inequalities. Subsequently, it is applied to a hypothetical postdisaster economic scenario of flooding in London around the year 2020 to assess the influence of future shocks to a regional economy and suggest adaptation measures. Economic projections are produced by a macro econometric model and used as baseline conditions. The results suggest that London's economy would recover over approximately 70 months by applying a proportional rationing scheme under the assumption of initial 50% labor loss (with full recovery in six months), 40% initial loss to service sectors, and 10–30% initial loss to other sectors. The results also suggest that imbalance will be the norm during the postdisaster period of economic recovery even though balance may occur temporarily. Model sensitivity analysis suggests that a proportional rationing scheme may be an effective strategy to apply during postdisaster economic reconstruction, and that policies in transportation recovery and in health care are essential for effective postdisaster economic recovery.     

A risk science perspective on liability/guilt and uncertainty judgements in courts

This article aims to provide new insights about risk and uncertainty in law contexts, by incorporating ideas and principles of contemporary risk science. The main focus is on one particular aspect of the law: its operation in courts where a defendant has been charged with a violation of civil or criminal law. Judgements about risk and uncertainty—typically using the probability concept—and how these relate to the evidence play a central role in such situations. The decision on whether the defendant is liable/guilty or not may strongly depend on how these concepts are understood and communicated. Considerable work has been conducted to provide theoretical and practical foundations for the risk and uncertainty characterizations in these contexts. Yet, it can be argued that a proper foundation for linking the evidence and the uncertainty (probability) judgements is lacking, the result being poor communication in courts about risk and uncertainties. The present article seeks to clarify what the problems are and provide guidance on how to rectify them.