对低价中标工程的利弊分析与探讨

在成熟市场经济体制下,最低价中标法作为一种国际上通行的评标方式,无论在国外的政府采购还是工程建设招标中均得到广泛的运用。低价中标法最大的特点是它通过市场竞争形成建筑产品的价格,彻底颠覆了依赖国家定额决定工程造价的传统模式。本文对低价中标工程的利弊进行了分析,并提出了几点看法和建议。     

浅析建筑经济中建筑的招标控制

随着我国的建筑市场逐渐成熟,工程招标的大范围使用,招标控制应运而生,这对实行工作量清单进行招标的项目产生量巨大的影响,所以,对招标控制价的产生和实行后产生的问题及解决办法具有极为重要的现实意义,招标控制是评定中标者价格的基础。招标控制也倡导了社会积极利用价格杠杆创建公平公正的建筑市场竞争环境。     

不同质量权重评分规则下的多维招标机制设计

本文主要研究包括价格变量及非价格变量(质量)的多维招标机制设计,在Che模型评分规则的基础上引入新的参数,研究了赋予质量不同权重的第一高分和第二高分招标机制的均衡情况。研究发现,不管新参数如何变化,第一高分招标和第二高分招标是等价的。在该评分规则下,买方还可以灵活根据自己的质量偏好、设定质量门槛筛选企业。如果买方和中标企业在中标后有协调机制,则能实现共赢、社会福利的最大化。     

经评审最低价中标的实施环境

本文通过对建筑市场招标过程采用经评审最低价中标的评标方法中存在问题的剖析 ,提出通过明确价格和质量的关系 ,加强合同管理 ,建立良好的信用制度是实施经评审最低价中标的必要环境。     

浅析如何降低工程成本

建筑市场的供需矛盾较为突出,市场属买方市场,由于招投标市场不太健全,施工企业大都是低价中标,这样对施工企业来说,如何有效的降低工程成本就尤为重要。     

浅谈最低价中标的危害及防范措施

低价中标在市场体系健全的情况下它能够有效的降低成本,减少投资,淘汰落后的企业即淘汰落后的生产方式和管理方式,由于我国市场体系不太健全,各项保障措施不到位,信用体系没有真正确立,建筑市场的激烈竞争等等,目前还不完全适应最低价中标。本文结合我单位实况,谈一谈最低价中标在工程建设工程中的危害与对策。     

浅谈如何确定建设工程施工合理最低价

招标投标制度是随着我国改革开放和市场经济的确定而产生的,随着建筑市场的全方位开放以及2000年<中华人民共和国招标投标法>的实施,为投标人提供了公平、公开、公正的竞争大舞台.而在众多的投标者中如何优中选优就成为了招标者的难题.中华人民共和国招标投标法四十一条第二款规定:投标人能够满足招标文件的实质性要求,并且经评审的投标价格最低;但是投标价格低于成本的除外.这一规定已明示了低价中标的原则,笔者就如何界定"投标价格低于成本"依据及其方法谈一点个人意见.     

关于公路施工企业财务问题分析与思考

由于建筑市场的恶性竞争及招标过程中的一些“人为”操作，造成近年来公路施工项目的中标价格都非常低，如何在保证质量、工期、安全的前提下保质保量完成施工任务，为企业创造效益，必须通过完善的成本管理体系来实现对公路工程成本的有效管理与控制。文章以公路施工企业财务问题为出发点，结合笔者自身管理经验，对公路施工企业财务问题进行分析并提出建议。     

合理低价中标法分析与研究

从实际操作情况来看,《招标投标法》在中标机制方面存在一定的缺陷。从当前建筑市场实际分析来看,采用"合理低价中标"机制是较为合理的。希望全社会能高度重视这一问题,多管齐下,改善市场环境,建立诚信法律机制,关注建筑工程行业持续稳定发展。     

浅析如何加强施工项目成本控制和管理

近年来,随着建筑市场与国际接轨,建筑承包市场的竞争愈来愈激烈,加上市场机制还不够完善,业主行为不够规范,全行业都进入了微利时代,特别是目前在建筑招投标市场实行工程清单计价模式,施工企业通过低价中标,承担大量垫资等苛刻条件取得项目,利润空间越来越小,严重影响了施工企业的生存和发展.要想提升企业的核心竞争力,在激烈的建筑竞争市场中立于不败之地,必须从成本管理上要效益,不断总结项目成本管理的先进经验,研究项目成本管理的新方法,从粗放型管理向精细化管理转变.     

BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同设计

为让管理水平较高的私营集团获得BOT项目特许权,并实现项目社会福利最大,本文利用机制设计理论建立了一个关于BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同的直接机制模型。通过模型分析,获得了该招标机制的可行性条件,最优形式和相应配置方案,并由一个算例表明,得到的最优招标机制在实际中是有效的。所获结果为政府对BOT特许权招标提供了一种理论指导和实际方法。     

Control Premium in Legally Constrained Markets for Corporate Control: The Italian Case (1993–2003)*

We discuss the simple model pioneered by Barclay and Holderness (1989, Journal of Financial Economics 25: 371–395) and recently reproposed by Dyck and Zingales (2004a, Journal of Finance 2, 537–600; 2004b Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16, 51–72) in order to measure the value of control in countries, like Italy, where transfer of control is regulated by law. We demonstrate that it is possible to broaden the application of B&;H approach to block trades followed by mandatory tender offers and we show the conditions under which we may obtain significant measures of private benefits also when voluntary tender offers are considered. In order to test for our theoretical predictions, we analyse the pricing of 27 control transactions involving the common stock of Italian listed corporations between 1993 and 2003. We find that block-transaction (tender) premium equals on average 8% of the firm’s equity value in the case of pure block-trades, 9% in the case of block trades followed by a mandatory tender offer, while it increases to 18% in the case of voluntary tender offers. The results suggest that, in the case of block trades followed by a mandatory tender offer, the acquirer does not transfer a larger portion of its surplus. This doesn’t take place in the case of voluntary tender offers, in which the raider’s bargaining power collapses. Our estimate of the control premium is sensibly lower than that presented in previous studies based on similar methodologies, providing up-to-date evidence for control stake valuation purposes and for comparison with cross country studies aiming at assessing the quality of rules devoted to minority shareholders’ protection. We also perform a cross-sectional regression analysis of private benefits of control and confirm some of the findings presented in the previous literature: particularly, we find evidence of a positive relation between the magnitude of private benefits of control and the target’s degree of stock-pyramiding. We also find that foreign acquirers and financial investors seem likely to face greater difficulties in extracting private benefits of control.     

基于一级密封的工程量清单投标报价的博弈模型

本文通过运用博弈论中一级密封价格拍卖理论,研究了建设工程投标企业在不完全信息下的工程量清单投标报价博弈模型.该模型考虑了各工程量清单子项的单位成本分布函数、投标企业的报价函数以及投标企业竞标成功的概率等因素,通过对模型解的分析得出投标企业的最优投标报价策略.     

Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions

We report on results of several laboratory experiments that investigate on‐line procurement auctions in which suppliers bid on price, but exogenous bidder quality affects winner determination. In procurement auctions, bidder quality may or may not be publicly known to all bidders, and the effect of this quality transparency on the auction outcome is one aspect of auction design that we examine. The second aspect of auction design that we examine is the effect of price visibility on the auction outcome, and the interaction between price visibility and quality transparency. In terms of price visibility, we consider two extreme cases: the sealed bid request for proposals (RFPs), and the open‐bid dynamic auction event. In terms of bidder quality transparency, we also consider two extreme cases: a setting in which bidder qualities are publicly known and the case in which they are private. We find that in our laboratory experiments, the RFP format is consistent in generating higher buyer surplus levels than does the open‐bid dynamic format. This advantage is independent of the quality transparency. In contrast, the open‐bid format is highly sensitive to quality transparency, generating significantly lower buyer surplus levels when the information about bidder quality is public.     

终极所有权、层级结构与信息泄露——来自控制权转让市场的经验证据

本文探讨了控制权转让市场中收购方终极所有权、层级与信息泄露之间的关系。研究发现收购方的终极所有权属性与信息泄露严重程度有着显著的相关关系。当收购人为民营企业时,非公开收购信息进入股价的速度要明显的慢于国有企业收购人;当地方国有企业为收购人时,其非公开收购信息进入股价的速度又明显的快于其他两类企业。表明民营企业维护收购信息的机密性的动机最强,而地方国有企业收购信息则最容易被市场察觉。与预期不一致的是,公司的层级结构与信息泄露速度没有显著的关系,这一发现意味着收购等重大事件的决策权集中在控制链最上层控制人手中,下层企业只是执行这些决策的工具。     

Determinants of short-term value creation for the bidder: evidence from France

This paper analyses bidder short-term returns of 58 takeover bids that occur between 1997 and 2005 on the French market. Furthermore, the determinants of this performance are examined to improve understanding of the sources of value creation or destruction arising from M&A. This study reports that M&A are typically friendly, horizontal transaction, and relate to the entire target capital. The event study methodology is used to estimate bidder value creation. Three findings are shown in this study. First, we find strong evidence that the announcement of a takeover bid generates significant, high returns for the bidder with prebid blockholder position in the target (toehold) versus the bidder without toehold. In this case, there is a strong presumption that the synergies’ motive is the prime reason for the offer. Second, these results show that bidders with low potential growth positively influence share price around the bid announcement. In addition, the growth profile of the target is associated with value creation for the bidder.     

Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long‐Term Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers

The well‐documented failure of the majority of acquisitions to create value is often identified in popular discussion with hostile acquisitions, whereas friendly acquirers seem to get a friendly press. The relative performance of friendly and hostile acquirers therefore warrants a rigorous empirical investigation. Clear evidence of superior value creation in hostile over friendly acquisitions allows us to judge the efficacy of the market for corporate control. In this article we examine the long‐term shareholder wealth performance of four types of acquirers – friendly bidder, hostile bidder, white knight and hostile bidder facing a white knight or another hostile bidder. For a sample of 519 acquisitions of UK target firms during 1983–1995, we estimated the three‐year post‐acquisition gains to acquirer shareholders and found that hostile acquirers deliver significantly higher shareholder value than friendly acquirers. We found that friendly acquirers with high stock‐market ratings destroyed more value than hostile acquirers with a similar rating. Friendly acquirer top managers suffered greater job losses than those of hostile acquirers, perhaps paying the price for their inferior value‐creation performance. Our study provides evidence of the superior value‐creation performance of hostile acquirers and makes the case against takeover regulatory rules that may impede hostile takeovers.     

The financial crisis,acquisition premiums and the moderating effect of CEO power

The recent financial crisis brought upon a period of increased information uncertainty for firms and market agents and in the context of mergers and acquisitions, increased information asymmetry between bidders and targets. This led to an overall increase in average acquisition premiums. However, the final realized premium can be moderated through CEO characteristics in dealing with such issues as uncertainty and asymmetry. Bidder CEOs can reduce these premiums through their expertise, networks and control: powerful CEOs will tend to pay smaller premiums than weaker CEOs because they are better equipped to deal with the increased information uncertainty and asymmetry, either through risk-averse behavior or better assessment of target quality. Our results based on a six-year sample of S&P500 firms engaged in M&A activity, and centered on the onset of the recent financial crisis, largely support our predictions. While earlier research suggested that CEO power could lead to higher premiums, our study points to the opposite conclusion: during times of financial crisis, CEO power effectively constrains premiums. This extends our understanding of why bidder CEOs overpay beyond the role of bidder anchoring bias, hubris, and target resistance by considering the role of macro-environmental conditions and power.     

An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers

Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first‐price and second‐price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first‐price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first‐price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second‐price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first‐price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two‐bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low‐cost type.     

Exploiting Technological Indicators for Effective Technology Merger and Acquisition (M&A) Predictions

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) play increasingly important roles for contemporary business, especially in high‐tech industries that conduct M&As to pursue complementarity from other companies and thereby preserve or extend their competitive advantages. The appropriate selection (prediction) of M&A targets for a given bidder company constitutes a critical first step for an effective technology M&A activity. Yet existing studies only employ financial and managerial indicators when constructing M&A prediction models, and select candidate target companies without considering the profile of the bidder company or its technological compatibility with candidate target companies. Such limitations greatly restrict the applicability of existing studies to supporting technology M&A predictions. To address these limitations, we propose a technology M&A prediction technique that encompasses technological indicators as independent variables and accounts for the technological profiles of both bidder and candidate target companies. Forty‐three technological indicators are derived from patent documents and an ensemble learning method is developed for our proposed technology M&A prediction technique. Our evaluation results, on the basis of the M&A cases between January 1997 and May 2008 that involve companies in Japan and Taiwan, confirm the viability and applicability of the proposed technology M&A prediction technique. In addition, our evaluation also suggests that the incorporation of the technological profiles and compatibility of both bidder and candidate target companies as predictors significantly improves the effectiveness of relevant predictions.