Male-female differences in the potential for union growth outside traditionally unionized industries

Using recent NLS data on preferences for union representation, this paper examines whether differences by sex exist in the potential for union organizing outside of traditionally unionized industries. The methodology distinguishes between workers’ preferences for union representation and the relative supply of union jobs in explaining interindustry differences in the extent of unionization. Within the private sector, women employed in industries other than those traditionally unionized are found to have at least as strong a preference for unionization as do comparable men but a considerably lower opportunity for unionized employment given the desire for union representation. Comparing the public sector with traditionally organized industries, the greater extent of unionization in the public sector is largely explained by a stronger desire for union representation on the part of both male and female public sector employees. The helpful comments of Rodney Fort, Daniel Hamermesh, Robert Hutchens, and Jon Sonstelie on an earlier draft of the paper are gratefully acknowledged.     

The effects of regulation on public sector labor relations: Theory and evidence

This paper assesses the effects of public sector collective bargaining laws on employee unionization, the bargaining process and bargaining outcomes, including pay, benefits and nonmonetary aspects of employment. Although several specific effects — positive and negative, direct and indirect — of regulation in this area have been reported by researchers, most studies do not deal adequately with the issues of model specification or simultaneity, thus calling their validity into question. The helpful comments of Professors John T. Delaney, Craig Olson, and Donna Sockell are gratefully acknowledged.     

The future of public sector collective bargaining in Canada

Conclusion Looking to the future of Canadian public sector labor relations, the glass is half full. Despite regular intervals when government fiscal and economic policy “trump” public sector bargaining rights through legislation, public sector unions and collective bargaining will survive. Public sector compensation and job security will likely continue to be at least comparable to the unionized private sector, and public sector union density should remain stable, at or near its currently high levels.     

Two faces of union voice in the public sector

Summary and Concluding Observations Employee voice through unions is manifest in various ways in the public sector including unionization itself, strikes, political activity, and challenging managerial prerogatives. In each of these areas there are two faces to voice just as there are two faces to unions. Voice can be used in a more influence-peddling and muscle-flexing bargaining fashion to enhance rent seeking and noncooperative behavior with negative effects on productivity, competitiveness, and resource allocation. Voice can also be used more positively by articulating preferences and trade-offs, improving communications, and involving employees and enhancing their commitment to the organization. In all likelihood both faces of voice apply to unions in the public sector just as they do in the private sector. In the private sector, however, the negative monopoly face of unions has been increasingly constrained by competitive market forces such as globalization and trade liberalization as well as by the industrial restructuring to services and the information economy. Rents are obviously harder to obtain when there are fewer rents on the bargaining table. There is little survival value to pricing yourself out of the market now that market forces are more prominent. In such a private sector environment, unions have generally declined, strikes have dissipated, and managerial prerogatives have been enhanced.     

Exclusive representation in public employment: A public choice perspective

Public sector unionization has grown rapidly in recent years, and research has suggested that among the reasons for such growth is legislation granting special privileges to public employee unions. This paper examines one form of legislative privilege, exclusive representation, from a public choice perspective. It is shown that exclusivity reduces employees’ freedom of choice, increases the welfare of union leaders at the expense of union members, limits employment opportunities to “outsiders,” entrenches the monopoly provision of public services, and generates conflict and instability in labor relations.     

A dynamic model of public sector employer response to unionization

We model the response of public sector employers to unionization using the response of public school boards to teacher unionization as an example. While it is generally believed that public sector employers pay unionized workers more than nonunion workers, there is less consensus about where the money comes from. We model two cases which are possible employer reactions to unionization: re-allocating resources among types of expenditures and modifying the way in which services are provided. The model contains a political equilibrium that determines the union’s preferences and an economic equilibrium that reflects labor market conditions. We compare the predictions of the two cases regarding the effect of unionization on wages, turnover, allocation of expenditures, and productivity. We interpret existing empirical research on public sector unionization in light of these predictions and make recommenda-tions for future empirical work.     

Police recognition strikes: Illegal and ill-fated

This study investigates the relationship between strike activity by nonunion public employees and unionization. This study examines strike activity and unionization rates of some 600 nonunion municipal police departments from 1972 to 1978 and finds that recognition strikes occur primarily where bargaining laws provide little or no protection of bargaining rights for municipal police. These strikes, however, do not help nonunion police gain recognition. The author thanks John Delaney for helpful comments on this paper.     

Compensation,employment, and the political activity of public employee unions

It has been hypothesized that because public employee unions are politically influential, they have a bargaining advanatage over their private-sector counterparts. Previous studies, however, have not directly measured the political activities of public employee unions and have instead usually used some type of unionization proxy. This paper uses unpublished data from the International City Managers Association to develop a more direct measure of union political activity. Using this measure, it is found that an increase in union political activity leads to higher compensation and employment for public employee union members.     

An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.     

Public sector union democracy: A comparative analysis

A congressional subcommittee held “union democracy” hearings in 1998 and 1999 to debate the impact and effectiveness of the union-democracy protections provided by the Land rum-Griffin Act which provides union members in the private sector and U.S. Postal Service certain democratic rights and protections. What was not resolved at that hearing was whether state sector or public employee union members should also enjoy the same democracy protections. We survey the existing 28 state sector collective bargaining laws and find that the majority of state legislation falls considerably short of the protections provided by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Moreover the consequences of limited state-enacted union-democracy protections are discussed and assessed to determine whether LMRDA jurisdiction should also cover public sector union members.     

Comparing Public and Private Sector Decision-Making Practices

Public and private sector decision making is studied with anexperiment. The study compares decision making in a tax-supportedgeneral purpose governmental agency with that done by a businessfirm selling to a market, using a simulation to capture differencesin the preferences and practices of mid-level managers workingin the two sectors. The simulation calls for participating managersto assess the risk and prospect of adopting budgets tailoredto match each sector. A cognitive culture that stresses analysis,speculation, bargaining, or networking is employed to fashiona budget appropriate for a public and a private sector organization,each with a controversial and a noncontroversial budget amount.The literature on public/private differences was consulted tomake predictions, suggesting that public sector managers wouldfavor bargaining and networking and private sector managerswould favor analysis and speculation. The cognitive style literaturesuggests that managers favor budgets constructed with an approachthat is consistent with their preferred cognitive style andsee less risk in the choice, except in a public setting whererisk would be unaffected. The study finds that private sectormanagers are more apt to support budget decisions made withanalysis and less likely to support them when bargaining isapplied. Public sector managers are less likely to support budgetdecisions backed by analysis and more likely to support thosethat are derived from bargaining with agency people.     

Wages,union membership,and public sector bargaining legislation: Simultaneous equations with an ordinal qualitative variable

A simultaneous equations model of teachers’ wages and unionization is constructed. The exogenous impact of collective bargaining legislation is captured by conditioning the wage-union system on an ordinal qualitative variable. A new estimation method involving N-chotomous probit and two-stage least squares is developed. The estimation results are consistent with a private interest theory of regulation, predicting that legislators will avoid direct subsidization of teacher wages. By comparison it is also shown that a conventional dummy variable specification of the qualitative legislative outcomes will yield misleading results. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of John Addison, Cletus Coughlin, and Robert P. Trost.     

South/non-south differentials in national labor relations board certification election outcomes: Comment

A recent study of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certification elections concluded that there are no regional differences in the probability of unionization. This paper suggests that it is inappropriate to draw such broad inferences from NLRB data, since elections occur only where an initial preference for unionism has been expressed. Using a national data set on private sector hospitals, we demonstrate that Southern location significantly reduces the probability of having an election and the probability of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, but it does not affect the probability of a union election victory. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors’ institutions. We would like to thank Peter Feuille and James Kuhn for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS

We model the politics of wage and employment determination for unionized public-sector workers who can strike. If the employment level affects the identity of the decisive voter in budget referenda and other elections, then unions may be able to increase wages by increasing employment. We identify conditions under which public sector unionization will lead to increased wages and employment; we also show that a majority of voters may favor unionization. (JEL 545, J51, H4)     

The legal status of collective bargaining by public school teachers

This paper examines the characteristics of area populations that predict the content of bargaining legislation for public school teachers. The authors provide evidence suggesting that 1) pro-bargaining legislation is correlated with the representation of union members and related workers who benefit from collective bargaining, and 2) the legislation appears to be demanded by career workers as a means of transferring resources away from teachers with relatively short career horizons. An N-chotomous probit model is used to estimate the form of legislation that ranges from bargaining prohibition to prescribed bargaining. Data for the study were obtained from 95 SMSAs in 35 states. We are indebted to Paul H. Rubin and Elchanon Cohn for their substantial contributions to this project. We also received helpful suggestions from Chris Paul and R. Carter Hill.     

Varieties of Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in Scandinavian Policy Making

Corporatism may be seen as variety of capitalism in which specific structural prerequisites such as unionization, centralization, and strong states combined with bargaining and concertation produce certain economic outputs. Corporatism may also be seen as a variety of democracy in which interest groups are integrated in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies. Departing in the last position, we measure the strength of Scandinavian corporatism by the involvement of interest groups in public committees, councils, and commissions. Corporatism in relation to the preparation of policy has gone down in all three Scandinavian countries whereas corporatism in implementation processes are more varied among the three countries.     

State employee bargaining legislation

The authors test competing hypotheses drawn from the public versus private interest theories of regulation to determine the status of bargaining rights of state employees. N-chotomous probit is employed to predict legislation which is characterized as an ordinal scale ranging from prohibition to prescribed bargaining. The presence of voter coalitions rather than intent to remedy monopsonistic production inefficiency explains liberal legislation.     

Exclusive representation and american industrial democracy: An historical reappraisal

Exclusive representation in the public sector has been defended on the basis of private sector experience, which purportedly demonstrates that stable, orderly, peaceful collective bargaining is otherwise impossible or impracticable. Nevertheless, nonexclusive collective bargaining was the norm in most industrial nations when the Wagner Act was passed in the 1930s, and it still is the rule outside the U.S. Historical evidence is presented for the thesis that exclusivity was adopted in the private sector primarily in order to pave the way for a corporative state. Peaceful, orderly collective bargaining by “responsible” unions in a competitive economy was a minor, secondary consideration. Editor’s Note: This Symposium was jointly sponsored by theJournal of Labor Research and the National Institute for Labor Relations Research and was held February 10, 1984 at the Westpark Hotel, Rosslyn, Virginia.     

Government Intervention in Public Sector Industrial Relations: Lessons from the Alberta Teachers’ Association

In the public sector, Canadian governments intervene frequently in labor disputes by suspending collective bargaining and curtailing legal strikes. Previous research has focused on the contours of government intervention, such as its overall effects on collective bargaining and strikes. The discussion highlights one actor, a government, restricting the behavior of another actor, a union, using legislation and policy making. As a result, we know less about more micro-level elements and implications of the process of government intervention. I address these themes using a detailed case study of the Alberta Teachers’ Association and the strikes it coordinated in 2002.

Some empirical observations of relevance to the analysis of union wage determination

Six important empirical characteristics of the union sector need to be incorporated into future research on wage determination. These are 1) the extent of unionization, 2) the statistical correlates of unionization, 3) divergent trends in union and nonunion earnings, 4) union/nonunion wage differentials, 5) the determinants of union and nonunion wage change, and 6) wage imitation. Examination of these characteristics suggests the following about union wage determination. Union wages have advanced relative to nonunion since the mid 1950s, despite relative shrinkage of the union sector. Union wage changes show less sensitivity to business-cycle pressures than nonunion. Limited spheres of wage imitation surround certain major union negotiations. These observations can be fitted into recent analyses of wage determination under long-term employer employee relationships, and have relevance for anti-inflation policy. Research for this paper was undertaken while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and was supported by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Views expressed should not be attributed to the Brookings Institution, its staff or trustees.