When Should a Firm Open its Source Code: A Strategic Analysis

Deciding to open the source code of a software product has advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that the firm loses the revenue from the software. The advantage is that the users' network can contribute to the quality of the software code, which increases the demand for the software and for a complementary product. Demand for the complementary product also goes up, because demand for a product increases when the price of its complement decreases, and under open source, the price of the software product drops down to zero. This paper examines the strategic interactions at work here, within a duopoly framework, and tries to determine the circumstances under which it is optimal for a firm to open its code. We find that firms open the source code when there is a competitive software‐product market, a less competitive complementary‐product market, and when the complementary product is of high quality. Furthermore, it is more profitable for the firm to open the source code if its competitor also does so. When this happens the incentive to open the code can even be higher than in a monopoly situation. More intense competition induces symmetric equilibria in which both firms choose the same strategy.     

Group Selling,Product Durability,and Consumer Behavior

Firms producing complementary goods often strategically form groups and jointly sell their products to better coordinate their decisions. For consumer durables, decisions about such collaboration might be complicated due to two factors. Because of their durability and presence of used goods markets, such products engender “future” price competition between new and used goods. On the other hand, consumers of such products might be forward‐looking and patient, both of which affect their purchasing behavior. In this study, we study how the above product and consumer characteristics interact to affect the group selling decisions of complementary firms. We do so through a two‐period model consisting of a value chain with two upstream manufacturers and a downstream retailer. When consumers are relatively impatient and reluctant to wait to buy later, group selling by manufacturers will take place only when the end product is relatively perishable, that is, product durability is low. However, if consumers are patient, that is, willing to wait, collaboration happens only when the end product is quite durable; for relatively perishable products the manufacturers sell their products separately. We also comment on how our results are affected by factors like manufacturers directly selling to end consumers or there being multiple opportunities to decide whether or not to use group selling strategy.     

消费者导向类型与电商全渠道决策研究

从现实出发，基于不同消费者导向类型研究了电商的全渠道决策问题。首先建立电商单渠道销售的基础模型，并得出最优产品组合、价格和交付时间。在此基础上，给出了消费者为产品导向型和渠道导向型情况下电商采取全渠道决策的条件，得出双渠道产品组合、价格及交付时间的最优决策；并进行了数值验证。研究发现，同一渠道提供的产品其最优价格相同，最优交付时间只和消费者耐心程度及交付成本函数有关。若消费者为产品导向型，仅当双渠道运营成本之差较小且消费者耐心程度较低时，电商进入线下渠道才有利可图，且在线下渠道提供最受欢迎的产品，线上渠道提供剩余产品。若消费者为渠道导向型，电商进入线下渠道必然有利可图，且在线下渠道提供最受欢迎的产品，线上渠道提供所有产品。     

竞争环境下客户服务投入对企业利润影响的均衡分析

客户服务投入是企业吸引新顾客和维持现有顾客的重要手段之一。然而,服务投入究竟是否能给企业带来价值？对于这一问题,业界和学界都没有明确的答案。本文通过建模的方法研究在竞争的市场环境下,固有的市场因素对客户服务投入价值的影响。研究发现,服务竞争的市场均衡结构是两家厂商都投入客户服务。服务投入给企业带来的价值随着产品差异度的提高而提高,随着厂商自身市场份额的增加而增加。即,在产品差异度高的市场,服务投入更容易给企业带来价值。而在集中度高的市场,服务投入更容易给市场份额大的企业带来价值。     

消费者异质性下供应链互补产品销售策略选择及其定价研究

基于消费者对互补品消费习性存在的异质性,对互补品消费市场进行细分,并在上游两个制造商分别提供具有互补特性的产品,下游一个销售商同时销售这两种产品的供应链环境下研究定价均衡。根据不同目标市场选择,识别出全市场覆盖以及聚焦细分市场两种销售策略,分别对两种营销策略下的供应链产品定价进行讨论,并通过模型求解分别得到两种策略下的均衡,讨论了两个均衡解存在的条件,讨论了均衡定价随产品互补程度以及互补品相对效用比的变化情况,以及销售商在不同情形下选择的定价策略。结果表明,当互补品相对效用差异不大,且互补程度不大的时候,渠道内形成第一个定价均衡;当产品间相对效用差异大,且互补程度足够大的时候,渠道内形成第二个定价均衡。     

焕新计划下考虑消费者细分的产品定价策略

焕新计划是生产商为提升自身竞争优势而推出的一种促销手段，加入焕新计划的消费者在第一阶段可以享受全方位服务，在第二阶段可以享受以旧换新抵扣优惠。消费者将权衡加入焕新计划的费用、服务水平以及抵扣力度等因素决策是否在第一阶段加入焕新计划。本文假设时尚型消费者每阶段都会购买最新产品，而节俭型消费者第一阶段购买产品后在第二阶段继续使用，针对这两类消费者在实施焕新计划和不实施焕新计划两种情况下，构建两阶段模型以决策产品的最优定价；运用解析方法分析了产品的生产成本等参数对最优定价的影响；运用解析方法和数值算例方法对两模型进行对比。     

Dynamic Competition With Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting

This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales in prior periods, firms post prices for their unsold output. In each period, the demand of a new batch of consumers is randomly activated. Existing customers who have not yet bought and then new customers arrive at the market in random order, observe the posted prices, and either purchase at the lowest available price or delay their purchase decision. We construct a sequential equilibrium in which the output produced and its allocation across consumers is efficient. Thus consumers endogenously sort themselves efficiently, with the highest valuations purchasing first. Transaction prices in each period rise continuously, as firms become more optimistic about demand, followed by a market correction. By the last period, prices are market clearing.     

面向动态完全竞争构建多维协同组合战略

现有战略管理理论以不完全竞争市场为前提条件,因而越来越难以应对日益激烈的超竞争环境.有甚于此,笔者的研究发现,在技术进步和收入增长效应足够大的情况下,传统上认定不会出现完全竞争的差别产品最终也会出现每个企业都按边际成本定价的动态完全竞争.面向动态完全竞争的战略管理的基本任务随之转为运用介观视野去发现并实施具备多维协同组合特性的新的商务模式,同时做到差异准确、成本领先、反应敏捷和分享得力.     

厂商动态竞争性差别定价和竞争优势实现——基于消费者寻求多样化购买行为的分析

随着信息技术的发展,厂商可以根据消费者的历史购买信息实施差别定价.该文主要研究相互竞争的厂商基于消费者的购买历史实行差别定价的本质特征和形成机制,以及实施这种定价策略能否在竞争中获取竞争优势.分析结果显示,在竞争性差别定价均衡中,消费者寻求多样化购买是厂商实施差别定价的内在原因,厂商在第2期通过给予价格优惠吸引消费者重复购买,对忠诚的消费者给予奖励,并在第1期弱化竞争,导致两期竞争存在"默契合谋",消费者寻求多样化购买成为竞争厂商利润的源泉;如果厂商能够比竞争对手率先实施差别定价的营销策略,那么就能在竞争中获取优势.另外,清晰地刻画了竞争性差别定价均衡存在且唯一的充分条件.该文的研究结果可以很好地解释现实经济中许多厂商的定价竞争策略行为,对于厂商的产品营销战略具有重要的指导意义.     

基于不同补贴主体的新能源汽车制造商定价决策研究

基于政府目前对新能源汽车消费者及制造商实施补贴的现实背景，假设两家技术水平不等的新能源汽车制造商所生产的产品之间存在替代关系，将制造商产品之间的价格和质量差异纳入考虑范围，构建了新能源汽车制造商最优定价模型，求解了在不同补贴方式下的最优定价方式，并在均衡状态下对模型进行了数值模拟和分析。研究结果表明，在不同补贴方式下，制造商将根据市场竞争环境和补贴投入的变化情况采取不同的定价策略。政府针对消费者的补贴可以使技术水平相对落后的制造商获得更高利润，促使更多的制造商进入新能源汽车产业。对制造商的补贴可以使较高技术水平的制造商获得更高利润，从而促进新能源汽车产业的优胜劣汰。政府补贴主体应由消费者逐步转向制造商，通过政策引导制造商和消费者进一步增进其对新能源汽车质量的重视程度，推动新能源汽车产业的良性发展。     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

Buying used products for remanufacturing: negotiating or posted pricing

Product reclamation is a critical process in remanufacturing. It is generally assumed in the literature that customers simply want to get rid of their used products without expecting any compensation for them. Some authors have only recently started looking into firms that offer a posted (fixed) price for them. Following recent reports suggesting that customers are increasingly open to bargaining, we compare using a posted price and bargaining to obtain used products. In our analysis, we consider an original manufacturer acting as a monopolist as well as a manufacturer and an independent remanufacturer acting in a duopoly. We analytically show that bargaining is always beneficial to the monopoly manufacturer. In the duopoly case, we distinguish a Cournot competition and a market with the manufacturer as Stackelberg leader. The results of a numerical study show that both firms will use posted pricing in the Cournot competition, especially if bargaining is not costless. By contrast, the remanufacturer can significantly increase his profit by using negotiations if he is the Stackelberg follower.     

The globalization of smaller agri-food firms: a decision-making framework tested through case research

Anecdotal evidence suggests that smaller firms are responding in various ways to market trends towards globalization. A fundamental question arises as to why some smaller firms are including global markets in their strategies and business operations while other firms with similar size and product mix are not. This paper hypothesizes necessary and sufficient conditions for a smaller agri-food firm to become actively global in perspective and practice. An hypothesized decision framework is articulated and results are reported from eight cases used to test this framework. The paper concludes that perceptions about competitive advantages and effective demand, and operative decision rules employed by the firm will determine if and when a firm can globalize its scope of operations.     

经济周期波动视角下现金持有在企业产品市场定价中的竞争效应研究

现金储备支撑企业价格策略,产品价格相对成本的变化是价格决策的重要方面,影响企业产品市场竞争表现,因此本文利用制造业上市公司数据,重点研究现金持有对相对价格竞争行为及相对价格变动在产品市场竞争中发挥的作用,以及这种作用程度在经济不同时期是否有所差别,最后依据相对价格变动的中介效应研究现金持有影响产品市场竞争绩效的作用路径。研究结果表明,企业现金持有越充足,其在产品市场上价格相对成本而言下降的可能性和幅度也更大,进而为企业在产品市场上带来的竞争优势就越明显,但在经济周期不同阶段,作用程度不同。同时企业的价格竞争行为是现金持有支持企业获取竞争绩效的一种路径。本文的研究丰富了现有文献,为我国上市公司增强竞争力提供了一定的理论和实证依据。     

A game-theoretic model for co-promotions: Choosing a complementary versus an independent product ally

This paper studies the optimal choice of promotional partners in a three-firm market where two firms sell complementary products and a third firm sells an independent product. Game-theoretic models are developed to investigate the following scenarios: no promotional partnership, partnership between the two complementary products, partnership between a complementary product and the independent product, and partnership between the three products. Equilibrium Nash solutions are obtained and conditions under which each of the four scenarios above can be implemented are identified. Results show that these conditions depend on various parameters, mainly the degree of product complementarity, the effectiveness of individual promotion, the effectiveness of joint promotion, and the base demand for each product. Commonly, a partnership between a complementary product and the independent product is optimal when the price effect of the complementary product is large, while the partnership between the two complementary products is more appealing when the effect of individual promotion is large enough. When feasible, a promotional partnership between the three products is preferred, except in some specified conditions.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

不同权力结构下供应链概率销售策略比较研究

考虑供应链不同权力结构,探讨产品概率销售问题,分析消费者对产品不完全匹配敏感程度、概率产品组合比例等因素变化对其所产生的影响,并对三种不同权力结构进行比较分析。从研究结果来看,三种不同权力结构下产品批发价格、边际利润有所不同,且消费者对产品不完全匹配敏感程度及概率产品组合比例变化均对其产生影响,但影响程度在不同权力结构下会不同。数值分析进一步表明,弱化消费者对产品不匹配敏感程度或提升消费者购买概率产品的不确定性将有利于供应链实施概率销售策略。     

策略型消费者创新感知与产品定价换代策略研究

科学技术迅猛发展促使厂商频繁推出创新型产品以抢占市场份额,产品定价和换代策略成为厂商经营成败的重要因素。本文在产品技术创新视角下构建双寡头厂商三阶段产品最优定价与换代决策模型,结合效用函数和博弈分析方法从同质产品市场拓展为异质产品市场,求解出单品换代策略及共生换代策略下新品上市时点和旧产品退出市场时点的显示解,并通过仿真模拟探讨产品技术创新水平、消费者创新感知度对最优产品定价和换代策略的影响。研究表明产品技术创新水平和消费者创新感知度对厂商产品定价和换代策略有重要影响。同质产品市场下,市场潜在需求越大,产品初始定价越高。厂商面临内外部产品竞争时,市场潜在需求较小且两代产品处于共生状态下,为减弱内部竞争新旧产品最优定价差距不大;当市场潜在需求较大,厂商新品定价由技术创新水平决定,消费者技术创新感知值越高,新品定价越高,反之越低。当厂商技术创新水平处于劣势时,两厂商技术创新水平差距越大,劣势厂商越应提早退出市场。     

考虑消费者策略行为的供应链两周期定价与契约设计

针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链,考虑消费者的策略性跨期购买行为,构建了两周期动态博弈模型,分析了消费者策略性程度对两周期均衡结果、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的均衡偏差,设计了与消费者策略性程度相关的两周期收益共享契约与"两周期收益共享+转移支付"组合式契约。研究表明：分散式决策下,消费者策略性程度有利于增加消费者剩余和社会福利,但会对供应链成员不利;某些情形下,消费者策略性程度会使分散式与集中式决策的系统利润差值增大;当消费者策略性程度相对较低时,两周期收益共享契约不仅可实现供应链完美协调,还可增加消费者剩余和社会福利;当消费者策略性程度较高时,通过组合式契约可实现供应链完美协调,但此时消费者策略性程度的增强可能对消费者剩余和社会福利产生负面影响。     

考虑随机市场需求的双渠道供应链风险补偿策略研究——从质量与价格竞争视角

在由两个供应商和单个零售商构成的二级双渠道供应链系统中，分析了随机市场需求以及供应商之间同时存在价格与质量竞争的情形下的双渠道供应链协调问题。在供应链集中决策、无风险补偿及有风险补偿三种情境下，构建了基于质量和价格的风险补偿模型并求得纳什均衡解。研究结果表明：存在可行的需求风险补偿策略使得供应链达到协调水平，并且需求风险补偿策略对零售商更加有利；在需求风险补偿策略下，需求风险补偿价格与其对应批发价格正相关，与其产品质量水平负相关；价格竞争程度对零售商订货量具有负向影响作用，对供应链总利润影响作用随着竞争程度增加而减弱，质量竞争程度对零售商订货量和供应商产品质量水平具有正向影响作用，对供应链总利润影响呈倒U型关系；需求风险补偿策略能够激励零售商的订货行为，强化价格竞争程度和质量竞争程度对供应商订货量和供应链总利润的影响；在供应链系统中双渠道营销模式下的供应链总利润要优于单渠道营销模式下的供应链总利润。本文结论不仅详细剖析了风险补偿策略对双渠道供应链协调的影响关系，也理清了价格与质量竞争对各方行为策略的影响机理。