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1.
This paper aims at explaining two stylized facts of the Lost Decade in Japan: rising wage inequalities and increasing firm‐level productivity differentials. We build a model where firms can choose between efficiency wages with endogenous effort and competitive wages, and show that it can replicate those facts. Using Japanese microeconomic data, we find support for the existence of efficiency wages in one group of firms and competitive wages in the other group. Based on those results, a simulation shows that the share of firms using efficiency wages has declined, within sectors, during the Lost Decade, as predicted by the model. 相似文献
2.
Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages. 相似文献
3.
We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the different submarkets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns in each submarket. We demonstrate the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages. The distribution can be right‐tailed, and, under additional restrictions, is hump‐shaped. Our results are illustrated by an example generating a Beta wage distribution. 相似文献
4.
Utilizing the link between employment and price changes as a result of minimum wages, we use firm‐level data to evaluate the effect of minimum wage introduction in the German construction sector. In East Germany we find significant positive price effects that exclude the possibility of rising employment. Rather, the results indicate the existence of a competitive sector‐specific labour market, and thus declining employment. In contrast, we cannot find any significant price reaction for West Germany. This suggests that the implemented minimum wage in West Germany is too low in comparison to the predominantly paid wages and is hence not binding. 相似文献
5.
This paper analyses the impact of workplace characteristics on individual wages based on a unique cross‐section matched employer–employee data set for the Israeli private manufacturing sector in 1995. Specifically, we examine the effects of the interaction between profit‐sharing and wages on the gender wage gap. The empirical findings show that individual compensation is significantly and positively correlated with firms’ profits‐per‐employee, even when controlling for all of the following: group effects in the residuals, individual and firms’ characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Wage–profit elasticity is found to be 11 per cent and it does not significantly differ between genders. With respect to the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 28 per cent less than men), the results show that within firms there is no gender discrimination and that 12 per cent of this gap can be explained by the wage–profits profile and by the fact that women are more likely to be employed in less profitable firms than men. 相似文献
6.
According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms. 相似文献
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8.
This paper studies the determinants and consequences in the early stages of the hiring process of unemployed workers' wage demands using direct data on workers' wage requests. We show that most unemployed workers want a wage close to their previous wage, and thus much more than they get in unemployment benefits. However, some groups, such as women, tend to demand lower wages. Moreover, we find that workers with high wage demands are contacted by firms less often than otherwise similar workers with lower wage demands. Thus, our results suggest that too high wage demands may contribute to high unemployment. 相似文献
9.
We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other. 相似文献
10.
Rune Vejlin 《LABOUR》2013,27(2):115-139
I develop a stylized partial on‐the‐job equilibrium search model that incorporates a spatial dimension. Workers reside on a circle and can move at a cost. Each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Implications about wages and job mobility are drawn from the model and tested on Danish matched employer–employee data. The model predictions hold true. I find that workers working farther away from their residence earn higher wages. When a worker is making a job‐to‐job transition where he/she changes workplace location he/she experiences a higher wage change than a worker making a job‐to‐job transition without changing workplace location. However, workers making a job‐to‐job transition that makes the workplace location closer to the residence experience a wage drop. Furthermore, low‐wage workers and workers with high transportation costs are more likely to make job‐to‐job transitions, but also residential moves. 相似文献
11.
Raising the minimum wage may reduce inequality by increasing the wages of low‐skill workers, but it may also increase inequality due to negative impacts on employment that produce wage losses. Using previous estimates of the elasticities of wages and employment to changes in the minimum wage in Colombia and Brazil, we show that the net impact on inequality of increasing the minimum wage may depend on the distributional weights used for inequality measurement. The results are obtained by decomposing the Gini index into reranking and gap‐narrowing effects. Inequality‐increasing reranking effects, which are associated with job losses, may dominate inequality‐decreasing gap‐narrowing effects, which are associated with wage gains, when high weights are placed on workers with low earnings. For standard distributional weights, however, the likely net impact is a reduction in wage inequality. 相似文献
12.
Bjrn Brügemann 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(2):369-416
This paper investigates the ability of employment protection to generate its own political support. A version of the Mortensen–Pissarides model is used for this purpose. If wages are set through Nash bargaining, workers value employment protection because it strengthens their hand in wage negotiations. Workers in high productivity matches benefit most from higher wages as they expect to stay employed for longer. By reducing turnover employment protection shifts the distribution of match‐specific productivity toward lower values. Thus stringent protection in the past actually reduces support for employment protection today. Introducing involuntary separations reverses this conclusion. Now workers value employment protection because it delays involuntary dismissals. Workers in low productivity matches gain most since they face the highest risk of dismissal. The downward shift in the productivity distribution is now a shift towards supporters. 相似文献
13.
Philippe Aghion Yann Algan Pierre Cahuc 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2011,9(1):3-42
In a cross‐section of countries, state regulation of labor markets is negatively correlated with the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we argue that these facts reflect different ways of regulating labor markets, either through the state or through the civil society, depending on the degree of cooperation in the economy. We rationalize these facts with a model of learning of the quality of labor relations. Distrustful labor relations lead to low unionization and high demand for direct state regulation of wages. In turn, state regulation crowds out the possibility for workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the potential cooperative nature of labor relations. This crowding out effect can give rise to multiple equilibria: a “good” equilibrium characterized by cooperative labor relations and high union density, leading to low state regulation; and a “bad” equilibrium, characterized by distrustful labor relations, low union density, and strong state regulation of the minimum wage. 相似文献
14.
We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small. 相似文献
15.
Rafael Lalive Jean‐Philippe Wuellrich Josef Zweimüller 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2013,11(1):25-58
A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This “threshold design” provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low‐wage firms than in high‐wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax. 相似文献
16.
Shouyong Shi 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2009,77(2):561-584
I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts. 相似文献
17.
Pieter A. Gautier Coen N. Teulings 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2015,13(6):1136-1166
We analyze a general search model with on‐the‐job search (OJS) and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. For given values of nonmarket time, the relative efficiency of OJS, and the amount of search frictions, we derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate, mismatch, and wage dispersion. We estimate the latter two from standard micro data. Our methodology accounts for measurement error, which is crucial to distinguish true from spurious mismatch and wage dispersion. We find that without frictions, output would be about 9.5% higher if firms can commit to pay wages as a function of match quality and 15.5% higher if they cannot. Noncommitment leads to a business‐stealing externality which causes a 5.5% drop in output. 相似文献
18.
Alain Cohn Ernst Fehr Benedikt Herrmann Frdric Schneider 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2014,12(4):877-898
Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort. 相似文献
19.
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano Giovanni Peri 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(1):152-197
This paper calculates the effects of immigration on the wages of native US workers of various skill levels in two steps. In the first step we use labor demand functions to estimate the elasticity of substitution across different groups of workers. Second, we use the underlying production structure and the estimated elasticities to calculate the total wage effects of immigration in the long run. We emphasize that a production function framework is needed to combine own‐group effects with cross‐group effects in order to obtain the total wage effects for each native group. In order to obtain a parsimonious representation of elasticities that can be estimated with available data, we adopt alternative nested‐CES models and let the data select the preferred specification. New to this paper is the estimate of the substitutability between natives and immigrants of similar education and experience levels. In the data‐preferred model, there is a small but significant degree of imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants which, when combined with the other estimated elasticities, implies that in the period from 1990 to 2006 immigration had a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree (between 0.6% and +1.7%). It also had a small positive effect on average native wages (+0.6%) and a substantial negative effect (−6.7%) on wages of previous immigrants in the long run. 相似文献
20.
Changes in the legislation in the mid‐1980s in Portugal provide remarkably good conditions for analysis of the employment effects of mandatory minimum wages, as the minimum wage increased sharply for a very specific group of workers. Relying on a matched employer‐employee panel data set, we model gross worker flows—accessions and separations—in continuing firms, as well as in new firms and those going out of business, using a count regression model applied to proportions. Employment trends for teenagers, the affected group, are contrasted to those of older workers before and after the raise in the youth minimum wage. The major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage has been the reduction of separations from the employer, which, during the period under analysis, has compensated for the reduction of accessions to new and continuing firms. In this sense, our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence in the empirical literature when analyzing the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on youth employment without decomposing it by type of worker flow. (JEL: D21, J23, J38) 相似文献