Information Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure in an Export‐Processing System

We study a strategic information management problem in the export‐processing trade, where the buyer controls the raw material input and sales and the producer is responsible for production. The production is vulnerable to random yield risk. The producer can exert a costly effort to acquire the private yield rate information and discretionarily share it with the buyer. We develop a sequential Bayesian game model that captures three key features of the system—endogenous information endowment, voluntary disclosure, and ex post information sharing—a significant departure from the literature. The optimal disclosure strategy is driven by the trade‐off between the gains from Pareto efficiency improvement and self‐interested overproduction. It is specified by two thresholds on yield rate: only the middle‐yield producers (with yield rate between these two thresholds) share private information to improve supply‐demand match; the low‐ and high‐yield producers withhold information to extract excess input from the buyer. The buyer in response penalizes nondisclosure with reduced input and rewards information sharing with a larger order. This strategic interaction is further exacerbated by the double marginalization effect from decentralization, resulting in severe efficiency loss. We examine the effectiveness of three corrective mechanisms—vertical integration, mandatory disclosure, and production restriction—and reveal the costs of information suppressive effect and overinvestment incentive and the benefit from concessions on the processing fee. Our study endogenizes the asymmetric supply risk and provides the first attempt to rationalize the strategic interactions of informational and operational incentives in the export‐processing system.     

Merit‐based Rewards,Job Satisfaction and Voluntary Turnover: Moderating Effects of Employee Demographic Characteristics

This paper draws on the reflection theory of compensation (Thierry, H. (1998). ‘Compensating work’. in P. J. D. Drenth, H. Thierry and C. J. de Wolff (eds), Handbook of Work and Organizational Psychology, 2nd edn, pp. 291–315, Psychology Press: Hove; Thierry, H. F. (2001). ‘Job evaluation systems and pay grade structures: do they match’, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8, pp. 1313–1324) to examine the influence of individual merit‐based rewards on voluntary turnover via job satisfaction. It also tests the moderating effects of employees’ gender, age and education level between merit‐based rewards and job satisfaction. Data were collected from 636 employees in Japan at three points in time over a 12‐month period. The findings show that merit‐based rewards have a direct, positive effect on job satisfaction and an indirect effect on voluntary turnover. The effect of merit‐based rewards on job satisfaction was moderated by gender and education, providing evidence that merit‐based rewards are more important for male and highly educated employees. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Extended Producer Responsibility for E‐Waste: Individual or Collective Producer Responsibility?

We investigate the implications of collective and individual producer responsibility (CPR and IPR, respectively) models of product take‐back laws for e‐waste on manufacturers’ design for product recovery (DfR) choices and profits, and on consumer surplus in the presence of product competition. We show that IPR offers superior DfR incentives as compared to CPR, and provides a level competitive ground. CPR may distort competition and allow free‐riding on DfR efforts to reduce product recovery costs. Thus, manufacturer preferences for IPR or CPR may differ because of the free‐riding implications under CPR, with even high‐end manufacturers having incentives to free‐ride under certain competitive conditions. The policy choice between IPR and CPR is not clear cut from an economic welfare perspective. This choice involves a comparison between the effects of superior recovery cost reduction through improved DfR under IPR and the operational cost‐efficiency under CPR.     

RISK SHARING,COMMITMENT, AND INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the effects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk. We find that limiting exogenously provided commitmentis associated with less risk sharing, whereas limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing. These results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, and by recognizing that social sanctions are costly to inflict or that individuals suffer from time‐inconsistent preferences. Comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life risk‐sharing networks in a few villages allows us to test the external validity of our experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk‐sharing arrangements observed in developing countries. (JEL: C93, D71, D81, O12)     

Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour: Evidence from Innovation

Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Pay dispersion among a firm's executives, however, can be associated with the antithetic effects of social comparison and individual motivation, with unclear implications for the company. We focus on innovation activities, which represent an important channel through which pay dispersion can affect firm performance, and test our predictions by exploring innovative output as a function of executives’ pay dispersion in a panel of US firms. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double‐edged sword. On the one hand, the higher the dispersion in variable pay, the higher the innovation. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion in fixed pay, the lower the innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, such as restricting the analysis to executives with direct responsibility for innovation projects and considering individual incentives in the form of cash pay.     

Optimal Inventory Control with Retail Pre‐Packs

A pre‐pack is a collection of items used in retail distribution. By grouping multiple units of one or more stock keeping units (SKU), distribution and handling costs can be reduced; however, ordering flexibility at the retail outlet is limited. This paper studies an inventory system at a retail level where both pre‐packs and individual items (at additional handling cost) can be ordered. For a single‐SKU, single‐period problem, we show that the optimal policy is to order into a “band” with as few individual units as possible. For the multi‐period problem with modular demand, the band policy is still optimal, and the steady‐state distribution of the target inventory position possesses a semi‐uniform structure, which greatly facilitates the computation of optimal policies and approximations under general demand. For the multi‐SKU case, the optimal policy has a generalized band structure. Our numerical results show that pre‐pack use is beneficial when facing stable and complementary demands, and substantial handling savings at the distribution center. The cost premium of using simple policies, such as strict base‐stock and batch‐ordering (pre‐packs only), can be substantial for medium parameter ranges.     

An Empirical Study of the Relations Between Hospital Volume,Teaching Status,and Service Quality

This paper contributes to research on quality drivers in healthcare settings by examining the relationships between patient volume, teaching mission, and process quality in US hospitals. To develop a model that accurately assesses the impact of patient volume and teaching status on quality, we draw on three related research streams pertaining to the volume–quality relationship, the comparative quality of care in teaching and non‐teaching hospitals, and quality drivers in service institutions. We propose the impact of patient volume on process quality varies across hospitals with different teaching intensities. The test of this proposition uses a large data set that measures process quality for treatments for heart attacks and heart failures in all major US hospitals. Our results suggest that, as hospital teaching intensity increases, greater patient volume is associated with decreased process quality. Never before was such a relationship uncovered. This initial finding has important practical implications. First, the regionalization policy of hospitals should be re‐evaluated in light of their teaching function. Second, the root causes for the lower quality scores of large, high resident‐to‐bed ratio teaching hospitals, compared with smaller versions, must be found.     

Competitive and Collaborative Quality and Warranty Management in Supply Chains

Product quality and product warranty coverage are two important and closely related operational decisions. A longer warranty protection period can boost sales, but it may also result in dramatically increased warranty cost, if product quality is poor. To investigate how these two decisions interact with each other and influence supply chain performance, we develop a single‐period model with a supplier that provides a product to an original equipment manufacturer, which in turn sells it to customers. Customer demand is random and affected by the length of the product warranty period. Warranty costs are incurred by both the supplier and the manufacturer. We analyze two different scenarios based on which party sets the warranty period: manufacturer warranty and supplier warranty. Product quality is controlled by the supplier, and the manufacturer determines the ordering quantity. We analyze these decentralized systems and provide the structural properties of the equilibrium strategies. We also compare the results of centralized and decentralized systems and identify the conditions under which one system provides a longer warranty and better product quality than the other. Our numerical study further shows that, in decentralized settings, when the warranty period is determined by the firm sharing the larger proportion of total warranty costs, the supply chain can achieve greater system‐wide profit. Both parties can therefore benefit from properly delegating the warranty decision and sharing the resulting additional profit. We further design a supplier‐development and buy‐back contract for coordinating decentralized supply chains. Several extensions are also discussed.     

Stochastic Optimization for Natural Disaster Asset Prepositioning

A key strategic issue in pre‐disaster planning for humanitarian logistics is the pre‐establishment of adequate capacity and resources that enable efficient relief operations. This paper develops a two‐stage stochastic optimization model to guide the allocation of budget to acquire and position relief assets, decisions that typically need to be made well in advance before a disaster strikes. The optimization focuses on minimizing the expected number of casualties, so our model includes first‐stage decisions to represent the expansion of resources such as warehouses, medical facilities with personnel, ramp spaces, and shelters. Second‐stage decisions concern the logistics of the problem, where allocated resources and contracted transportation assets are deployed to rescue critical population (in need of emergency evacuation), deliver required commodities to stay‐back population, and transport the transfer population displaced by the disaster. Because of the uncertainty of the event's location and severity, these and other parameters are represented as scenarios. Computational results on notional test cases provide guidance on budget allocation and prove the potential benefit of using stochastic optimization.     

Aspirations and Inequality

This paper develops a theory of socially determined aspirations, and the interaction of those aspirations with growth and inequality. The interaction is bidirectional: economy‐wide outcomes determine individual aspirations, which in turn determine investment incentives and social outcomes. Thus aspirations, income, and the distribution of income evolve jointly. When capital stocks lie in some compact set, steady state distributions must exhibit inequality and are typically clustered around local poles. When sustained growth is possible, initial histories matter. Either there is convergence to an equal distribution (with growth) or there is perennial relative divergence across clusters, with within‐cluster convergence. A central feature that drives these results is that aspirations that are moderately above an individual's current standard of living tend to encourage investment, while still higher aspirations may lead to frustration.     

Risk Assessment of Human Listeriosis from Semisoft Cheeses Made from Raw Sheep's Milk in Lazio and Tuscany (Italy)

Semisoft cheese made from raw sheep's milk is traditionally and economically important in southern Europe. However, raw milk cheese is also a known vehicle of human listeriosis and contamination of sheep cheese with Listeria monocytogenes has been reported. In the present study, we have developed and applied a quantitative risk assessment model, based on available evidence and challenge testing, to estimate risk of invasive listeriosis due to consumption of an artisanal sheep cheese made with raw milk collected from a single flock in central Italy. In the model, contamination of milk may originate from the farm environment or from mastitic animals, with potential growth of the pathogen in bulk milk and during cheese ripening. Based on the 48‐day challenge test of a local semisoft raw sheep's milk cheese we found limited growth only during the initial phase of ripening (24 hours) and no growth or limited decline during the following ripening period. In our simulation, in the baseline scenario, 2.2% of cheese servings are estimated to have at least 1 colony forming unit (CFU) per gram. Of these, 15.1% would be above the current E.U. limit of 100 CFU/g (5.2% would exceed 1,000 CFU/g). Risk of invasive listeriosis per random serving is estimated in the 10^?12 range (mean) for healthy adults, and in the 10^?10 range (mean) for vulnerable populations. When small flocks (10–36 animals) are combined with the presence of a sheep with undetected subclinical mastitis, risk of listeriosis increases and such flocks may represent a public health risk.     

Time Consistency: Stationarity and Time Invariance

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic “preference reversals” between sooner‐smaller and later‐larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically motivated design permits separate identification of time consistent, stationary, and time invariant choices. At least half of the subjects are time consistent, but only three‐quarters of them exhibit stationary choices. About half of subjects with time inconsistent choices have stationary preferences. These results challenge the view that present‐bias preferences are the main source of time inconsistent choices.     

Incentive Contracts in Projects with Unforeseeable Uncertainty

Designing incentive contracts that constructively guide employee efforts is a particularly difficult challenge in novel innovation initiatives, where unforeseen events may occur. Empirical studies have observed a variety of incentive structures in innovation settings: “time and material contracts” (compensation for executing orders), “downside protection” (target‐driven incentives with protection from unexpected risks), and “upside rewards” (additional remuneration for pursuing opportunities). This paper develops a model of incentives in presence of unforeseen events and offers a theoretical prediction of which of the empirically observed incentive structures should be used under which circumstances. The combination of three key influences drives the shape of the best incentive contract. First, the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty, or the occurrence of events that cannot possibly be foreseen at the outset. These may force a change in the project's plan, making pure target setting insufficient. Second, fairness concerns dictate that the employee's expected compensation cannot be shifted downward by unforeseen events, because it would cause demotivation, hostility, and defection. Third, management may not be able to observe the detailed actions of the employee (moral hazard) nor whether a positive or negative unforeseen event has occurred (asymmetric information).     

Coordinating Supply Chains via Advance‐Order Discounts,Minimum Order Quantities,and Delegations

To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre‐established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance‐order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance‐order discount contract is Pareto‐improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre‐specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance‐order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first‐best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto‐improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one‐supplier‐one‐manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.     

Efficiency Wages: Signals or Incentives An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Wage and Commitment

Efficiency wage theories arguethat firms induce their employees to work in a moredisciplined way by paying high wages. Two basicmechanisms have been pointed out in economics about how these wage premia motivate employees.The incentives-driven `shirking model' impliesthat employees who have a highly paid job workin a more disciplined way so as to avoid beingdismissed. The ``gift exchange' model is basedon the assumption that high wages change therelationship between employer and employee.Empirical evidence on the incentives approachis mixed and a thorough competitive testingagainst the gift exchange model was notpossible due to the fact that the latter wasnot worked out enough. However, there is a relational theory of efficiency wages which isworked out in detail in order to allow directcompetitive testing. This relationalsignaling approach, as it is called, is basedon framing effects and comes to specifichypotheses about the conditions under whichefficiency wages work. These hypothesescontrast sharply with predictions from theincentives approach. The paper presents anempirical test of the theories and shows thatthe data clearly reject the incentive-basedpredictions and confirm the relationalsignaling predictions.     

Managing Supply Chain Execution: Monitoring Timeliness and Correctness via Individualized Trace Data

Improvements in information technologies provide new opportunities to control and improve business processes based on real‐time performance data. A class of data we call individualized trace data (ITD) identifies the real‐time status of individual entities as they move through execution processes, such as an individual product passing through a supply chain or a uniquely identified mortgage application going through an approval process. We develop a mathematical framework which we call the State‐Identity‐Time (SIT) Framework to represent and manipulate ITD at multiple levels of aggregation for different managerial purposes. Using this framework, we design a pair of generic quality measures—timeliness and correctness—for the progress of entities through a supply chain. The timeliness and correctness metrics provide behavioral visibility that can help managers to grasp the dynamics of supply chain behavior that is distinct from asset visibility such as inventory. We develop special quality control methods using this framework to address the issue of overreaction that is common among managers faced with a large volume of fast‐changing data. The SIT structure and its associated methods inform managers on if, when, and where to react. We illustrate our approach using simulations based on real RFID data from a Walmart RFID pilot project.     

Sleep disturbances in shift-workers: A marker for maladaptation syndrome

Abstract

This study aims to examine whether the relationship between overtime and well-being is influenced by the voluntary vs. involuntary (i.e., compulsory) nature of overtime work and by the presence or absence of rewards for overtime. We also explored the prevalence of these types of overtime and how they were related to work and personal characteristics. A survey was conducted among a representative sample of Dutch full-time employees (N=1612). AN(C)OVA was used to compare rewarded and unrewarded, voluntary and involuntary overtime workers on personal and work characteristics, fatigue, and work satisfaction. Most overtime workers were rewarded (62%). About half of the sample (n=814) could be classified as either voluntary or involuntary overtime workers, or as having “mixed reasons” to work overtime. Voluntary and unrewarded overtime workers had a relatively high income and favourable job characteristics. Involuntary overtime work was associated with relatively high fatigue and low satisfaction, especially for involuntary overtime workers without rewards who can be considered a burnout risk group. Voluntary overtime workers were non-fatigued and satisfied, even without rewards. It can be concluded that control over overtime and rewards for overtime are important for well-being. Moderate overtime work may not be a problem if it is done voluntarily. Moreover, the negative effects of compulsory overtime work may be partly offset by fair compensation for the extra work.     

Tolerance for Failure and Incentives for Collaborative Innovation

Most organizations employ collaborative teams to manage innovation projects. Although the use of collaborative innovation teams is a good starting point, an organization's ability to innovate can be enhanced by managing risk‐taking behavior through monetary incentive schemes and through an organizational culture that tolerates failure. This article reports the results of two controlled experiments aimed at understanding how tolerance for failure and incentives impact the decisions of individuals engaged in a collaborative innovation initiative. A key element of our experiments is the notion of endogenous project risk, which we define as the explicit link between resources allocated to a project and the likelihood of project success. We observe that when penalties are low, the amount of risk an individual assumes is fairly insensitive to the rewards that are offered. In an analogous result, when individuals make decisions alone (rather than collaboratively), higher tolerance for failure does little to increase the amount of risk an individual is willing to take. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of implicit incentives that are created as a result of project and organizational characteristics.     

Insurance,Public Assistance,and Household Flood Risk Reduction: A Comparative Study of Austria,England, and Romania

In light of increasing losses from floods, many researchers and policymakers are looking for ways to encourage flood risk reduction among communities, business, and households. In this study, we investigate risk‐reduction behavior at the household level in three European Union Member States with fundamentally different insurance and compensation schemes. We try to understand if and how insurance and public assistance influence private risk‐reduction behavior. Data were collected using a telephone survey (n = 1,849) of household decisionmakers in flood‐prone areas. We show that insurance overall is positively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. Warranties, premium discounts, and information provision with respect to risk reduction may be an explanation for this positive relationship in the case of structural measures. Public incentives for risk‐reduction measures by means of financial and in‐kind support, and particularly through the provision of information, are also associated with enhancing risk reduction. In this study, public compensation is not negatively associated with private risk‐reduction behavior. This does not disprove such a relationship, but the negative effect may be mitigated by factors related to respondents' capacity to implement measures or social norms that were not included in the analysis. The data suggest that large‐scale flood protection infrastructure creates a sense of security that is associated with a lower level of preparedness. Across the board there is ample room to improve both public and private policies to provide effective incentives for household‐level risk reduction.     

Consistent Testing of Cointegrating Relationships

In this paper we investigate methods for testing the existence of a cointegration relationship among the components of a nonstationary fractionally integrated (NFI) vector time series. Our framework generalizes previous studies restricted to unit root integrated processes and permits simultaneous analysis of spurious and cointegrated NFI vectors. We propose a modified F‐statistic, based on a particular studentization, which converges weakly under both hypotheses, despite the fact that OLS estimates are only consistent under cointegration. This statistic leads to a Wald‐type test of cointegration when combined with a narrow band GLS‐type estimate. Our semiparametric methodology allows consistent testing of the spurious regression hypothesis against the alternative of fractional cointegration without prior knowledge on the memory of the original series, their short run properties, the cointegrating vector, or the degree of cointegration. This semiparametric aspect of the modelization does not lead to an asymptotic loss of power, permitting the Wald statistic to diverge faster under the alternative of cointegration than when testing for a hypothesized cointegration vector. In our simulations we show that the method has comparable power to customary procedures under the unit root cointegration setup, and maintains good properties in a general framework where other methods may fail. We illustrate our method testing the cointegration hypothesis of nominal GNP and simple‐sum (M1, M2, M3) monetary aggregates.