Pricing in a Transportation Station with Strategic Customers

We consider a transportation station, where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, observe the delay information and the fee imposed by the administrator and decide whether to use the facility or not. A transportation facility visits the station according to a renewal process and serves all present customers at each visit. We assume that every customer maximizes her individual expected utility and the administrator is a profit maximizer. We model this situation as a two‐stage game among the customers and the administrator, where customer strategies depend on the level of delay information provided by the administrator. We consider three cases distinguished by the level of delay information: observable (the exact waiting time is announced), unobservable (no information is provided) and partially observable (the number of waiting customers is announced). In each case, we explore how the customer reward for service, the unit waiting cost, and the intervisit time distribution parameters affect the customer behavior and the fee imposed by the administrator. We then compare the three cases and show that the customers almost always prefer to know their exact waiting times whereas the administrator prefers to provide either no information or the exact waiting time depending on system parameters.     

限制性定价策略中在位厂商的最优产量选择

Milgrom-Roberts模型及相关研究证明了不完全信息条件下限制性定价策略均衡的存在,但对存在的具体形式却没有说明。本文通过对Milgrom-Roberts限制性定价模型的进一步研究,指出不完全信息条件下不同成本类型的在位厂商阻止潜在竞争厂商进入的策略均衡可以在一个产量区间内存在;并且由于利润最大化原则,实际上形成在位厂商生产最优产量即阻止进入的均衡产量区间内的利润最大化产量、潜在竞争厂商不进入的唯一策略均衡结果。由于潜在的进入威胁,在位厂商要想成功实施限制性定价策略,其最优产量只能大于或等于垄断产量,而利润只能小于或等于垄断利润。     

电信业务定价决策理论研究

价格竞争是研究定价的影响因素之一.国外多从定量的角度,以成本为基础,通过建模研究电信业务的定价,而国内则多从定性的角度研究电信业务定价的理念、方法.一般来说,在二部制价格模式下,电信业务的固定价格和消费流量价格将影响用户数量和消费流量,最终影响企业的运营收益.本文通过模型分析了二部制价格变化对用户数量、业务流量和考虑了技术升级的影响下的定价策略,从理论上指出了基于收益、规模和业务流量的定价方法,同时指出了根据客户的支付水平和企业发展的需要的定价策略,和细分市场方法.     

Optimal Workforce Mix in Service Systems with Two Types of Customers

We consider a service system with two types of customers. In such an environment, the servers can either be specialists (or dedicated) who serve a specific customer type, or generalists (or flexible) who serve either type of customers. Cross‐trained workers are more flexible and help reduce system delay, but also contribute to increased service costs and reduced service efficiency. Our objective is to provide insights into the choice of an optimal workforce mix of flexible and dedicated servers. We assume Poisson arrivals and exponential service times, and use matrix‐analytic methods to investigate the impact of various system parameters such as the number of servers, server utilization, and server efficiency on the choice of server mix. We develop guidelines for managers that would help them to decide whether they should be either at one of the extremes, i.e., total flexibility or total specialization, or some combination. If it is the latter, we offer an analytical tool to optimize the server mix.     

基于顾客不公平规避的服务定价研究

设计合理的服务机制和定价策略对于企业运营至关重要。由于顾客异质性（等待时间成本不同）企业通常对顾客进行分类服务,然而分类服务会引发顾客的不公平心理,并带来负效用,从而引起顾客流动与转移,进而影响企业收益与社会成本。本文针对垄断型服务系统中,顾客不公平规避心理（用参数α表示）对于企业优化目标的影响进行分析,在此基础之上,研究企业是否对顾客采取分类服务以及如何合理定价。结果表明,当顾客不公平规避偏好心理较弱时,从社会成本最小化和企业收益最大化的角度都应该对顾客进行分类服务并收取优先服务费用。当顾客不公规避心理较强时,从企业收益最大化的角度应仅保留优先权顾客并收取优先服务费用,从社会成本最小化的角度则应取消优先服务费用仅保留普通顾客。最后,通过数值模拟和理论分析对上述结论进行验证。     

基于顾客心理期望等待时间的服务策略研究

顾客在排队系统获取服务时,会存在心理上的期望等待时间,该期望会影响顾客在排队系统中的行为变化和流动,从而影响企业收益。本文以传统的M/M/1排队系统为背景,基于顾客存在期望等待时间的前提下,以企业收益最大化为优化目标进行研究。首先,对相应基础理论和模型假设进行介绍;其次,对顾客存在心理期望等待时间情形提出三种新的策略：重新定价、通过折扣对顾客期望值进行调整、提高服务率;然后,分别对上述三种策略进行优化分析,并同现有结果进行比较;研究表明：三种策略都比维持原有定价带来更大收益;当折扣力度较小时或顾客对费用感知强于时间感知时,折扣策略优于重新定价策略;当折扣力度较大或顾客对时间感知强于费用感知时,重新定价策略优于折扣策略;最后,通过对最优结果分析提出相应管理启示。本文的研究对于顾客存在心理期望等待时间的服务定价具有重要的指导意义和实际应用价值。     

Bertrand寡占市场企业交叉持股时定价策略和最优持股的研究

本文首先研究了公司间交叉持股的利益分配问题,导出了n个公司间交叉持股的利润分配公式。以此为基础,导出了Bertrand寡占市场公司间交叉持股时价格反应函数和均衡价格的一般表达式。通过构建一个两阶段动态博弈,着重研究了Bertrand双寡头市场两厂商交叉持股时的均衡策略问题,给出了厂商间均衡定价与最优持股,分析了均衡策略对厂商经济行为及市场绩效的影响。研究结果表明,可替代品市场的两厂商间交叉持股具有反竞争、促合作的效应。较之非交叉持股,均衡交叉持股提高了均衡价格水平,降低了两厂商各自的产量水平,使各自在较低产量水平下获得较高的利润,从而实现了两厂商间双赢的局面。然而,交叉持股将导致消费者剩余减少,社会经济福利降低。     

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Items by a Monopolist Facing Strategic Consumers

We introduce a dynamic pricing model for a monopolistic company selling a perishable product to a finite population of strategic consumers (customers who are aware that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases strategically). This problem is modeled as a stochastic dynamic game in which the company's objective is to maximize total expected revenues, and each customer maximizes the expected present value of utility. We prove the existence of a unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium pricing policy, provide equilibrium optimality conditions for both customer and seller, and prove monotonicity results for special cases. We demonstrate through numerical examples that a company that ignores strategic consumer behavior may receive much lower total revenues than one that uses the strategic equilibrium pricing policy. We also show that, when the initial capacity is a decision variable, it can be used together with the appropriate pricing policy to effectively reduce the impact of strategic consumer behavior. The proposed model is computationally tractable for problems of realistic size.     

考虑消费者网购体验滞后的产品定价研究

随着电子商务技术的发展,网络购物越来越便利。与此同时,网络购物带来的产品体验滞后也导致了消费者对产品的认知不确定性。而这种不确定性正在成为消费者策略性退货行为的主要原因,如消费者同时购买多件具有横向差异的产品,在收到货物后经亲身体验后保留一件而将其他产品退货。本文通过构建Hotelling模型,探讨了企业在考虑此种影响情况下的最优定价策略,分析得出：当消费者的退货成本增加时,企业最优定价也随之增加;消费者对产品的先验效用差异化越小,企业的最优定价也越低。同时发现,若某种产品无消费者单独购买,企业的最优定价会随消费者偏好的增加而增加;而当两种产品均有消费者单独购买且消费者退货成本较大时,企业的最优定价不但不会随消费者偏好的增加而提高,反而会随消费者偏好增加而减少。此外,本文给出了消费者策略性退货行为存在的临界条件,当消费者的退货成本高于这一临界条件时消费者的策略退货行为将消失。     

Static and Dynamic Pricing of Excess Capacity in a Make‐to‐Order Environment

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer that serves two customer classes: core customers who pay a fixed negotiated price, and “fill‐in” customers who make submittal decisions based on the current price set by the firm. Using a Markovian queueing model, we determine how much the firm can gain by explicitly accounting for the status of its production facility in making pricing decisions. Specifically, we examine three pricing policies: (1) static, state‐independent pricing, (2) constant pricing up to a cutoff state, and (3) general state‐dependent pricing. We determine properties of each policy, and illustrate numerically the financial gains that the firm can achieve by following each policy as compared with simpler policies. Our main result is that constant pricing up to a cutoff state can dramatically outperform a state‐independent policy, while at the same time achieving most of the increase in revenue achievable from general state‐dependent pricing. Thus, we find that constant pricing up to a cutoff state presents an attractive tradeoff between ease of implementation and revenue gain. When the costs of policy design and implementation are taken into account, this simple heuristic may actually out‐perform general state‐dependent pricing in some settings.     

考虑需求端和产出端不确定性的服务平台定价和商业模式研究

同时考虑平台需求端和供给端不确定性,分析此时服务平台的产品定价、最优激励、商业模式和效率损失传导。通过将委托代理理论和平台理论结合的方法进行分析,研究表明:(1)需求端和产出端的不确定性越高,平台对消费端的定价越低;随着需求端自网络外部性增强,需求端不确定对消费端的影响减弱;随需求端交叉网络外部性增强,需求端不确定对消费端的定价影响增强。(2)需求或产出不确定性越大,分成报酬占总报酬比例越低,平台商业模式更接近于雇佣或自营模式;反之接近纯平台模式。(3)产出端不确定性带来的效率损失在平台两端之间传导。当服务端存在不确定性,服务端报酬和需求端定价同时上升,服务提供端的报酬升高幅度大于需求端产品价格升高幅度。同时,平台将部分效率损失内化,平台承担的效率损失与需求端交叉网络外部性成正比。     

Quality of Service Based Pricing Schemes for Content Sharing in Peer‐to‐Peer Networks

In this paper, we study quality‐of‐service (QoS) based pricing schemes that serve as incentive mechanisms to induce sharing behaviors in Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) networks. We incorporate operational QoS metrics into users’ utility functions and demonstrate how they affect individual users’ content sharing decisions. Using a game‐theoretic model, our study reveals how organizations respond to the changes of operational QoS metrics in their design of pricing schemes for various business objectives at different stages of network evolution. Our results show that a higher upload capacity can foster rational sharing to start when the network is small; however, it also discourages sharing behaviors when the network becomes large. In order to induce a socially optimal behavior, a pricing scheme will not charge users for requesting content while compensating them for sharing content. Such compensation is found to increase faster with the network size when the network is large. In order to maximize the profit of a monopolistic provider, however, a pricing scheme will charge content requests with a positive price while providing less compensation to sharing users compared to the socially optimal scheme. When the network size is small, such compensation can be even negative, which implies that a monopolistic provider discourages content sharing when the network is small, but encourages it when the network becomes larger. In addition, we find that more information about peer upload capacity discourages peers to share.     

跳过程下的公司证券定价和最优资本结构

由于几何布朗运动不能反映复杂经济背景下的资产价值动态,本文以双指数跳扩散过程作为资产价值过程来研究公司证券定价和最优资本结构问题。本文主要结果是：运用均衡定价的方法给出了公司证券的定价并获得了公司资本价值的解析解。通过比较静态分析揭示了跳风险对企业资本价值、最优资本结构、收益率差价等都具有显著的影响。与几何布朗运动相比,跳风险降低了公司价值和债券价值以及公司最优杠杆率,同时增加了债券的收益率差价和股权价值。