DEBT,POLICY UNCERTAINTY,AND EXPECTATIONS STABILIZATION

This paper develops a model of policy regime uncertainty and its consequences for stabilizing expectations. Because of learning dynamics, uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy is shown to restrict, relative to a rational expectations analysis, the set of policies consistent with macroeconomic stability. Anchoring expectations by communicating about monetary and fiscal policy enlarges the set of policies consistent with stability. However, absent anchored fiscal expectations, the advantages from anchoring monetary expectations are smaller the larger is the average level of indebtedness. Finally, even when expectations are stabilized in the long run, the higher are average debt levels the more persistent will be the effects of disturbances out of rational expectations equilibrium.     

THE MYSTERY OF THE PRINTING PRESS: MONETARY POLICY AND SELF‐FULFILLING DEBT CRISES

We study the conditions under which unconventional (balance sheet) monetary policy can rule out self‐fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers. When purchasing sovereign debt, the central bank effectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding a lower interest rate. As central bank purchases reduce the (ex ante) costs of debt, we characterize a critical threshold beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default. Because default may still occur for fundamental reasons, however, the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate inefficient inflation. We show that these losses do not necessarily undermine the credibility of a backstop, nor the monetary authorities' ability to pursue its inflation objectives. Backstops are credible if either the central bank enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are sufficiently averse to inflation. (JEL: E58, E63, H63)     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico‐Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico‐economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.     

Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy—the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment—can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including time‐varying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).     

基于宏观经济视角的我国上市公司现金持有量研究

已有研究表明,公司现金持有量受到公司内部因素的影响并会进行动态调整。然而,现金持有量受宏观经济环境的影响如何以及如何根据宏观经济的变化进行动态调整,少有文献探讨。本文在理论分析的基础上,构建了宏观经济环境对现金持有量影响的静态模型和动态模型,以2001-2011年沪深两市843家上市公司的平衡面板数据为样本,就宏观经济环境对不同控股性质上市公司现金持有行为的影响进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,上市公司现金持有量与经济周期和财政政策显著负相关,而与货币政策显著正相关;现金持有量调整速度与经济周期变化和货币政策变化正相关,而与财政政策变化显著负相关。研究结果还显示,非国有控股公司的现金持有量对宏观经济更敏感,调整速度明显快于国有控股公司。本文为现金持有量的研究提供了更全面的视角。     

基于宏观经济政策视角的我国企业负债融资研究

本文主要研究宏观经济政策作为政府调控宏观经济的手段,对微观企业融资行为所产生的显著影响。鉴于我国金融机构对国有和非国有企业存在的信贷歧视,本文剔除了产权性质的影响,把国有上市企业作为研究对象,以2003-2013年的数据为样本。首先研究宏观经济政策对国有企业负债融资行为的影响,证明了财政政策的扩张和货币政策的紧缩都能促进国有企业负债融资的增加。然后进一步研究宏观经济政策的外部因素和股权结构的内部因素对负债融资与企业业绩之间关系的影响,研究结果表明扩张性财政政策下,负债融资与国有企业绩效正相关;紧缩性货币政策下,负债融资与国有企业绩效负相关;股权结构分散程度的增加,有利于促进负债融资对国有企业绩效的正效应。     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

我国货币政策作用非对称性和波动性的实证检验

货币政策的非对称性主要是指货币政策在经济周期的不同阶段具有不同的作用效果. 文 章利用描述实际GDP 增长率波动成分的各种GARCH 模型检验发现,在我国经济运行当中,紧 缩性货币政策对于经济的减速作用大于扩张性货币政策对于经济的加速作用. 因此,应该在经 济收缩阶段实行稳健性货币政策来规避金融风险和防范通货膨胀,采用积极财政政策刺激投 资需求和消费需求,以保持经济的快速稳定增长.     

货币供应机制与财政支出的乘数效应——基于DSGE的分析

本文通过构建包括货币供应机制的DSGE模型,分析了中国政府购买支出和公共投资支出的乘数效应,发现两类财政支出对私人消费和私人投资都产生了挤出效应,公共资本的产出弹性低是产生挤出效应的结构性原因,在中国货币供应机制减小对通货膨胀负向反应和增大对产出正向反应的配合下,政府购买支出和公共投资支出能够对私人消费和私人投资产生正向的挤入效应。     

货币政策作用的有效性和非对称性研究

货币政策的非对称性主要是指货币政策在经济周期的不同阶段具有不同的作用效果。通过对货币政策状态（扩张性和紧缩性）的度量，我们检验发现在我国经济运行当中，紧缩性货币政策对于经济的减速作用大于扩张性货币政策对于经济的加速作用。因此，在经济收缩阶段应该实行稳健性货币政策来规避金融风险和防范通货膨胀，采用积极财政政策刺激投资需求和消费需求，以保持经济的快速稳定增长。     

现阶段我国政府债务“警戒线”的反思及债务风险的防范

通常人们依据债务规模的“警戒线”来衡量政府债务风险 ,认为我国政府债务风险已经较高。本文对此作了探讨并得出结论：前面的结论实际上很难成立 ,我国积极财政政策还有较大的空间。我国债务风险主要在于经济增长对债务资金可能形成的持久依赖。防范债务风险的根本措施是坚持深化改革、促进结构调整 ,主要依靠民间投资和消费拉动经济增长。国债资金应该用于支持体制改革和结构调整。随着积极财政政策在我国的运用 ,对我国政府债务风险的讨论也越来越多。一般对债务风险的判断都是基于国债负担率、赤字率、债务依存度、偿债率这样一些指标。…     

财政风险:从经济总量角度的分析

在干预公共风险的过程中,政府会承受各种各样的支出压力,这些支出压力表现为政府的各种形式的负债,即未来一个时期政府资源的流出。作为公共主体,政府面对的债务是不确定的,不能仅仅从会计学角度来认定。公共债务与经济总量是一种历史的循环关系,不同的循环状态决定了政府财政风险是趋向收敛还是发散。不同的债务结构对经济总量及其增长产生不同的影响,因而具有不同的风险。认清不同公共债务类型的来源、不确定性程度及其风险可控性,是把握公共债务与经济总量的关联向哪一种循环转化的重要一环,仅仅关注债务总量是远远不够的,抽象地谈公共债务负担率的高低没有意义。改善公共债务结构,降低整个公共债务的不确定性程度至关重要,这比控制债务规模更迫切。     

IS THERE A FISCAL FREE LUNCH IN A LIQUIDITY TRAP?

In this paper, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the effects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap. If the liquidity trap is very prolonged, the spending multiplier can be much larger than in normal circumstances, and the budgetary costs minimal. However, given this fiscal free lunch, it is unclear why policymakers would want to limit the size of fiscal expansion. Our paper addresses this question in a model environment in which the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously, and depends on the size of the fiscal stimulus. We show that even if the multiplier is high for small increases in government spending, it may decrease substantially at higher spending levels; thus, it is crucial to distinguish between the marginal and average responses of output and government debt.     

UNINSURED COUNTERCYCLICAL RISK: AN AGGREGATION RESULT AND APPLICATION TO OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We consider an incomplete markets economy with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face countercyclical idiosyncratic labor and asset risk. We derive conditions under which the aggregate allocations and price system can be found by solving a representative agent problem. This result is applied to analyze the properties of an optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with uninsured countercyclical individual risk. The optimal monetary policy that emerges from our incomplete markets economy is the same as the optimal monetary policy in a representative agent model with preference shocks. When price rigidity is the only friction the optimal monetary policy calls for stabilizing the inflation rate at zero.     

SOVEREIGNS VERSUS BANKS: CREDIT,CRISES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policy. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co‐evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries from 1870 to 2012. We find that in advanced economies financial crises are not preceded by public debt build‐ups nor are they more likely when public debt is high. However, history shows that high levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after financial crises. The economic costs of financial crises rise substantially if large private sector credit booms are unwound at times when the public sector has little capacity to pursue macroeconomic and financial stabilization.     

EXPANSIONARY AUSTERITY? INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This paper investigates the short‐term effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity in OECD economies. We examine contemporaneous policy documents to identify changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to reduce the budget deficit and not by responding to prospective economic conditions. Using this new dataset, our estimates suggest that fiscal consolidation has contractionary effects on private demand and GDP. By contrast, estimates based on conventional measures of the fiscal policy stance used in the literature support the expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis but appear to be biased toward overstating expansionary effects.     

Supply Policies in an Open Economy with Centralized Wage Setting

Abstract. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of a fiscal policy based on government subsidies to firms in an open economy, characterized by the “strategic” interaction of government and unions. Before developing the theoretical model, some evidence about government reaction functions for selected OECD countries is presented. The main theoretical results can be summed up as follows. A fiscal policy based on a tax-financed increase in government transfers to firms makes the country more competitive internationally, but reduces employment. Only when the increase in government transfers to firms is financed by the public debt is the fiscal policy able to achieve its two-fold aim of greater competitiveness and a higher level of employment.     

我国通货膨胀路径的对称性和波动性分析

我国价格水平变化具有一定程度的对称性,但在通货膨胀和通货紧缩阶段具有不同的波动性。影响我国价格水平变化的重要原因来自消费需求,目前我国价格水平变化具有有效需求驱动特性。紧缩货币政策有效地抑制了通货膨胀,但稳健货币政策对缓解通货紧缩作用微弱,同时积极财政政策也没有明显地影响价格水平,因此缓解通货紧缩还需要更为积极的名义扩张。     

LIQUIDITY AND INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT

We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the nonpledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over‐hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex‐ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex‐post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex‐ante perspective. The model throws light on the holding of foreign reserves in international markets.