Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning,Spillover, and Competition

We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier.     

Evaluation frequency and evaluator’s experience: the case of venture capital investment firms and monitoring intensity in stage financing

In this paper we analyze the relation between an investor’s experience and the intensity of monitoring activities. Specifically, we consider venture capitalist firms and their choices of time intervals between financing rounds. We hypothesize that more industry investment experience leads to longer time intervals between financing rounds and hence, lower monitoring intensity. Using a unique data set of venture capital firms from Germany during the period from 1995 to 2005 we find evidence for our hypothesis that in a given time frame more experienced investors evaluate and monitor their investments less often than less experienced investors. In addition, VC investors pool their experience and share the risk involved in investing by forming syndicates which reduces the incentives to monitor subsequently. On the basis of our results we argue that the optimal frequency of performance evaluations should take into account the experience of the evaluator.     

HYBRID R&D

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in‐house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non‐core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits. In this context, we identify a second aspect of complementarity: Equilibrium investments in in‐house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects. However, we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits, suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research. (JEL: L13, L14, L22, O31, O32)     

Patents,R&D investments and post-IPO strategies

This paper empirically investigates the effect of going public on the evolution of high-tech entrepreneurial firms, focussing in particular on the interaction between innovation variables and financing and investment strategies. Specifically, I confront the effects of the IPO on firms with higher R&D investments versus firms with more patents. Firms with higher R&D investments typically view the IPO as a mechanism to raise external equity, used to pursue investments and to acquire participation in other companies, whereas those with more patents raise more debt capital and invest less after the IPO, as compared to high-tech entrepreneurial firms. I suggest that a large number of patents is an index of technological maturity for high-tech ventures, even more than age and size, that helps investors to individuate firms with a lower level of risk.     

Maximizing the rate of return on the capital employed in shipping capacity renewal

Decisions regarding investments in capacity expansion/renewal require taking into account both the operating fitness and the financial performance of the investment. While several operating requirements have been considered in the operations research literature, the corresponding financial aspects have not received as much attention. We introduce a model for the renewal of shipping capacity which maximizes the Average Internal Rate of Return (AIRR). Maximizing the AIRR sets stricter return requirements on money expenditures than classic profit maximization models and may describe more closely shipping investors׳ preferences. The resulting nonlinear model is linearized to ease computation. Based on data from a shipping company we compare a profit maximization model with an AIRR maximization model. Results show that while maximizing profits results in aggressive expansions of the fleet, maximizing the return provides more balanced renewal strategies which may be preferable to most shipping investors.     

Supply Chain Structure Incentives for Corporate Social Responsibility: An Incomplete Contracting Analysis

Downstream firms increasingly recognize the importance of integrating social and environmental concerns with their businesses. As a consequence, they urge to create incentives for their suppliers to invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Contracts to provide these incentives are rarely observed in practice. If not totally absent, contracts may be incomplete, in that unforeseen contingencies or some CSR attributes that are difficult to measure may not be included in the contract. We show that incentives for CSR investments can also be provided through the supply chain structure, which consists of the distribution of ownership rights over the firms' assets of production, and involves horizontal and/or vertical alliances among supply chain members. Motivated by examples in agricultural contexts, this study adopts the property rights approach to study the impact of supply chain structures on the adoption of CSR activities. We show that the structure that best incentivizes CSR investments depends on the interaction between CSR vertical synergy, free‐riding, and countervailing power. One of the main findings is that the alliance between suppliers is beneficial only if the revenues generated by a downstream investment are sufficiently high. In fact, only in this case, the suppliers can appropriate a sufficiently large stake of the revenues generated downstream, thanks to their countervailing power. When the upstream investment costs become high, however, the suppliers will invest in CSR only if the downstream distributor is vertically integrated. The resulting structure of a cooperative will best incentivize CSR investments only if the CSR vertical synergy between the two tiers of the supply chain is sufficiently high.     

Shareholders and managers: Who care more about corporate diversity and employee benefits?

We test two competing theories that explain a firm’s engagement in corporate diversity and employee benefits: socially responsible investment theory and management overinvestment theory. We find that publicly-traded companies with strong shareholder rights are more likely to promote women and/or minorities to the positions of CEO and board of directors in their organizations, conduct business with women- and/or minority-owned operations, and provide better family benefits to their employees than firms with strong management power. These findings indicate that the companies with strong shareholder rights engage more actively in internal aspects of CSR activities, which supports the socially responsible investment theory rather than the management overinvestment theory. Shareholders (i.e. institutional investors) tend to integrate their social goals (i.e. internal CSR issues) and financial goals into their investments. In response to these changes, managers should engage in the internal aspects of corporate social issues more aggressively as the agents of shareholders.     

The Timing of Capacity Investment with Lead Times: When Do Firms Act in Unison?

We study competitive capacity investment for the emergence of a new market. Firms may invest either in capacity leading demand or in capacity lagging demand at different costs. We show how the lead time and other operational factors including volume flexibility, existing capacity, and demand uncertainty impact equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that a type of bandwagon behavior is the most likely equilibrium outcome: if both firms are going to invest, then they are most likely to act in unison. Contrary to much received wisdom, we show that leader–follower behavior is very uncommon in equilibrium where firms do not have volume flexibility, and will not occur at all if lead times are sufficiently short. On the other hand, if there is volume flexibility in production, then the likelihood of this sequential investment behavior increases. Our findings underscore the importance of operational characteristics in determining the competitive dynamics of capacity investment timing.     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

Earnings per share is a poor indicator of performance

One of the greatest dangers in corporate financial planning is failing to separate investment decision making from financial policy, because poor quality investments can appear to be desirable as a result of the particular financing vehicle employed. Management's focus of attention should not be rates of growth and earnings per share or return on net worth. Rather, the most important measure of corporate performance is the rate of return on total capital employed. The paper identifies the dangers of employing an earnings per share criterion for evaluating corporate performance, and suggests an alternative: focusing on a company's free cash flow, net operating profits after taxes minus the amount of new capital investment required in order to generate future profits. The author presents an analytical framework employing his free cash flow concept which can be applied to pricing and financing acquisitions.     

When Gray is Good: Gray Markets and Market‐Creating Investments

Gray markets arise when an intermediary buys a product in a lower‐priced, often emerging market and resells it to compete with the product's original manufacturer in a higher priced, more developed market. Evidence suggests that gray markets make the original manufacturer worse off globally by eroding profit margins in developed markets. Thus, it is interesting that many firms do not implement control systems to curb gray market activity. Our analysis suggests that one possible explanation lies at the intersection of two economic phenomena: firms investing to build emerging market demand, and investments conferring positive externalities (spillovers) on a rival's demand. We find that gray markets amplify the incentives to invest in emerging markets, because investments increase both emerging market consumption and the gray market's cost base. Moreover, when market‐creating investments confer positive spillovers, each firm builds its own market more efficiently. Thus, firms can be better off with gray markets when investments confer spillovers, provided the spillover effect is sufficiently large. These results provide a perspective on why firms might not implement control systems to prevent gray market distribution in sectors where investment spillovers are common (e.g., the technology sector) and, more broadly, why gray markets persist in the economy.     

The influence of industry structure on the entry mode choice of overseas entrants in manufacturing industries

This study examines the impact of industry structure on the foreign direct investment (FDI) entry mode decisions by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in manufacturing industries. We explore the notion that firms would seek to balance the risks due to industry structural barriers and liabilities of foreignness while seeking entry in international markets. A multinomial logistic regression model is used to test 336 entry decisions from 18 countries entering the United States over the period 1989–1994. Empirical evidence shows that underlying industries' structural characteristics influence a firm's preference for entry mode alternatives such as greenfield investments, acquisitions, and joint ventures. In concentrated and high-growth industries, foreign firms prefer entry by setting up greenfield operations rather than pursuing acquisitions or joint ventures. However, in industries characterized by high gross profits or higher plant scale, the preference is for joint ventures or acquisitions as an entry mode over greenfield operations.     

International business taxation and the business cash flow tax

Investments and business profits are internationally mobile. Countries respond by tackling international profit shifting. As a result, the international allocation of taxable profits becomes an increasingly complex and costly issue. Reform proposals either address the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development approach to international profit allocation or target tax bases that are less mobile than profits. This paper investigates cash flow as a tax base. A business cash flow tax abolishes current accrual accounting and has the potential to block international profit shifting. Financing vanishes to become a tax-planning tool because the investments’ market return is tax free under a cash flow tax. Profit shifting via intra-group transactions is eliminated if the business cash flow tax is based on the country of destination principle. However, a destination-based business cash flow tax might distort the investment decisions of international groups.     

Business Angel Investment as an Informal Learning Process: Does Experience Matter?

This paper addresses the question of how the informal learning processes of angel investors shape the way in which they assess new investment opportunities. Previous research has suggested that angels learn from their previous investment activity. However, the measurement of investment experience as a function of years of investing and number of investments made does not take into account how, and to what extent, learning occurs and how it impacts investors’ decision-making. To address this deficiency, we suggest a dynamic model of informal learning which incorporates the informal learning typology developed by Schugurensky and extended by Bennett, as a conceptual framework to understand how learning experiences impact angel investment decisions. Based on interviews and verbal protocol analysis with 30 investors, we demonstrate how learning impacts learning processes and outcomes as angels assess an investment opportunity. The findings highlight the importance of supporting angel learning with support for angel groups and angel training programmes.     

Product Launches and Buying Frenzies: A Dynamic Perspective

Buying frenzies caused by a firm's intentional undersupplying of a new product are frequently evident in several industries including electronics (cell phones, video games), luxury automobiles, and fashion goods. We develop a dynamic model of buying frenzies that incorporates the firm's manufacturing and sale of a product over time and characterizes the conditions under which inducing such frenzies is an optimal strategy. We find that buying frenzies occur when customers are sufficiently uncertain about their valuations of the product and when they discount the future sufficiently but not excessively. We propose measures of “customer desperation” and of the extent of scarcity to measure the depth and breadth of buying frenzies, respectively. We also demonstrate that such frenzies can have a significantly positive effect on firm profits and partially recover the loss due to non‐commitment to future prices. This study provides managerial insights on how firms can influence market response to a new product through production, pricing, and inventory decisions to induce profitable frenzies.     

基于临界价格的易变质产品生产企业 RFID技术投资决策

RFID技术可以优化易变质产品的流通速度,降低变质率对该类企业收益的影响。现代市场是开放型的系统,然而当前RFID技术投资成本过高,因此迫切需要研究开放系统下不同成本的易变质产品生产企业投资RFID技术的可行性。本文建立了不同成本易变质产品生产企业未投资RFID技术时的竞争博弈价格模型和合作博弈价格模型,分析了变质产品数量对产品定价的影响,得出竞合模式下保持企业较高收益且对新企业不产生吸引力的临界价格。在临界价格基础上,分析了投资RFID技术对易变质产品生产企业收益的影响,得出企业可承担的最大RFID标签成本,为该类企业RFID技术的投资提供了科学决策的依据。最后,通过数值模拟分析验证了所建立的模型。     

The syndication of venture capital investments

This paper examines competing finance, resource-based and deal flow explanations for the syndication of venture capital investments. Evidence from 60 firms (a 58.8% response rate) is analysed. Overall the finance perspective provides a strong explanation of motives for syndication, but the resource-based view is found to be much more important for those firms involved in at least some early stage transactions. The implications for researchers are that venture capital firms should not be treated as a homogeneous group and that the investment stages in which they operate may strongly influence attitudes towards syndication. In addition, there are implications for practitioners as venture capital firms may not be attributing sufficient attention to the need to augment their own resource base in order to enable them to make superior decisions when selecting deals and managing investments.     

Market Impact on IT Security Spending

Traditionally, IT security investment decisions are made in isolation. However, as firms that compete for customers in an industry are closely interlinked, a macro perspective is needed in analyzing these decisions. We utilize the notions of direct‐ and cross‐risk elasticity to describe the customer response to adverse IT security events in the firm and competitor, respectively, thus allowing us to analyze optimal security investment decisions. Examining both symmetric and asymmetric duopoly cases using a continuous‐time Markov chain (CTMC) model, we demonstrate that optimal IT security spending, expected firm profits and willingness of firms to cooperate on security improvements are highly dependent on the nature of customer response to adverse events. We also examine the investment problem when security attacks on different firms are correlated.     

Delegation,R&;D and competitiveness in a Bertrand duopoly

This paper studies the profitability of centralized investments in R&D versus decentralized price determination in a duopoly for Bertrand consumer markets. As a direct effect, R&D investments lower the firm’s production costs and thus increase c.p. the firm’s profits. However, as an indirect effect, lowering production costs causes market reactions and alters the competition between the firm and its competitors. In the extreme, aggressive competition can occur that diminish an investing firm’s profits. Delegating the price decision using an incentive contract distorts a manager’s perceived costs and induces a virtual cost increase in equilibrium. Trading off the factual cost reduction against a virtual cost increase we find that competition makes strategic delegation more attractive compared to investments in R&D. If firms are allowed to apply both strategies in combination, they concentrate on just one of them for strategic considerations.     

Investment Appraisal and Measures of Performance in Italian Divisionalised Companies

The aim of this study was to describe and analyse the current practice and trends in the development of management control practice as regards divisional investments in large Italian firms, using a survey questionnaire method. Some comparison with top North-American and German international manufacturing units were also made.The findings of the study supported two theoretical propositions. In the identification stage, firms tend to decentralise the process of capital budgeting and the control mechanism ensuring the link between corporate strategic objectives and capital expenditure projects at divisional level is based on guidelines produced by headquarters. In the selection stage firms which perceive a high interface level with the corporate strategic objectives in divisional capital expenditure tend to use discounted cash flow techniques when choosing one or more investment projects. When an economic approach is used to provide a comprehensive measure of performance, the theoretical framework fails to predict the relationship between corporate control and performance evaluation system in divisionalised companies. Essentially, financial control combines non-financial measures, used to understand manufacturing operations, with traditional accounting measures, used to understand the effects of manufacturing activities on the level of operating cash flow and operating income, as a comprehensive measures of performance in the medium-term of divisional investments.