Global supply chain management: The selection of globally competent managers

The ability of organizations to effectively compete in the global marketplace is contingent on identifying and selecting an adequate number of qualified global managers. Nowhere is the shortage of managerial talent more evident than in the management of global supply chains. The complex and vexing set of problems facing global supply chain managers makes the task of selecting an adequate supply of managers much more daunting. Given the historic perspective of manning supply chain positions (i.e., managers with a operation and functional orientation), human resource managers are modifying and updating the profile of the global supply chain manager's position to encompass political, cultural/social, network, and an awareness of the significant differences to be found in global markets. In an effort to develop a criteria for the selection of global supply chain managers, a competency-based theoretical perspective is used and eight intelligences are examined that can be used in the selection of global supply chain managers.     

The Structured Meeting System

The effectiveness of a structured meeting system, incorporating weekly meetings, deadlines and task monitoring was evaluated with four middle managers. The manager/experimenter introduced the system according to a multiple-baseline across-subjects design, and each supervisee improved markedly during intervention on measures of timeliness and productivity. A behavioral analysis suggested that the meeting system changed both the manager's and the supervisees' contingencies, and made the planned consequence of manager approval more contingent on desired supervisee behavior.     

Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield

We consider coordination issues in supply chains where supplier's production process is subject to random yield losses. For a simple supply chain with a single supplier and retailer facing deterministic demand, a pay back contract which has the retailer paying a discount price for the supplier's excess units can provide the right incentive for the supplier to increase his production size and achieve coordination. Building upon this result, we consider coordination issues for two other supply chains: one with competing retailers, the other with stochastic demand. When retailers compete for both demand and supply, they tend to over‐order. We show that a combination of a pay back and revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain, with the pay back mechanism correcting the supplier's under‐producing problem and the revenue sharing mechanism correcting the retailers' over‐ordering problem. When demand is stochastic, we consider a modified pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract under which the retailer agrees to not only purchase the supplier's excess output (beyond the retailer's order), but also share with the supplier a portion of the revenue made from the sales of the excess output. We show that this contract, by giving the supplier additional incentives in the form of revenue share, can achieve coordination.     

Cooperation in the Face of Conflict: Effects of Top Managers’ Trust Beliefs in their Firms’ Major Suppliers

As with any relationships, those between buying firms and their major suppliers are likely to experience situations of conflict. When facing such situations, top managers tend to approach conflict either cooperatively or competitively. However, when and why top managers tend towards cooperation or competition is far from clear. This study proposes a novel link between the theory of cooperation and competition and the discounting principle of attribution theory to argue that it is top managers’ trust beliefs in their firms’ major suppliers that influences their intended approach to conflict. Using survey data from 140 C‐level managers and business owners, the authors develop and test a model that differentiates between two attributional dimensions of trust (competence and goodwill) and the specific relational conditions that influence how these attributions operate. The results indicate that top managers’ trust in their suppliers’ competence and goodwill is, in fact, decisive in determining how they intend to approach conflict. Further, the authors demonstrate that a top manager's trust belief in the supplier's goodwill is of particular relevance in driving the top manager to cooperate in the face of conflict. However, this link seems to be contingent on the specific conditions of the buyer–supplier relationship in question.     

Relative Performance Evaluation and Risk Taking in Delegated Investment Decisions*

Providing proper incentives to firm managers is increasingly important in the current competitive environment. Analytical research has suggested that evaluating a manager's performance relative to that of a peer group, in conjunction with standard-based pay, can induce efficient risk-sharing between firm owners and managers while maintaining the latter's incentives to exert effort. To date, direct empirical tests of this proposition have not been reported. This study uses a laboratory experiment to test the effect of relative performance evaluation on the risk-aversion of delegated investment decisions. Project-specific risk is operationalized using operating leverage, in part because the variability of a project's operating profits generally increases with this variable, and in part because many of the new manufacturing approaches held to be important to competitive advantage require significant capital investments and attendant increases in operating leverage. Across two levels of environmental uncertainty, subjects under a relative (as opposed to absolute) performance standard selected investments with significantly higher project-specific risk. Also, as environmental uncertainty increased, subjects under an absolute standard significantly reduced the riskiness of their investments. In contrast, subjects shielded from environmental uncertainty by a relative standard chose investments of about equal riskiness under both low and high uncertainty conditions. If supported by future research, these findings would suggest that relative performance evaluation may reduce managers' reluctance to adopt risky capital investments, especially in firms operating in high-risk economic or technological environments.     

Putting the “psychic” Back in Psychic Distance: Awareness,Perceptions, and Understanding as Dimensions of Psychic Distance

Unlike the IB literature whose emphasis within the term ‘psychic distance’ has been more on “distance” and less on “psychic,” our starting point is all “psychic” and no “distance,” assuming distance is defined as the difference between two countries. We propose that psychic distance be centered on the firm's managers and explain how their cognitive limitations, perceptions, heuristics, and experiences interact with a foreign environment to influence their decision making. We replace the conventional definition of distance with the cognitive dimensions of managerial awareness, perceptions, and understanding. Awareness captures the manager's consciousness of foreign context elements relevant to the firm's decision, perception is the manager's interpretation of the extent of these relevant environmental elements, and a manager's understanding captures the relationships among these context elements and the firm's decision. We argue that a multidimensional psychic distance construct is necessary as many of distance's problems are due to the illusion it promises of capturing a manager's perception of a complex foreign environment in a single number. Our approach eliminates distance's problems of symmetry and linearity. It also eliminates the constraint that distance is only associated with negative outcomes. After explaining the theoretical value of awareness, perception, and understanding by developing propositions predicting context traps, we present our operationalization of psychic distance.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Perceptions of facial dominance,trustworthiness and attractiveness predict managerial pay awards in experimental tasks

Positive associations between physical attractiveness and employee reward are well-documented within the organisational literature. Although the impact of facial cues to trustworthiness and dominance on a number of social outcomes has been established outside of the workplace, the extent to which they, in addition to attractiveness, affect pay at different managerial levels is yet to be investigated. This paper presents research into this issue using a face payment task for shop floor managers (Retail Managers) and senior managers (Heads of Retail Operations). Evaluations indicated that all three facial cues were positively associated with awarded pay at both managerial levels. Moreover, attractiveness had a significantly stronger link with shop-floor managers' than senior managers' pay, whereas perceived trustworthiness and perceived dominance had significantly stronger links with pay for senior managers than shop-floor managers. It further emerged that women were paid more in this experimental task where pay was awarded solely based on facial features and that the facial features were more predictive of women's than men's pay. Awareness of the role of physical cues in pay awards can be considered by organisations to reduce biases in remuneration.     

MANAGERIAL HEDGING AND PORTFOLIO MONITORING

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his compensation using financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is costly. We find that the optimal incentive compensation and governance provisions have the following properties: (i) the manager's portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the manager's compensation is more sensitive to firm performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm's performance, the manager's compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. Moreover, the model suggests that the optimal level of portfolio monitoring is higher for managers of firms whose performance canbehedged more easily, such as larger firms and firms in more developed financial markets. (JEL: G30, D82)     

基于决策者风险规避特性的供应链需求信息共享价值分析

在随机需求条件下,利用条件风险估值(conditional value-at-risk,CVaR)的风险度量准则建立了供应链的需求信息共享决策模型,着重分析了零售商的风险规避程度以及市场需求的不确定性信息对供应链各决策者以及供应链整体信息共享价值的影响。研究结果表明,需求信息共享价值与零售商的风险规避程度、市场不确定性大小以及市场不确定信息所预测的市场需求变化情况有关。数值分析结果表明,零售商越害怕市场的不确定性风险,需求信息共享越有利于提升分散供应链的运作效率;但当市场信息反映出未来的市场需求是消极且零售商接近风险中性时,供应链的需求信息共享价值反而小于零,此时没有进行信息共享的必要。     

Perception and control of occupational injury risks in fishery--a pilot study

The frequency of occupational accidents in fishery is high in most fishery nations. Implementation of safety measures has, however, been limited. The purpose of the present cross-sectional study was to explore Swedish fishermen's attitudes towards occupational risks and accident control. Information was acquired through a questionnaire distributed to a convenience sample of 92 fishermen. Indices were built, containing variables relevant to perceived risk levels in connection with work, perceived manageability of risks, activity in safety work, technical knowledge and individual attitudes towards risks. The results did not support earlier findings of low risk awareness and risk acceptance among fishermen. Perceived manageability of risks but not perceived risk level, accident experience or risk acceptance, were significantly associated with activity in safety work. The results suggest that safety work might benefit from efforts to develop fishermen's understanding of how the development of hazardous situations can be prevented or managed. The results do not support strategies for accident control in fishery based solely on increasing risk awareness.     

Supplier Behavior in Capacity Investment Competition: An Experimental Study

Many manufacturers ensure supply capacity by using more than one supplier and sharing their capacity investment costs via supplier development programs. Their suppliers face competitive pressure from peers despite the reduced capacity investment cost. Although standard game theory makes clear prediction that cost sharing increases the suppliers' capacity choice and supply chain profit, the complex decision environment of capacity competition makes it interesting to test whether the theory predictions are robust and, if not, whether systematic deviations occur. We present a laboratory experiment study. The experiment data show that supplier subjects invested in higher capacities than what our theoretical analysis predicted, resulting in profit loss for the supply chain. Our econometric analysis indicates that the subjects are bounded rational and their concern for relative standing may be the potential driver of capacity over‐investment. Based on the experimental findings, we study a modified cost‐sharing mechanism that adapts to the behavioral biases. Its performance is validated in a second experiment.     

Joint supplier selection and scheduling of customer orders under disruption risks: Single vs. dual sourcing

This paper presents a stochastic mixed integer programming approach to integrated supplier selection and customer order scheduling in the presence of supply chain disruption risks, for a single or dual sourcing strategy. The suppliers are assumed to be located in two different geographical regions: in the producer's region (domestic suppliers) and outside the producer's region (foreign suppliers). The supplies are subject to independent random local disruptions that are uniquely associated with a particular supplier and to random semi-global (regional) disruptions that may result in disruption of all suppliers in the same geographical region simultaneously. The domestic suppliers are relatively reliable but more expensive, while the foreign suppliers offer competitive prices, however material flows from these suppliers are more exposed to unexpected disruptions. Given a set of customer orders for products, the decision maker needs to decide which single supplier or which two different suppliers, one from each region, to select for purchasing parts required to complete the customer orders and how to schedule the orders over the planning horizon, to mitigate the impact of disruption risks. The problem objective is either to minimize total cost or to maximize customer service level. The obtained combinatorial stochastic optimization problem will be formulated as a mixed integer program with conditional value-at-risk as a risk measure. The risk-neutral and risk-averse solutions that optimize, respectively average and worst-case performance of a supply chain are compared for a single and dual sourcing strategy and for the two different objective functions. Numerical examples and computational results are presented and some managerial insights on the choice between the two sourcing strategies are reported.     

Quality Testing and Product Rationing by Input Suppliers

Quality testing by suppliers has significant ramifications for downstream supply chain participants and retail consumers. This article focuses on such implications accounting for the fact that suppliers often enjoy discretion in quality testing and reporting. Under a discretionary testing and reporting environment, we show that a supplier can improve the market's perception of product quality by engaging in self‐imposed production cuts. Production cuts dampen supplier incentives to engage in excessive quality testing, putting the supplier and the market on a more equal information footing. This reduces the market's need to skeptically discount product quality to protect itself. The improved market perception, then, reduces quality testing demand, introducing cost savings. The result that costly production cuts can improve quality perceptions indicates that the groundwork for influencing market perceptions may have to be laid upfront, even prior to acquiring private information, providing a contrast to routine signaling models.     

Configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty

In this paper, we study a buyer׳s configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty. His main supplier׳s production process is uncertain, and he can either choose pricing flexibility (setting prices depending on the available supply) or operational flexibility (requesting a contingent order from a backup supplier). As the buyer may or may not find a suitable contingent supplier ex post, we study two scenarios that the backup supplier׳s supply is infinite, and that this supply is random. We also include the factor that the main supplier may determine the wholesale price. We demonstrate that the adoption of flexibility strategies is controlled by threshold policies in different scenarios whether the main supplier determines the wholesale price or not. We also investigate how the buyer׳s attribute (finding a suitable contingent supplier) affects the configuration of flexibility strategies.     

Supply Contract Design for Competing Heterogeneous Suppliers under Asymmetric Information

This study considers a supply chain with two heterogeneous suppliers and a common retailer whose type is either low‐volume or high‐volume. The retailer's type is unknown to the suppliers. The flexible supplier has a high variable cost and a low fixed cost, while the efficient supplier has a low variable cost and a high fixed cost. Each supplier offers the retailer a menu of contracts. The retailer chooses the contract that maximizes its expected profit. For this setting, we characterize the equilibrium contract menus offered by the suppliers to the retailer. We find that the equilibrium contract menus depend on which supplier–retailer match can generate the highest supply chain profit and on how much information rent the supplier may need to pay. An important feature of the equilibrium contract menus is that the contract assigned to the more profitable retailer will coordinate the supply chain, while the contract assigned to the less profitable retailer may not. In addition, in some circumstances, the flexible supplier may choose not to serve the high‐volume retailer, in order to avoid excessive information rent.     

Push and Pull Contracts in a Local Supply Chain with an Outside Market*

Wholesale price contracts are widely studied in a single supplier‐single retailer supply chain, but without considering an outside market where the supplier may sell if he gets a high enough price and the retailer may buy if the price is low enough. We fill this gap in the literature by studying push and pull contracts in a local supplier–retailer supply chain with the presence of an outside market. Taking the local supplier's maximum production capacity and the outside market barriers into account, we identify the Pareto set of the push and/or pull contracts and draw managerial implications. The main results include the following. First, the most inefficient point of the pull Pareto set cannot always be removed by considering both the push and pull contracts. Second, the supplier's production capacity plays a significant role in the presence of an outside market; it affects the supplier's negotiating power with the retailer and the coordination of the supply chain can be accomplished only with a large enough capacity. Third, the import and export barriers influence the supply chain significantly: (i) an export barrier in the local market and the supplier's production capacity influence the supplier's export strategy; (ii) a low import (resp., export) barrier in the local market can improve the local supply chain's efficiency by use of a push (resp., pull) contract; and (iii) a high import (resp., export) barrier in the local market encourages the supplier (resp., retailer) to bear more inventory risk.     

Willingness to Pay for Shifting Inventory Risk: The Role of Contractual Form

In order to reduce their inventory risk, firms can attempt to contract with their suppliers for shorter supply lead‐times, with their buyers for longer demand lead‐times, or both. We designed a controlled laboratory experiment to study contracts that shift a focal firm's inventory risk to its supply chain partners and address two questions. First, is it more effective if the cost of shifting inventory risk is framed as a fixed fee or in per‐unit cost terms? We find that, generally, our participants are willing to pay more to avoid supply–demand mismatches than the expected costs from such mismatches. This tendency to overpay is mitigated under fixed fee schemes. Second, does it matter whether the option to reduce inventory risk is the outcome of either increased responsiveness from the upstream supplier or advanced demand information from the downstream buyer? Our results suggest that this difference, when only a matter of framing, has no significant effect on willingness‐to‐pay.     

Toward Computerizing a Causal Modeling Approach to Strategic Problem Framing*

This paper proposes an object-oriented approach to the development of interactive software for the purpose of managerial problem solving. A prototype is being developed using CSM causal mapping to represent each manager's perceptions of the relationships between key variables of a firm's strategic situation. This paper suggests the design of GDSS that would enable a group of managers to discuss, learn from each other, and possibly develop consensus about decisions or their causes. Issues involving future development are discussed.     

Sharing inventory risk in supply chain: The implication of financial constraint

A supply chain may operate under either preorder mode, consignment mode or the combination of these two modes. Under preorder, the retailer procures before the sale and takes full inventory risk during the sale, while under consignment, the retailer sells the product for the supplier with the supplier taking the inventory risk. The combination mode shares the risk in the supply chain. The existing research has examined the supply chain modes from various operational aspects. However, the impact of financial constraint is neglected. This paper examines the impact of financial constraint and investigates the supply chain efficiency under each mode. Based on a Stackelberg game with the supplier being the leader, we show that without financial constraint the supplier always prefers the consignment mode, taking full inventory risk. Whereas, in the presence of financial constraint, the supplier will sell part of the inventory to the retailer through preorder, which shares the inventory risk in the supply chain. We show that with financial constraint, the combination mode is the most efficient mode even if the retailer earns zero internal capital.