How Responsive Is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Redistributive Policies and in Returns?

This paper uses an unusual pay reform to test the responsiveness of investment in schooling to changes in redistribution schemes that increase the rate of return to education. We exploit an episode where different Israeli kibbutzim shifted from equal sharing to productivity‐based wages in different years and find that students in kibbutzim that reformed earlier invested more in high school education and, in the long run, also in post‐secondary schooling. We further show that the effect is mainly driven by students in kibbutzim that reformed to a larger degree. Our findings support the prediction that education is highly responsive to changes in the redistribution policy.     

CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES?

This paper uses a novel approach to infer hospital technical quality from revealed preferences over residency programs. Specifically, we use Spanish medical graduates’ residency choices made from 1995 to 2000. We start by estimating a model of medical graduates preferences that controls for hospital, proximity, specialty, and gender effects. We interpret the coefficients on the hospital dummy variables as measures of medical graduates’ preferences over hospitals. Our results show that graduates do indeed discriminate between hospitals and that their preferences correlate with hospital‐specific covariates arguably related to hospital training quality. We then show that preferences from medical graduates are positively and statistically significantly correlated with risk‐adjusted hospital rankings based on five alternative outcome measures. Finally, we construct reputation scores for each hospital using news story counts in three media outlets and find that medical graduates’ preferences are especially valuable for inference of hospital technical quality of care as they do not simply reflect well known reputation.     

EXTERNALITIES IN PROGRAM EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF A WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT PROGRAM ON IMMUNIZATION

Impact evaluations of development programs usually do not explicitly take into account externalities on non‐participants. Based on a unique dataset we estimate the direct as well as the spillover effects of Mahila Samakhya, a women's empowerment program in India, on child immunization. The survey covers both participants and non‐participants in program villages, as well as respondents in control villages. We account for participation selection bias using instrumental variables. We propose a direct test for the exclusion restriction using the control villages. We find both direct effects on the immunization rates of participants’ children and significant spillovers on immunization rates of non‐participants’ children. The impact of interventions might be substantially underestimated if such external effects were not taken into account. Alternative estimation methods such as propensity score matching and a regression discontinuity approach yield comparable results.     

MISBEHAVIOR,EDUCATION, AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

Using data on young men from the National Education Longitudinal Survey, this paper investigates the relationship between childhood misbehavior and later education and labor market outcomes. The main finding is that eighth‐grade misbehavior is important for earnings over and above eighth‐grade test scores. Moreover, controlling for educational attainment, childhood misbehavior is associated with earnings at all educational levels, whereas achievement test scores are related to earnings only for young men with postsecondary degrees. Possible explanations for the association between eighth‐grade misbehavior and economic success are explored.     

EFFICIENT TUITION FEES AND EXAMINATIONS

We assume that students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability and that universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. If the university observes a private signal of each student's ability, which is soft information, then asymmetries of information are two‐sided, and the optimal admission policy involves a mix of pricing and pre‐entry selection, based on the university's private information. In contrast, if all test results are public knowledge, then there is no sorting on the basis of test scores: Tuition alone does the job of implementing an optimal degree of student self‐selection. These results do not depend on the existence of peer effects. The optimal tuition follows a classic marginal social‐cost pricing rule. (JEL: D82, H42, I22, J24)     

Who Chooses Which Private Education? Theory and International Evidence

Private school students do not always perform better in standardized tests. We suggest that this may be explained by choice of private schooling by less capable students in countries where government schools are better suited to talented students. To assess the empirical relevance of this mechanism, we exploit cross‐country variation in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 survey of differences between private and state school regarding organizational features that are differently suitable for students with different learning ability. We seek and find evidence of this mechanism's empirical relevance in controlled regressions that treat within‐country variation of PISA scores as an indicator of unobserved ability to learn.     

CLASS SIZE AND CLASS HETEROGENEITY

We study how class size and class composition affect the academic and labor market performance of college students, two crucial policy questions given the secular increase in college enrollment. Our identification strategy relies on the random assignment of students to teaching classes. We find that a one standard deviation increase in class‐size results in a 0.1 standard deviation deterioration of the average grade. Further, the effect is heterogeneous as it is stronger for males and lower income students. Also, the effects of class composition in terms of gender and ability appear to be inverse U‐shaped. Finally, a reduction of 20 students (one standard deviation) in one’s class size has a positive effect on monthly wages of about €80 ($115) or 6% over the average.     

RANKING THE SCHOOLS: HOW SCHOOL‐QUALITY INFORMATION AFFECTS SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE NETHERLANDS

This paper analyzes whether information about the quality of high schools published in a national newspaper affects school choice in the Netherlands. We find that negative (positive) school‐quality scores decrease (increase) the number of first‐year students who choose a school after the year of publication. These effects are only large for the college‐preparatory track, such that a school receiving the most positive score for its most academic track sees 16–18 more first‐year students enroll. We find that parents respond to the most recent and most prominently displayed information. The effects of information about school quality do not seem to be greater in regions with larger relevant newspaper circulation, suggesting that direct exposure to news about school quality does not explain the response to this information.     

Redistribution Through Education and Other Mechanisms Under Capital‐Market Imperfections and Uncertainty: A Welfare Effect Analysis

Abstract. This paper considers a two‐period model of endogenous human capital formation under the credits‐market imperfection and uncertainty assumptions. We compare in the first part of the paper ex‐ante and ex‐post general‐equilibrium effects of the education subsidy policy to those of the negative income tax and the unskilled wage subsidy regimes. We show that the education subsidy policy raises an efficiency‐inequality trade‐off issue, and therefore it is optimal unless the degree of inequality aversion is relatively high and financing the subsidy is not too distorsive. Public loans are generally claimed to provide a solution for such issue. We explore the implications of implementing the public loan under several schemes in the second part of the paper. We show that combining between a pure public loan and education subsidies provides higher levels of welfare than these two policies taken separately provided that the inequality aversion degree is high. For low degrees of inequality aversion, the pure public loan is the optimal policy.     

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.     

Skill Acquisition in the Informal Economy and Schooling Decisions: Evidence from Emerging Economies

Informal jobs offer skill acquisition opportunities that may facilitate a future switch to formal employment for young workers. In this sense, informal training on the job may be a viable alternative to formal schooling in an economy with a large and diverse informal sector. In this paper, I investigate if these considerations are relevant for the schooling decisions of young individuals using panel data for 17 Latin American countries and micro‐level data for Turkey. Specifically, I ask if the prevalence of informal jobs distorts schooling attainment. I concentrate on three measures of schooling outcomes: (1) secondary education enrollment rate; (2) out‐of‐school rate for lower secondary school; and (3) tertiary education graduation rate. I find that the secondary education enrollment rate is negatively correlated with the size of the informal economy, whereas the out‐of‐school rate is positively correlated. Moreover, the tertiary education graduation rates tend to fall as the informal employment opportunities increase. This means that informal training on the job may be crowding out school education in developing countries. Policies that can potentially affect the size of the informal sector should take into consideration these second‐round effects on aggregate schooling outcomes.     

Sustaining the Buyout Governance Model: Inside Secondary Management Buyout Boards

This paper examines the impact of private equity (PE) directors and their human capital on operating performance in a unique hand‐collected sample of 200 secondary management buyouts (SMBOs) during 2000–2015. It shows that PE directors’ human capital tends to play a statistically and economically important role in performance. Financial (rather than operational) experience of PE directors in acquiring PE firms tends to have a substantial impact on post‐SMBO profitability, while high‐level business education is especially important in post‐SMBO growth performance enhancement. Complementary expertise, provided by directors in buying and selling PE firms, plays an important role only in post‐SMBO growth improvements. Overall, the paper's results provide evidence that governance benefits of the buyout model tend not to be exhausted in the primary buyout stage, but the effects in the secondary buyout phase depend on the nature of PE directors’ human capital resource, notably in respect of the balance between board monitoring and advisory roles. This study therefore adds to growing evidence on how the ownership and life‐cycle nature of firms affect sustainability of boards fulfilling their roles. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different types of PE firms and different measures of human capital.     

IMMIGRATION,WAGES, AND COMPOSITIONAL AMENITIES

There is strong public opposition to increased immigration throughout Europe. Given the modest economic impacts of immigration estimated in most studies, the depth of anti‐immigrant sentiment is puzzling. Immigration, however, does not just affect wages and taxes. It also changes the composition of the local population, threatening the compositional amenities that natives derive from their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. In this paper we use a simple latent‐factor model, combined with data for 21 countries from the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), to measure the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in driving opinions about immigration policy. The ESS included a unique battery of questions on the labor market and social impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing or reducing immigrant inflows. We find that compositional concerns are 2–5 times more important in explaining variation in individual attitudes toward immigration policy than concerns over wages and taxes. Likewise, most of the difference in opinion between more‐ and less‐educated respondents is attributable to heightened compositional concerns among people with lower education.     

LIQUIDITY AND INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT

We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the nonpledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over‐hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex‐ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex‐post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex‐ante perspective. The model throws light on the holding of foreign reserves in international markets.     

Competing on Time: An Integrated Framework to Optimize Dynamic Time‐to‐Market and Production Decisions

This study develops a comprehensive framework to optimize new product introduction timing and subsequent production decisions faced by a component supplier. Prior to market entry, the supplier performs process design activities, which improve manufacturing yield and the chances of getting qualified for the customer's product. However, a long delay in market entry allows competitors to enter the market and pass the customer's qualification process before the supplier, reducing the supplier's share of the customer's business. After entering the market and if qualified, the supplier also needs to decide how much to produce for a finite planning horizon by considering several factors such as manufacturing yield and stochastic demand, both of which depend on the earlier time‐to‐market decision. To capture this dependency, we develop a sequential, nested, two‐stage decision framework to optimize the time‐to‐market and production decisions in relation to each other. We show that the supplier's optimal market entry and qualification timing decision need to be revised in real time based on the number of qualified competitors at the time of market‐entry decision. We establish the optimality of a threshold policy. Following this policy, at the beginning of each decision epoch, the supplier should optimally stop preparing for qualification and decide whether to enter the market if her order among qualified competitors exceeds a predetermined threshold. We also prove that the supplier's optimal production policy is a state‐dependent, base‐stock policy, which depends on the time‐to‐market and qualification decisions. The proposed framework also enables a firm to quantify how market conditions (such as price and competitor entry behavior) and operating conditions (such as the rate of learning and inventory/production‐related costs) affect time‐to‐market strategy and post‐entry production decisions.     

Inventory Management for Customers with Alternative Lead Times

It is common for suppliers operating in batch‐production mode to deal with patient and impatient customers. This paper considers inventory models in which a supplier provides alternative lead times to its customers: a short or a long lead time. Orders from patient customers can be taken by the supplier and included in the next production cycle, while orders from impatient customers have to be satisfied from the on‐hand inventory. We denote the action to commit one unit of on‐hand inventory to patient or impatient customers as the inventory‐commitment decision, and the initial inventory stocking as the inventory‐replenishment decision. We first characterize the optimal inventory‐commitment policy as a threshold type, and then prove that the optimal inventory‐replenishment policy is a base‐stock type. Then, we extend our analysis to models to consider cases of a multi‐cycle setting, a supply‐capacity constraint, and the on‐line charged inventory‐holding cost. We also evaluate and compare the performances of the optimal inventory‐commitment policy and the inventory‐rationing policy. Finally, to further investigate the benefits and pitfalls of introducing an alternative lead‐time choice, we use the customer‐choice model to study the demand gains and losses, known as demand‐induction and demand‐cannibalization effects, respectively.     

A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities

We propose a theory of monetary policy and macroprudential interventions in financial markets. We focus on economies with nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets and subject to constraints on monetary policy, such as the zero lower bound or fixed exchange rates. We identify an aggregate demand externality that can be corrected by macroprudential interventions in financial markets. Ex post, the distribution of wealth across agents affects aggregate demand and output. Ex ante, however, these effects are not internalized in private financial decisions. We provide a simple formula for the required financial interventions that depends on a small number of measurable sufficient statistics. We also characterize optimal monetary policy. We extend our framework to incorporate pecuniary externalities, providing a unified approach to both externalities. Finally, we provide a number of applications which illustrate the relevance of our theory.     

EFFECTS OF RANDOM SHIFTS OF TESTING EQUIPMENT ON PROCESS CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN AND SELECTION OF PROCESS CONTROL POLICIES*

This paper studies issues associated with designing process control systems when the testing equipment is subjected to random shifts. We consider a production process with two states: in control and out of control. The process may shift randomly to the out‐of‐control state over time. The process is monitored by periodically sampling finished items from the process. The equipment used to test sampled items also is assumed to have two states and may shift randomly during the testing process. We formulate a cost model for finding the optimal process control policy that minimizes the expected unit time cost. Numerical results show that shifts of the testing equipment may significantly affect the performance of a process control policy. We also studied the effects of the testing equipment's shifts on the selection of process control policies.     

WHO IS ‘BEHAVIORAL’? COGNITIVE ABILITY AND ANOMALOUS PREFERENCES

In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high‐school students with similar schooling backgrounds shows that small‐stakes risk aversion and short‐run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores. The relationship with test scores survives controls for parental education and wealth. We find some evidence that elementary‐school GPA is predictive of preferences measured at the end of high school. Two laboratory interventions provide suggestive evidence of a possible causal impact of cognitive resources on expressed preferences.     

Improving the Milk Supply Chain in Developing Countries: Analysis,Insights, and Recommendations

Quality issues in milk—arising primarily from deliberate adulteration by producers—have been reported in several developing countries. In the milk supply chain, a station buys raw milk from a number of producers, mixes the milk and sells it to a firm (that then sells the processed milk to end consumers). We study a non‐cooperative game between a station and a population of producers. Apart from penalties on proven low‐quality producers, two types of incentives are analyzed: confessor rewards for low‐quality producers who confess and quality rewards for producers of high‐quality milk. Contrary to our expectations, whereas (small) confessor rewards can help increase both the quality of milk and the station's profit, quality rewards can be detrimental. We examine two structures based on the ordering of individual and mixed testing of milk: pre‐mixed individual testing (first test a fraction of producers individually and then [possibly] perform a mixed test on the remaining producers) and post‐mixed individual testing (first test the mixed milk from all producers and then test a fraction of producers individually). Whereas pre‐mixed individual testing can be socially harmful, a combination of post‐mixed individual testing and other incentives achieves a desirable outcome: all producers supply high‐quality milk with only one mixed test and no further testing by the station.