Low‐wage Jobs — Springboard to High‐paid Ones?

We examine whether low‐paid jobs have an effect on the probability that unemployed persons obtain better‐paid jobs in the future (springboard effect). We make use of data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and apply a dynamic random effects bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that low‐wage jobs can act as springboards to better‐paid work. The improvement of the chance to obtain a high‐wage job by accepting low‐paid work is particularly large for less‐skilled persons and for individuals who experienced longer periods of unemployment. Low‐paid work is less beneficial if the job is associated with a low social status.     

Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous‐Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?

This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous‐agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model that yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates. Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.     

How Portable Is Level‐0 Behavior? A Test of Level‐k Theory in Games With Non‐Neutral Frames

We test the portability of level‐0 assumptions in level‐k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non‐neutral frames. Assuming that level‐0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level‐k models to Hide and Seek data. We show that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that replicates the main patterns in these data has a high probability of false positives.     

Is It Always Worth Waiting? The Effect of Autonomy‐supportive Teaching on Short‐term and Long‐term Learning Outcomes

Autonomy is known for its positive effects and its use in management practice. Recently an urgent debate has emerged on its drawbacks on individual outcomes. In this study, we investigate and test a model on the effect on individual learning of an autonomy‐supportive teaching style and its interplay with the learner's previous experience and perceived management support. Specifically, while research has emphasized the positive effect of similar contexts, this study focuses on its differential effect on short‐term and long‐term learning outcomes, challenging the traditional view of autonomy. We also explore how job experience and management support can improve the effects of autonomy on individual learning. We test our model by collecting longitudinal data on a sample of 200 individuals participating in a training programme on managerial skills. Our results show that (1) the extent to which teachers were perceived as autonomy‐supportive presents a linear relationship with short‐term learning outcomes (utility reactions) and a positive curvilinear relationship with training transfer in the long term; (2) learner job experience and perceived management support for learning have a positive moderating effect on the linear relationship between autonomy and learning outcomes.     

Potential Pitfalls for the Purchasing‐Power‐Parity Puzzle? Sampling and Specification Biases in Mean‐Reversion Tests of the Law of One Price

The PPP puzzle is based on empirical evidence that international price differences for individual goods (LOOP) or baskets of goods (PPP) appear highly persistent or even nonstationary. The present consensus is these price differences have a half‐life that is of the order of five years at best, and infinity at worst. This seems unreasonable in a world where transportation and transaction costs appear so low as to encourage arbitrage and the convergence of price gaps over much shorter horizons, typically days or weeks. However, current empirics rely on a particular choice of methodology, involving (i) relatively low‐frequency monthly, quarterly, or annual data, and (ii) a linear model specification. In fact, these methodological choices are not innocent, and they can be shown to bias analysis towards findings of slow convergence and a random walk. Intuitively, if we suspect that the actual adjustment horizon is of the order of days, then monthly and annual data cannot be expected to reveal it. If we suspect arbitrage costs are high enough to produce a substantial “band of inaction,” then a linear model will fail to support convergence if the process spends considerable time random‐walking in that band. Thus, when testing for PPP or LOOP, model specification and data sampling should not proceed without consideration of the actual institutional context and logistical framework of markets.     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

DOES THE BETTER‐THAN‐AVERAGE EFFECT SHOW THAT PEOPLE ARE OVERCONFIDENT?: TWO EXPERIMENTS

We conduct two experimental tests of the claim that people are overconfident, using new tests of overplacement that are based on a formal Bayesian model. Our two experiments, on easy quizzes, find that people overplace themselves. More precisely, we find apparently overconfident data that cannot be accounted for by a rational population of expected utility maximizers who care only about money. The finding represents new evidence of overconfidence that is robust to the Bayesian critique offered by Benoît and Dubra (Jean‐Pierre Benoît and Juan Dubra (2011). “Apparent Overconfidence.” Econometrica, 79, 1591–1625). We discuss possible limitations of our results.     

When Do Multinational Companies Consider Corporate Social Responsibility? A Multi‐country Study in Sub‐Saharan Africa

While African countries are becoming more and more relevant as host countries for suppliers of multinational companies little is known about corporate social responsibility (CSR) in this region. To fill this gap, the present article explores CSR considerations of foreign affiliates of multinational companies when choosing local African suppliers. The article suggests a model of three types of determinants, namely firm characteristics, exports, and intra‐trade. Analyses of a large‐scale and quite unique firm level data for more than 2,000 foreign owned firms in 19 sub‐Saharan African countries demonstrate that firms importing intermediates from their parent company abroad are more likely to implement CSR. Similarly, CSR plays a larger role for affiliates that export to developed countries. Different determinants affect environmental and social CSR activities.     

Does Formal Education for Older Workers Increase Earnings? — Evidence Based on Rich Data and Long‐term Follow‐up

Governments in Europe, Canada and the USA have expressed an ambition to stimulate education of older. In this paper, we analyse if there are effects on annual earnings of formal education for participants aged 42–55 at the time of enrolment in 1994–95. The analysis explores longitudinal population register data stretching from 1982 to 2007. The method used is difference‐in‐differences propensity score matching based on a rich set of covariates, including indicators of health and labor market marginalization. Our findings underline the importance of long follow up periods and imply positive effects for women, especially so for women with children, and no significant average earnings effects for men. These results differ from earlier studies but are stable to several alternative assumptions regarding unobservable characteristics. Data further indicate that the gender gap in our estimates may stem from differences in underlying reasons for enrolment.     

Are Self‐Service Customers Satisfied or Stuck?

This paper investigates the impact of self‐service technology (SST) usage on customer satisfaction and retention. Specifically, we disentangle the distinct effects of satisfaction and switching costs as drivers of retention among self‐service customers. Our empirical analysis examines 26,924 multi‐channel customers of a nationwide retail bank. We track each customer's channel usage, overall satisfaction, and retention over a 1‐year period. We find that, relative to face‐to‐face service, customers who use self‐service channels for a greater proportion of their transactions are either no more satisfied, or less satisfied with the service they receive, depending on the channel. However, we also find that these same customers are predictably less likely to defect to a competitor if they are heavily reliant on self‐service channels characterized by high switching costs. Through a mediation model, we demonstrate that, when self‐service usage promotes retention, it does so in a way that is consistent with switching costs. As a robustness check, we examine the behavior of channel enthusiasts, who concentrate transactions among specific channels. Relative to more diversified customers, we find that self‐service enthusiasts in low switching cost channels defect with greater frequency, while self‐service enthusiasts in high switching cost channels are retained with greater frequency.     

CAN LONG‐RUN RESTRICTIONS IDENTIFY TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS?

Galí's innovative approach of imposing long‐run restrictions on a vector autoregression (VAR) to identify the effects of a technology shock has become widely utilized. In this paper, we investigate its reliability through Monte Carlo simulations using calibrated business cycle models. Overall, Galí's methodology appears to be fruitful: the impulse responses derived from the artificial data generally have the same sign and qualitative pattern as the true responses, and the approach can be informative in discriminating between alternative models. However, our results reveal some important quantitative shortcomings, including considerable estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables. More generally, the conditions under which the methodology performs well appear considerably more restrictive than implied by the key identifying assumption. This underscores the importance of using economic models to guide in the implementation of the approach, in interpreting the results, and in assessing its limitations. (JEL: C32, E32, O33)     

固基础·促转变·惠民生-2010＇中国经济社会发展路径

新世纪以来经济最困难的2009年已经过去,2010年既是夯实复苏基础的调整之年,又是实现可持续发展的关键之年,同时也是中国与世界发展进一步融合的一年。     

Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?

Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. Results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effects are indeed present in the data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare‐state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events appears highly institution‐dependent, as does the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.     

Is Wage Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Unions’ Wage Policy?The Case of Imperfect Product Markets

Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions organized at firm level want to coordinate their bargaining activities. If for some exogenous reasons centralization is not possible, unions could try to coordinate wage setting by wage leadership. The outcome of such wage leadership is compared with that of an uncoordinated bargaining and is characterized by higher utilities for all unions. But wages and employment levels are not symmetrical either for unions or for firms. The leader firm employment decreases and the follower firm employment rises compared with uncoordinated bargaining. This may cause problems with the implementation of wage leadership.     

Level‐k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private‐Value Auctions?

This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete‐information games based on “level‐k” thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete‐information games. We derive the model's implications in first‐ and second‐price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) “cursed equilibrium,” and evaluate the model's potential to explain nonequilibrium bidding in auction experiments. The level‐k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common‐value auctions and overbidding in those independent‐private‐value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.     

What Number is “Fifty‐Fifty”?: Redistributing Excessive 50% Responses in Elicited Probabilities

Studies using open-ended response modes to elicit probabilistic beliefs have sometimes found an elevated frequency (or blip) at 50 in their response distributions. Our previous research suggests that this is caused by intrusion of the phrase "fifty-fifty," which represents epistemic uncertainty, rather than a true numeric probability of 50%. Such inappropriate responses pose a problem for decision analysts and others relying on probabilistic judgments. Using an explicit numeric probability scale (ranging from 0-100%) reduces thinking about uncertain events in verbal terms like "fifty-fifty," and, with it, exaggerated use of the 50 response. Here, we present two procedures for adjusting response distributions for data already collected with open-ended response modes and hence vulnerable to an exaggerated presence of 50%. Each procedure infers the prevalence of 50s had a numeric probability scale been used, then redistributes the excess. The two procedures are validated on some of our own existing data and then applied to judgments elicited from experts in groundwater pollution and bioremediation.     

How Selective Are Real Wage Cuts? A Micro‐analysis Using Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using linked employer–employee panel data for Germany, we investigate whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider–outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective wage cuts with high‐productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent differences in firms' wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council.     

DO PARTIES MATTER FOR ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? A REGRESSION‐DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

A long‐standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This article uses a regression‐discontinuity design, namely, party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote share, which can produce “near” experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes. The method is applied to a large panel data set from Swedish local governments with a number of attractive features. The results show that there is an economically significant party effect: Left‐wing governments spend and tax 2–3% more than right‐wing governments. Left‐wing governments also have 7%lower unemployment rates, which is partly due to that left‐wing governments employ 4% more workers than right‐wing governments. (JEL: C21, D72, D78, H71, H72)