The impact of legislator and constituency ideology on voting on the assault weapons ban

Using variables that represent a legislator's entire legal constituency, previous research by social scientists has concluded that views of the legislator's constituency have little effect on how legislators vote. This question is reexamined by defining constituency as those voters most likely to vote for the legislator (i.e., members of the legislator's own political party and independents). Furthermore, instead of measuring constituency by either a demographic or vote-based measure, a survey measure of the ideological identification of voters (i.e., the voter's self-identification as liberal, moderate, or conservative) is introduced. It is found that the ideology of a senator's electoral constituency was an important factor on the recent U.S. Senate vote to ban 19 semi-automatic assault weapons. The findings have important implications for how social scientists conceptualize and measure constituency.     

The impact of legislator and constituency ideology on voting on the assault weapons ban

Using variables that represent a legislator's entire legal constituency, previous research by social scientists has concluded that views of the legislator's constituency have little effect on how legislators vote. This question is reexamined by defining constituency as those voters most likely to vote for the legislator (i.e., members of the legislator's own political party and independents). Furthermore, instead of measuring constituency by either a demographic or vote-based measure, a survey measure of the ideological identification of voters (i.e., the voter's self-identification as liberal, moderate, or conservative) is introduced. It is found that the ideology of a senator's electoral constituency was an important factor on the recent U.S. Senate vote to ban 19 semi-automatic assault weapons. The findings have important implications for how social scientists conceptualize and measure constituency.     

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.     

Constituents’ economic interests and senator support for spending limitations

Peltzman [Peltzman, S., 1984. Constituent interest and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 27, 181–210] argues that if constituents’ economic interests have well-defined “winners and losers” and are appropriately measured, then constituents’ economic interests, and not legislator ideology, are the most important determinates of legislator voting. We test Peltzman's theory by examining senatorial voting on three mandated spending limitation bills. We find, consistent with Peltzman's theory, that the ratio of federal spending in a senator's state to federal taxes paid by that state, and not a senator's personal ideology, matters on legislation where there are well-defined economic “winners and losers.” This is particularly important because unlike other constituents’ economic interest measures that only impact a fraction of the constituency, the ratio of federal spending to federal taxes in a state represents the economic interests of all the constituents in a state.     

Banning Abortion:

This paper contrasts bimodal and unimodal issues, and identifies abortion as a bimodal issue. While unimodal issues exhibit continuous issue positions, a range of policy options, greater possibility of consensus, and often include financial proposals, bimodal issues are charcterized by dichotomous and mutually exclusive policy options, conflict, use of emotion-laden symbols, and often include civil liberties and soical issues. This paper examined two Senate votes on abortion in 1982 and 1983-the Helms proposal to restrict abortion and the Hatch human life amendment. Social variables were more important than political variables in explaining voting outcomes. When the impacts of constituency and Senators' characteristics were compared, those of constituencies were found to have greater impact. For abortion votes, social and constituency variables outweigh political and Senators' characteristics since public opinion is very intense and the issue is of high salience to constituents.     

Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives

We consider a decision board with representatives who vote on proposals on behalf of their constituencies. We look for decision rules that realize utilitarian and (welfarist) egalitarian ideals. We set up a simple model and obtain roughly the following results. If the interests of people from the same constituency are uncorrelated, then a weighted rule with square root weights does best in terms of both ideals. If there are perfect correlations, then the utilitarian ideal requires proportional weights, whereas the egalitarian ideal requires equal weights. We investigate correlations that are in between these extremes and provide analytic arguments to connect our results to Barberà and Jackson (J Polit Econ 114(2):317–339, 2006) and to Banzhaf voting power.     

Policy choice as an electoral investment

Traditional approaches to policy choice typically simplify their analysis by ignoring the question of internal constituency politics: constituencies are modelled simply as a single “generic” voter. We explicitly take into account how differential rates of participation and support by various groups in a legislator's constituency will influence the legislator's choice of policy. Viewing the choice of policy as essentially a question of redistribution of welfare, we argue that riskaverse politicians will attempt, not to be evenhanded toward all groups in their constituency, as some scholars have suggested, nor to direct benefits chiefly to swing groups, as has also been hypothesized, but rather, first and foremost, to maintain their current electoral coalition, and in particular, their “primary constituency”.     

Support for campaign spending limitations in the U. S. senate: The role of party,ideology and electoral security

Recent media disclosures of American campaign funding raising practices in the 1996 election have renewed political interest in campaign finance reform. This paper examines senatorial support for the McCain/Feingold measure that would have established voluntary spending limits on senate candidates and banned unlimited campaign contributions through political party organizations. While party affiliation and senator ideology are very important in explaining support for the McCain/Feingold measure, various measures of electoral security are not significant. This is important because the public choice literature emphasizes that electoral security is the primary goal of legislators. Additionally, the electoral self-interest of legislators is probably much more accurately measured by the various electoral security measures used in this study than by the constituency measures typically employed in the public choice literature. Nevertheless, personal legislator electoral security is not a powerful explanatory factor.     

Reconsidering Explanations for Regional Convergence in Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States, 1956–20001

In the United States, voter turnout rates have been declining for the last 4 decades; however, this pattern differs substantially by region. Southern states have actually seen a fairly dramatic increase in turnout since the 1950s and currently the South and non‐South have almost identical rates of voter registration and turnout. Using a series of Heckman probit models, which examine voting as a two‐step process of registering and casting a vote, we systematically investigate differences in rates of registering and voting across regions and test explanations for regional convergence over time. Using data from the American National Election Studies (1956–2000), we find that regional convergence in voter registration is primarily due to the removal of formal and informal barriers to registration and voting in the South and declining efforts to mobilize potential voters in the non‐South. In addition, we find some fairly distinct differences in which predictors are important to each stage of the voting process; for example, race is a better predictor of registering to vote than voting. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results.     

CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Past research of the effects of campaign spending in Congressional elections has found, contrary to expectations, that incumbent spending lowers votes he or she receives. Our model simultaneously determines votes and spending and eliminates this anomaly. A measure comparing the incumbent's voting record to constituent preferences aids model identification. Using two-stage least squares, we find that both incumbent and challenger spending are signficant determinants of the popular vote received. Tenure and spending appear to have diminishing returns, and voters appear to punish incumbents who vote against their wishes.     

Two’s a Crowd: Women Candidates in Concurrent Elections

ABSTRACT

Most research on evaluations of women candidates considers single elections in isolation. Using two Dynamic Process Tracing experiments, this article examines whether voters alter their evaluations of women candidates, as well as their willingness to learn about and vote for them, based on the presence of other women running simultaneously in concurrent contests. We find a consistent pattern in which female candidates are not adversely affected when they are the only woman on a voter’s ballot, but they are disadvantaged when other women appear on the same party’s ballot in other races. This effect is more prominent for women in lower offices: women running for the House of Representatives are more disadvantaged than women running for higher offices are.     

Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote

This paper develops a model of interest group lobbying based on the central premise that such lobbying is fundamentally an exercise in strategic information transmission. Lobbyists typically possess information that legislators do not and, inter alia, such information is relevant to legislators when it concerns the consequences — either policy or political — of supporting one bill rather than another. However, given that the interests of lobbyists do not necessarily coincide with those of legislators, the extent to which a lobbyist is able to persuade a legislator to act in his or her interest is moot. The paper explores the extent to which lobbyists can influence a legislative decision in such a setting; in particular, we are concerned with the incentives for interest groups to acquire costly information and lobby a legislator when there exist other groups that do not share the same interests. Among the results are that a legislator will on average make better decisions with lobbying than without, and that the more important is an issue to a special interest group, the more likely is the legislator to make the correct full-information decision.Herb and Gloria Weiss are indirectly responsible for this paper. Unfortunately, neither they nor the anonymous referees can be held responsible for any errors or omissions the paper might contain.     

Equal representation in two-tier voting systems

The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte–Carlo simulations. Penrose’s square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.     

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

This paper distinguishes between electoral platforms and implemented policies through a non-trivial policy-setting process. Voters are sophisticated and may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.     

Challenges to professionalism and union voting intentions: The case of pharmacists

Using data from a national survey of pharmacists who are members of the American Pharmaceutical Association, we examine the union voting intentions of employee pharmacists. We find that union instrumentality regarding professionalism is a primary predictor of union voting intent among these employees. In addition, this predictor mediates the relationship between the level of professionalism at a pharmacist’s current employment situation and his or her expected union vote. Also important to union voting intent are respondent beliefs about union instrumentality regarding pecuniary issues, prior union experience, as well as overall job satisfaction. Implications for employers, unions, and researchers are drawn. We thank Mary Graham, Jann Skelton, Paul Swiercz, Terry Thomason, and participants at the Seventh Bar-gaining Group Conference at Michigan State University for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was made possible by a grant from the American Pharmaceutical Association.     

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

We model the behavior of a vote-maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non-hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.     

Divine Development: Transnational Indian Religious Organizations in the United States and India

This article examines how Indian Americans’ religious organizations send not only financial remittances to India, but also social remittances that shape development ideologies. Comparing Indian‐American Hindu and Muslim organizations, I find both groups draw from their socioeconomic experiences in India and use their position as elite immigrants in the United States to identify and empower their respective religious constituencies in India and overturn different social relations (not just religious practices). Hindu Americans draw from their majority status in India to overturn India's lower position in the world system and support poverty alleviation efforts within a neoliberal development framework. Indian‐American Muslims draw from their poor status in India to overturn economic inequities within India by shifting India's development rhetoric from identity to class. Collective religious identities (expressed through organizations) not only affect the intensity of immigrants’ development efforts, but also their content and ideology. These findings urge us to fold transnational religious organizations into contemporary discussions on migration and development.     

Black heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men in the United States

Although the direction and intensity of Black heterosexuals’ attitudes toward homosexuality have been topics for considerable speculation, empirical data from representative samples previously have not been available. In the current article we report findings from a two‐wave telephone survey with a national probability sample of 391 Black heterosexual adults. Results indicated that negative attitudes toward homosexuality are widespread but do not appear to be more prevalent among Blacks than among Whites. Gender differences in Black heterosexuals’ attitudes (men's attitudes toward gay men were more negative than their attitudes toward lesbians or women's attitudes toward gay men) appeared to result primarily from men's greater tendency to regard male homosexuality as unnatural. The single most important predictor of attitudes was the attribution of choice to sexual orientation: Respondents who believed that homosexuality is beyond an individual's control expressed significantly more favorable attitudes toward gay men and lesbians than did respondents who regarded homosexuality as a choice. Consistent with previous research in predominantly White samples, respondents were more likely to express favorable attitudes if they were highly educated, unmarried, politically liberal, registered to vote and not religious, and if they included Blacks in their concept of gay men. In addition, respondents reported more favorable attitudes if they had experienced personal contact with gay men or lesbians, but this was not a significant predictor of attitudes when other variables were statistically controlled. Possible differences between Blacks’ and Whites’ social constructions of sexual orientation are discussed.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

Are Italian consumer confidence adjustments asymmetric? A macroeconomic and psychological motives approach

This paper estimates the determinants of Italian consumer confidence indicator (CCI) using time series methods. We find there exists a long-run relationship between CCI and its determinants when an important political event ‘operation clean hands’, captured by a dummy, is considered. Using the asymmetric error correction model (Enders & Siklos, 2001), we find that consumers respond asymmetrically to different types of disequilibrium error under threshold autoregressive (TAR) adjustment specification. These findings are consistent with the psychological bias approach (Bovi, 2009).