Impact of Take‐Back Regulation on the Remanufacturing Industry

As waste from used electronic products grows steadily, manufacturers face take‐back regulations mandating its collection and proper treatment through recycling, or remanufacturing. Environmentalists greet such regulation with enthusiasm, but its effect on remanufacturing activity and industry competition remains unclear. We research these questions, using a stylized model with an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) facing competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). We examine the effects of regulation on three key factors: remanufacturing levels, consumer surplus, and the OEM profit. First, we find that total OEM remanufacturing actually may decrease under high collection and/or reuse targets, meaning more stringent targets do not imply more remanufacturing. Consumer surplus and the OEM profit, meanwhile, may increase when OEM‐IR competition exists in a regulated market. Finally, through a numerical study, we investigate how total welfare changes in the collection target, what happens when the cost of collection is not linear, and what happens when IR products are valued differently by consumers.     

WTP差异下的再制造进入决策研究

本文在消费者对再制造产品及新产品的支付意愿存在差异的条件下,分别对有无竞争环境下OEM的再制造进入决策边界条件进行了研究。研究结果表明,满足边界条件时,虽然再制造产品对新产品的市场产生了蚕食效应,但再制造产品的获利性能弥补这种损失,使得OEM进入再制造能获取更多的利润。在此基础上,通过数值仿真,讨论了不同参数对OEM及竞争者的产量及利润的影响。     

政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响研究

为分析政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响,基于政府两种政策构建了外包再制造下制造/再制造博弈模型。基于博弈模型,对比分析政府两种对策对外包再制造下最优解的影响,研究主要得到：政府补贴政策可以有效提高废旧产品回收率,但只有当单位新产品碳税额度只有大于某一阈值时,政府碳税政策才会提高废旧产品回收率;政府采取补贴政策时,原始制造商通过降低单位再制造产品外包费用来获取政府补贴;政府采取碳税政策时,原始制造商通过提高单位新产品零售价格,把部分碳税转移给消费者;政府补贴政策可以同时增加原始制造商和再制造商收益;政府碳税政策可以增加再制造商收益,但只有单位新产品碳税额度大于某一阈值时,才可以增加原始制造商收益;当单位新产品对环境造成影响一定,并且单位再制造产品对环境造成影响与单位新产品对环境造成影响之比大于某一阈值时,政府补贴政策对环境造成影响最大、政府碳税政策对环境造成影响最小。     

消费者品牌忠诚对品牌商再制造市场策略的影响

独立再制造商IR的市场进入给品牌商带来了显著的竞争压力。品牌忠诚源于消费者对某个产品品牌的信任和特殊情感,在产品选择中具有明显的倾向性和排他性,进一步增加了品牌商市场策略的复杂性。针对这一现象,本文采用博弈论结合数值仿真研究了消费者具有品牌忠诚特性下的品牌商再制造市场策略问题。建立并求解了IR不进入且品牌商不再制造（n）、IR不进入且品牌商再制造（nR）、IR进入且品牌商不再制造（nr）、IR进入且品牌商再制造（nrR）四种市场模式,对模型结果进行了灵敏度分析,并探讨了各成员的模式偏好。研究表明：新产品价格、品牌再制品价格、一般再制品价格均与品牌忠诚度正相关;品牌忠诚度的提高一定增大品牌商的利润,但不一定会降低IR利润;当新产品制造成本较高时,品牌商的模式偏好始终为nR$\succ$nrR$\succ$n$\succ$nr,较低时模式偏好受到消费者品牌忠诚度的大小的影响;nr和nrR模式下,品牌忠诚度仅可能提高品牌消费者剩余,但会降低普通消费者剩余、总消费者剩余和社会总福利。     

OEM product design in a price competition with remanufactured product

An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces new products and often faces a dilemma when determining the level of interchangeability in its product design. The interchangeability is considered as a degree to which the product can be disassembled without force, and thus an increasing degree of interchangeability would decrease the OEM's production cost, but it would also lower a remanufacturer's cost in cannibalizing used items. Decreasing the level of interchangeability to deter the remanufacturer, on the other hand, would simultaneously increase the production costs of the OEM. We thus formulate a two-period supply chain model consisting of two chain members, an OEM and a remanufacturer, to investigate the product design decision of the OEM and both chain members' competitive pricing strategies. We then characterize the equilibrium decisions and profits with regard to costs and consumers' preference for the remanufactured product. We also evaluate a strategic game in which the OEM chooses the degree of interchangeability, and the remanufacturer determines its collection strategy. We find that the product-design strategy is effective for the OEM in competing with the remanufacturer, but it is not necessarily harmful to the remanufacturer.     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

考虑顾客策略行为和产品质量的闭环供应链决策模型

策略型的顾客对于不同质量的产品以及不同时间的产品会有不同的估值和支付意愿,企业在进行决策时应当考虑顾客的策略性行为。建立了由一个制造商(即原始设备制造商)和一个独立的再制造商以及一组策略型顾客组成的闭环供应链模型,利用动态博弈理论分析了当由独立的再制造商负责回收旧产品并进行再制造时顾客策略行为和再制造品的质量水平对闭环供应链的产品价格、利润、消费者剩余的影响。研究结果表明,当顾客的策略程度增加时,制造商的利润减少,再制造商的利润和消费者剩余增加。当再制造品的质量水平增加时,制造商的利润降低,再制造商的利润先增加后降低,消费者剩余增加。     

多再制造商回收定价竞争博弈

多个再制造商在同一回收市场中获取废旧产品并进行再制造,他们之间存在回收竞争.每个再制造商回收废旧产品的数量取决于自身付出的回收价格,同时和对手们的回收价格相关.目标是最大化各自的期望利润.本文首先利用优化理论和非合作博弈理论,证明了该博弈作为超模博弈,存在唯一的Nash均衡.然后通过比较发现竞争下的Nash均衡价格高于串谋下的合作均衡价格.最后通过数值仿真探讨了再制造商的数目和再制造成本对博弈的影响.     

The Effect of Competition on Recovery Strategies

Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end‐of‐life products through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are (rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher‐margin new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in industries where their end‐of‐life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc.) are attractive to third‐party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer's recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first analyze the competition between new and remanufactured products produced by a monopolist manufacturer and identify conditions under which the firm would choose not to remanufacture its products. We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and analyze two entry‐deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Finally, we discuss conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.     

Models to explore remanufacturing as a competitive strategy under duopoly

Remanufacturing is a product recovery option that upgrades the quality of returns to “as-good-as-new” conditions. Remanufactured products cost less, and are sold with the same or better warranty as for new products. In this paper, we consider a duopoly environment with two manufacturers in direct competition selling their respective new products on the primary market. Specifically, we address the question: In case one manufacturer decides to remanufacture and sell remanufactured products on the price-sensitive secondary market, will it get a competitive advantage over the other manufacturer? We develop theoretical models for a single period and two periods, and show that under the stated assumptions, remanufacturing is almost always more profitable than when there is no remanufacturing. Although remanufacturing may cannibalize new product sales, the combined profitability and market share of the (re)manufacturer on account of new and remanufactured product sales improve over new product sales only. For the competitor, we get mixed results. In some situations, its profitability improves; in some others, it worsens. We also conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to the substitution parameters, price-sensitivity of the secondary market, rate of return of used products (cores), relative market shares of the manufacturers, and relative sizes of the primary and secondary markets. We conclude the paper with managerial implications and directions for future research.     

COMPETITION IN REMANUFACTURING

We present a two‐period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition. In our model, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items. After establishing the Nash Equilibrium in the second period sub‐game, we use numerical experiments for comparative statics. OEM wants to increase L'S remanufacturing cost. Surprisingly, while L competes in the sales market, she has incentives to reduce oem's remanufacturing cost. A social planner who wants to increase remanufacturing can give incentives to the OEM to increase the fraction available for remanufacturing, or reduce his remanufacturing costs.     

Design of the Reverse Channel for Remanufacturing: Must Profit‐Maximization Harm the Environment?

A key attribute of a remanufacturing strategy is the division of labor in the reverse channel, especially whether remanufacturing is performed in‐house or outsourced. We investigate this decision for a retailer who accepts returns of a remanufacturable product. Our formulation considers the cost structures of the two strategies, uncertainty in the input quality of the collected/returned used products, consumer willingness‐to‐pay for remanufactured product, the extent to which the remanufactured product cannibalizes demand for a new product, and the power structure in the channel. For the profit‐maximizing retailer, the differentials in variable remanufacturing costs drive strategy choice, and higher fixed costs of in‐house remanufacturing favors outsourcing. The variable remanufacturing costs and the balance of power in the prospective outsourced reverse channel are the key drivers of environmental impact, as measured by the retailer's propensity to remanufacture. While profitability and environmental goals often conflict, they align under certain conditions. These include (a) the third party has less bargaining power; or (b) the fixed cost for in‐house remanufacturing is relatively high. All else equal, when remanufacturing is outsourced, the environment fares better if the third party has leadership power. We generalize to the cases when remanufacturing achieves a quality level less than “good‐as‐new" and when used items have non‐zero salvage value. Analysis of these extensions illuminates how relative power in the reverse channel drives the firms’ preferences, as well as the end customers’ consumption experience.     

制造商作为再制造商的经销商的合作模式研究

与传统的再制造商与制造商市场竞争模式研究不同,首次研究了制造商作为再制造商的经销商的合作模式。分别求得合作模式下的新产品与再制造产品的最优价格决策,并将该模式与竞争模式进行比较。通过数值仿真,分析了在合作模式下消费者对再制造产品的接受度、生产成本对生产商盈利的影响;比较了合作模式与竞争模式下生产商的盈利情况。     

Managing Demand Uncertainty through Core Acquisition in Remanufacturing

We discuss the optimal raw material acquisition strategy for a third party remanufacturer (3PR). We specifically investigate whether a 3PR should acquire used products or cores in bulk with uncertain quality levels, or in sorted grades with known quality levels; and whether to acquire and remanufacture cores before the demand is realized (planned acquisition), or after the demand is realized (reactive acquisition), or on both occasions (sequential acquisition). When only sorted cores are acquired, we find that, (i) it is optimal to acquire cores in multiple grades to balance acquisition and remanufacturing costs; (ii) if reactive acquisition is possible, it reduces the assortment size (number of grades in which cores are acquired) and the total inventory acquired in the planned acquisition; and (iii) the optimal portfolio of grades to acquire and the optimal acquisition and remanufacturing quantities of these grades can be determined analytically. When bulk cores are acquired in addition to sorted cores, the property of reduction in assortment size of the planned acquisition is preserved. We also show that the 3PR should acquire only a fraction of the demand in planned acquisition, and leave the rest for reactive acquisition. This fraction changes during the lifecycle of a remanufactured product. Using a combination of empirical and realistic data from a smartphone remanufacturer we show that sequential acquisition increases expected profit by up to 8% and 27% over only planned and only reactive acquisitions respectively, and reduces the inventory acquired by up to 21% over only planned acquisition.     

基于市场划分的再制造许可费对定价策略的影响

研究了基于市场划分的再制造许可费对闭环供应链定价策略的影响。考虑到再制造商具有只针对于绿色消费者进行销售的高价策略和针对于全体消费者进行销售的低价策略，基于回收量约束构建了包含一个原制造商和一个再制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型，求解两类定价策略下的最优决策。分析表明存在再制造许可费取值区间，当再制造许可费在不同的区间时，原制造商将通过在闭环供应链中的领导者地位迫使再制造商决定不同的定价策略。最后通过数值分析验证了再制造许可费的取值区间以及不同许可费时的闭环供应链定价策略和利润。     

Forecasting Product Returns for Remanufacturing Operations

Driven by legislative pressures, an increasing number of manufacturing companies have been implementing comprehensive recycling and remanufacturing programs. The accurate forecasting of product returns is important for procurement decisions, production planning, and inventory and disposal management in such remanufacturing operations. In this study, we consider a manufacturer that also acts as a remanufacturer, and develop a generalized forecasting approach to determine the distribution of the returns of used products, as well as integrate it with an inventory model to enable production planning and control. We compare our forecasting approach to previous models and show that our approach is more consistent with continuous time, provides accurate estimates when the return lags are exponential in nature, and results in fewer units being held in inventory on average. The analysis revealed that these gains in accuracy resulted in the most cost savings when demand volumes for remanufactured products were high compared to the volume of returned products. Such situations require the frequent acquisition of cores to meet demand. The results show that significant cost savings can be achieved by using the proposed approach for sourcing product returns.     

Effects of Remanufacturable Product Design on Market Segmentation and the Environment

Despite documented benefits of remanufacturing, many manufacturers have yet to embrace the idea of tapping into remanufactured‐goods markets. In this article, we explore this dichotomy and analyze the effect of remanufacturable product design on market segmentation and product and trade‐in prices by studying a two‐stage profit‐maximization problem in which a price‐setting manufacturer can choose whether or not to open a remanufactured‐goods market for its product. Our results suggest that it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product when the value‐added from remanufacturing is relatively high but product durability is relatively low and innovation is nominal. In addition, we find that entering a remanufactured‐goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate into environmental friendliness. On the one hand, the optimal trade‐in program could result in low return and/or remanufacturing rates. On the other hand, a low price for remanufactured products could attract higher demand and thereby potentially result in more damage to the environment. Meanwhile, external restrictions imposed on total greenhouse gas emissions draw criticism in their own right because they risk stifling growth or reducing overall consumer welfare. Given these trade‐offs, we therefore develop and compare several measures of environmental efficiency and conclude that emissions per revenue can serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall environmental stewardship.     

专利保护下闭环供应链的再制造策略研究

在专利完善市场,受专利保护的原制造商享有产品再制造的专有权利,只有获得原制造商的专利许可,第三方再制造商才能进行旧产品的回收再制造。本文分析了受专利保护下原制造商所采取的不同再制造策略:阻止旧产品再制造(N策略)、原制造商自己再制造(O策略)和许可第三方再制造商进行再制造(A策略),并建立了由零售商负责旧产品回收的闭环供应链模型。通过比较发现,只有在第三方再制造商处理旧产品的节省成本足够低时,受专利保护的原制造商才会选择许可第三方再制造商进行旧产品再制造。     

考虑不同回收质量等级的再制造系统回收生产决策

废旧产品的回收再制造过程往往在回收质量、再制造成本、再制造产出率、再制造产品需求等方面存在不确定性因素,极大地增加了再制造生产管理决策的复杂性。本文在一个回收再制造系统中研究了存在多种回收质量等级时的两阶段回收—再制造联合优化决策问题,并扩展到需求与价格相关和再制造产出率随机两种情形。在最大化再制造商期望利润的决策目标下,基于每种回收质量等级的单位回收和再制造成本构造出再制造系统的有效生产前沿面,给出了不同决策情形下再制造商的最优回收数量、销售定价的解析解,并且分析了一些主要的参数对再制造商最优决策的影响。本文的研究结果表明：（1）含有多种回收质量等级的再制造系统中存在一个下凸的有效生产前沿面,不在该前沿面上的任何质量等级的回收产品都将不会被用于再制造;（2）在同等的政府补贴额度下,回收补贴方式对再制造商决策的影响程度大于再制造补贴方式;（3）当再制造品的市场需求与价格相关时,最优销售价格至少大于第一种被使用的回收质量等级的边际回收和再制造成本;（4）任意两种回收质量等级之间存在着替代或互补效应,由其成本差异决定,并且这种效应随着需求不确定性的增大而增大;（5）再制造产出率的不确定性和再制造品需求的不确定性之间存在"对冲"效应,这种效应随着再制造产出率不确定性的降低而减弱。本文的研究可为不确定性环境下再制造企业的回收、生产管理决策提供有益的管理启示。     

Optimal Acquisition and Sorting Policies for Remanufacturing

The condition of the used items acquired by remanufacturers is often highly variable, and sorting is an important aspect of remanufacturing operations. Sorting policies—the rules specifying which used products should be remanufactured and which should be scrapped—have received limited attention in the literature. In this paper, we examine the case of a remanufacturer who acquires unsorted used products as needed from third party brokers. As more used items are acquired for a given demand, the remanufacturer can be more selective when sorting. Thus, two related decisions are made: how many used items to acquire, and how selective to be during the sorting process. We derive optimal acquisition and sorting policies in the presence of used product condition variability for a remanufacturer facing both deterministic and uncertain demand. We show the existence of a single optimal acquisition and sorting policy with a simple structure and show that this policy is independent of production amount when acquisition costs are linear.