COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Abstract When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long‐term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.     

REFERENCE POINTS,SOCIAL NORMS,AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS

How does an ex‐ante contract affect behavior in an ex‐post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical buyer–seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex‐ante contract was written. The ex‐ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45% lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. These effects do not depend on whether the contract was written under competitive or monopolistic conditions. Our results provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contracts serve as reference points that shape and coordinate the expectations of the contracting parties.     

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex‐ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex‐post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey‐Clark‐Groves mechanism guarantees both ex‐ante as well as ex‐post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex‐ante and ex‐post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub‐ and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex‐post efficient mechanisms lead to private under‐ or over‐acquisition of information.     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital‐backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements—namely, put and call options, tag‐along and drag‐along rights, demand and piggy‐back rights, and catch‐up clauses. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we show that these clauses can ensure that the contract parties make efficient ex ante investments in the firm. They do so by constraining renegotiation. In the absence of the clauses, ex ante investment would be distorted by unconstrained renegotiation aimed at (i) precluding value‐destroying ex post transfers, (ii) inducing value‐increasing ex post investments, or (iii) precluding hold‐out on value‐increasing sales to a trade buyer or the IPO market. (JEL: G34)     

Crime,Search, and Ex‐offenders’ Accessibility to Labor Markets

Rehabilitation for ex‐offenders has positive (e.g. more production) and negative (e.g. more crime) effects on society. We investigate the effect of rehabilitation on criminal behavior and the labor market using a search model. In the case where ex‐offenders cannot join the labor market, promoting rehabilitation for them may reduce crime. In such a case, the equilibrium allocation may be inefficient. Moreover, under the Hosios condition, equilibrium labor market tightness is lower than the efficient outcome because of crime, as the crime option raises the value of unemployed workers. Because this option works as a negative externality on matched firms, equilibrium tightness is lower than the optimal level.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination

We investigate the effect of employer‐provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare using a search, matching, and bargaining framework. In our model, health insurance coverage decisions are made in a cooperative manner that recognizes the productivity effects of health insurance as well as its nonpecuniary value to the employee. The resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health insurance, wages at jobs providing health insurance are larger (in a stochastic sense) than those at jobs without health insurance, and workers at jobs with health insurance are less likely to leave those jobs, even after conditioning on the wage rate. We estimate the model using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and find that the employer‐provided health insurance system does not lead to any serious inefficiencies in mobility decisions.     

Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

INCOMPLETE SOCIAL CONTRACTS

There is a long normative ‘Social Contract’ tradition that attempts to characterize ex‐post income inequalities that are agreeable to all ‘behind a veil of ignorance.’ This paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision‐making procedures. It is shown that quite generally some form of majority‐voting is preferred to unanimity ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers. Deviations from unanimity (or ex‐post Pareto optimality) are ex‐ante efficient to the extent that they economize on costly compensating transfers. Put another way, the optimal decision rule trades off the benefits of minority protection and those from greater flexibility. (JEL: H11, G33, G34, D63, P16, P48)     

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.     

JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE POSITION,OR BECKER MARRIED TO SPENCE

This paper considers a matching model of the labor market where workers, who have private information on their quality, signal to firms that also differ in quality. Signals allow assortative matching in which the highest‐quality workers send the highest signals and are hired by the best firms. Matching is considered both when wages are rigid (nontransferable utility) and when they are fully flexible (transferable utility). In both cases, equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on the distributions of worker and firm types. This is in contrast to separating equilibria of the standard model, which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. With sticky wages, despite incomplete information, equilibrium investment in education by low‐ability workers can be inefficiently low, and this distortion can become worse in a more competitive environment. In contrast, with flexible wages, greater competition improves efficiency.     

Temptation and Self‐Control

We study a two‐period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision‐maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices. Our axioms yield a representation that identifies the individual's commitment ranking, temptation ranking, and cost of self‐control. An agent has a preference for commitment if she strictly prefers a subset of alternatives to the set itself. An agent has self‐control if she resists temptation and chooses an option with higher ex ante utility. We introduce comparative measures of preference for commitment and self‐control and relate them to our representations.     

LIQUIDITY AND INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT

We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the nonpledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over‐hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex‐ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex‐post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex‐ante perspective. The model throws light on the holding of foreign reserves in international markets.     

Redistribution Through Education and Other Mechanisms Under Capital‐Market Imperfections and Uncertainty: A Welfare Effect Analysis

Abstract. This paper considers a two‐period model of endogenous human capital formation under the credits‐market imperfection and uncertainty assumptions. We compare in the first part of the paper ex‐ante and ex‐post general‐equilibrium effects of the education subsidy policy to those of the negative income tax and the unskilled wage subsidy regimes. We show that the education subsidy policy raises an efficiency‐inequality trade‐off issue, and therefore it is optimal unless the degree of inequality aversion is relatively high and financing the subsidy is not too distorsive. Public loans are generally claimed to provide a solution for such issue. We explore the implications of implementing the public loan under several schemes in the second part of the paper. We show that combining between a pure public loan and education subsidies provides higher levels of welfare than these two policies taken separately provided that the inequality aversion degree is high. For low degrees of inequality aversion, the pure public loan is the optimal policy.     

Equity in Social Risk: Some Empirical Observations

In societal risk analysis the equity of the distribution of risks is often an important consideration owing to the special nature of health risks. We empirically validate some assumptions about equity that have been discussed in the decision analytic literature. Our results show that the way fatalities are distributed throughout a society is considered along with the number of fatalities in evaluating alternative policies involving mortality risks. The concepts of ex ante equity and ex post equity are both shown to be important in judgments of fairness. We next present a decision model based on multiattribute preference theory incorporating the number of fatalities, as well as ex ante equity and ex post equity. When ex ante equity and ex post equity are positively weighted in this fair-risk model , options with more equal risk distributions are ranked higher. Next we empirically show that the distribution of benefits has an impact on judgments of fairness. The fair-risk model does not include information on the benefits distribution, so it would apply when benefits are distributed equally or when the decision maker wishes to not include benefits in the model. We briefly discuss how the notion of proportional equity can incorporate benefits into judgments of the fairness of risk distributions. We then include benefits in a more general model in which fair risk-benefit combinations are those that are exchange equitable. A key implication of this envy-free risk–benefit model is that an unequal distribution of risks may be preferred if it is accompanied by a compensatory differential in benefits consistent with peoples' preference tradeoffs between received benefits and assumed risks. Finally, we discuss how perceived deservedness may influence judgments about equity. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of research on alternative notions of equity for policy makers dealing with social risks.     

Shop Floor Control When Tacit Worker Knowledge is Important

We investigate a shop where the workers and supervisors have tacit knowledge of how to operate efficiently and where efficiency is important to providing capacity to meet demand. This tacit knowledge includes setup dependencies between products as well as which worker or machine is best suited for a particular product. We discuss a real‐world shop where this is the case. Management expects workers and supervisors to use their knowledge to schedule efficiently by monitoring their performance based on standards. The question that we explore is how management should control for due date performance in light of the discretion given to the workers and supervisors to sequence jobs on the basis of efficiency. We explore management control of due date performance through the use of order review and release (ORR) and management expediting. We find that although ORR is quite effective at reducing work‐in‐process (WIP) inventories, it may foster very late deliveries in a shop such as this. In fact, under such conditions, deftly executed expediting with no ORR at all can be far more effective at supporting all deliveries. Even improving ORR into a hybrid by actively updating path efficiencies (observed from supervisor/worker scheduling) did not support a change to this conclusion. Conversely, when conditions are created where tacit knowledge plays a reduced role or utilization is decreased, ORR delivers in a timely manner. The interaction between utilization, WIP levels, and worker knowledge all help dictate the appropriate control methodology.     

CREDIT,WAGES, AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS

We analyze how bankruptcy laws affect the general equilibrium interactions between credit and wages. Soft laws reduce the frequency of liquidations and thus ex post inefficiencies, but they worsen credit rationing ex ante. This hinders firm creation and thus depresses labor demand. Rich agents who need few outside funds can invest even if creditor rights are weak. Hence, they favor soft laws that exclude poorer agents from the credit market and reduce the competition for labor. Such laws can generate greater utilitarian welfare than under perfect contract enforcement: By barring access to credit to some agents, soft laws lower wages, which increases the pledgeable income of richer agents and decreases the liquidation rates they must commit to. When they induce strong credit rationing, however, soft laws are Pareto‐dominated by tougher laws combined with subsidies to entrepreneurs. (JEL: D82, G33, K22)     

DISTANCE TO RETIREMENT AND OLDER WORKERS‘ EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE FOR DELAYING THE RETIREMENT AGE

This paper presents empirical evidence and a theoretical foundation in favor of the view that the retirement age decision affects older workers' employment prior to retirement. To the extent that there are search frictions on the labor market, the return on jobs is determined by their expected duration: The time to retirement is then key to understanding older workers' employment. Countries with a retirement age of 60 are indeed characterized by lower employment rates for workers aged 55–59. Based on the French Labor Force Survey, we show that the likelihood of employment is significantly affected by the distance to retirement, in addition to age and other relevant variables. We then extend McCall's job search model by explicitly integrating life‐cycle features with the retirement decision. Using simulations, we show that the distance effect in interaction with the generosity of unemployment benefits and the depressed demand for older workers explains the low rate of employment just before the eligibility age for the Social Security pension. Finally, we show that implementing actuarially fair schemes not only extends the retirement age, but also encourages a more intensive job search by older unemployed workers. (JEL: J22, J26, H55)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLEXICURITY

We document the presence of a trade‐off in the labor market between the protection of jobs and the support offered to unemployed people. Different countries’ locations along this trade‐off represent stable political‐economic equilibria. We develop a model in which individuals determine the mix of job protection and support for the unemployed in a political environment. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status (insiders and outsiders) and skills (low and high). Unlike previous work on the political economy of labor market institutions, we emphasize the role of job protection and unemployment benefits in the wage‐setting process. A key implication of the model is that flexicurity configurations with low levels of job protection and high levels of support to the unemployed should emerge in the presence of a highly educated workforce. Panel regressions of countries’ locations along this institutional trade‐off are consistent with the implications of our model.     

An Activation Program as a Stick to Job Finding

In an experimental setting some Danish unemployed workers were assigned to an activation program whereas others were not. The unemployed who were assigned to the activation program found a job more quickly. We show that the activation effect increases with the distance between the place of residence of the unemployed worker and the place where the activation took place. We also find that the quality of the post‐unemployment jobs was not affected by the activation program. Both findings confirm that the activation program mainly worked because it was compulsory and the unemployed did not like it. The activation program worked as a stick to job finding.