THE EURO AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT FLOWS

Greater financial integration between core and peripheral European Monetary Union (EMU) members not only had an effect on both sets of countries but also spilled over beyond the euro area. Lower interest rates allowed peripheral countries to run bigger deficits, which inflated their economies by allowing credit booms. Core EMU countries took on extra foreign leverage to expose themselves to the peripherals. We present a stylized model that illustrates possible mechanisms for these developments. We then analyze the geography of international debt flows using multiple data sources and provide evidence that after the euro's introduction, core EMU countries increased their borrowing from outside of the EMU and their lending to the EMU periphery. Moreover, we present evidence that large core EMU banks' lending to periphery borrowers was linked to their borrowing from outside of the euro area.     

VOLATILITY,LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY,AND THE PATTERN OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

This paper studies the link between volatility, labor market flexibility, and international trade. International differences in labor market regulations affect how firms can adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. These institutional differences interact with sector specific differences in volatility (the variance of the firm‐specific shocks in a sector) to generate a new source of comparative advantage. Other things equal, countries with more flexible labor markets specialize in sectors with higher volatility. Empirical evidence for a large sample of countries strongly supports this theory: the exports of countries with more flexible labor markets are biased towards high‐volatility sectors. We show how differences in labor market institutions can be parsimoniously integrated into the workhorse model of Ricardian comparative advantage of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, American Economic Review, 67, 823–839). We also show how our model can be extended to multiple factors of production.     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

INSTITUTION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS

This paper studies theoretically how the cross‐country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by changing productivity–agency‐cost trade‐offs across heterogeneous investment projects. Such institution‐induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences. This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U‐shaped responses of the investment and capital flows. Among other things, this means that capital could flow from middle‐income countries to both low‐income and high‐income countries, and that, starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a current account surplus after a successful institutional reform. More generally, the results here provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows. It also calls into question the validity of treating the degree of financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions, as commonly done in the literature.     

A GLOBAL VIEW OF CROSS‐BORDER MIGRATION

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitative multi‐sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm‐level data. Our framework features cross‐country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances, and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels of migration to a no‐migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that received a lot of migration—such as Canada or Australia—are better off due to greater product variety available in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run, the impact of migration on average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled natives tend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries with large emigration flows—such as Jamaica or El Salvador—are also better off due to migration, but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration is substantial, at about 5% to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries with large incoming remittances.     

THE RISE OF THE EAST AND THE FAR EAST: GERMAN LABOR MARKETS AND TRADE INTEGRATION

We analyze the effects of the unprecedented rise in trade between Germany and “the East” (China and Eastern Europe) in the period 1988–2008 on German local labor markets. Using detailed administrative data, we exploit the cross‐regional variation in initial industry structures and use trade flows of other high‐income countries as instruments for regional import and export exposure. We find that the rise of the East in the world economy caused substantial job losses in German regions specialized in import‐competing industries, both in manufacturing and beyond. Regions specialized in export‐oriented industries, however, experienced even stronger employment gains and lower unemployment. In the aggregate, we estimate that this trade integration has caused some 442,000 additional jobs in the economy and contributed to retaining the manufacturing sector in Germany. This is almost exclusively driven by the rise of Eastern Europe, not by China. We also conduct an analysis at the individual worker level, and find that trade had a stabilizing overall effect on employment relationships.     

LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN THE US ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the cross‐country effects of productivity and demand disturbances in the United States identified with sign restrictions based on standard theory. Productivity gains in US manufacturing increase US consumption and investment vis‐à‐vis foreign countries, resulting in a trade deficit and higher international prices of US goods, despite the rise in their supply. Financial adjustment works via a higher global value of US equities, real dollar appreciation, and an expansion of US gross foreign liabilities as well as assets. Positive demand shocks to US manufacturing also increase investment and cause a real dollar appreciation, but have limited effects on the trade balance and net foreign assets. Our findings emphasize the importance for macroeconomic interdependence of endogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand across countries in response to business cycle shocks.     

THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF VOLATILITY SHOCKS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This paper proposes an empirical model which can be used to estimate the international transmission of volatility shocks. Using this model we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of the shock to US real GDP leads to a decline in UK GDP of 1% relative to trend and a 0.7% increase in UK CPI relative to trend at the two‐year horizon. Using a nonlinear open‐economy DSGE model, we find that these empirical estimates are consistent with the response to a perturbation to the volatility of foreign “supply” type shocks, while an increase in the volatility of demand shocks has a negligible impact.     

FROM MAIZE TO HAZE: AGRICULTURAL SHOCKS AND THE GROWTH OF THE MEXICAN DRUG SECTOR

Understanding how economic incentives affect illegal drug production is essential for crafting policies in response to the international drug trade. Policymakers typically face a choice between two strategies: targeting criminal groups via law enforcement, and offering producers incentives to engage in alternate activities. Yet, little is known about how the returns to alternate legal activities affect drug supply. We contribute to this literature by examining how shocks to legal commodity prices affect the drug trade in Mexico. Our analysis exploits exogenous movements in the Mexican maize price stemming from weather conditions in US maize‐growing regions, as well as exports of other major maize producers. Using data on over 2200 municipios spanning 1990–2010, we show that lower prices differentially increased the cultivation of both marijuana and opium poppies in municipios more climatically suited to growing maize. We also find impacts on downstream drug‐trade outcomes, including drug cartel operations and killings perpetrated by these groups. Our findings demonstrate that maize price changes contributed to the burgeoning drug trade in Mexico, and point to the violent consequences of an expanding drug sector.     

THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY

An empirical finding by Trefler (2004, “The Long and Short of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement”, American Economic Review, 94(4), 870–895) and others that industrial productivity increases more strongly in liberalized industries than in nonliberalized industries has been widely accepted as evidence for the Melitz ( 2003 , “The Impact of Trade on Intra‐Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725) model. We show that under fairly standard assumptions a multi‐industry version of the Melitz model does not predict this relationship. Instead, it predicts the opposite relationship that industrial productivity increases more strongly in nonliberalized industries than in liberalized industries.     

REPATRIATION OF DEBT IN THE EURO CRISIS

With the beginning of the Euro Crisis, the long‐standing trend of European financial integration reversed. Investors unwound cross‐border positions of debt obligations and increased holdings of locally issued debt. In other words, debt obligations were repatriated. We use data on bank portfolios to document three new empirical regularities of the financial disintegration: (i) repatriation affected mainly debt of crisis countries; (ii) repatriation affected mainly public debt; (iii) the public debt of crisis countries that was not repatriated was reallocated to large and politically influential countries within the Euro area. We read these results in light of standard theories of cross‐border portfolio allocation and argue that the sum of these patterns constitutes evidence for the secondary market theory of public debt.     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND HETEROGENEITY

Research has shown that, absent individual heterogeneity and under complete markets, the welfare impact of financial openness is quantitatively limited. Not only are inequalities in wealth and labor productivity a feature of most societies, but also financial markets suffer from many well‐known frictions. This paper demonstrates that, when households face borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to income, the welfare implications of financial liberalization are considerable. For instance, the average increase in welfare of a typical emerging market economy that switches from a closed capital market to perfect capital mobility is equivalent to a permanent increase in average consumption of roughly 5.4%. This is about 3.9 times more than the welfare gains of the same policy under a complete markets environment without any individual heterogeneity. We show that individual heterogeneity accounts for two thirds of this additional increase in the average welfare gain; market incompleteness accounts for the remaining third. In our calibration, the median household in capital‐scarce countries is in favor of international financial integration. However, if the pivotal voter is wealthy enough then such reform might not be implemented, since richer households have a vested interest in capital market closedness.     

Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries

We model a small open economy in which both domestic financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , to study the general equilibrium impact of various types of capital inflows on the efficiency and governance of domestic banks. Banks have an advantage in monitoring firms, but the latter can collude with banks and offer side‐payments to reduce the intensity of monitoring. Opening up to international capital flows makes domestic banks’ capital scarcer relative to uninformed capital, thus increasing the relative cost of monitoring. We show that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the governance of the domestic financial system by sometimes increasing firms’ incentives to collude with banks. We characterize the conditions under which governance is more likely to deteriorate after opening up the capital account, and discuss the effects on investment, productivity and output. We also analyze the effects of foreign direct investment in the corporate and banking sectors. Stylized facts are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

IMMIGRATION,JOBS, AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE BEFORE AND DURING THE GREAT RECESSION

In this paper we analyze the impact of immigrants on the type and quantity of native jobs. We use data on 15 Western European countries during the 1996–2010 period. We find that immigrants, by taking manual‐routine type of occupations pushed natives towards more “complex” (abstract and communication) jobs. This job upgrade was associated to a 0.7% increase in native wages for a doubling of the immigrants' share. These results are robust to the use of an IV strategy based on past settlement of immigrants across European countries. The job upgrade slowed but did not come to a halt during the Great Recession. We also document the labor market flows behind it: the complexity of jobs offered to new native hires was higher relative to the complexity of lost jobs. Finally, we find evidence that such reallocation was larger in countries with more flexible labor laws.     

THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT RECOVERY ON LOGISTICS NETWORK DESIGN

Efficient implementation of closed‐loop supply chains requires setting up appropriate logistics structures for the arising flows of used and recovered products. In this paper we consider logistics network design in a reverse logistics context. We present a generic facility location model and discuss differences with traditional logistics settings. Moreover, we use our model to analyze the impact of product return flows on logistics networks. We show that the influence of product recovery is very much context dependent. While product recovery may efficiently be integrated in existing logistics structures in many cases, other examples require a more comprehensive approach redesigning a company's logistics network in an integral way.     

RELATIVE FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE

We present a model of international portfolio choice based on cross‐country differences in relative factor abundance. Countries have varying degrees of similarity in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject to aggregate productivity shocks. Risk‐averse consumers can insure against these shocks by investing their wealth at home and abroad. In a many‐good setup, the change in factor prices after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that have dissimilar factor endowment ratios, but is bad news for countries with similar factor endowment ratios, since their incomes will worsen. Therefore countries with similar relative factor endowments have a stronger incentive to invest in one another for insurance purposes than countries with dissimilar endowments. The importance of this effect depends on the size of countries. Empirical evidence linking bilateral international equity investment positions to a proxy for relative factor endowments supports our theory: the similarity of host and source countries in their relative capital–labor ratios has a positive effect on the source country’s investment position in the host country. The effect of similarity is enhanced by the size of host countries.     

WHY DO EMERGING ECONOMIES BORROW SHORT TERM?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaper than borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as during these episodes the relative cost of long‐term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereign bond prices, returns, and issuances at different maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990 to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher risk premium on long‐term than on short‐term bonds. During crises, the difference between the two risk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument, we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk‐sharing problem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk‐averse international investors.     

SYSTEMIC AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES

The theoretical literature on sovereign defaults has focused on adverse shocks to debtors' economies, suggesting that defaults are of an idiosyncratic nature. Still, sovereign debt crises are also of a systemic nature, clustered around panics in the financial center, such as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis in 2008. Crises in the financial centers are rare disasters and, thus, their effects on the periphery can only be captured by examining long episodes. In this paper, we examine sovereign defaults from 1820 to the Great Depression, with a focus on Latin America. We find that 63% of the crises are of a systemic nature. These crises are different. Both the international collapse of liquidity and the growth slowdown in the financial centers are at their core. These global shocks trigger longer default spells and larger losses for investors.     

THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF TRUST

We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump‐shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. However, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college. Our findings hold in large‐scale international survey data, as well as inside a country with high‐quality institutions, and are also supported by experimental findings. (JEL: A1, A12, D1, O15, Z1)