Buttressing Supply Chains against Floods in Asia for Humanitarian Relief and Economic Recovery

Floods are the most frequent category of disasters worldwide. Among all geographic regions, Asia has suffered the most. While there are several ongoing humanitarian efforts and initiatives, we believe there is a new opportunity to coordinate “last mile” humanitarian efforts in the event of a flood using micro‐retailers. Because micro‐retailers are the “last mile” nodes in traditional retail supply chains in many Asian countries, we propose the use of social enterprise to buttress these supply chains for distribution of essential goods by coordinating with micro‐retailers before and after floods. We also present a stylized model to quantify the benefits of doing so.     

双向部分透明供应链的大数据投资决策与激励

针对供应链中需求大数据的分散投资与决策激励问题,考虑单个供应商和制造商均能通过大数据投资预测需求,且彼此可共享部分大数据。建立基于上下游间双向部分透明的大数据投资决策模型,揭示双向透明对于大数据应用价值与投资激励的影响,并设计契约合作机制解决大数据投资的激励失调问题。研究发现:双向透明总是对供应商有利,当逆向透明度低时,正向部分透明可能对制造商最有利,当正向透明度低时,促进双向透明可能对所有参与者均有利;正向透明而逆向不透明有利于提高大数据投资的可行性;制造商只存在大数据投资激励不足,而供应商在双向透明度低时还存在大数据投资激励过度;投资补偿契约能协调各参与者的大数据投资激励,且可提升系统投资利润5-49%。     

两级供应链上质量控制的动态协调机制研究

文章应用微分博弈的方法研究了由单一制造商和单一供应商组成的两级供应链上的质量控制的协调问题.首先讨论了制造商作为供应链上质量控制的领导者而供应商作为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈情形,得到了一般的非协同质量控制博弈情形下制造商和供应商的最优行动选择;接着探讨了双方在协同质量控制博弈情形下的最优行动选择;通过对比两种情形下的博弈均衡结果,阐明了在两级供应链上的质量管理过程中,协同质量控制博弈结构严格优于一般的非协同质量控制博弈结构.     

考虑不同风险偏好的供应链企业创新投资决策模型

在条件风险值度量准则下,建立了考虑不同风险偏好的供应链创新投资决策模型,并在此基础上分别分析了供应商单独投资和联合投资2种情况下供应链的创新投资水平。给出了联合投资时投资分担比例必须满足的区间,确定了供应商主导和制造商主导下的最优投资分担比例。研究表明:制造商喜好风险可以增加市场中的产品数量,提高供应商创新投资水平;供应商可以通过提升技术创新能力,抵消制造商因为风险规避带来的消极影响。当制造商分担供应商的部分创新投资时,供应商的创新投资水平和制造商的产量均得到了提高,并且供应商主导下确定的最优创新投资分担比例大于制造商主导下确定的最优创新投资分担比例。最后用数值分析验证了模型的有效性。     

CSR投入对闭环供应链定价与协调决策的影响

研究了供应链成员的社会责任（CSR）投入行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了闭环供应链中以下四种不同的CSR投入方式：（1）无CSR投入;（2）制造商投入CSR;（3）零售商投入CSR;（4）制造商和零售商同时投入CSR。通过对比不同模型的均衡决策和利润,发现制造商和零售商同时进行CSR投入的方式对闭环供应链决策成员和系统均最有利,而零售商投入CSR的方式优于制造商投入CSR方式。其次,以集中化决策模型的最优结果为基准,探讨了不同CSR投入方式下分散化闭环供应链系统的协调机制设计问题。结果表明：两部定价契约能有效实现CSR约束的闭环供应链的协调;且在制造商与零售商同时投入CSR决策情形,契约中制造商的议价能力最弱,零售商的议价能力最强。最后,通过算例分析了模型中关键参数对闭环供应链均衡决策与利润的影响,并进一步对闭环供应链协调的性能进行了分析。     

Problem Formulation and Solution Mechanisms: A Behavioral Study of Humanitarian Transportation Planning

When dealing with urgent, ill‐defined problems, such as rapidly evolving emergency situations, operations managers have little time for problem formulation or solution. While the mechanisms by which humans formulate and solve problems have been described, mechanisms for rapid, concurrent formulating and solving are not well understood. This study investigates these mechanisms through a field study of transportation planning in a humanitarian response setting. The findings show that the problem is solved through greedy search and formulated through sensemaking, in which search enables updates to an evolving problem formulation, and the formulation directs and limits the search process. This study explores the implications of these findings for the development of better problem formulation processes and problem‐solving strategies for urgent and ill‐defined operations management problems.     

Temporary Hubs for the Global Vehicle Supply Chain in Humanitarian Operations

We model the global vehicle supply chain of an International Humanitarian Organization (IHO) with a dynamic hub location model across monthly periods. We use actual vehicle data from the International Federation of the Red Cross to feed our model and provide insights into IHO secondary support demand. We find that secondary support demand for items such as vehicles is different from primary beneficiary demand for items such as water and food. When considering disaster response and development program demand simultaneously (disaster cycle management), our results illustrate that keeping a lean centralized hub configuration with an option for temporary hubs in mega disaster locations can reduce overall supply chain costs over a long time horizon. We also show that it is possible to structure a supply chain to take operational advantage of earmarked funding. This research lays the groundwork for using optimization models to analyze disaster cycle management.     

考虑创新补偿的双渠道供应链协调机制研究

电子商务环境下,以创新降低物流、库存等分销成本是零售商赢得生存与发展的重要途径;在渠道和谐与利润最大化驱使下,策略性创新补偿成为制造商的首选策略.本文在传统分销与在线直销价格竞争下,构建模型并研究了上述双渠道供应链的协调问题.研究发现,单独利用创新补偿能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进,却无法达到供应链整体最优,设计了使渠道协调的两部定价合同.     

Managing Disruption Risks in Supply Chains

There are two broad categories of risk affecting supply chain design and management: (1) risks arising from the problems of coordinating supply and demand, and (2) risks arising from disruptions to normal activities. This paper is concerned with the second category of risks, which may arise from natural disasters, from strikes and economic disruptions, and from acts of purposeful agents, including terrorists. The paper provides a conceptual framework that reflects the joint activities of risk assessment and risk mitigation that are fundamental to disruption risk management in supply chains. We then consider empirical results from a rich data set covering the period 1995–2000 on accidents in the U. S. Chemical Industry. Based on these results and other literature, we discuss the implications for the design of management systems intended to cope with supply chain disruption risks.     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

Innovations in humanitarian supply chains: the case of cash transfer programmes

Abstract

Cash transfer programmes (CTPs) are revolutionizing humanitarian supply chains (HSCs), yet just how CTPs are to be understood as innovation, and how they impact on HSCs, remains unclear. Innovation in the humanitarian context more often than not stems from outside humanitarian organizations – that is innovation occurs in their supply chain. The aim of this study is to further the understanding of supply chain innovation (SCI) in the humanitarian context. Based on empirical evidence this article suggests a supply chain innovation model (SCIM). This SCIM is useful because it allows different processes to be understood and compared, by providing guidance on how innovations progress. The contribution of this research is threefold: First, the research presents a SCIM for the humanitarian context. Second, this is the first application of a SCIM to the humanitarian environment. Finally, the research is field based and grounded in empirical observations thus adding to the literature and offering insights to practice.     

Power Structure and Profitability in Assembly Supply Chains

This paper studies the impact of supply chain power structure on firms' profitability in an assembly system with one assembler and two suppliers. Two power regimes are investigated—in a Single Power Regime, a more powerful firm acts as the Stackelberg leader to decide the wholesale price but not the quantity whereas in a Dual Power Regime, both the price and quantity decisions are granted to the more powerful firm. Tallying the power positions of the three firms, for each power regime we study three power structures and investigate the system's as well as the firms' preference of power. We find that when the assembler is the most powerful firm among the three, the system‐wide profit is the highest and so is the assembler's profit. The more interesting finding is that, if the assembler is not the most powerful player in the system, more power does not necessarily guarantee her a higher profit. Similarly, a supplier's profit can also decrease with the power he has. These results contrast with the conclusion for serial systems, where a firm always prefers more power. We also find that when both suppliers are more (less) powerful than the assembler, it can be beneficial (indifferent) for everyone if the two suppliers merge into a mega supplier to make decisions jointly. When the assembler is more powerful than one supplier and less so than the other, it is always better for the system to have the two suppliers merge, and for each individual firm, merging is preferred if the firm becomes the more powerful party after merging.     

Trust and Information Sharing in Supply Chains

Drawing on behavioral research, we construct a multi‐period model with which to examine the role of trust and other social characteristics in a supply chain. Specifically, we focus on trust building in the context of a salesperson who acts as a representative of a manufacturer and shares demand forecast information with a retailer. The actions of the salesperson affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility as determined by retailer's trust. Our analysis reveals that, in such environments, although salespersons of widely varying types (e.g., honest, self‐serving, benevolent, loyal) lie some extent about their forecast information, they tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their forecasting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the profits of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a salesperson. Finally, we make the general observation that the appropriate salesperson compensation scheme depends on her social characteristics, and the specific observation that when the salesperson cares for the retailer, the linear compensation scheme commonly suggested in the literature as the optimal compensation scheme for the salesperson is no longer optimal.     

供应链提前期风险空间传递机理与控制策略

针对供应链结构特性,本文分析了供应链提前期风险在链状供应链上的空间传递机理;根据风险因素作用的特点,将提前期风险划分为节点企业自身提前期风险、物流延期风险和传递风险。在此基础上,构建了供应链提前期风险空间传递模型和供应链提前期风险控制机理框架,并提出了关键的控制策略;最后通过算例分析验证了模型的有效性。     

多个零售商情况下使用转移支付协调发生突发事件的供应链

考虑存在突发事件的供应链中使用转移支付合同协调供应链的问题.给出了按照时间顺序研究突发事件的两阶段模型,研究了可以协调该供应链的转移支付合同应满足的条件,给出了可以协调供应链的转移支付的表达式,分析了供应商两阶段最优决策变量以及决策变量大小与相关参数的关系.最后通过教例说明结论的有效.     

需求与回收确定下闭环供应链的竞争与链内协调研究

针对两条分别由单生产商和单零售商组成、零售商负责废品回收的闭环供应链,运用博弈论和均衡理论建立了对应两条闭环供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链一条为集中式供应链的带均衡约束的均衡（EPEC）模型、纳什（Nash）均衡模型和带均衡约束的优化（MPEC）模型,并进行了模型求解。对比三种模式表明：集中式控制是供应链竞争下的占优策略。随后,给出了两条供应链竞争下可协调分散式供应链达到集中式供应链效果的批发价加回收补贴契约。最后的数值算例和敏感性分析表明了模型的合理性、协调契约的有效性、以及相关参数的影响。     

第三方负责回收的再制造闭环供应链决策结构的效率分析

本文研究了第三方负责回收的再制造闭环供应链在不同决策结构下的供应链收益,以及与集成式"超组织"结构相比的效率损失。结果表明:回收物品的潜在期望收益是回收行为的驱动因素,期望的残余收益越大、回收价格越低,则越能激发回收行为努力且增加供应链成员企业收益;在分散式决策结构中,不论是生产商还是销售商占据市场地位,供应链效率损失不可避免;通过契约先谋求供应链的整体收益最大,然后根据约定的比例进行收益分享,是实现逆供应链成员"双赢"目的的有效策略。     

Value of Information in Closed Loop Supply Chains

We explore the value of information (VOI) in the context of a firm that faces uncertainty with respect to demand, product return, and product recovery (yield). The operational decision of interest in matching supply with demand is the quantity of new product to order. Our objective is to evaluate the VOI from reducing one or more types of uncertainties, where value is measured by the reduction in total expected holding and shortage costs. We start with a single period model with normally distributed demands and returns, and restrict the analysis to the value of full information (VOFI) on one or more types of uncertainty. We develop estimators that are predictive of the value and sensitivity of (combinations of) different information types. We find that there is no dominance in value amongst the different types of information, and that there is an additional pay‐off from investing in more than one type. We then extend our analysis to the multi‐period case, where returns in a period are correlated with demands in the previous period, and study the value of partial information (VOPI) as well as full information. We demonstrate that our results from the single period model (adapted for VOPI) carry‐over exactly. Furthermore, a comparison with uniformly distributed demand and return show that these results are robust with respect to distributional assumptions.     

基于价格博弈的闭环供应链协调策略设计

分析了两阶段闭环供应链中上下游双方在批发价格、零售价格以及各自产品回收价格的决策问题上的主从博弈过程,严格证明了Stackelberg均衡解在分散决策与集中决策两种模式下的存在性与唯一性,并分别给出了均衡解的具体形式,即实现了决策者以及供应链利润最优的相应定价方案.在此基础上,设计了在供应链实践中具有可操作性的、能够实现供应链协调的两阶段关税策略与批量折扣策略,给出了这两种策略的具体形式,并严格证明了协调策略的有效性.最后对一个案例进行了分析,验证了前述结论.