Gendering fertility: Second births in Sweden and Hungary

With the growing prevalence of the dual-earner family model in industrialized countries the gendered nature of the relationship between employment and parenting has become a key issue for childbearing decisions and behavior. In such a context taking into account the societal gender structure (public policies, family-level gender relations) explicitly can enhance our understanding of contemporary fertility trends. In this paper we study the second birth, given its increasing importance in the developed world as large proportions of women remain childless or bear only one child. We focus on Sweden where gender equality is pronounced at both the societal and the family level and on Hungary where the dual-earner model has been accompanied by traditional gender relations in the home sphere. Our analysis is based on data extracted from the Swedish and Hungarian Fertility and Family Surveys of 1992/93. We use the method of hazard regression. The results suggest that the second-birth intensity increases as the combination of parenthood and labor-force attachment of either parent is facilitated. We see this in the effect of family policies in Sweden and in the higher second-birth intensity of couples who share family responsibilities as compared to those with traditional gender-role behavior in both countries. Also, the lack of any visible impact of men's educational attainment in both Sweden and Hungary is probably linked to public policies as state support for families with children has reduced the importance of income for second childbearing. A positive educational gradient for Swedish women and an essentially zero gradient in Hungary reflects the success of policy measures in reducing fertility cost for more educated women in both countries.     

On the tempo of childbearing in England and Wales

Abstract The paper describes a computerized model developed to simulate the fertility of a hypothetical marriage cohort in a closed population. The model was applied to England and Wales fertility data of marriage cohorts of the years 1951 to 1970. For each of these cohorts, the computer was programmed to construct five series of tables showing birth-order probabilities, family size frequency distribution, mean length of intervals between marriage and successive births, parity progression ratios and mean family sizes of fertile women. The results showed that the fertility of the cohorts of women who married between the middle 1950s and the early 1960s was character ized by a declining trend in the frequency of childlessness and by a dramatic increase in the proportion of marriages with two or more children. Since 1964 or so, there has been a downward trend in duration-specific birth-order probabilities. The analysis suggests that the recent drop in fertility may well prove to be the effect of an upward shift in the timing of births as well as a fall in completed fertility.     

Does family policy affect fertility?

From the mid-1960s to around 1980, Sweden extended its family policies that provide financial and in-kind support to families with children very quickly. The benefits were closely tied to previous work experience. Thus, women born in the 1950s faced markedly different incentives when making fertility choices compared to women born only 15–20 years earlier. This paper examines the evolution of completed fertility patterns for Swedish women born in 1925–1958 and makes comparisons to women in neighbouring countries where the policies were not extended as much as in Sweden. The results suggest that the extension of the policy raised the level of fertility, shortened the spacing of births, and induced fluctuations in the period fertility rates, but it did not change the negative relationship between women’s educational level and completed fertility.     

The TFR and birth control]

Total fertility rate if (TFR) is a simple an straight forward measure of women's fertility. However, it is difficult to use the TFR as a target measure in FP programs. If TFR level is set as a target for a particular year, how can women's fertility be regulated to achieve this target? The following analysis suggests a simple model to control the proportion of birth parity. First, the TFR is decomposed into a parity- specific TFR. The parity-specific TFR can be worked out using coefficients of the regression models calculated from data of previous fertility surveys. Once the TFR is given, the parity-specific total fertility can be calculated using a model with coefficients from empirical data. Then the number of births of each parity may be calculated from the parity-specific TFR using the female age structure in a particular year, the survival probability, and the standard fertility model for each parity. When the number of surviving children of each women at child-bearing age is known, the desired proportion of births of each parity can be calculated using the standard birth probability during a years. From these models, it would be possible to calculate how many women can have their first child/year, and how many can have the second. Thus, family planning organizations would be in a position to formulate a birth quota on the basis of the above information.     

Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Neighbours,Religion and Education

Individual fertility preference is influenced by observed social norms. The present paper investigates the effect of the observed fertility of peers on a woman’s fertility preference. We explore the role of two peer groups: neighbourhood peers and religious peers. Data from the National Family Health Surveys (1992–1993, 1998–1999 and 2005–2006) in India is employed for empirical estimations using a multinomial logit model. We find that both neighbourhood and religious peers have a significant impact on individual fertility preferences, but their relative importance changes with family size. An increase in peer fertility increases the probability of preferring more children. We further examine the roles of education and wealth as transmission channels between the fertility norms of peers to the fertility preferences of the women and find that education plays an important role in moderating peer influences. These findings can serve as vital inputs in formulating family planning and gender policies.     

The impact of family policy expenditure on fertility in western Europe

This article analyzes the impact on fertility of changes in national expenditure for family allowances, maternity- and parental-leave benefits, and childcare subsidies. To do so, I estimate a model for the timing of births using individual-level data from 16 western European countries, supplemented with data on national social expenditure for different family policy programs. The latter allow approximation of the subsidies that households with children receive from such programs. The results show that increased expenditure on family policy programs that help women to combine family and employment-and thus reduce the opportunity cost of children—generates positive fertility responses.     

A probability mixture model of completed parity

This research was designed to find a probability model that would adequately describe completed parity for women in populations characterized by high fertility combined with high zero parity. A negative binomial mixture distribution was adapted for this purpose. The form of this distribution suggests the hypothesis that human populations consist of two subgroups of women with respect to completed parity, defined according to whether they do or do not produce viable offspring. Results of the present research further suggest that the proposed distribution for completed parity has general applicability across human populations, whether they are of a high or low fertility type, and whether they have a high or low zero parity.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.     

Rural-urban fertility differentials in Western Nigeria

Abstract The paper attempts to glean some information on differential fertility from data obtained in a survey of selected urban and rural communities in Western Nigeria. The results show that the attitudes of rural women are far more favourable to high fertility than those of urban women, though for both groups the modal number of children preferred is five or six. The analysis also yields a total fertility of nearly six and an average family size of about five for both groups. No conclusive evidence of rural-urban fertility differentials has, however, been found. All that can be said on the basis of the available data is that the level of fertility in Western Nigeria is currently very high and that urban fertility is probably as high as rural fertility, though the probability of much larger errors in the rural than in the urban data may imply somewhat higher rural fertility.     

Planned fertility and family background: a quantile regression for counts analysis

This paper examines how education and family background affect the fertility plans of young individuals in Mexico. Quantile regression for count data is used for the analysis. Results indicate that education and family structure affect planned fertility only at the tails of the conditional distribution. Education reduces planned fertility only among women with relatively strong preferences towards children. An absent father reduces planned fertility mostly at the bottom of the conditional distribution.

Union Instability as an Engine of Fertility? A Microsimulation Model for France

Opportunities for conceiving and bearing children are fewer when unions are not formed or are dissolved during the childbearing years. At the same time, union instability produces a pool of persons who may enter new partnerships and have additional children in stepfamilies. The balance between these two opposing forces and their implications for fertility may depend on the timing of union formation and parenthood. In this article, we estimate models of childbearing, union formation, and union dissolution for female respondents to the 1999 French Etude de l’Histoire Familiale. Model parameters are applied in microsimulations of completed family size. We find that a population of women whose first unions dissolve during the childbearing years will end up with smaller families, on average, than a population in which all unions remain intact. Because new partnerships encourage higher parity progressions, repartnering minimizes the fertility gap between populations with and those without union dissolution. Differences between the two populations are much smaller when family formation is postponed—that is, when union formation and dissolution or first birth occurs after age 30, or when couples delay childbearing after union formation.     

To have or not to have? Australian women’s childbearing desires,expectations and outcomes

Australia’s low fertility rate is commonly attributed to deliberate decisions by women to avoid having children. Existing theoretical explanations of fertility decision-making mostly view childbearing as a rational, voluntary process and focus on the ‘costs’ to women of having children. Although this may help explain why women do not have children, it contributes very little to understanding why women do have children. This study describes childbearing desires, expectations and outcomes in a population-based sample of 569 30–34-years-old Australian women recruited from the Australian Electoral Roll in 2005. Most women surveyed wanted to have children, and their childbearing outcomes were associated with biological, psychological and social factors including the lack of a partner and adverse health conditions. The factors and their relative importance varied by parity. Most women had fewer children than they desired, and many would have children, or more children, if their circumstances were different. These data challenge prevailing assumptions about women’s childbearing behaviour that women are able to choose when and if they have a child. Based on the findings, a conceptual framework of childbearing behaviour is proposed which builds on existing theoretical explanations to explain why women do and do not have children, differences by parity, and the role of circumstances in women’s childbearing behaviour. The findings and conceptual framework have implications for public policies, and indicate that multiple approaches are required which are sensitive to and address the barriers women face in family formation.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.     

Do Cross-National Differences in the Costs of Children Generate Cross-National Differences in Fertility Rates?

Parity-specific probabilities of having a next birth are estimated from national fertility data and are compared with nation-specific costs of having children as measured by time-budget data, by attitude data from the International Social Survey Program, and by panel data on labor earnings and standard of living changes following a birth. We focus on five countries (the United States, the former West Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom), whose fertility rates span the observed fertility range in the contemporary industrialized world and whose social welfare and family policies span the conceptual space of standard welfare-state typologies. Definitive conclusions are difficult because of the multiple dimensions on which child costs can be measured, the possibility that child costs affect both the quantum and the tempo of fertility, the relatively small fertility differences across industrialized nations, and the inherent small-N problem resulting from nation-level comparisons. Empirical analysis, however, supports the assertion that institutionally driven child costs affect the fertility patterns of industrialized nations.     

Lifetime probability of additional births by age and parity for American women, 1935–1968: A new measurement of period fertility

A new fertility measurement, probability that a woman of specified parity and age will bear a given number of births in her remaining lifetime, is proposed in this article. The measurement is a summary index of a set of age-parity-specific birth probabilities and in a particular case it is conceptually analogous to the total fertility by birth order but free from the influence of the parity distribution. Fertility of American women for the period 1935-1968 was studied by use of such lifetime probabilities. It appears that the trend of fertility of high birth orders has been parallel with that of low orders. Initiation of the recent decline in fertility depends on parity and age of woman.     

Medicaid Expansions and Fertility in the United States

Beginning in the mid-1980s and extending through the early to mid-1990s, a substantial number of women and children in the United States gained eligibility for Medicaid through a series of income-based expansions. Using natality data from the National Center for Health Statistics, we estimate fertility responses to these eligibility expansions. We follow Currie and Gruber (2001) and measure changes in state Medicaid-eligibility policy by simulating the fraction of a standard population that would qualify for benefits in different states and different time periods. From 1985 to 1996, the fraction of women aged 15–44 who were eligible for Medicaid coverage for a pregnancy increased more than 20 percentage points. When we use a state and year fixed-effects model with a limited set of covariates, our estimates indicate that fertility increases in response to Medicaid expansions. However, after we include fixed effects for demographic characteristics, the estimated relationship diminishes substantially in size and is no longer statistically significant. We conclude that there is no robust relationship between Medicaid expansions and fertility.     

Outsourcing of Housework and the Transition to a Second Birth in Germany

The struggle that women face in reconciling their work and family roles is one of the main explanations proposed for the rapid decline in fertility rates in some developed countries. This study examines the role of the outsourcing of housework in reducing such role incompatibility and in increasing fertility among women in Germany—a country with below-replacement fertility rates, which enacted a series of large-scale schemes from the beginning of the 1990s that give incentives to households to outsource housework. Based on Goode’s role strain theory and by using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this study analyzed whether women who outsourced housework after the birth of their first child had a higher probability of having a second child. A survival analysis of 3990 person years demonstrates that, controlling for observables, the outsourcing of domestic labor is positively associated with a higher probability of a subsequent second birth in German women.