Leader corruption depends on power and testosterone

We used incentivized experimental games to manipulate leader power — the number of followers and the discretion leaders had to enforce their will. Leaders had complete autonomy in deciding payouts to themselves and their followers. Although leaders could make prosocial decisions to benefit the public good they could also abuse their power by invoking antisocial decisions, which reduced the total payouts to the group but increased the leaders' earnings. In Study 1 (N = 478), we found that both amount of followers and discretionary choices independently predicted leader corruption. In Study 2 (N = 240), we examined how power and individual differences (e.g., personality, hormones) affected leader corruption over time; power interacted with endogenous testosterone in predicting corruption, which was highest when leader power and baseline testosterone were both high. Honesty predicted initial level of leader antisocial decisions; however, honesty did not shield leaders from the corruptive effect of power.     

All risk-taking is not the same: examining the competing effects of firm risk-taking with meta-analysis

Although researchers have vigorously studied organizational risk-taking for over 35 years, relatively little emphasis has been placed on theoretically differentiating the unique relationships between the many risk-taking choices organizations make and firm risk or firm performance. In this research, we propose a new framework that builds from March’s exploration–exploitation model to argue that different risk-taking choices can have substantially different influences on firm outcomes. We use meta-analysis to examine the unique and at times competing effects of four of the most commonly studied risk-taking choices on firm risk and firm performance. Results from a meta-analysis of 257 unique studies (N = 499,808) demonstrate support for our proposed framework and cast significant doubt on the idea that commonly studied firm risk-taking choices theoretically aggregate into one overarching risk-taking construct.     

Leader decision speed as a signal of honesty

Decision speed is emerging as an important topic to organizations, yet its consequences for leaders have received little research attention. The present research builds on this notion by examining how the speed with which leaders come to decisions shapes observers' perceptions and behaviors. In three incentivized experiments, participants evaluated leaders who decided whether to include or exclude followers from participating in consequential decisions. Leaders were seen as more honest when they were fast (vs. slow) to include followers, but as less honest when they were fast (vs. slow) to exclude followers from decisions. These perceptions influenced several key outcomes: the willingness to reward leaders (Experiment 1) and the willingness to cooperate with leaders (Experiment 3). Consistent with a signaling perspective, these effects disappeared when observers learned that leaders were externally pressed to decide quickly or slowly (Experiment 2). The present research offers new insights into the cues that people use when judging leaders' decision-making processes, and the behavioral consequences of these judgments.     

连锁股东对企业风险承担的影响研究

以中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验连锁股东对企业风险承担的影响。研究发现:连锁股东能够发挥监督效应、信息效应和资源效应,从而提升企业风险承担;在行业竞争程度较高和经济政策不确定性较低的情境下,连锁股东对企业风险承担的积极效应更显著;相较于国有连锁股东,机构和外资连锁股东更有助于提升企业风险承担;虽然连锁股东持股有助于提升企业风险承担,但连锁股东委派董事的过度监督效应降低了企业风险承担;经济后果检验发现,连锁股东通过提升企业风险承担进而提升了企业价值。     

Does power corrupt the mind? The influence of power on moral reasoning and self-interested behavior

We test whether leaders' power shapes their reasoning about moral issues and whether such moral reasoning subsequently influences leaders' display of self-interested behavior. We use an incentivized experiment to manipulate two components of leader power: power over more versus fewer followers and power to enforce one's will by having discretion over more versus fewer payout options to allocate between oneself and one's followers. We find that having power over more followers decreased leaders' principled moral reasoning, whereas having higher power to enforce one's will enabled leaders to engage in self-interested behavior. We also find suggestive evidence that power over increases self-interested behavior by decreasing principled moral reasoning; the effect of power to was not mediated by moral reasoning. These results illustrate that power activates self-interest within and outside the context in which power is held. They also show that moral reasoning is not a stable cognitive process, but that it might represent an additional path via which power affects self-interested behavior.     

The role,power and influence of company chairs

This paper develops an analytical framework to depict the heterogeneity that characterises the role of board chair and demonstrate the potential variability in how chairs operate boards and exercise power and influence on strategy, control and resource related tasks at board level. Theories of power and influence, as applied to top management teams and boards of directors, are explicated within the context of contemporary governance practices that are establishing the role of the board chair as distinct to that of the chief executive officer. Specifically, the paper maps sources of power and varying contemporary chair practices, including chair nomenclature (i.e. executive vs. non-executive chairs), chair origin (insider vs. outsider) and chair time (full-time vs. part-time). A number of theoretical chair-power models emerge from this analysis and are subject to empirical analysis using data collected from 160 chairs of 500 FTSE-listed companies. Theoretically and empirically, the paper complements structural approaches to studying boards with attention to behaviour on boards. By linking board structure, board process and the exercise of influence, the study reveals both differences amongst chairs in how they run the board, but also that chairs’ differ in the influence they exert on board-related tasks. Full-time executive chairs exert their greatest influence in strategy and resource dependence tasks whereas part-time, non-executive chairs seem to exert more influence over monitoring and control tasks.     

Fairness in Selling to the Newsvendor

This paper studies the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance (SCP) in the two‐party newsvendor setting. We extend prior fairness analysis to a wide range of demand distributions, and also allow the degree and definition of fairness to assume a broader range of preferences than those in prior literature. Contrary to prior literature, we find that if the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is not sufficiently large, regardless of demand variability, a fair‐minded retailer makes no difference to system efficiency when facing a traditional profit‐maximizing supplier. Only when the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is above a threshold can the retailer's fairness concern improve the system efficiency for sufficiently high demand uncertainty. In order for the retailer's fairness concern to improve expected profits of both parties compared to the traditional supply chain case (win–win), the demand uncertainty cannot be too low, the retailer is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity, and his ideal allocation to the supplier is within a specific range. If only the supplier is concerned for fairness, the results range from worsening to improving (but not coordinating) the system and a win–win situation is impossible. Finally, when both the supplier and retailer are fair‐minded, SCP is improved unless both parties prefer to allocate small portions of system profit to the other. Again, win–win will be achieved only when the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high, the retailer's ideal allocation is within a certain range, and he is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity.     

针对存在传染效应突发事件的资源布局问题研究

本文针对一类具有传染效应的突发事件建立资源布局模型。具有传染效应的突发事件是指在某地区发生事件,在其周围一定距离内的其他地区也会发生同类事件。对初始发生事件供应不同的资源将影响到其他地区的资源需求,因此整个地区的资源需求表现为多个需求组合。本文建立的模型考虑到某个地点发生事件带来的多种资源需求组合,将问题分为两个阶段进行分析,并同时考虑选址和资源配置来满足该地区发生事件需求以及引发的其他地区的资源需求。针对此模型,构造两层的禁忌搜索算法,并在最后给出算例。     

Pricing,Allocation, and Overbooking in Dynamic Service Network Competition When Demand Is Uncertain

We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well‐known off‐the‐shelf commercial software.     

Toward an Understanding of the Influence of Cultural Background and Domain Experience on the Effects of Risk‐Pricing Formats on Risk Perception

Risk‐information framing can be a powerful tool for aiding the communication of risk and improving decision making. However, little work has investigated the extent that these framing effects depend on the characteristics of the perceiver. In our study, we examine whether the effects of different risk‐pricing formats on risky choices are the same for all individuals, no matter their domain experience or cultural background, or whether there are interactions between these factors. Survey 1 revealed that three risk‐pricing formats of the same choice problem resulted in the same individuals making different risky choices (preference reversal), suggesting that risk perception was distorted by the risk‐pricing format manipulation. In Survey 2, the effects of the risk‐pricing formats were shown to differ by the participants’ cultural background (Asian vs. European) and the extent of their domain experience. The fact that there were no differences between the cultural or domain experience groups in their overall tendency to select riskier (cf. safer) choices indicates that risk behavior differences between groups are often closely linked to perceptual, rather than simply attitudinal, cognitive processes. The results demonstrate the complex, interactive cognitive processes that are used to encode risk information, involving the framing of the information and the cultural background and previous experiences of the individual. We conclude that it is important to consider the characteristics of the individual (e.g., culture, domain experience, etc.) when manipulating risk‐information framing with the aim of improving risk communication.     

A Cooperative Savings Game Approach to a Time Sensitive Capacity Allocation and Scheduling Problem

We consider a competitive scheduling setting with arbitrary number of agents each having the option to utilize two parallel resources to satisfy its demand: (i) an in‐house resource dedicated to process only the tasks of each specific agent, and (ii) a flexible resource capable of processing all agents' workloads. In a noncooperative setting, each agent would determine how much of its demand it will subcontract to the flexible resource with the objective to deliver its entire demand as quickly as possible subject to the priority rules set by the owner of the flexible resource (i.e., third‐party). In this study, we also allow for agents to coalesce with other agents and update their initial subcontracting decisions to attain rescheduling savings. Evidently, a grand coalition of all agents can coordinate to achieve the maximum savings possible, but the resulting schedule may yield individual losses for a subset of agents (which we refer to as “losers”), thus necessitating a transfer payment scheme to distribute the rescheduling savings among the agents in an equitable way. We model the rescheduling interactions among the agents as a cooperative savings game, and propose savings distribution schemes that invoke the core allocation concept.     

COMMON COMPONENTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ATTITUDES ACROSS CONTEXTS AND DOMAINS: EVIDENCE FROM 30 COUNTRIES

Attitudes towards risk and uncertainty have been indicated to be highly context‐dependent, and to be sensitive to the measurement technique employed. We present data collected in controlled experiments with 2,939 subjects in 30 countries measuring risk and uncertainty attitudes through incentivized measures as well as survey questions. Our data show clearly that measures correlate not only within decision contexts or measurement methods, but also across contexts and methods. This points to the existence of one underlying “risk preference”, which influences attitudes independently of the measurement method or choice domain. We furthermore find that answers to a general and a financial survey question correlate with incentivized lottery choices in most countries. Incentivized and survey measures also correlate significantly between countries. This opens the possibility to conduct cultural comparisons on risk attitudes using survey instruments.     

Impartiality,Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice

The ethic of priority is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of outcome equality and the needs‐blind ethic of resource equality. We propose an axiom of priority and characterize resource‐allocation rules that are impartial, prioritarian, and solidaristic. They comprise a class of rules that equalize across individuals some index of outcome and resources. Consequently, we provide an ethical rationalization for the many applications in which such indices have been used (e.g., the human development index, the index of primary goods, etc.).     

Robust allocation of a defensive budget considering an attacker's private information

Attackers' private information is one of the main issues in defensive resource allocation games in homeland security. The outcome of a defense resource allocation decision critically depends on the accuracy of estimations about the attacker's attributes. However, terrorists' goals may be unknown to the defender, necessitating robust decisions by the defender. This article develops a robust-optimization game-theoretical model for identifying optimal defense resource allocation strategies for a rational defender facing a strategic attacker while the attacker's valuation of targets, being the most critical attribute of the attacker, is unknown but belongs to bounded distribution-free intervals. To our best knowledge, no previous research has applied robust optimization in homeland security resource allocation when uncertainty is defined in bounded distribution-free intervals. The key features of our model include (1) modeling uncertainty in attackers' attributes, where uncertainty is characterized by bounded intervals; (2) finding the robust-optimization equilibrium for the defender using concepts dealing with budget of uncertainty and price of robustness; and (3) applying the proposed model to real data.     

Indulgence and risk-taking behavior of firms: Direct and interactive influences

This study examines the impact of Hofstede's indulgence vs restraint national culture dimension (IVR) on firms' risk-taking behavior. We argue that firms in more indulgent societies will show greater risk-taking behavior given their tendencies to be less rigid and their greater inclination for discounting risk-taking losses. We further argue that the buffers that slack resources provide against risk-taking losses and the positive expectations of potential gains from risk-taking provided by growth opportunities will further increase firms' risk-taking behavior when interacting with indulgence mechanisms. Our findings from a 37-country study support these arguments. They show that high indulgence does increase firms' risk-taking behavior and slack resources and growth opportunities intensify this causal effect. Tests of three-way interactions further reveal that the positive impact of indulgence on firms' risk-taking behavior is strongest when both slack resources are abundant and the growth opportunities are high. We extend current knowledge about culture's effect on firm behavior.     

The dysfunctions of power in teams: A review and emergent conflict perspective

We review the new and growing body of work on power in teams and use this review to develop an emergent theory of how power impacts team outcomes. Our paper offers three primary contributions. First, our review highlights potentially incorrect assumptions that have arisen around the topic of power in teams and documents the areas and findings that appear most robust in explaining the effects of power on teams. Second, we contrast the findings of this review with what is known about the effects of power on individuals and highlight the directionally oppositional effects of power that emerge across different levels of analysis. Third, we integrate findings across levels of analysis into an emergent theory which explains why and when the benefits of power for individuals may paradoxically explain the potentially negative effects of power on team outcomes. We elaborate on how individual social comparisons within teams where at least one member has power increase intra-team power sensitivity, which we define as a state in which team members are excessively perceptive of, affected by, and responsive to resources. We theorize that when power-sensitized teams experience resource threats (either stemming from external threats or personal threats within the team), these threats will ignite internal power sensitivities and set into play performance-detracting intra-team power struggles. This conflict account of power in teams integrates and organizes past findings in this area to explain why and when power negatively affects team-level outcomes, and opens the door for future research to better understand why and when power may benefit team outcomes when power’s dark side for teams is removed.     

Robust,multi-objective optimization for the military medical evacuation location-allocation problem

Determining where to locate mobile aeromedical staging facilities (MASFs) as well as identifying how many aeromedical helicopters to allocate to each MASF, commonly referred to as the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) location-allocation problem, is vital to the success of a deployed MEDEVAC system. Within this research, we develop an integer mathematical programming formulation to determine the location and allocation of MEDEVAC assets over the phases of a military deployment to support operations ranging from peacekeeping through combat to post-combat resolution. Our model seeks to address the multi-objective problem of maximizing the expected demand coverage as a measure of solution effectiveness, minimizing the maximum number of located MASFs in any deployment phase as a measure of solution efficiency, and minimizing the total number of MASF relocations throughout the deployment as a measure of solution robustness. This research makes two contributions. First, it formulates a representative mathematical programming formulation and identifies an accompanying solution methodology (i.e., the ε-constraint Method) to assess and recommend improvements to deployed military MEDEVAC systems designed to provide large-scale emergency medical response for contingency operations that range in casualty-inducing intensity (i.e., demand) over the phases of a deployment. Second, the research illustrates the application of the model for a realistic, synthetically generated medical planning scenario in southern Azerbaijan. Comparisons are made between the model’s (multi-phase) optimal solution and the phase-specific optimal solutions that disregard concerns of transitions between phases. The results highlight the conflicting nature between the objectives and illustrate the trade-offs between objectives as restrictions applied to the second and third objectives are respectively tightened or relaxed.     

With or Without Forecast Sharing: Competition and Credibility under Information Asymmetry

Forecast sharing among trading partners lies at the heart of many collaborative and contractual supply chain management efforts. Even though it has been praised in both academic and practitioner circles for its critical role in increasing demand visibility, some concerns remain: The first one is related to the credibility of forecast sharing, and the second is the fear that it may turn into a competitive disadvantage and induce suppliers to increase their price offerings. In this study, we explore the validity of these concerns under a supply chain with a competitive upstream structure, focusing specifically on (i) when and how a credible forecast sharing can be sustainable, and (ii) how it impacts on the intensity of price competition. To address these issues, we develop a supply chain model with a buyer facing a demand risk and two heterogeneous suppliers competing for order allocation from the buyer. The extent of demand is known only to the buyer. The buyer submits a buying request to the suppliers via a commonly used procurement mechanism called request for quotation (RFQ). We consider two variants of RFQ. In the first type, the buyer simply shares the estimated order quantity with no further specifications. In the second one, in addition to this, the buyer also specifies minimum and/or maximum order quantities. We fully characterize equilibrium decisions and profits associated with them under symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Our main findings are that the buyer can use a RFQ with quantity restrictions as a credible signal for forecast sharing as long as the degree of demand information asymmetry is not too high, and that, contrary to above concerns, the equilibrium prices that emerge between competing suppliers under asymmetric information may indeed increase if the buyer cannot share forecast information credibly with its upstream partners.