Durkheim,Schopenhauer and the Relationship Between Goals and Means: Reversing the Assumptions in the Parsonian Theory of Rational Action*

Scholars have approached Durkheim's thought primarily from the starting point that he was a positivist. Although Schopenhauer's philosophy is not generally invoked in Durkheim's work, it appears that Schopenhauer's philosophy supplanted Comte's positivism at the turn of the century and that Durkheim was enamored with Schopenhauer's philosophy. In this essay Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim is traced, and the implications of this influence are discussed in terms of their effect upon sociology. By applying this starting point to Durkheim's thought and the Parsonian-Mertonian goals-means schema, it is demonstrated that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, assumed the opposite of the Enlightenment belief that human reason could dominate passion. Implications for interpreting Durkheim's work are also discussed.     

Moral theory based on the ‘heart’versus the ‘mind’: Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics

Schopenhauer criticized Kant's moral theory on the grounds that it was non-empirical and inadequate, because it attempted to establish morality on the basis of reason and duty. Contrary to Kant, Schopenhauer argued that genuine morality is irrational, based on compassion, and a human product, hence that it could be studied empirically. Schopenhauer established the ‘science of morality’which occupied the attention of a host of turn of the century precursors of the social sciences, especially Durkheim. Durkheim's version of the science of moral facts is compared and contrasted with Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, and it is demonstrated that Durkheim tends to follow Schopenhauer's lead. Problems with Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's critiques of Kantian ethics are also discussed.     

Searching for the Starting Points of Scientific Inquiry: Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method and Schopenhauer's Philosophy*

Durkheim's methodological classic is frequently read from Kantian, positivistic, or other Enlightenment contexts despite the fact that Durkheim criticizes these doctrines. Durkheim also tends to be read as a deductive analyst. Using Schopenhauer's philosophy as an alternative starting point in reading the Rules, it is demonstrated that Schopenhauer and Durkheim agree that perceptual, inductive knowledge of “things” is superior to conceptual, deductive knowledge; that causal explanations are merely phenomenal; and that the one, well-designed experiment is sufficient for the establishment of scientific laws. Durkheim's distinction between the normal and the pathological is also addressed in this context. The implications of Durkheim's focus on induction are discussed with regard to its similarity to the works of Claude Bernard, Florian Znaniecki, and Max Weber, as well as current epistemological crises in sociology.     

Emotions, embodiment and the sensation of society

The study of emotions has attracted an increased amount of attention from mainstream sociologists in recent years, both because of its potential to provide an added dimension to the analysis of such subjects as social conflict, gender inequalities and the organisation of the workplace, and as a result of its relevance to theoretical and methodological debates which have long characterised the discipline. This paper suggests that some of the core questions facing this subject can be interrogated productively by engaging critically with the work of one of the most important ‘founding figures’ of the discipline, Emile Durkheim. What Collins (1988) refers to as the ‘underground wing’ of Durkheim's work has yet to be fully utilised or developed by sociologists concerned with emotions, yet it provides us with a suggestive and provocative means of reconceptualising the gulf that often exists within contemporary work on emotions as malleable and controllable, on the one hand, and that concerned with emotions as intransigent ‘somatic states of being’, on the other. As such, Durkheim's writings constitute an important resource for sociologists concerned with the ongoing project of ‘embodying’ the discipline.     

Fetishes and factishes: Durkheim and Latour

This paper defends the concept of ‘fetishism’ as an explanatory parameter in sociological theorizing on Durkheimian grounds, while at the same time paying due attention to important insights regarding the role of objects in social life, originating from Actor‐Network Theory (ANT). It critically assesses the current critique of the concept of fetishism propagated by ANT protagonist Bruno Latour. Latour and suggests a compromise between these two ‘schools’. First, to place the paper firmly in context, I analyse some examples of modern fetishism and outline the themes of the ensuing discussion. Next, I turn to Durkheim, seeking to develop a distinct interpretation of the concept of the social and of fetishism, and then point to some of Durkheim's shortcomings and attempt to make room for Latourian perspectives. Finally, I critically assess Latour's dismissal of forms of social ‘explanation’ and of the concept of fetishism.     

Theorizing the social: Émile Durkheim's theory of force and energy

This paper offers a new interpretation of Émile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) as the basis for reconsidering the Tarde–Durkheim debate of 1903 and the distinctions between a theory of social force and a theory of social assemblage. Resisting traditional interpretations of Durkheim's scientism, this essay traces how concepts of force and energy are centrally developed in Elementary Forms to draw new lines between epistemology to ontology for twentieth-century theory. I argue that Durkheim develops an ‘energetic epistemology’ that conceives of the human capacity for shared meaning as a product of invested energy in the form of continually enacted and evolving material practice, thought, and attention. According to Durkheim, when a member of a collective perceives a god or feels belief, he or she actually perceives the accumulated energy of on-going creation and maintenance of objects and ideas by members of a collective. Sacred objects, images, and ideas bear the trace of collective energy the more they are carefully crafted, maintained in spaces that are specially arranged, and written into behavioural codes. This reading of Durkheim allows us to consider him in a lineage of social constructivists and, particularly, in relation to Ludwik Fleck, who has been largely confined to different theoretical discussions when his contributions to sociology have been acknowledged at all. By reconsidering Durkheim, we have occasion to rethink his sociology and understand how he redrew the lines between thought and action, between epistemology and ontology, through the material framework of energy and force.     

Durkheim on Religion and Moral Community in Modernity*

Durkheim's theory of religion is approached from the perspective of his lifelong concern with the question of meaning and moral order in modern society. This emphasis naturally leads to a consideration of wider themes informing Durkheim's sociology of religion than are usually found in analyses focusing exclusively on his treatment of primitive religion in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1964). Durkheim sees as the distinguishing feature of modernity the progressive emancipation of the individual from traditional sources of influence. The evolution toward greater individuation, culminating in the “cult of the individual” or “religion of humanity,” is set by Durkheim within the context of the role of collective ideals in promoting social change and in the maintenance of moral order. Religion, the major symbolic expression of societal wide ideals, is identified as the key variable which enables Durkheim to reconcile the competing demands of individuals for freedom with the interests of society in collective welfare.     

Durkheim's cult of the individual as civil religion: Its appropriation by Erving Goffman

The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of the place of Durkheim's “cult of the individual” in Erving Goffman's sociology.¹ I have reviewed the most pertinent aspects of Durkheim's sociology of religion. This article discusses and/or analyzes the development of the cult of the individual primarily within the context of Durkheim's (1951) monograph on suicide; Durkheim's notions of sacred, profane, and ritual; Goffman's two‐pronged intellectual heritage; and Goffman's “Communication Conduct in an Island Community” (1953) with respect to several key Durkheimian concepts. Also discussed are several important secondary analyses—primarily those of Jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman—which help to further delineate the conditions of the Durkheim‐Goffman link. The final section applies Goffman's sociology to the case of Evangelicalism and “political civility.”     

Bosanquet's social theory of the state

Bosanquet's political philosophy was a social theory of the function of the State as ‘hinderer of hindrances to the best life’, where individual development was supported by relationships within a community. This was worked out in the context of considerable knowledge of conditions among the London poor at the turn of the century, and reinforced by his wife's practical work and research. He sympathized with Durkheim's pioneering sociology, and was in contact with him through the Sociological Society. His ‘New Liberal’approach, seeing problems of poverty as to be met by informed charitable activity, was restricted by insufficient recognition of the structural aspects of social problems and conflicts. The bearing of his Idealist Metaphysics is critically considered, and it is claimed that, although a good deal of this may not be acceptable, it gave a background to a kind of social thinking which is of interest to those looking for a communitarian type of political philosophy.     

Durkheim and individualism

Durkheim endorses moral and rejects methodological individualism. But he arrives at this ‘general position’via a particular development of it that runs into serious sociological, apart from any philosophical, trouble. It depends on an ethical relativism that in turn depends on an idea of society qua harmonious system, generating more or less practical aspirations, and a single appropriate, ‘normal’ morality. Yet modern society generates ideals quite unrealisable in it, and continuing, fundamental conflicts between moral doctrines and beliefs. To uphold central humanist, individualist ideals, we cannot rely on Durkheim's particular sociology or on his ethical relativism, and to defend his general position must unhook it from both.     

Durkheim and The Structure of Social Action*

The analysis of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action is integral to Parsons's discussion of the utilitarian-positivist tradition and the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action from it. The four “stages” of theoretical argument in Durkheim can be related directly to the four defining elements of the “utilitarian dilemma,” namely empiricism, rationality, atomism, and the randomness of ends. The most questionable aspect of Parsons's argument is the alleged stubbornness of Durkheim's empiricism. On the other hand, much of the criticism of Parsons's argument, by Pope in particular, although also by Scott and Warner, Is either misdirected or itself questionable. The development and conclusions of Durkheim's moral sociology are as Parsons claims, and form a viable basis for a non-positivist theory of action.     

Stjepan Metrović and Michel Maffesoli's 'implosive' defence of the Durkheimian tradition: theoretical convergences around Baudrillard's thesis on the 'end' of the social

This paper critically examines Metrovi? and Maffesoli's attempt to understand postmodernity through Émile Durkheim's nonrational link between society, religion and morality. Metrovi? (1991, 1997) and Maffesoli's (1996) work draws upon this emotional element when attempting to refute Baudrillard's (1983) cognitively focused, if implicit, critique of the Durkheimian tradition. Despite their best intentions, Metrovi? and Maffesoli still fail to exploit the partialities of Baudrillard's critique to the full. While both have some appreciation of the link between emotion and religion as found in Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) they, nevertheless, fall short of grasping its full conceptual importance. This leads them to an implicit acceptance of Baudrillard's thesis on the ‘end’ of the social. This pitfall could have been avoided if Metrovi? and Maffesoli had built their respective analyses of the postmodern condition on a closer reading of The Elementary Forms. Reading this text alongside those other insights on emotion and social life as contained within Durkheim and Mauss's Primitive Classification (1903) and Talcott Parsons's subsequent writings on the sociological problem of religion, would have helped to distance the work of Metrovi? and Maffesoli from that of Baudrillard, and allowed them to offer a stronger and more comprehensive defence of the said tradition.     

The positive science of ethics in France: German influences onDe la division du travail social

What was Durkheim doing—in the sense of an intended social action—in writing De la Division du travail social? At least a part of the answer is that Durkheim's project was linguistic—i.e., he was attempting to replace an outworn vocabulary of Cartesian metaphysics with a more Germanic lexicon—one in which simplicity gave way to complexity, the abstract to the concrete, the ideal to the real, deduction to induction, rationalism to empiricism, and so on. To some extent, this was motivated by the superiority—widely acknowledged among intellectuals of the Third Republic—of German science and Protestant scientific education. But an additional motivation was Durkheim's belief that only a real, concrete entity—society as a “thing” (chose)—could provide an object worthy of the veneration of the “new man” of the Republic. Durkheim's attempt to construct a science of social facts was therefore itself subsidiary to another, “higher” purpose—i.e., the construction of a moral authority (real, concrete, complex) adequate to the needs of the Third French Republic. Rather than an end in itself, Durkheim's sociology should thus be seen as a means to other ends—i.e., the “construction” of a particular kind of “fact”—within a specific social and historical context.     

DURKHEIM'S PREDICTION ABOUT THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE:

In 1912 Emile Durkheim predicted that testators would shift their beneficiaries in their last wills from their families to organizations as societies industrialized, primarily because the family would decline as an economic institution. This article analyzes and expands Durkheim's prediction into a “Durkheimian’ theory of organizational inheritance. The 429 last wills filed in the probate court of Providence, Rhode Island, from 1775–1985 are content analyzed in order to test Durkheim's prediction and to determine if other fundamental changes have occurred in testamentary behaviors. Contrary to Durkheim's prediction, families and kin remain as the beneficiaries in more than 90 percent of the sole beneficiary wills and in more than 80 percent of the combined beneficiary wills. Spouses, children, and grandchildren remain as the most frequent beneficiaries. Although many other types of beneficiaries besides family members and voluntary associations were named by testators in 1985, these other types accounted for a relatively small percentage of the beneficiaries. Other factors are suggested that could bring about widespread organizational inheritance during the next twenty years. The family was in the past better suited to ensure the continuity of economic life as well, because it was a small group in direct touch with things and people and also itself endowed with a genuine continuity. To-day this continuity no longer exists. The family is all the time in process of breaking up; it lasts only for a period and it may die out here and there. It no longer has sufficient power to link the generations one to another, in the economic sense. But only a secondary, fairly small medium can be a substitute. This can and should have greater scope than the family because the economic interests themselves have grown. It is not possible for any central organ to be everywhere present and everywhere active at the same moment. All these points, then persuade us in favour of the professional groups. -Emile Durkheim     

Organizing the organism: a re-casting of the bio-social interface for our times

I present a future-oriented look at sociology and anthropology's historical appropriation of the concept of organism. The ‘future’ of which I speak is one in which the biological and technological are blending together. In cultural and science studies, the figure of the ‘cyborg’ is often discussed in this context. But the cyborg tends to be treated as a specifically ‘postmodern’ innovation, whereas the organism has always invited the cyborg's ontological ambivalence. This sensibility goes back to the dawn of both the modern biomedical sciences and the social sciences. I begin on the relatively familiar terrain of the role that emerging medical conceptions of the organism in the mid-nineteenth century played in the formation of such founding figures of sociology and anthropology as Emile Durkheim and Franz Boas. I then move to the specific ‘relativization’ of Darwin's theory of evolution that fostered turn-of-the-century conceptions of the social organism, including that emergent entity, the ‘superorganism’, which figures prominently – albeit differently – in the attempts to characterize the uniquely ‘human’ character of culture and technology. Finally I look at one very explicitly ‘constructivist’ approach to the social organism promoted by the distinguished chemist Wilhelm Ostwald, who was in turn anathematized by Max Weber in one of the original episodes of sociology's disciplinary boundary maintenance. The pride of place that Ostwald gave to ‘catalysts’ in consolidating and enhancing social organisms – from business firms to academic disciplines – earns his perspective a second look in our time. I end with directions for further exploration, which include reviving Norbert Wiener's cybernetic vision.     

Anomic suicide: A Durkheimian analysis of European normlessness

ABSTRACT

According to Durkheim (1897), periods of economic, social, or political change result in a state of anomie or normlessness. Anomic periods lead to deregulation of desires and suffering. Durkheim hypothesized that, as an expression of suffering, societies and groups experience an increase in suicide rates. This paper provides two formal tests of Durkheim’s (1897) theory of anomie - a behavioral aggregate analysis and an attitudinal individual-level analysis - on the backdrop of the 2008 economic crash. The first analysis assesses the relationship between unemployment and suicide in the European Union between 2000 and 2010. Results provide conditional support for Durkheim's theory: suicide rates increased following the crash and decreased once economic stability resumed in 2010 for males only. A second attitudinal analysis identified factors contributing to the gendered relationship between anomie and suicide. Results indicated that traditional Durkheimian regulatory mechanisms, such as marriage and divorce, contributed to the gender-specific results.     

René Maunier (1915), Les idées sociologiques d’un philosophe arabe/The sociological ideas of an Arab philosopher in the 14th century

René Maunier (1887-1951) is usually considered to be the “founder” of “colonial sociology” in France. Much closer to the anthropologist Marcel Mauss than to the latter's uncle, Emile Durkheim, Maunier's academic career was largely connected to Arab countries like Egypt, and Algeria in particular, where he would teach for more than twenty years. Maunier's inclusion of Ibn Khaldûn into the history of sociology needs to be understood in line with the fact that at the time this article was published, the young Egyptian student Taha Hussein was beginning a thesis in France under the joint supervision of Durkheim and of the orientalist Paul Casanova. Defended in January 1918, three months after Durkheim's death, it was entitled Etude analytique et critique de la philosophie sociale d'Ibn Khaldoun (Analytic and critical study of Ibn Khaldoun's social philosophy).     

Suicide and Homo Duplex an Interpretation of Durkheim's Typology of Suicide*

The four types of suicide that Durkheim distinguished are implicit in his concept of homo duplex and the view of socialization this entailed. The individual requires both repression of his passions and direction toward society; too much or too little of either of these two processes leads to suicide and each of the four types represents one type of such failure in socialization. Internal evidence from Suiciae is used to show that Durkheim did in fact derive the suicide typology from his view of man. From the standpoint of this interpretation, those by Parsons and Douglas and by commentators who equate the anomic and egoistic suicide types are reviewed and their misunderstandings noted. Finally, the interpretation given is used to shed light on other aspects of Durkheim's thought, especially some that are disputed in the secondary literature.     

Separate but Equal: Durkheim's Response to the Woman Question*

This article reexamines Durkheim's views on gender relations within the context of nineteenth century French feminism. Durkheim's response to the woman question reflects the sociopolitical discourse on individual rights and responsibilities, the family, and women's roles in the private and public spheres. Durkheim's perspective on gender relations is predicated on a biologically differentiated conception of gender role complementarity that emphasizes the couple, not the individual. This perspective, shared by feminists, is best characterized by the phrase, separate, but equal.     

Reconsidering Durkheim's Assessment of Tarde: Formalizing a Tardian Theory of Imitation,Contagion, and Suicide Suggestion

Emile Durkheim summarily rejected Gabriel Tarde's imitation thesis, arguing that sociology need only concern itself with social suicide rates. Over a century later, a burgeoning body of suicide research has challenged Durkheim's claim to a general theory of suicide as 4 decades worth of evidence has firmly established that (1) there is a positive association between the publicization of celebrity suicides and a spike in the aggregate suicide rate, (2) some social environments are conducive to epidemic‐like outbreaks of suicides, and (3) suicidal ideas or behavior spreads to some individuals exposed to a personal role model's suicidal behavior—for example, a friend or family member. Revisiting Tarde, the article examines why Tarde's theory deserves renewed attention, elucidates what he meant by imitation, and then formalizes his “laws” into testable theses, while suggesting future research questions that would advance the study of suicide, as well as other pathologies. Each “law” is elaborated by considering advances in contemporary social psychology as well as in light of its ability to supplement Durkheim's theory in explaining the “outlier” cases.