Durkheim and The Structure of Social Action*

The analysis of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action is integral to Parsons's discussion of the utilitarian-positivist tradition and the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action from it. The four “stages” of theoretical argument in Durkheim can be related directly to the four defining elements of the “utilitarian dilemma,” namely empiricism, rationality, atomism, and the randomness of ends. The most questionable aspect of Parsons's argument is the alleged stubbornness of Durkheim's empiricism. On the other hand, much of the criticism of Parsons's argument, by Pope in particular, although also by Scott and Warner, Is either misdirected or itself questionable. The development and conclusions of Durkheim's moral sociology are as Parsons claims, and form a viable basis for a non-positivist theory of action.     

The Jamesian theory of action

By emphasizing the emotional basis of action and the orientation of action to the future, the theory of action in William James challenges and provides an alternative to accounts of action which emphasize cognition and norms. This paper provides a statement of the Jamesian theory of action, which has been neglected in sociology. The Jamesian critique of the approach to social action in symbolic interactionism and in Parsons's voluntaristic theory of action is also indicated in the paper. Other aspects of the Jamesian theory of action of interest to sociological concern treated in the paper are the non-constructionist account of emotion developed by James, and his reconceptualization of rationality as continuous with rather than opposed to emotion.     

Parsons's Early Voluntarism*

This paper is intended as a critique of the conventional understanding of Parsons's voluntarism. On the level of analytical theory. Parsons's scheme does not refer to the conscious choices of concrete individuals in concrete social situations, but is a system of abstract causal properties characterizing social action as a process of resolution of the inherent tension of normative and conditional aspects of reality through the mechanism of effort. The recent debate about Parsons's voluntarism misses this central dynamic.     

Structure,Agency, and Social Reality in Blumerian Symbolic Interactionism: The Influence of Georg Simmel

Mead no doubt had a manifest influence on Blumer's thinking, and Blumer's acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Mead is a central feature of Blumer's writing. While I do not presume to question the importance Blumer assigns to the role played by Mead in the development of Blumerian symbolic interactionism, I argue that the perspective also owes much to the insights of Georg Simmel. In particular, a Simmelian flavor is evident in how Blumer addresses the core sociological issues of the nature of social reality, the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, and the nature of social action.     

The Spirit of Blumer's Method as a Guide to Sociological Discovery

Herbert Blumer did not offer textbook-style instructions for how to do research. What he offered, in his classic 1969 essay “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” is a broad account of what research must entail to accord with symbolic interactionist premises that human social life depends on meanings, interpretation, and interaction. Blumer's essay also voices a spirit of research that is ardently empirical, sociological, and creative. It is this spirit, I argue, that holds great value for guiding sociological research toward fresh discoveries. I make this argument by reviewing what Blumer meant by exploration and inspection, and then drawing out five Blumerian principles of inquiry. By embracing these principles we can avoid the problems of inadvertent theorizing, unreflective mesearch, analytic foreclosure, excessive subjectivism, and aprocessuality. I also suggest how we can enhance the sociological value of Blumer's method by paying more attention to power, inequality, and our own institutional biases. Embracing the spirit of Blumer's method, I conclude, can help a new generation of symbolic interactionists do more imaginative and insightful work.     

Ninety Years in the World of Work in America

Parsons's tripartite model suggests that gaining information about the world of work is a critical factor in vocational decision making. This article compares and contrasts data from around 1909, when F. Parsons's Choosing a Vocation was published, with contemporary data on the workplace and the American worker. Data on other contextual factors, such as demographic trends, are also presented. There are surprising similarities between Parsons's time and the present, and also obvious differences. The author suggests that having information about occupations is still an essential component of career counseling, and ideas are presented for updating knowledge about the increasingly complex world of work.     

Herbert Blumer and the Study of Fashion: A Reminiscence and A Critique

Recounting my late 1940s graduate student contacts with Herbert Blumer on the topic of fashion, 1 go on to assess his important contribution to the sociological study of fashion. Conceptually rich, the corpus of Blumer's writing on fashion is yet surprisingly small. His major opus on fashion, anticipated only in part by several of his earlier, less exhaustive writings on the subject, did not see print until 1969 with the publication of the justly famous Sociological Quarterly piece “Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection.” There Blumer pursues two aims: (1) to challenge the then prevalent functionalist view of fashion as a “trickle down” symbolic mechanism for effecting social class differentiation, a view associated with such sociological eminences as Simmel and Veblen, and (2) to offer in its place his own quite original approach to fashion as a massive “collective selection” process wherein choices are guided more by the elusive lure of modernity than by invidious class tinctions as such. Prominent among the strengths of Blumer's position is the demonstrably greater empirical validity of “collective selection” as compared to “class differentiation.” Among its shortcomings are Blumer's slighting of a salient social psychological theme in Simmers dialectical approach to fashion and, more important, his failure to address in any sustained way the role of the fashion industry in the fashion process. The recently emerging, symbolic interactionist concept of social world offers a means for redressing this omission and for advancing further upon the ground opened by Herbert Blumer's still exciting breakthrough in the sociology of fashion.     

Naturalistic Observation in the Laboratory

Symbolic interactionists generally eschew laboratory research in favor of naturalistic observation in field settings. This is consistent with the recommendations of Blumer, who argued that social processes and relationships, which are the appropriate subject matter for sociology, cannot be studied adequately within the laboratory. In this statement, I argue that when the laboratory is used as a “provocative stage,” the integrity of social action and social relationships as they are manifest in social process can be as adequately studied in the laboratory as they can be in the field. I further argue that when the laboratory is used in the manner specified here, Blumer's recommendations are more adequately met than they are in field studies.     

Extending and Broadening Blumer's Conceptualization of Fashion: Adding Notions of Generic Social Process and Semiotic Transformation

Abstract

Herbert Blumer's critics and followers have, for the most part, neglected the significance of his theory of fashion. In this paper I revisit Blumer's thesis on fashion by identifying the fashion process as an instance of the generic social process of semiotic transformation. The concept of semiotic transformation refers to the change in meanings of symbolic objects over time. By identifying six elements of the generic social process of semiotic transformation (systemic permeability, systemic freedom, logonomic fluidity, logonomic openness, indeterminacy, and logonomic hegemony) and by viewing semiotic transformation as a joint act grounded in emergence, I argue that the meaning of change over time is a process structuring both the definition of the situation and symbolic objects. I conclude the paper with a set of reflections on the significance of Blumer's work on fashion for the development of a research agenda of semiotic transformation and for the legacy and reception of Blumerian theory.     

HERBERT BLUMER'S CONCEPTUAL IMPACT

Blumer's conceptual development was particularly crucial to the development of sociology. Despite his many talents, Blumer's importance as a sociologist stems from his profound theoretical contributions. He affected the discipline through his insistence on precision of thought in a field that let fuzzy ideas and meaningless numbers take its place. In addition, he offered a serious axiomatic-deductive theory to sociology. Although we do not always recognize his impact, few sociologists are untouched by his work. Ultimately Blumer's impact is what we make it by our own practice.     

HERBERT BLUMER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIOLOGY

Herbert Blumer's work has had considerable impact on the growth of twentieth-century sociology. He kept alive an interest in George Mead at a time when Pragmatism floundered. Although it is unlikely that Mead's work would have been overlooked, there can be no question that Blumer's forceful advocacy helped bring it to the forefront of modern social thought. Park first organized the subfield of collective behavior, but it was Blumer who kept it going in the face of opposition from structural-functionalism. Whether or not collective behavior endures as a separate area of specialization, sociologists will have to concern themselves with the manner in which human beings adapt to problematic situations. Although his views on methodology have been controversial, some of his positions will probably prevail. His insistence on the direct observation of people in their indigenous settings and his contention that human agency must be taken into account in explanations of social processes are difficult to counter.     

Digitalization as “an Agent of Social Change” in a Supermarket Chain: Applying Blumer's Theory of Industrialization in Contemporary Society

In this article I pursue Blumer's argument in Industrialization as an Agent of Social Change that social changes are the consequence of people's interpretation of technology. By examining oral history interviews with managers and other staff of the British supermarket chain Tesco I explore the relationship between “digitalization” and the organization of the business. The analysis reveals how the interviewees interpreted emerging computing technologies, and how the deployment of these technologies in the business impacted the material and ecological arrangement and the distribution of knowledge in the company. The article ends with a discussion of the relevance of Blumer's framework for contemporary studies of “digitalization” and social change.     

HERBERT BLUMER: A PILGRIMAGE WITH PRAGMATISM

This article is an examination of Herbert Blumer's lifelong effort to perpetuate pragmatism raises serious questions about the future of the social sciences. He tried, through critical analyses, to tell social scientists how to make their fields scientific. Opposition to this effort was overwhelming and eventually weakened his own perspective and thus his influence in the discipline. The story of Blumer provides several lessons for future social scientists. It is intended that these lessons to be useful to those who still believe in a scientific social science.     

Mind,Self, and Human-Animal Joint Action

Abstract

Because Herbert Blumer maintained that symbolic interactionism was useful in examining all realms of social behavior, and advocated what Martin Hammersley refers to as “critical commonsensism,” this paper focuses on one of the most common contemporary social relationships—that between people and companion animals. I first examine the basis for Blumer's (like Mead before him and many interactionist scholars today) exclusion of nonhuman animals from consideration as “authentic” social actors. Primarily employing the recent work of interactionists Eugene Myers, Leslie Irvine, Janet and Steven Alger, and Clinton Sanders, this paper advocates the reasonableness of regarding nonhuman animals as “minded,” in that mind, as Gubrium emphasizes, is a social construction that arises out of interaction. Similarly, I maintain that animals possess an admittedly rudimentary “self.” Here I focus special attention on Irvine's discussion of those “self experiences” that are independent of language and arise out of interaction. Finally, I discuss “joint action” as a key element of people's relationships with companion animals as both the animal and human attempt to assume the perspective of the other, devise related plans of action and definitions of object, and fit together their particular (ideally, shared) goals and collective actions. I stress the ways in which analytic attention to human-animal relationships may expand and enrich the understanding of issues of central sociological interest.     

SUBSTANCE AND STYLE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LEGACY OF HERBERT BLUMER

The substance and the style of Herbert Blumer's legacy to sociology are examined. Examining the former proceeds by specifying essentials and nonessentials of a symbolic interactionist framework, and by distinguishing between Blumer's ideas that do and do not contribute toward the objective of general explanatory theory premised on the framework together with rigorous tests of such theory using a full arsenal of research methods and techniques. Examining the latter proceeds by suggesting that Blumer's style of combative and oppositional argumentation, while not without its utility, has contributed to a present-day scholasticism within symbolic interactionism that inhibits the development of the framework.     

The Two Bridging Functions of Sociology in the House of Intellect

Abstract

The Kantian origins of Rawls' A Theory of Justice and Parsons' systematic sociology are examined. It is suggested that while both Rawls and Parsons were heavily influenced by Kant, their convergent contract doctrines of modern social orders can best be understood as a result of an inherited or a self imposed legalization of Kantian moral philosophy. This inheritance is traced through Maine, Jhering and Weber in the case of Parsons. It is argued that Rawls uses a legalization of Kantian philosophy in order to facilitate his quest for a theory of justice within the confines of liberal democratic theory. Finally it is argued that the legalism in Rawls' and Parsons' work represents a conservative bias with respect to the full potential inherent in Kant and that a revision of the concept of natural law may remedy the bias of legalism.     

MYTH,TEXT, AND INTERACTION COMPLICITY IN THE NEGLECT OF BLUMER'S MACROSOCIOLOGY

This article depicts a major line of assessment of the work of Herbert Blumer as constituting a series of myths. Portrayals of his work as subjectivistic and ideographic combine with the predominant myth that Blumer ignored issues of large-scale organization and social structure. Documentation of his analyses of corporate power relations, racial stratification, and industrialization and industrial organization reveals the mythical character of much published opinion regarding his work. The micro-macro distinction is an ideology within which these myths have been created and perpetuated. Interactionists who have benignly bought into that ideology contribute to the myth of Blumer's neglect of societal organization. In closing it is suggested that greater attention needs to be given to the influence of Robert Park on Blumer's perspectives and that such an assessment might contribute to a broadening of the base of symbolic interactionism.     

THE POLITICS OF HERBERT BLUMER'S SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD

Prevailing wisdom among sociologists is that Herbert Blumer's sociology is not useful in modern contexts because he did not provide a method for researching his ideas. This article contends that Blumer's appreciative view of the actor's perspective is a methodological contribution; and that his methodological perspective is political in two respects: it is anti-elitist and democratic.     

Discrimination and Reaction: The Practical Constitution of Social Exclusion

This article explores and extends Blumer's work on race prejudice and discrimination by using empirical data from an ethnographic study of minority communities in Greece. Blumer explains prejudice as the result of an interactional process through which one group defines itself as superior or dominant in relation to the other. His work on race prejudice has often been misinterpreted as emphasizing the individual's subjective imaginary of the “other.” Here I illustrate the importance of the intersubjective processes involved in defining a particular social situation as discriminatory. A central point of the article is to elaborate on his analysis by looking at the experience of prejudice and discrimination from the receiving end, through the participants' interpretation of their social interactions with the dominant group. Therefore I focus on how members of the subordinate group interact with the process that Blumer identifies.