Risk Analysis in Developing Countries1

In summary, risk analysis is not yet well practiced in developing countries, although there are numerous, diverse environmental and other risk-related issues and concerns that need attention. A few initiatives have been taken, but, so far, they have created only relatively small impact in a few areas. Many risk issues may not be addressed, partly as a result of lack of resources and inadequate knowledge by policy makers. Risk analysis is an essential tool for the planning and implementation of development projects. To enhance its use, however, risk analysis approaches and methods must be adapted to developing countries, and this requires research. Unfortunately, funds for research, in general, are hard to find. There are other problems in the implementation of risk analysis. Trained professionals on risk analysis are few. Existing institutions that are tasked with resolving environmental and other risk issues are overburdened. Risk-related data are sorely lacking. Resources are very limited for addressing numerous natural and technological hazards. In most developing countries, political and economic stability is still threatened by both internal and external forces, hence, that is what receives priority attention. Activities like risk analysis, which generally lead to long-term results and benefits, do not get enough interest. In addition, there is still little public awareness of risks even among those who have passed the stage of survival; thus, there is little public concern about them. We cannot afford this lack of concern for long. In the Philippines, the government was the first to recognize after our peaceful revolution in 1986 that “the environmental issues can add fuel to the insurgency; they can also hamper efforts towards national recovery”.⁽⁴⁾ To this point, I have added that risk management (including risk assessment and risk communication), like attainment of peace and freedom, is a social imperative because risk issues affect our health, safety, and both our physical and economic well-being.⁽⁷⁾ Many of such issues in developing countries have not only local, but also global origin and impacts. They thus deserve the interest of each of us.     

Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis1

So, we can argue that the lay public are not fools in their attitudes about risk. That nonexperts should show more concern over hazardous waste facilities in their neighborhoods than radon levels in their homes is not a sign of irrationality (because aggregate and individual risks are greater from the radon), but simply a sign that nonexperts are working from a different set of criteria. These criteria are incorporated in what I call the democratic model. The democratic model evaluates risk based on its social and political consequences, such as possible disruption in the social fabric or a loss of communality. Lay criteria for assessing the impact of risk decisions are not explicit, like the those of the risk analyst, but are embedded in cultural values. Similarly, lay evaluations of risk incorporate substantive and procedural democratic values, such as the acceptability of processes for making decisions, the ethics of the distribution of risk, and the capacity to control a source of risk in the community's interests. Finally, the democratic model relates judgments about risks to the competence (Can we trust them?) and the legitimacy (Should we trust them?) of the social institutions that impose and control those risks. The public's judgments about risk are not inferior, but different, and arguably richer than those of the experts.     

后现代语境下逆向领导力的内涵及价值解析

传统领导力理论在后现代语境下存在诸多不适应性,而逆向领导对其是一种超越。后现代语境下,逆向领导力的主要内涵和特征包括领导主体的离心化、领导权力的微观化、领导方式的权变化,其价值在于自主与秩序的自恰、柔性与效率的相容、上级与下级的和谐、员工与组织的共生。     

后现代管理理论辩析

对西方后现代管理理论做具体分析,认为该理论是以不同方式探究或表现当代西方的企业组织与文化特征,并揭示了西方管理的现代性、管理的现代化发展模式的内在矛盾与种种消极后果,对我们进行管理理论的研究有认识价值与借鉴意义.     

An Exploratory Risk Perception Study of Attitudes Toward Homeland Security Systems

Understanding the issues surrounding public acceptance of homeland security systems is important for balancing security needs and potential civil liberties infringements. A psychometric survey was used in an exploratory study of attitudes regarding homeland security systems. Psychometric rating data were obtained from 182 respondents on psychological attributes associated with 12 distinct types of homeland security systems. An inverse relationship was observed for the overall rating attributes of acceptability and risk of civil liberties infringement. Principal components analysis (PCA) yielded a two-factor solution with the rating scale loading pattern suggesting factors of perceived effectiveness and perceived intrusiveness. These factors also showed an inverse relationship. The 12 different homeland security systems showed significantly different scores on the rating scales and PCA factors. Of the 12 systems studied, airport screening, canine detectors, and radiation monitoring at borders were found to be the most acceptable, while email monitoring, data mining, and global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking were found to be least acceptable. Students rated several systems as more effective than professionals, but the overall pattern of results for both types of subjects was similar. The data suggest that risk perception research and the psychometric paradigm are useful approaches for quantifying attitudes regarding homeland security systems and policies and can be used to anticipate potentially significant public acceptance issues.     

Incorporating Risk Assessment and Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental Management1

Using data from interviews with a key set of individuals at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, this study examines intraagency views about the incorporation of risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis in environment management.     

Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to estimate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particularly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.     

Issues in Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Analysis for Developmental Toxicology1

The qualitative and quantitative evaluation of risk in developmental toxicology has been discussed in several recent publications.(^1–3) A number of issues still are to be resolved in this area. The qualitative evaluation and interpretation of end points in developmental toxicology depends on an understanding of the biological events leading to the end points observed, the relationships among end points, and their relationship to dose and to maternal toxicity. The interpretation of these end points is also affected by the statistical power of the experiments used for detecting the various end points observed. The quantitative risk assessment attempts to estimate human risk for developmental toxicity as a function of dose. The current approach is to apply safety (uncertainty) factors to die no observed effect level (NOEL). An alternative presented and discussed here is to model the experimental data and apply a safety factor to an estimated risk level to achieve an “acceptable” level of risk. In cases where the dose-response curves upward, this approach provides a conservative estimate of risk. This procedure does not preclude the existence of a threshold dose. More research is needed to develop appropriate dose-response models that can provide better estimates for low-dose extrapolation of developmental effects.